Was McClellan (and the Union war effort) sabotaged for pure political reasons in Spring of 1862?

[SgtTB]

I am examining the events that frame the Seven Days Battles and Peninsula Campaign of 1862. Prior, you see the administration removing McDowell's command from McClellan under the auspices of supplementing weak DC defenses, something that McClellan is only informed of 2 days after he has arrived on the peninsula. Then you see McDowell not allowed to reenforce McClellan. (Reenforce is the wrong term, McDowell was to be a whole other pincer moving in, no?) Finally, on the other end, we see McDowell's army given to John Pope, who is aligned with hard line Republican policy fully, acting as a parallel independent command.

How is this just not blatant sabotage of one political faction by another? I don't believe there's an outright smoking gun in a telegram or letter, but the coincidences pile up.

 

[SgtTB]

Once again, withholding McDowell was because of his own actions. If he had been honest with the administration in regards to the numbers that he was leaving behind or had a good-faith discussion about it, it would not have come back to bite him. Instead, he knew better than the government and messed around. Unfortunately for him, he also had to find out when he was relying on those troops.

Ryan

That's the political cover. In truth, the radicals and Stanton were out for his blood.

This isn't even controversial. Stanton swung the war board against Mac to deprive him of troops. This is already after the radicals rehabbed Fremont and made lincoln give up blenker.

 

[SgtTB]

McClellan left the agreed upon number, didnt protest Blenker, and Stantons bureaucratic machinations didnt get into play until Mac was well out of DC.

Contemporaries like McDowell (not exactly a McClellanite) agreed as such, even Harper's Weekly wrote that Mac was sabotaged. The Radicals and their man Stanton had been after him for a while at this point. Their very survival depended on him not succeeding.

"Mac was sabotaged" isn't a hot take, its just forgotten history.

A hot take would be that they got very lucky they didnt work themselves into a Sulla like situation. Of course McClellan was not the knave they made him out to be, but its probably not a good idea for legislators to sabotage charismatic military men who hold power in crisis situations.

That he still performed ably after being sabotaged, was canned in favor of a Republican, and asked to return only to competently win his campaign speaks to McClellan's character, in as much as he's become a sort of historical caricature.

Edit: Removed a swear

 

[dlofting]

The thing about McClellan is that there were a lot of "almosts" or "was going to" according to his supporters.

He "almost" captured Richmond, he "was going to" cross the James and he "almost" defeated Lee decisively at Antietam...but he didn't.

As the old saying goes "close is only good in horseshoes and hand grenades".

 

[rpkennedy]

McClellan left the agreed upon number, didnt protest Blenker, and Stantons bureaucratic machinations didnt get into play until Mac was well out of DC.

Contemporaries like McDowell (not exactly a McClellanite) agreed as such, even Harper's Weekly wrote that Mac was sabotaged. The Radicals and their man Stanton had been after him for a while at this point. Their very survival depended on him not succeeding.

"Mac was sabotaged" isn't a hot take, its just forgotten history.

A hot take would be that they got very lucky they didnt work themselves into a Sulla like situation. Of course McClellan was not the knave they made him out to be, but its probably not a good idea for legislators to sabotage charismatic military men who hold power in crisis situations.

That he still performed ably after being sabotaged, was **** canned in favor of a Republican, and asked to return only to competently win his campaign speaks to McClellan's character, in as much as he's become a sort of historical caricature.

From Stephen Sears' To the Gates of Richmond, pages 51-53:

Secure behind his convictions, McClellan was unable to comprehend the deep concern Lincoln and Stanton felt for the capital's safety. The president had clearly stipulated, in approving the general's plan, that no change of base be made "without leaving in, and about Washington, such a force as . . . shall leave said City entirely secure." In approving the decisions of the Fairfax Court House war council he was equally direct: "Leave Washington secure." Yet McClellan, when he worked up the final details for the capital's defense, made no effort to meet Lincoln and Stanton to discuss and explain his ideas. Instead, on April 1, he hurriedly dashed off a paper outlining his dispositions and dispatched it to the War Department, and even before the courier reached Washington he set sail for Fort Monroe in the headquarters ship Commodore. That afternoon, as the Commodore steamed down the Potomac, he wrote his wife to boast how he had gotten under way with all due speed: "I feared that if I remained at Alexandria I would be annoyed very much & perhaps be sent for from Washn. Officially speaking, I feel very glad to get away from that sink of iniquity."

At first glance, McClellan's paper appeared to assign more troops to the capital's defense than even Secretary Stanton could wish. Two days earlier, Stanton had obtained a general accounting of manpower from McClellan that listed under the heading "to be left around Washington" 50,000 men—the city's garrison troops, plus Banks's corps. Now the general wrote that he was leaving nearly 55,500 from his army, which, when added to the 18,000 in the Washington garrison, totaled no fewer than 73,500 men to defend the city. When Stanton took a closer look at McClellan's calculations, however, he discovered that nearly half this imposing total was in the Shenandoah Valley, a very different matter from being stationed "in, and about Washington," as the president had directed. Stanton put staff officers to analyzing the general's paper down to the last comma.

The staff reported serious problems both with McClellan's troop placements and with his arithmetic. Of the men he had listed, fully one-quarter of them—18,600—simply did not exist. They were overcounted on returns, or counted twice, or were not with the army at all. Blenker's division was counted with the troops in the Valley, but shortly it would have to join Fremont's Mountain Department. Instead of the 50,000 men Stanton had been told would be "left around Washington"—instead of the 40,000 the army's corps commanders had specified as the minimum number needed to guard the capital—General McClellan had assigned just 26,761 troops to this task. What was worse, the majority of these were raw recruits, poorly equipped and totally without training. The verdict was unanimous, Stanton wrote, that General McClellan had disregarded the president's orders: "They agreed in opinion that the capital was not safe." It was reported that when Mr. Lincoln was told these facts, "he was justly indignant."

While I'll be the first to say that Sears is probably too anti-McClellan, he's not wrong here. McClellan played around with the numbers and never had a follow-up discussion with the administration about it. This was an issue entirely of his own making.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

Clearly he was out of step with Republican policy for quite some time. That's precisely why they undercut him for most of 1862. If he took Richmond and brought Virginia back into the fold like Kentucky and Tennessee were, suddenly the war's a lot shorter and they have a lot less bargaining power for reunification.

We can say through the Peninsula campaign that he is 100% in line with the official public policies of the United States. Where Lincoln changed and it was widely known he changed, I can't say, but it does make it sweeter that he had to invite McClellan back to actually win to give him the cover to issue it. Perhaps then opposition to McClellan wasn't because he was incompetent then eh?

You appear not to understand that the policy was Lincoln's - the C-in-C. You can call it "Republican", "abolitionist", or whatever label you want, but that's irrelevant. McClellan's proposal to Halleck on August 4, by the way, was to disregard bringing "Kentucky and Tennessee" in the fold.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This is what you believe, but as we've discussed it rests entirely on one line that appears to have been written to placate Lincoln. Grant's actual plans were to get to Butler by D+10 and besiege Richmond, and as early as the 8th May Grant was writing Halleck that instead of "going after Lee" he was trying to march on Richmond instead.

The problem for you hypothesis is that Grant does not follow Lee, and instead is trying to reach Richmond, and Lee keeps interposing himself. Grant's actions and his statements of intent once actually committed show that Grant was certainly focused not on fighting Lee, but on disrupting his supply base. This is because Grant understood the fundamentals of operations, and Lincoln did not...




He did. This has been discussed many times before, such as here.

False. Grant wrote to numerous people in the spring of '64 explaining his strategy. Meade, Sherman, Halleck, Burnside, etc. In every one he describes the objective of the AotP as Lee's army. Your fake history version, which you repeat over and over again, would require people to ignore numerous primary sources. No one here is that dumb.

 

[Belfoured]

From Stephen Sears' To the Gates of Richmond, pages 51-53:




While I'll be the first to say that Sears is probably too anti-McClellan, he's not wrong here. McClellan played around with the numbers and never had a follow-up discussion with the administration about it. This was an issue entirely of his own making.

Ryan

Ryan

That's entirely aside from additional issues, such as McClellan's correspondence with others during October 1862 about the congressional elections and his preferences, which also included specific statements about his C-in-C "the Gorilla" and his limited intellect. It was similar to the correspondence of McClellan's compadre Porter with Manton Marble, editor of the vehemently anti-administration New York World. "Sabotage" appears to have been a two-way street with Mac ...

 

[67th Tigers]

False. Grant wrote to numerous people in the spring of '64 explaining his strategy. Meade, Sherman, Halleck, Burnside, etc. In every one he describes the objective of the AotP as Lee's army. Your fake history version, which you repeat over and over again, would require people to ignore numerous primary sources. No one here is that dumb.

Yes, and he explained he was trying to link up with Butler.

What are these strategy documents you wish to introduce into the discussion? I'd like to see them.

Did Grant stick to them?

 

[Belfoured]

McClellan left the agreed upon number, didnt protest Blenker, and Stantons bureaucratic machinations didnt get into play until Mac was well out of DC.

Contemporaries like McDowell (not exactly a McClellanite) agreed as such, even Harper's Weekly wrote that Mac was sabotaged. The Radicals and their man Stanton had been after him for a while at this point. Their very survival depended on him not succeeding.

"Mac was sabotaged" isn't a hot take, its just forgotten history.

A hot take would be that they got very lucky they didnt work themselves into a Sulla like situation. Of course McClellan was not the knave they made him out to be, but its probably not a good idea for legislators to sabotage charismatic military men who hold power in crisis situations.

That he still performed ably after being sabotaged, was **** canned in favor of a Republican, and asked to return only to competently win his campaign speaks to McClellan's character, in as much as he's become a sort of historical caricature.

""Mac was sabotaged" isn't a hot take, its just forgotten history."

Actually, it's "hot [something else]". Relying on an opinion from Harper's Weekly speaks for itself.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, and he explained he was trying to link up with Butler.

What are these strategy documents you wish to introduce into the discussion? I'd like to see them.

Did Grant stick to them?

You can find all the correspondence online in the Papers of US Grant. Yes, Grant explained that all the armies were to work towards a common center, and eventually he expected Meade would link up with Butler, and he envisioned needing the York or the James at some point for supplies, but it was definitely the plan that Lee's army was the objective point for the Army of the Potomac.


Grant wrote to Butler on April 2nd, "The Army of the Potomac will act from it present base, Lee's Army
being the objective point."

Grant wrote to Sherman on April 4th, "I will stay with the Army of the Potomac increased by Burnsides Corps of not less than 25.000 effective men, and operate directly against Lee's Army wherever it may be found."

Grant wrote to Meade on April 9th, "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going North on a raid. But if we take this route all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with holds out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to cooperate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James River."

Grant wrote to Halleck on April 29th, "Gen. Butler will operate on the South side of James River, Richmond being his objective point. I will move against Lee's Army attempting to turn him by one flank or the other."

 

[SgtTB]

""Mac was sabotaged" isn't a hot take, its just forgotten history."

Actually, it's "hot [something else]". Relying on an opinion from Harper's Weekly speaks for itself.

And what of his contemporaries in the military like McDowell? Or historians like T Harry Williams?

Its not even up for debate its just a question of why as a perspective it got so muted in recent decades.

 

[SgtTB]

You appear not to understand that the policy was Lincoln's - the C-in-C. You can call it "Republican", "abolitionist", or whatever label you want, but that's irrelevant. McClellan's proposal to Halleck on August 4, by the way, was to disregard bringing "Kentucky and Tennessee" in the fold.

Lincoln was pressured by outside forced and was even Mac's best friend for sometime.

 

[SgtTB]

The thing about McClellan is that there were a lot of "almosts" or "was going to" according to his supporters.

He "almost" captured Richmond, he "was going to" cross the James and he "almost" defeated Lee decisively at Antietam...but he didn't.

As the old saying goes "close is only good in horseshoes and hand grenades".

A) He did defeat Lee decisively at Antietam he just didnt destroy the army

B) There's no almost about being outside Richmond, it was a position that would take two years to return to, and countless failed commanders who had more support from DC and far less success.

Again, if he was so incompetent why bring him back to Maryland? If he needs more offense why remove him from the Peninsula?

 

[dlofting]

A) He did defeat Lee decisively at Antietam he just didnt destroy the army

B) There's no almost about being outside Richmond, it was a position that would take two years to return to, and countless failed commanders who had more support from DC and far less success.

Again, if he was so incompetent why bring him back to Maryland? If he needs more offense why remove him from the Peninsula?

I disagree with A) as Lee held his position and offered battle the day after the main battle. This is a subjective assessment of course so we'll just have to agree to disagree.

Outside Richmond or even taking Richmond doesn't help a lot if Lee's army is intact and capable...future battles would show just how capable they were.

McClellan was the best choice available to reconstitute the AOP and rebuild morale. No one on this board questions Mcclellan's organizational abilities or his popularity with the soldiers.

 

[SgtTB]

I disagree with A) as Lee held his position and offered battle the day after the main battle. This is a subjective assessment of course so we'll just have to agree to disagree.

Outside Richmond or even taking Richmond doesn't help a lot if Lee's army is intact and capable...future battles would show just how capable they were.

McClellan was the best choice available to reconstitute the AOP and rebuild morale. No one on this board questions Mcclellan's organizational abilities or his popularity with the soldiers.

Did or did not the Maryland campaign end after Antietam?

Taking Richmond wrecks the supply line of Lee's Army. Its not a winning condition but its absolutely better than what followed. Thus why its what Grant ended up doing two-years later.

 

[Belfoured]

Lincoln was pressured by outside forced and was even Mac's best friend for sometime.

Believe what you want to believe. It's a free country and there's absolutely no requirement that opinions be informed or based on facts.

 

[67th Tigers]

You can find all the correspondence online in the Papers of US Grant. Yes, Grant explained that all the armies were to work towards a common center, and eventually he expected Meade would link up with Butler, and he envisioned needing the York or the James at some point for supplies, but it was definitely the plan that Lee's army was the objective point for the Army of the Potomac.

So he said.

So why did he tell Butler he was going to join him on D+10 to besiege Richmond per Butler's autobiography), and that the AoP would come to the Bermuda Hundred:

"Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction." - Grant to Butler, 2nd April

"You also understand that with the forces here I shall aim to fight Lee between here and Richmond if he will stand. Should Lee, however, fall back into Richmond, I will follow up and make a junction with your Army on the James River. Could I be certain that you will be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have your left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there." - Grant to Butler, 19th April

"General Butler will operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being his objective point. I will move against Lee's army, attempting to turn him by one flank or the other. Should Lee fall back within his fortifications at Richmond, either before or after giving battle, I will form a junction with Butler, and the two forces will draw supplies from the James River. My own notions about our line of march are entirely made up, but as circumstances beyond my control may change them, I will only state that my effort will be to bring Butler's and Meade's forces together." - Grant to Halleck, 29th April


Why did he write to Halleck on 8th May:

"It is not demonstrated what the enemy will do, but the best of feeling prevails in this army, and I feel at present no apprehension for the result. My efforts will be to form a junction with General Butler as early as possible, and be prepared to meet any enemy interposing. The result of the three days fighting at the Old Wilderness was decidedly in our favor. The enemy having a strongly intrenched position to fall back on when hard pressed, and the extensive train we have to cover, rendered it impossible to inflict the heavy blow on Lee's Army I had hoped. My exact route to the James river. I have not yet definitely marked out."

"A DESPATCH from Gen. Grant has just been received, — he is on the march with his whole army to form a junction with you, but had not determined his route." Stanton to Butler, 9th May

Grant, after the Wilderness, did not follow Lee, and did not make Lee's Army his objective point. He was endeavoring to march to the James to be transported to the Bermuda Hundred, in order to besiege Richmond. Lee kept interpositing and forcing Grant to fight. Grant seems to have been living in a fantasy world where Lee was a passive target, and would allow him to do whatever he liked. Unfortunately for Grant, Lee was no Pemberton or Bragg...

--- A Further Point ---

Grant's int when he made the proclamations about following Lee was that Longstreet was staying in East Tennessee. Indeed, it was the 7th April before Longstreet was ordered back to VA, and it was the 20th April before a message was sent to Grant telling him that Longstreet had gone.

Grant had wanted to use Burnside's 9th Corps overland (which he gives as 25,000 strong), despite Lincoln having a pet project for it - Fort Fisher. Grant used the int of Longstreet coming east to lever the 9th Corps from this. However, had 9th Corps gone to the Carolina Coast, it would have forced Hoke's and Pickett's divisions to remain there.

Grant's planning is to take ca. 150,000 men overland, against opposition of only ca. 50,000 (<40,000 infantry). He thinks he'll knock Lee out of the way, link up with Butler's 33,000 on the James and besiege Richmond in mid-May.

 

[SgtTB]

Believe what you want to believe. It's a free country and there's absolutely no requirement that opinions be informed or based on facts.

I mean it's not exactly any sort of controversy that the Radical Republicans were gunning for Mac and had an ally in Stanton doing the same. They railroaded two of his friends and took troops meant for the AOP to send to Republican generals or aligned generals.

 

[Belfoured]

I mean it's not exactly any sort of controversy that the Radical Republicans were gunning for Mac and had an ally in Stanton doing the same. They railroaded two of his friends and took troops meant for the AOP to send to Republican generals or aligned generals.

It's also "not exactly any sort of controversy" that McClellan vigorously objected to the policy of his C-in-C regarding emancipation, that while on active duty and in command of an army, he routinely corresponded and agreed with opponents of the administration regarding its policies, and that McClellan did plenty in his own right from late 1861 on to cause legitimate uncertainty about his commitment to fighting the war as his C-in-C wanted and to follow his C-in-C's wishes. When pursuing the "McClellan as Victim" tack it's always a good idea to read all his correspondence and keep in mind his role. Especially when one - as appears to be the case with you- assumes that the administration set things up with the purpose of having the Union's largest army defeated in battle.

In other words, it's acceptable to lose the war so long as we can give the army to somebody else. That, by the way, is what "sabotage" amounts to.

 

[DanSBHawk]

So he said.

So why did he tell Butler he was going to join him on D+10 to besiege Richmond per Butler's autobiography), and that the AoP would come to the Bermuda Hundred:

"Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction." - Grant to Butler, 2nd April

"You also understand that with the forces here I shall aim to fight Lee between here and Richmond if he will stand. Should Lee, however, fall back into Richmond, I will follow up and make a junction with your Army on the James River. Could I be certain that you will be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have your left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there." - Grant to Butler, 19th April

"General Butler will operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being his objective point. I will move against Lee's army, attempting to turn him by one flank or the other. Should Lee fall back within his fortifications at Richmond, either before or after giving battle, I will form a junction with Butler, and the two forces will draw supplies from the James River. My own notions about our line of march are entirely made up, but as circumstances beyond my control may change them, I will only state that my effort will be to bring Butler's and Meade's forces together." - Grant to Halleck, 29th April


Why did he write to Halleck on 8th May:

"It is not demonstrated what the enemy will do, but the best of feeling prevails in this army, and I feel at present no apprehension for the result. My efforts will be to form a junction with General Butler as early as possible, and be prepared to meet any enemy interposing. The result of the three days fighting at the Old Wilderness was decidedly in our favor. The enemy having a strongly intrenched position to fall back on when hard pressed, and the extensive train we have to cover, rendered it impossible to inflict the heavy blow on Lee's Army I had hoped. My exact route to the James river. I have not yet definitely marked out."

"A DESPATCH from Gen. Grant has just been received, — he is on the march with his whole army to form a junction with you, but had not determined his route." Stanton to Butler, 9th May

Grant, after the Wilderness, did not follow Lee, and did not make Lee's Army his objective point. He was endeavoring to march to the James to be transported to the Bermuda Hundred, in order to besiege Richmond. Lee kept interpositing and forcing Grant to fight. Grant seems to have been living in a fantasy world where Lee was a passive target, and would allow him to do whatever he liked. Unfortunately for Grant, Lee was no Pemberton or Bragg...

--- A Further Point ---

Grant's int when he made the proclamations about following Lee was that Longstreet was staying in East Tennessee. Indeed, it was the 7th April before Longstreet was ordered back to VA, and it was the 20th April before a message was sent to Grant telling him that Longstreet had gone.

Grant had wanted to use Burnside's 9th Corps overland (which he gives as 25,000 strong), despite Lincoln having a pet project for it - Fort Fisher. Grant used the int of Longstreet coming east to lever the 9th Corps from this. However, had 9th Corps gone to the Carolina Coast, it would have forced Hoke's and Pickett's divisions to remain there.

Grant's planning is to take ca. 150,000 men overland, against opposition of only ca. 50,000 (<40,000 infantry). He thinks he'll knock Lee out of the way, link up with Butler's 33,000 on the James and besiege Richmond in mid-May.

As I said, Grant envisioned all the armies working towards a common center. Do you simply ignore those quotes I posted?