Was McClellan (and the Union war effort) sabotaged for pure political reasons in Spring of 1862?

SgtTB · May 21, 2026

I am examining the events that frame the Seven Days Battles and Peninsula Campaign of 1862. Prior, you see the administration removing McDowell's command from McClellan under the auspices of supplementing weak DC defenses, something that McClellan is only informed of 2 days after he has arrived on the peninsula. Then you see McDowell not allowed to reenforce McClellan. (Reenforce is the wrong term, McDowell was to be a whole other pincer moving in, no?) Finally, on the other end, we see McDowell's army given to John Pope, who is aligned with hard line Republican policy fully, acting as a parallel independent command.

How is this just not blatant sabotage of one political faction by another? I don't believe there's an outright smoking gun in a telegram or letter, but the coincidences pile up.

BuckPvt · Jun 4, 2026

Stanton's attempts to remove McClellan were really quite rude. McClellan tried to remove Stanton first so Stanton really should have waited his turn.

JerryD · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Lincoln in a personal letter to McClellan about the removal of Blenker:

This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Frémont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case I am confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases.

Are you denying that the Radical Republicans didn't spend the first years of the war urging Lincoln to move away from Unionism and towards their political objectives? I mean this goes against everything we know about their relations.

None of that has a shred of evidence that Lincoln essentially committed treason for political reasons to make McClellan lose.

atlantis · Jun 4, 2026

Both Lee and Johnston feared the methodical approach of McClellan would force the loss of Richmond. Efforts to remove McClellan began in 2nd half of 62, so what made him vulnerable to those efforts besides his personality flaws. I submit that a weak intel service of the AotP and a weak calvary arm meant he was unable to capitalize on any success. Lincoln didn't care if you were an A-hole as long as you were a successful A-hole.
It is an undeniable fact GM got the union army to the gates of Richmond but why no further.

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

JerryD said:
None of that has a shred of evidence that Lincoln essentially committed treason for political reasons to make McClellan lose.

Lincoln was the President and was well within his rights to do whatever he wanted with McClellan.

What I'm saying is the Radical Republican wing and Stanton acted in bad faith to hamstring McClellan (and promote their own) for basically all of 1862. Lincoln still gave Mac incredible leeway through it all.

Lincolns position is more sympathetic in the wake of Antietam when there needed to be a little less scientific generalship and some more Young Napoleon in action.

atlantis said:
It is an undeniable fact GM got the union army to the gates of Richmond but why no further.

His base of supply was hanging free up on White House landing, Lee swiped at it successfully at Gaines Mill when the AoP was divided and had numbers over Porters corps,who were alone above the chickahominy as the Union right.

I think McClellans position is most sympathetic here, between the time of Seven Pines and his being pushed back. Despite Mac's habit of overrepresenting Confederate strength, he did face massive numbers where the armies were almost 1:1, against an army with strong interior lines and a strong base of supply.

A McDowell pincer would have changed the whole character of the campaign, even with Mac's flaws. I think Mac's forward momentum earned him it.

13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf · Jun 4, 2026

DanSBHawk said:
You can find all the correspondence online in the Papers of US Grant. Yes, Grant explained that all the armies were to work towards a common center, and eventually he expected Meade would link up with Butler, and he envisioned needing the York or the James at some point for supplies, but it was definitely the plan that Lee's army was the objective point for the Army of the Potomac.

Grant wrote to Butler on April 2nd, "The Army of the Potomac will act from it present base, Lee's Army
being the objective point."

Grant wrote to Sherman on April 4th, "I will stay with the Army of the Potomac increased by Burnsides Corps of not less than 25.000 effective men, and operate directly against Lee's Army wherever it may be found."

Grant wrote to Meade on April 9th, "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going North on a raid. But if we take this route all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with holds out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to cooperate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River."

Grant wrote to Halleck on April 29th, "Gen. Butler will operate on the South side of James River, Richmond being his objective point. I will move against Lee's Army attempting to turn him by one flank or the other."

Those are appropriate points, @DanSBHawk.

Rhea Cole · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
But he literally wasn't. I mean they invited him back and he won.

Your definition of literal is not in my dictionary.

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

Rhea Cole said:
Your definition of literal is not in my dictionary.

I mean he won the Maryland campaign, he lost initiative at Seven Day's but he never suffered the sort of morale crushing defeat or sacrifice of men/materiel like Burnside, nor was he outmanuvered and put the AoP at risk like Pope or Hooker.

We could debate whether he's better equal or worse than Meade for the prize of second place in the east, but appallingly bad is just hyperbole that doesn't match the plain historic record. Especially when we got to see appallingly bad quite a bit!

Rhea Cole · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
I mean he won the Maryland campaign, he lost initiative at Seven Day's but he never suffered the sort of morale crushing defeat or sacrifice of men/materiel like Burnside, nor was he outmanuvered and put the AoP at risk like Pope or Hooker.

We could debate whether he's better equal or worse than Meade for the prize of second place in the east, but appallingly bad is just hyperbole that doesn't match the plain historic record. Especially when we got to see appallingly bad quite a bit!

Military historians agree there is no debate about McClellan's unsuitability as a combat commander. There is, literally, no on the other hand of this subject.

Belfoured · Jun 4, 2026

atlantis said:
Both Lee and Johnston feared the methodical approach of McClellan would force the loss of Richmond. Efforts to remove McClellan began in 2nd half of 62, so what made him vulnerable to those efforts besides his personality flaws. I submit that a weak intel service of the AotP and a weak calvary arm meant he was unable to capitalize on any success. Lincoln didn't care if you were an A-hole as long as you were a successful A-hole.
It is an undeniable fact GM got the union army to the gates of Richmond but why no further.

It appears that some (not you) fail to understand why the Army of the Potomac had a "weak intel service" and a "weak cavalry arm". Here's a tip for them: look at the chain of command in the Army, starting with its CO and working downwards. The dots connect ...

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

Rhea Cole said:
Military historians agree there is no debate about McClellan's unsuitability as a combat commander. There is, literally, no on the other hand of this subject.

Then they're wrong and prove my point about persistent anti McClellan bias.

One simply needs to compare his track record to his contemporaries.

Its not like his betters were cut down in battle repeatedly and they scraped the barrel with him. Lincoln was like "Pope is hot garbage, send in someone decent" and was rewarded with Antietam.

Belfoured · Jun 4, 2026

JerryD said:
My understanding is that McClellan was refusing to tell Lincoln anything until Lincoln issued General Order No. 1 ordering Mac to advance in Northern Virginia. To avoid this, Mac finally revealed his plans under duress. It must have been like pulling teeth with him.

Drawing from his correspondence starting in late 1861, he likely felt it would be foolish to reveal his plans to a "Gorilla". As an aside, Article 5 of the Articles of War (1806) always comes to mind for some reason when I read Mac's voluminous correspondence.

dlofting · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Then they're wrong and prove my point about persistent anti McClellan bias.

One simply needs to compare his track record to his contemporaries.

Its not like his betters were cut down in battle repeatedly and they scraped the barrel with him. Lincoln was like "Pope is hot garbage, send in someone decent" and was rewarded with Antietam.

I find that when I'm right and every other knowledgeable person is wrong it's a good idea to rethink my position.

repman66 · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Then they're wrong and prove my point about persistent anti McClellan bias.

One simply needs to compare his track record to his contemporaries.

Its not like his betters were cut down in battle repeatedly and they scraped the barrel with him. Lincoln was like "Pope is hot garbage, send in someone decent" and was rewarded with Antietam.

Why do you keep referring to Lincoln re-appointing McClellan as overall army commander of the Army of the Potomac/Army of Virginia in September, 1862 as some great force of argument when Lincoln didn't have any other viable choice and he was smart enough to realize that, (something McClellan, with his ego, would never be able to do). As Lincoln said, you have to work with the tools you've got.

Corp Commanders in August of 62 for both armies: Sigel, Franklin, Sumner, Porter, McDowell, Banks, Burnside, Heintzelman, and Keyes.

The only real viable candidate is Burnside - but, he knows really nothing of the conditions, the army, the situation having come from North Carolina.

Which, of the others do you put in command.

Players like Meade, Hooker, Reynolds, Kearny, Sedgwick, Hancock are at division level or lower, captured, or dead.

You don't have time to get someone from out of theater. Additionally, you recognize that the army has a pro-McClellan bend.

There isn't a choice - that is ALSO an indictment against McClellan and Porter will be sacked (rightfully for the wrong reason) and McClellan will soon shuffle off the civil war mortal coil.

Belfoured · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Then they're wrong and prove my point about persistent anti McClellan bias.

One simply needs to compare his track record to his contemporaries.

Its not like his betters were cut down in battle repeatedly and they scraped the barrel with him. Lincoln was like "Pope is hot garbage, send in someone decent" and was rewarded with Antietam.

Which of those historians have said that Pope or Burnside weren't also "unsuitable"? By the way, more historians - many more - have addressed McClellan beyond T. Harry Williams. Since, however, you have a vise-like grip on Williams be sure to read his book Lincoln and His Generals. Feel free to report back on what Williams wrote about McClellan during the Seven Days and afterwards. Extra credit: search for the word "unhinged".

Belfoured · Jun 4, 2026

dlofting said:
I find that when I'm right and every other knowledgeable person is wrong it's a good idea to rethink my position.

That's a peculiarity that seems to be one of the requirements for being a McClellan-phile. The other one is a rigid, ironclad, unalterable inability to concede that McClellan ever made a single mistake.

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

dlofting said:
I find that when I'm right and every other knowledgeable person is wrong it's a good idea to rethink my position.

Sometimes people can concerned more with consensus than truth. I could speculate why consensus has turned so much against Mac, but that's a whole other can of worms. I stand by my position.

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

repman66 said:
Why do you keep referring to Lincoln re-appointing McClellan as overall army commander of the Army of the Potomac/Army of Virginia in September, 1862 as some great force of argument

Two reasons:

A) If Mac was truly that bad, he wouldn't have sniffed around command again. We can see from his prior campaigns that he wasn't a rank incompetent.

B) McClellan followed up his appointment with winning, and ending the Maryland campaign. How many eastern theater generals bested Bobby Lee? Right.

Taken together I think these are pretty strong points that maaaaaaaybe some of the present consensus on his record isn't true.

repman66 · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Two reasons:

A) If Mac was truly that bad, he wouldn't have sniffed around command again. We can see from his prior campaigns that he wasn't a rank incompetent.

B) McClellan followed up his appointment with winning, and ending the Maryland campaign. How many eastern theater generals bested Bobby Lee? Right.

Taken together I think these are pretty strong points that maaaaaaaybe some of the present consensus on his record isn't true.

McClellan was literally handed Lee's entire battleplan. That's like saying an NFL team (narrowly) won a game even when gifted with the other teams plays.

McCellan certainly reorganized the army and led it competently, if uninspiringly. However, when he had the Confederates on the ropes, he backed up and waited for time to run out to win on a technicality.

Your argument, sir, is that the "radical republicans" sabotaged the war effort - well, Little Mac had the war, and the careers of the radicals, in his hands, and he let go....

dlofting · Jun 4, 2026

SgtTB said:
Two reasons:

A) If Mac was truly that bad, he wouldn't have sniffed around command again. We can see from his prior campaigns that he wasn't a rank incompetent.

B) McClellan followed up his appointment with winning, and ending the Maryland campaign. How many eastern theater generals bested Bobby Lee? Right.

Taken together I think these are pretty strong points that maaaaaaaybe some of the present consensus on his record isn't true.

McClellan wasn't "that bad". Everyone keeps telling you that. In many ways he was very good....something else that people are saying. He just was not a good combat commander.

He did win at South Mountain and fought Lee to a tactical draw at Antietam. However, he had the chance to inflict much more damage on the ANV than he did. It's possible that this chance would not come again until Sailors Creek.

That's why Lincoln finally relieved him. Lincoln was convinced that at Antietam, McClellan had shown once again that he was not the man who was going to win the war in Virginia. Despite all the good things that McClellan had done, it was time to try someone else.

SgtTB · Jun 4, 2026

repman66 said:
Your argument, sir, is that the "radical republicans" sabotaged the war effort - well, Little Mac had the war, and the careers of the radicals, in his hands, and he let go....

I never said he was a perfect general. I never said he was months out from winning the war. I'm not even saying he was going to take Richmond with re-enforcements or extra troops. I've been clear he needed to show more initiative at Harrison's Landing and the day after Antietam. I never said he politicked right or spoke appropriately to superiors.

None of these were part of the central thesis of my thread, that there was a faction that worked to hamstring his power, and they did it for pure politics. And I think I've only discovered more proof of that the more I read about the situation.

Was McClellan (and the Union war effort) sabotaged for pure political reasons in Spring of 1862?

Private

Private

1st Lieutenant

2nd Lieutenant

Private

Captain

Lt. Colonel

Private

Lt. Colonel

Colonel

Private

Colonel

2nd Lieutenant

Corporal

Colonel

Colonel

Private

Private

Corporal

2nd Lieutenant

Private

Similar threads

Similar threads