Doc_Ralph
First Sergeant
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2023
Okay...here I go again, and not sure where the heck to post this. So it's here and ready for civil discourse (of course).
The early strategic decisions made at the outset of the war
Both sides were well-versed in the military/strategy theory of the 19th Century. These theories were developed by Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and used in continental Europe military conflicts. Their books had been read by many of the civil (Davis) and military leaders (Davis, Lee, Jackson, Grant) during formal USA military training at West Point. The Jomini text was only available in French at West Point, but French was taught there. Lincoln was an exception who was self-taught in military affairs.
(I believe we have flogged this subject in Old World Tactics in the New World Post. However, the flogging of the author may commence at any time. Can you please provide refs?)
A brief description of the components of von Clausewitz may be helpful as a starting point for this discussion.
Von Clausewitz
The triad of policy, national strategy, and military strategy can be seen as going from macro (general) to more specific.
Policy is the political objectives/aims of a nation at war. This involves national leadership. Ultimately, in our discussion, Davis and Lincoln et al. Examples: To maintain slavery and be left alone. To restore the Union and free the slaves.
National strategy is the mobilization of the entire country for the war effort (political, economic, diplomatic, and military resources). Examples: CSA -To gain foreign recognition and assistance. USA - Issuing a contract for a retired U.S. General to augment heavy ordnance production.
Military strategy to the fielding of a nation's armed forces to achieve war aims.
(James McPherson, This Mighty Scourge, 2007, Pps. 52-53)
McPherson writes: "In theory, there should be congruity among policy, national strategy, and military strategy…. But in practice, they sometimes diverge. Wars have a tendency to take on a character and momentum that become increasingly incompatible with the original war aims…." (McPherson, 2007, Page 53) Theory hits a bump in the road.
Confederate States of America (CSA)
The strategy adopted by Jefferson Davis and the CSA was an evolutionary one. The South started the war with a bang at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, with the political and military strategic decision - that Lincoln maneuvered them into. (McPherson, 2007, Page 207) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 44-50). This highly aggressive and "bridge-burning" military action started what would be for both sides a real-life game of chess using these strategies.
Concentration
This initial offensive action was almost immediately replaced - by necessity - with the concentration strategy. Davis was equally restricted by frequent CSA governors demanding that their states be defended by their states' military forces (political) and the sheer fact of geography. Rather than presenting a thin gray line that could be breached anywhere (everywhere) by superior USA forces, Davis, in 1861, scattered small armies in Virginia and Tennessee. This strategy was fraught with danger, but given the CSA political and manpower available, it was the reality. (McPherson, 2007, Pages 55-56)
An advantage of this strategy was the use of interior lines. McPherson writes: "The first and one of the most famous examples was the transfer by rail of most of Joseph Johnson's small army from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas in July 1861 to repel General Irvin McDowell's attackers at Bull Run and drive them in a rout back to Washington." (McPherson, 2007, Page 56).
So, much for a view in the North that the war would be quick and practically bloodless. The civilians who had come to see the "show" had even brought picnic lunches.
Concentration: Early War Example
A concentration case in point is the Battle of Big Bethel (June 10, 1861), in which a USA force under Major General Benjamin Butler (3500 strong) left the safety of Fort Monroe, Virginia, and took the bait set by CSA Colonel John Magruder (1400) in two camps out in the open at Big and Little Bethel. A USA night march and an attack (not led by Butler) turned into a friendly fire incident in which Lieutenant John T. Greble (1st regular USA officer to fall in the War) was killed, another seventeen dead, and scores wounded and missing during the battle. One CSA was killed and eight wounded. Miscommunication with passwords and inexperienced troops added to the complete rout of the USA forces. Magruder was later obliged to reform lines further towards Richmond. (Foote, Civil War: A Narrative,1986, Pps.56-7), (Cobb, Hicks, Holt, Battle of Big Bethel, Crucial Clash in Early Civil War Virginia, 2013, ISBN 978-1-61121-116-0).
Eastern theater Concentration strategy after 1st Manassas
The concentration and interior lines strategy had worked! However, nine months later, the CSA faced a new threat in southern Virginia with USA General McClellan's forces on the Peninsula. Again, Johnston's army used interior lines to move his forces from Centerville to Yorktown to face a new threat.
There was a significant disagreement between Davis and General Johnson. McPherson writes: "…concerning the relationship between interior lines and concentration. Davis wanted to leave a substantial force along the Rappahannock River to protect that region against Union forces south, Washington-thus retaining part of his concept of an extended defense. Johnston wanted to concentrate nearly all Confederate units in Virginia against McClellan, as near to Richmond as possible, even at the risk of temporarily yielding other parts of Virginia to the enemy. After disposing of McClellan, Johnston said, the main Confederate army could then recapture these other regions." (McPherson, 2007, Pps. 56-57)
Thus, this is what was done, although not under Joe Johnston, who was wounded at Seven Pines and was replaced by Robert E. Lee on June 1st, 1862. His CSA army of 90,000 was the largest Confederate army and was again drawn from the Shenandoah Valley.
What had preceded all this was a two-month flurry of military activity by Stonewall Jackson, hitting smaller USA forces at McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester and turning on those chasing him at Cross Keys and Port Republic. (McPherson, 2007, Page 57) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 461-463)
After these shellackings were given to the USA, Jackson joined Lee and gave a somewhat lackluster performance in Seven Days around Richmond. He redeemed himself in the next campaign by using Lee's exploitation of interior lines against General Pope along the Rappahannock as McClennan was withdrawing from the Peninsula. McPherson wraps up this campaign by explaining: "Using a favorite strategic operation of Napoleon's …a wide flanking movement to get into the enemy's rear – Jackson then marched around Pope's flank, destroyed his supply base at Manassas, and held out until the Confederates reconcentrated to win the second battle of Manassas." (McPherson, 2007, Page 57) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 621-627)
Western theater Concentration strategy
CSA forces in the West also used the concentration strategy in 1862. After the USA had broken through Albert Sidney Johnston's army, in Kentucky and Tennessee, he retreated to Corinth, Mississippi. He reassembled his forces for a counterthrust at Shiloh. This battle, while not a victory and cost Albert Sidney his life, it did set the USA back for some time.
(McPherson, 2007, Page 58) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 340-348)
McPherson continues on concertation strategy by writing: "The Confederate Army of Mississippi, now commanded by Beauregard, was finally forced to evacuate Corinth at the end of May 1862, just as Joseph Johnston's army had evacuated Yorktown several weeks earlier. But these retreats set the stage for offensive operations later in the summer under new commanders (Lee in Virginia and Bragg in Kentucky) that took the armies across the Potomac and almost to the Ohio River by September."
(McPherson, 2007, Page 58)
Offensive defensive strategy
CSA strategy, under Davis, evolved into the offensive defensive. This nomenclature would sound like an oxymoron for a novice of military theory, given the general knowledge of the Civil War. However, the definition - although confusing - is workable.
McPherson writes: "…a new phase in Confederate strategy, which has been variously offensive-defensive, offensive defense, or defensive-offensive." (McPherson, 2006, Page 58). My vote would be for the last option. Davis would have to be careful (defense) but would grab the opportunity for a tussle (offense). That is also the "my-two cents" option/opinion. McPherson continues: "Davis himself describes it as offensive-defensive and contrasted it with what he called 'purely defensive operations.'" (McPherson, 2006, Page 58)
Going deeper into these nomenclature waters is the dilemma or failure of distinguishing between what is a strategy and what is tactics, or are both involved? A few examples of these combinations can be seen in Lee's campaigns. The Seven Days and Gettysburg were operational offensive in strategy and tactics. Seven Days was also defensive as easing the threat to Richmond. Fredericksburg was a defensive battle (strategy and tactics). Antietam concluded a campaign of offense, but the CSA fought there with a tactical defense.
(McPherson, 2006, Pps. 58-59)
Question: Which side was poised for a victory?
At the outset of the war (first months), it would appear that the CSA had the upper hand by (1) the taking of Ft. Sumter, (2) the near bloodless win at Big Bethel, (3) the successful transporting an army by rail and (4) to be in place to defeat/rout a USA army (First Manassas/ Bull Run) close to the USA capital.
The USA had a plan - but as a cold snake needs warmth for movement – it would take time, as the wise and retired General Scott understood. There were moments of failure and peril, but there were also avenues of opportunity that would transform the war.
The early strategic decisions made at the outset of the war
Both sides were well-versed in the military/strategy theory of the 19th Century. These theories were developed by Karl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and used in continental Europe military conflicts. Their books had been read by many of the civil (Davis) and military leaders (Davis, Lee, Jackson, Grant) during formal USA military training at West Point. The Jomini text was only available in French at West Point, but French was taught there. Lincoln was an exception who was self-taught in military affairs.
(I believe we have flogged this subject in Old World Tactics in the New World Post. However, the flogging of the author may commence at any time. Can you please provide refs?)
A brief description of the components of von Clausewitz may be helpful as a starting point for this discussion.
Von Clausewitz
The triad of policy, national strategy, and military strategy can be seen as going from macro (general) to more specific.
Policy is the political objectives/aims of a nation at war. This involves national leadership. Ultimately, in our discussion, Davis and Lincoln et al. Examples: To maintain slavery and be left alone. To restore the Union and free the slaves.
National strategy is the mobilization of the entire country for the war effort (political, economic, diplomatic, and military resources). Examples: CSA -To gain foreign recognition and assistance. USA - Issuing a contract for a retired U.S. General to augment heavy ordnance production.
Military strategy to the fielding of a nation's armed forces to achieve war aims.
(James McPherson, This Mighty Scourge, 2007, Pps. 52-53)
McPherson writes: "In theory, there should be congruity among policy, national strategy, and military strategy…. But in practice, they sometimes diverge. Wars have a tendency to take on a character and momentum that become increasingly incompatible with the original war aims…." (McPherson, 2007, Page 53) Theory hits a bump in the road.
Confederate States of America (CSA)
The strategy adopted by Jefferson Davis and the CSA was an evolutionary one. The South started the war with a bang at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, with the political and military strategic decision - that Lincoln maneuvered them into. (McPherson, 2007, Page 207) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 44-50). This highly aggressive and "bridge-burning" military action started what would be for both sides a real-life game of chess using these strategies.
Concentration
This initial offensive action was almost immediately replaced - by necessity - with the concentration strategy. Davis was equally restricted by frequent CSA governors demanding that their states be defended by their states' military forces (political) and the sheer fact of geography. Rather than presenting a thin gray line that could be breached anywhere (everywhere) by superior USA forces, Davis, in 1861, scattered small armies in Virginia and Tennessee. This strategy was fraught with danger, but given the CSA political and manpower available, it was the reality. (McPherson, 2007, Pages 55-56)
An advantage of this strategy was the use of interior lines. McPherson writes: "The first and one of the most famous examples was the transfer by rail of most of Joseph Johnson's small army from the Shenandoah Valley to Manassas in July 1861 to repel General Irvin McDowell's attackers at Bull Run and drive them in a rout back to Washington." (McPherson, 2007, Page 56).
So, much for a view in the North that the war would be quick and practically bloodless. The civilians who had come to see the "show" had even brought picnic lunches.
Concentration: Early War Example
A concentration case in point is the Battle of Big Bethel (June 10, 1861), in which a USA force under Major General Benjamin Butler (3500 strong) left the safety of Fort Monroe, Virginia, and took the bait set by CSA Colonel John Magruder (1400) in two camps out in the open at Big and Little Bethel. A USA night march and an attack (not led by Butler) turned into a friendly fire incident in which Lieutenant John T. Greble (1st regular USA officer to fall in the War) was killed, another seventeen dead, and scores wounded and missing during the battle. One CSA was killed and eight wounded. Miscommunication with passwords and inexperienced troops added to the complete rout of the USA forces. Magruder was later obliged to reform lines further towards Richmond. (Foote, Civil War: A Narrative,1986, Pps.56-7), (Cobb, Hicks, Holt, Battle of Big Bethel, Crucial Clash in Early Civil War Virginia, 2013, ISBN 978-1-61121-116-0).
Eastern theater Concentration strategy after 1st Manassas
The concentration and interior lines strategy had worked! However, nine months later, the CSA faced a new threat in southern Virginia with USA General McClellan's forces on the Peninsula. Again, Johnston's army used interior lines to move his forces from Centerville to Yorktown to face a new threat.
There was a significant disagreement between Davis and General Johnson. McPherson writes: "…concerning the relationship between interior lines and concentration. Davis wanted to leave a substantial force along the Rappahannock River to protect that region against Union forces south, Washington-thus retaining part of his concept of an extended defense. Johnston wanted to concentrate nearly all Confederate units in Virginia against McClellan, as near to Richmond as possible, even at the risk of temporarily yielding other parts of Virginia to the enemy. After disposing of McClellan, Johnston said, the main Confederate army could then recapture these other regions." (McPherson, 2007, Pps. 56-57)
Thus, this is what was done, although not under Joe Johnston, who was wounded at Seven Pines and was replaced by Robert E. Lee on June 1st, 1862. His CSA army of 90,000 was the largest Confederate army and was again drawn from the Shenandoah Valley.
What had preceded all this was a two-month flurry of military activity by Stonewall Jackson, hitting smaller USA forces at McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester and turning on those chasing him at Cross Keys and Port Republic. (McPherson, 2007, Page 57) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 461-463)
After these shellackings were given to the USA, Jackson joined Lee and gave a somewhat lackluster performance in Seven Days around Richmond. He redeemed himself in the next campaign by using Lee's exploitation of interior lines against General Pope along the Rappahannock as McClennan was withdrawing from the Peninsula. McPherson wraps up this campaign by explaining: "Using a favorite strategic operation of Napoleon's …a wide flanking movement to get into the enemy's rear – Jackson then marched around Pope's flank, destroyed his supply base at Manassas, and held out until the Confederates reconcentrated to win the second battle of Manassas." (McPherson, 2007, Page 57) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 621-627)
Western theater Concentration strategy
CSA forces in the West also used the concentration strategy in 1862. After the USA had broken through Albert Sidney Johnston's army, in Kentucky and Tennessee, he retreated to Corinth, Mississippi. He reassembled his forces for a counterthrust at Shiloh. This battle, while not a victory and cost Albert Sidney his life, it did set the USA back for some time.
(McPherson, 2007, Page 58) (Foote, 1986, Pps. 340-348)
McPherson continues on concertation strategy by writing: "The Confederate Army of Mississippi, now commanded by Beauregard, was finally forced to evacuate Corinth at the end of May 1862, just as Joseph Johnston's army had evacuated Yorktown several weeks earlier. But these retreats set the stage for offensive operations later in the summer under new commanders (Lee in Virginia and Bragg in Kentucky) that took the armies across the Potomac and almost to the Ohio River by September."
(McPherson, 2007, Page 58)
Offensive defensive strategy
CSA strategy, under Davis, evolved into the offensive defensive. This nomenclature would sound like an oxymoron for a novice of military theory, given the general knowledge of the Civil War. However, the definition - although confusing - is workable.
McPherson writes: "…a new phase in Confederate strategy, which has been variously offensive-defensive, offensive defense, or defensive-offensive." (McPherson, 2006, Page 58). My vote would be for the last option. Davis would have to be careful (defense) but would grab the opportunity for a tussle (offense). That is also the "my-two cents" option/opinion. McPherson continues: "Davis himself describes it as offensive-defensive and contrasted it with what he called 'purely defensive operations.'" (McPherson, 2006, Page 58)
Going deeper into these nomenclature waters is the dilemma or failure of distinguishing between what is a strategy and what is tactics, or are both involved? A few examples of these combinations can be seen in Lee's campaigns. The Seven Days and Gettysburg were operational offensive in strategy and tactics. Seven Days was also defensive as easing the threat to Richmond. Fredericksburg was a defensive battle (strategy and tactics). Antietam concluded a campaign of offense, but the CSA fought there with a tactical defense.
(McPherson, 2006, Pps. 58-59)
Question: Which side was poised for a victory?
At the outset of the war (first months), it would appear that the CSA had the upper hand by (1) the taking of Ft. Sumter, (2) the near bloodless win at Big Bethel, (3) the successful transporting an army by rail and (4) to be in place to defeat/rout a USA army (First Manassas/ Bull Run) close to the USA capital.
The USA had a plan - but as a cold snake needs warmth for movement – it would take time, as the wise and retired General Scott understood. There were moments of failure and peril, but there were also avenues of opportunity that would transform the war.
Bringing the