Doctrine for Dummies

[JohnG0609]

For sometime I've been using the Siege of Vicksburg forum as a bit of a lab for my experiment; to create a methodology for interpreting ACW operations using the analytic tools from modern doctrine documents and various root cause analysis methodologies.

I've been blessed to receive a first rate professional military education. Which means nothing really, I'm just a guy with a bit of knowledge, enthusiasm for the ACW, and some opinions. And far from a professional planner or strategist or even a practitioner in a meaningful way of the profession of arms (I'm medical). But my education and experience does allow me to frame things differently than an academic or historian.

Over on the Vicksburg forum we've been having a discussion under the heading "Raymond" and "Raymond and Walker's brigade" which led me to create a post today that I think really gets to the essence of what I'm attempting to do, make military doctrine simple and relatable to the academic, historian, or lay person.

So I'm beta testing my post with a larger audience here and I ask for any and all feedback, good, bad, or indifferent of what I've written. I'd be most interested in knowing if it's easily understood and that you don't have to be a War College graduate to grasp modern doctrine concepts. TIA!
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My post on Siege of copied and pasted here:

Your comment started me looking at the artillery available for operations around 05.11-05.13 time frame.

Hoskin's battery, Brookhaven Light artillery, was attached to Gregg's brigade and is present on the April 30 return at PH. It went with the brigade on its move to Jackson. Pemberton, responds to a 05.08 dispatch from Gregg at Brookhaven, "Yes, bring batteries...", obviously implying more than one battery (Hoskins and Bledsoe). But Gregg fought the Battle of Raymond with just one battery (Bledsoe). So where was Hoskins?

I speculate that the purpose of Gregg's dispatch that Pemberton responded to was possibly for some sort of official sanction to allow Hoskin's battery some time at home, considering they were from Brookhaven. Transportation thru-put after Grierson was still slow and I speculate that Gregg may have allowed Hoskins to ship last and granted Hoskins' men a short, unofficial leave to see their families. I speculate that Gregg may have allowed them to proceed by road to Jackson. So now Hoskins' battery would be running 24-36 hours behind the rest of the brigade.

After Gregg had begun his movement to Raymond, J. Adams, on 05.11 stated that there was, "no field battery," present then in Jackson. But by the afternoon of 05.12 two batteries are now accounted for, Hoskins' and Martin's (Walker's battery). Adams sent forward with Walker one battery while, "one battery to arrive in morning." By 05.13 that battery arrived and Adams was, "sending forward one battery- all that is here." Adams confirmed in a second 05.13.63 dispatch that he had, "sent forward from here this morning one battery and a battalion."

Now which of the two batteries, Hoskins' or Matin's, arrived first and went forward first to Gregg's support isn't specified. I speculate that Hoskins' arrived first to Jackson based solely on the seemingly surprise battery that suddenly appeared solo for Adams to order forward with Walker. Martin's battery arriving the next morning (05.13) by railroad with an additional infantry contingent.

Why does any of this matter?

Pemberton had ordered a mission and that mission is expressed doctrinally as Commander's Intent. Commander's Intent is a clear and concise statement of the purpose, desired end state, and key tasks of an operation. For the mission Pemberton had designed his Commander's Intent would be expressed as a statement something similar to:

"Position troops at Raymond of sufficient capability to defend the approaches to Jackson and Southern Railroad and if ordered, attack in rear or flank enemy forces attacking friendly forces at Edwards Depot and Big Black River Bridge."

Then it becomes fair to ask, "How well did the leaders of TF Gregg do in executing this mission?"

In two words, not well.

Obviously, it isn't fair to judge them based on doctrine that didn't exist in 1863, but it is fair to use modern doctrine to explain how things went wrong.

The mnemonic METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations) is a good tool for analyzing the Raymond operation. Focusing just on the Troops, establishing what friendly forces were available to execute this mission. In other words, the Combatant Commander (Pemberton) presents forces to the Task Force Commander (Gregg) to execute the assigned mission.

That would have looked something like this:
Gregg's brigade 2700
Walker's element 1000
Adams' Cavalry 300
Thompson's MI 200(?)

Bledsoe's Battery 3 guns
Hoskins' Battery 4 guns
Adams' howitzers 2 guns
Total: 4200 men and 9 guns

But as we know, Gregg was only able to get his brigade and one 3 gun battery into action. So this is where all these seemingly minor deviations from orders begin to come into play.

If W Adams orders had not been confused by competing command authorities
If Walker had obeyed his orders to move immediately
If Gregg had not allowed Hoskins to move independently (I speculate)
If Gregg had properly provisioned his troops for sustained operations

Then maybe the Battle of Raymond would have turned out differently, at the very least delaying Grant another day, allowing the Confederate reinforcements one more day to get into place at Jackson, thus making the Battle of Jackson a bit more of a contest for Grant.

Using James Reasons "Swiss Cheese Model" of error causation in complex systems, it's easy to see how the holes in the cheese all lined up to create Confederate defeat at Raymond.

This is far from a complete analysis of the operation concluding with the Battle of Raymond. But is a fair representation I think of how things could have been different.

Interested to know what you guys think, feel free to be critical of my analysis or correct any mistakes I may have made.

 

[Stryker65]

As a Doctrine Dummy myself, this is very helpful!

 

[JohnG0609]

As a Doctrine Dummy myself, this is very helpful!

Thank you! Please go over to the Vicksburg forum to capture all the context.

Do you feel this method brings clarity and is easy to understand?

For my part it has been very hard to distill all the jargon and wonkiness of modern doctrine down into something the lay person could understand. Every post or reply I make on CWT is based in my interpretation of various doctrine documents.

Google JP 5-0, Joint Planning if you want to see the Bible, so to speak, of modern doctrine. Then you can see how difficult it might be to distill all that down for a general audience.

I've been making posts on the Siege of Vicksburg forum trying to develop a methodology and this was the first post I felt I was able to break it down using doctrine in the way I have been hoping to do.

 

[James Brenner]

You might find FM 3-0 and ADP 3-0 more useful. They are Army specific manuals, not joint publications. Also, you can't go wrong if you know the tried and true Principles of War.

 

[Sheltowee]

Feel like I've arrived to a quantum physics class with a coloring book and three crayons. Maybe out of my element on this one.

Will say it seems the JP-5 doctrine might be geared more towards high-level operations strategy. Is that correct?

How is the methodology applied to a tactical situation like Raymond?

I appreciate the level of analysis. For me, it would be helpful to pull out specific command failures- and identify where each failed to meet doctrine mandates.

Is this same doctrine applied to the study of battles during army staff rides?

 

[James Brenner]

Yes, joint pubs are designed for joint (Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied) operations. BTW, Joint ops shouldn't be confused with combined arms ops which typically involves US only forces. Joint ops are conducted at the upper operational/ strategic level and are a hallmark of combatant command planning: EUCOM, CENTCOM, etc. Additionally, the 5-series pubs are intended for long range planning while the 3-series pubs are designed for more current operations.

Staff rides draw upon a variety of sources, but generally try to use various battles to show the tactical applications of such concepts as economy of force, oblique movements, envelopments, deception, unity of command, maneuver, security/intelligence, terrain appreciation, acoustic shadow, technology, etc.

In terms of methodologies, I have found that the Principles of War are extremely useful: objective, simplicity, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, security, offensive, economy of force , and concentration. Most are just common sense, but the last two tie them all together.

 

[JohnG0609]

FM 3-0 and ADP 3-0

Interestingly that's where I started. It certainly seemed common sense to start with the Operations series. And I spent months trying to make it work, but I never could. A lot of the difficulty was frankly me. I'm not an operations guy, heck I'm not even combat arms, so I struggled grasping operations concepts. Interestingly, I found Army 3 series operations doctrine didn't align well with ACW campaigns. The army is so tech heavy now, designed to fight across multiple domains (land, air, space, cyber) that it was difficult to tease out doctrine for a war fought in two domains (land and water). Where I did find some good ground was in MCDP 3-0. USMC is as close as we can get to an infantryman, armed with a rifle and artillery much like an ACW battle.

Where I did finally have success was going back to my Air Force roots, whose core doctrine is Mission Command. Mission Command doctrine is captured in 1 series for USAF and 6 series for USA and USMC. Once I realized Pemberton was attempting centralized command and decentralized control, that the geographic reality of the DMEL demanded that he put faith in his subordinates to execute as he couldn't personally be at the scene of every contingency it began to make sense. Once I was able to get the right doctrine I was able to overlay it on Confederate operations and it lit up like a Christmas tree, I could see everywhere they colored outside the lines. Then it becomes easy to apply the elements of mission command doctrine, commander's intent, shared understanding, mutual trust, mission type orders, etc. and see the deviations.

I use JP 5-0 Planning for the analytic tools available in it. Every branch's 5 series planning doctrine is for the most part a restatement of the military planning process laid out in JP 5-0 but then modified to meet that specific branches needs.

What I realized is that the product of planning is the plan. It matters not whether it is Grant locked in a stateroom, wreathed in cigar smoke, poring over maps and reading dispatches or a staff of hundreds generating a plan delivered by power point, the results are the same. The plan. Then you just follow the steps in the Joint Planning Process (JPP), using the analytic tools and you can get a pretty good analysis of how well they executed that plan.

you can't go wrong if you know the tried and true Principles of War.

No you really can't. The Principles of War will get you to your destination. But it's one thing to say, "Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative is crucial for achieving objectives." and it is an entirely different thing to know how to seize retain, and exploit. I've always considered principles as the overarching, broad framework, doctrine is the playbook, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are the game plan.

But I also can't say enough about applying root cause analysis methodologies like 5 Why's, Swiss cheese model, LEAN, etc. to find exactly where the deviations occurred.

But thank you for the reply. I'm grateful for it and exactly what I had hoped for. To get challenged forces me to sharpen my thinking on what I'm attempting to do. So please keep em coming!

 

[JohnG0609]

Will say it seems the JP-5 doctrine might be geared more towards high-level operations strategy. Is that correct?

It is, but the analytic tools available in it are super helpful. As I said in my reply to James, I discovered the product of planning is the plan. No matter if its generated by a staff of hundreds or between John Pemberton's two ears the result is the same, a plan. To illustrate, as it regards to Pemberton specifically and the infamous council of war, that lines up as COA decision brief from JP 5-0, so it is possible to sort of reverse engineer Pemberton's "plan" using the joint planning process and the analytic tools therein.

How is the methodology applied to a tactical situation like Raymond?

I am not the guy to ask about tactics. My view so far is that the battles themselves are well described and well understood. Without appearing too morbid, the battle is the plane crash, that is obvious. Now its time for the investigation. It's the things that occurred, or didn't occur, the orders given, how they were understood, and how they were executed that have been my primary focus.

If you read the original post, I thought that for the first time I was able to make sense of what I was trying to get at. Why did Gregg deviate from his orders to take three days rations? Why did Walker take nearly 24 hours and still couldn't get within 4 miles of Raymond? Why was Hoskins' battery not present with its brigade? How did Adams get conflicting orders crossed up?

I've discovered where things go wrong is generally related to technical competence, the blocking and tackling fundamentals that are not well learned or not well obeyed.

Thanks for the great question and keep them coming. I couldn't ask for a better outcome for my post. Challenging questions create sharper knowledge.

 

[JohnG0609]

n terms of methodologies, I have found that the Principles of War are extremely useful: objective, simplicity, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, security, offensive, economy of force , and concentration. Most are just common sense, but the last two tie them all together.

They are extremely useful as a guide and a framework, but they lack specificity. Maneuver, unity of command, surprise, security, etc. are all aspirational. A commander should aspire to achieve these things but they don't tell you how to achieve any of the principles. Principles are the overarching broad objectives, without doctrine, from which TTPs are derived, principles are just guidance. Anyway, Just my two cents.

 

[JohnG0609]

Yes, joint pubs are designed for joint (Army, Navy, Air Force, and allied) operations. BTW, Joint ops shouldn't be confused with combined arms ops which typically involves US only forces. Joint ops are conducted at the upper operational/ strategic level and are a hallmark of combatant command planning: EUCOM, CENTCOM, etc. Additionally, the 5-series pubs are intended for long range planning while the 3-series pubs are designed for more current operations.

Staff rides draw upon a variety of sources, but generally try to use various battles to show the tactical applications of such concepts as economy of force, oblique movements, envelopments, deception, unity of command, maneuver, security/intelligence, terrain appreciation, acoustic shadow, technology, etc.

In terms of methodologies, I have found that the Principles of War are extremely useful: objective, simplicity, maneuver, unity of command, surprise, security, offensive, economy of force , and concentration. Most are just common sense, but the last two tie them all together.

Would it be fair for me to assume that you are a proud graduate of some PME? CGSC? War College?

 

[James Brenner]

That's true. They do lack specificity. And that's where experience, skill, training, morale, luck, and a whole host of other tangible and intangible factors come into play. Eisenhower noted that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable. I remember someone commenting that when the first bullet goes downrange, all plans are off.

Yes, to all the above: CGSC (1992), AWC (2004). Unfortunately, the Army I grew up in doesn't exist anymore.

 

[JohnG0609]

Yes, to all the above: CGSC (1992), AWC (2004).

My PME journey is a bit of a story (of course) but I've got:
USAF: ACSC and AWC
USMC: CSC
Army: USAWC from good ole Carlisle Barracks PA!

 

[JohnG0609]

I appreciate the level of analysis. For me, it would be helpful to pull out specific command failures- and identify where each failed to meet doctrine mandates.

The doctrine is that of Mission Command, which is codified in ADP 6-0. A full discussion would be well beyond what a post in a forum ought to really be. But the principles of Mission Command are:

My personal opinion is the Confederates were off to a bad start because their commander, Pemberton lacked competence. But I feel sure you can understand the intent of the other principles, seems like common sense. So I'll "yada, yada, yada.." over some of the details and just leave you with this portion of Gregg's report:

Suffice it to say that if a subordinate is forced to divine what his commander wants by what the commander "intimated" and therefore his next actions can only be "inferred from" it, then the Commander, Pemberton, has failed miserably at the doctrine of Mission Command.

Again, I do not think it fair to judge their actions based on doctrine that doesn't exist. But our knowledge of doctrine does now allow us to see how they "crashed the plane," so to speak.

I'm happy to go a bit more granular into particulars if there is the desire, but again I'm somewhat loathe to just keep running my mouth on CWT. I really had hoped to come and listen more and talk a bit less.

*I'm off my feet for a few days after an ortho procedure so I pass the time by annoying people on CWT.

 

[wausaubob]

Simpler: In that era, every army experienced friction.

 

[JohnG0609]

Simpler: In that era, every army experienced friction.

So as not to misunderstand you I'd be grateful if you could add a little more context. I think I know what you are referring to but I'd prefer to not assume.

 

[wausaubob]

I am not a von Clausewitz expert, but I think when the Prussians first started thinking rationally about something that was basically irrational, the initial descriptions were correct: https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch07.html

 

[JohnG0609]

I am not a von Clausewitz expert, but I think when the Prussians first started thinking rationally about something that was basically irrational, the initial descriptions were correct: https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch07.html
View attachment 558333

I get it now and I agree with you. And some "things" that cause friction are easy to identify: a train derails, a bridge is out, a map is wrong, etc. But war in its essence is a human endeavor and subject to the frailties of humans. The military decision making process (MDMP) and human factors in war (my background is human biology) fascinate me.

In the original post you can "see" friction in action. It's all these little rubs and scrapes that sap efficiency and combat power from units because as you noted from Clausewitz, paraphrased, "in war everything is simple, but even the simplest thing is hard."

I speculate that Hoskins' battery was not present with its brigade at Raymond because Gregg deviated, allowing the men of Hoskins' battery, the Brookhaven Light Artillery, to linger in their hometown of Brookhaven. A very human thing for Gregg to do.

Walker deviated from his orders to move "immediately" and yet took 24 hours to move to Raymond and still ended up 4 miles short. Why? Walker was a very eccentric, an ardent secessionist, and a very opinionated man and I speculate that he had no desire to place himself under the command of Pemberton and perhaps he delayed, hoping Johnston, who Walker knew was on the way, would arrive. Again another very human thing to do.

My point being, to me that is the essence of friction. Humans being humans.

 

[Sheltowee]

Suffice it to say that if a subordinate is forced to divine what his commander wants by what the commander "intimated" and therefore his next actions can only be "inferred from" it, then the Commander, Pemberton, has failed miserably at the doctrine of Mission Command.

Absolutely correct. Which leads into another question-

Has the military culture changed?

We seem to see a lot of instances of commanders "suggesting" orders. "If practicable"….."upon your judgement", etc.

Pretty certain this type of ambiguity is strongly discouraged when training today's leaders.

Maybe for a different thread….. But was the sometime absence of direct, concise orders a byproduct of a 19th century gentleman's code? Or perhaps due to the understanding that communication is slow- and a subordinate may need a free hand to react to the situation as it is presented? Maybe a bit of both?

 

[JohnG0609]

Brother those are some excellent questions!

Has the military culture changed?

Yes. But the US military has a very short attention span. We fought the Banana Wars and the Philippine insurrection, learned a bunch of lessons published in the USMC "Small Wars Journal." Then promptly forgot them to fight large scale wars of maneuver in Europe and into the Cold War. So doctrine became focused on large scale maneuver warfare. Remember the Cold War days of thinking about large Soviet tank formations storming through the Fulda Gap. Then we went into another asymmetric war, Viet Nam, where we had to dust off "Small Wars Journal" and re-learn the lessons found in them. Then we went back to large scale manuever warfare with the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force, large formations, and combined arms for Desert Storm and promptly forgot the lessons of asymmetric, small wars. Until 9/11, OEF and OIF, when once again, faced with an insurgency we had to re-learn asymmetric, small war, counter-insurgency doctrine once again. Then we began to move back to large power competition with China and joint doctrine got a real push forward, and now here we are again, back to a land war in Europe.... with the rise of drone warfare.

We seem to see a lot of instances of commanders "suggesting" orders. "If practicable"….."upon your judgement", etc.

Yes, I think the inherent latency of ACW communications demanded giving subordinate commanders some lee way. But, where I see a lot of confusion across the spectrum, academics, historians, enthusiasts, is about what constitutes an order. "Take that hill, if practicable," is an order even with some built in discretion for the subordinate.

One example that is often used for Vicksburg is the idea that Pemberton was ordered to hold Vicksburg at all costs. Simply not true. It's most frequently based on Davis' message to Pemberton that "to hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with the Trans-Mississippi." That is categorically not an order. It is a statement of fact and at most guidance.

Generally speaking an order contains a modal verb, "will, shall, must," but not always. But an order always generates a task. Tasks are either specific or implied and together create essential tasks, expressed as METL, mission essential task list. The order, "take that hill" creates the specified task, take the hill, but maybe a bridge must be taken first, that would be an example of an implied task. You have to take the bridge before you take the hill. Now go back and re-read the Davis quote I cited. It creates no task.

But was the sometime absence of direct, concise orders a byproduct of a 19th century gentleman's code?

I don't think so, I just don't think doctrine had caught up to the speed of war, even for the ACW. The ACW was still a war of attrition. Two armies marched up to each other and went to blasting away at each other until one quit. Doesn't take a lot of military skill by an officer to do that. And of course, the vast majority were not professional military officers.

One more thing I see a lot of is mistaking a Course of Action (COA) for a plan. Using Vicksburg again, on the run up to Champion Hill, Pemberton sent a dispatch to Johnston stating he was moving on Dillon's in order to cut the supply line and force the enemy to attack him. That is a COA, not a plan. COA decision creates detailed planning. Choosing a COA IS like deciding if you want to go to the beach or the mountains, but you still have to plan the trip.

Great questions though and I thank you for them!

 

[JohnG0609]

I would like to thank all who participated in the discussion. My mental health thanks you. Been laid up with a slow healing ortho issue and I've learned you can, in fact, get tired of watching Andy Griffith reruns.