McClellan freely discussed his plans with Lincoln in private. Various people tried to get public statements of his plans, which he resisted for obvious OPSEC reasons.
General War Order No. 1 was actually written by Stanton, after consulting the radicals in private. Lincoln rubberstamped it. I should have continued
this:
No-one doubted that the Constitution invested the powers of "commander in chief" with the President. However, in all previous wars the President had appointed a "general in chief", and in the 1820's this post was made permanent. The role of POTUS was to set policy, that of SECWAR to allocate resources, and that of GinC to command and control operations.
Lincoln stepped into a situation where the GinC (Scott) was acting far too independently for him. Chase, with Lincoln's approval, created a parallel command structure with a committee of Lorenzo Thomas (Adj Gen), Irvin McDowell and Wm. Franklin creating their own plan. The result was the Bull Run operation, which was what Lincoln, Chase and the committee came up with. It was of course a disaster.
In the wake of Bull Run, McClellan was called to Washington. McClellan essentially supplanted the old committee and there were still two parallel command structures in the army; Scott and McClellan. Since McClellan conversed directly with the government, this irked Scott. For several months this situation continued, with Scott trying to assert absolute authority over McClellan, despite McClellan receiving orders directly from POTUS and SECWAR. Scott's issue was that he thought he should be in absolute command - Lincoln should tell him war policy, and Scott should enact it without regard to POTUS. This was the understanding of the civil-military relationship that had existed since the old Continental Army.
McClellan for his part tried to work with Scott. In mid-October he organised divisions out of the Army of the Potomac, contravening Scott's explicit order. This brought about a confrontation and Scott basically said "him or me" to Lincoln and gave in a letter of resignation. This did not impress Lincoln, who accepted the resignation, but refused the recommendation of Halleck in favour of McClellan. (NB: Halleck was not Scott's first choice, which was Col Totten, but Totten refused)
In the 1st November Cabinet, Lincoln questioned Bates about the legal status of GinC. It is clear that Lincoln was reluctant to appoint anyone, and wanted to leave the post empty and run the war himself. Bates assured him that the GinC was a lieutenant to the POTUS, and Lincoln was indeed supreme commander. Lincoln then issued the order, but excluded MG Wool and his command (Wool had been promoted MG by brevet in 1847, and considered the office of GinC his by right of seniority).
For two months McClellan laboured as GinC, and he did what was asked of him by Lincoln. On assuming the office he sent Buell and Halleck to assume command of the two western departments. In Sherman's department, only 4 brigades had been organised (at Camp Nevin by McCook) but had no transportation etc. to take to the field, and the rest of the department just consisted of regiments at various camps of instruction or occupation. In Fremont's department there were no organised brigades.
McClellan assigned Halleck to replace Fremont, ordering him to concentrate a field army on the Mississippi once he'd sorted the department out. His orders to Buell were to concentrate an army to seize Knoxville and the Cumberland Gap. These reflected Lincoln's concerns - reopen the Mississippi (and McClellan started to create an expedition to New Orleans) and liberate East Tennessee.
Meanwhile, Lincoln's popularity, such as it was,was in freefall. Starting with his repudiation of the Fremont emancipation Lincoln came to seen to be support the slavocracy. Lincoln recalled the Sec'y of War's annual report for being too pro-emancipation, and had it redacted. He needed immediate military victories to shore up his own position. McClellan however went down with fever, and was at one point expected to die. Cameron, the Sec'y of War, had to be purged in early January as a threat to the government. Lincoln would continue to annoy the Radicals with actions like pardoning an African slave trader in early February etc.
With all this going on, at the beginning of January, Chase reformed his committee. It primarily still consisted of McDowell and Franklin. Chase knew McClellan's plan to make an amphibious movement down the Chesapeake, because Lincoln (who of course discussed it with McClellan) asked McClellan to brief Chase. Initially McDowell favoured another direct assault on Centreville, but after discussion of the Chesapeake plan, the committee adopted it.
At the same time, Lincoln started to assume direct command. He cut Cameron out before forcing him to resign, and at the same time consulted Bates about whether he could assume direct command of all forces. Bates' argument
is worth a read, but Bates' theory was that there was no use for a GinC, and that Lincoln as POTUS should assume direct command of all forces. Lincoln indeed did assume command, and found that he could not get Halleck or Buell to move, and also met Chase's committee where he asks about "borrowing" the Army of the Potomac "provided he could see how it could be made to do something". The committee replied with the Peninsula plan. Lincoln approved the plan.
A few days later the committee met with the rump cabinet, with Meigs in attendance. Meigs was there to report on the feasibility of moving the army down the Chespeake. In walked McClellan, and resumed command. Chase asked for McClellan to state his plan in cabinet, and McClellan asked whether Lincoln would order it. He didn't. Everyone in the room had heard McClellan's plan, either first hand (Lincoln and Chase certainly), or second hand from the committee. However McClellan's refusal to have the plans placed in the official minutes of the cabinet is misconstrued as him keeping his plans from Lincoln. He did not. On the same day, Lincoln nominated Stanton to be Sec'y of War.
Not much happens for the following fortnight. McClellan resumed command, but in the interim Buell and Thomas had cancelled the advance to the Cumberland Gap. CF Smith reported Forts Henry and Donelson could easily be taken in accordance with McClellan's orders to Halleck. On the 20th January Cameron handed over his office to Stanton. That evening McClellan held a reception for Stanton, and afterwards Stanton had a meeting with Ben Wade and his fellow radicals, and they agreed that the existence of a General-in-Chief was "illegal" and that McClellan should be removed from office and Stanton should run the army directly.
Stanton's first move was to get Lincoln to write his "War Orders". These were in fact written by Stanton, probably as a way of removing McClellan, and approved by Lincoln. As we know, as soon as McClellan moved against Centreville on 11th March, Stanton, Bates etc. ambushed Lincoln in Cabinet and forced him to suspend the office of GinC. Stanton immediately seized the office, and all McClellan's papers. The orders were a typical "damned if you do, damned if you don't trick" that a lawyer would pull; if McClellan didn't throw his army directly into the Centreville entrenchments then he'd disobeyed an order, but if he did then he'd vacated his office.
As it was, McClellan asked Lincoln if his orders were peremptory (in which case he'd obey without question), or whether he could rebut them. Lincoln indicated that he could give a rebuttal, and that if he did then Lincoln would "gladly yield my plan to yours". McClellan's 22 page long rebuttal was apparently effective, as the President suspended the order. He approved the Urbanna Plan on two provisos: that the B&O Railroad be reopened, and that the rebel batteries on the Potomac be removed.
Lincoln was still not happy, preferring his own idea. McClellan reoccupied the line of the B&O RR and had the railroad back in service. There was an argument that developed when McClellan sent a report to Lincoln, through Stanton, about why Lincoln's idea of using canal boats failed. It was found that Stanton had pocketed the report and not passed it on.
However, on the evening of 27th February he authorised starting to assemble transports. The Navy was still procrastinatng about landing Hooker to deal with the Potomac batteries. Lincoln suggested to McClellan that the division commanders should vote on it, or rather Stanton suggested that Lincoln suggest this. Lincon told McClellan that if the vote went against him, then McClellan would be replaced by Fremont as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Stanton meanwhile was telegraphing EA Hitchcock to come to Washington to assume the chair of a new "War Board". It was a disaster for Lincoln, as the result was 8-4 in McClellan's favour.
Almost immediately Johnston retreated, and McClellan and his army chased him to the Rappahannock. Stanton moved against McClellan, delivering his case to the cabinet (as
recorded in Bates' diary). He argued that McClellan wasn't really GinC, and that the existence of such a position was illegal and unconstitutional. Bates repeated his advice. Lincoln assented to Stanton's and Bates' proposition that McClellan wasn't GinC and all armies should report to Stanton. Stanton seized McClellan's office.
Unhappy with the result of the last vote, Stanton appointed corps commanders (which Lincoln rubberstamped) from those opposed to McClellan's plans, and got them to vote again. Amazingly, whilst the CC's rejected the Urbanna plan, they substituted an even worse plan - the Peninsula. The same day Stanton held the first meeting of the War Board, and his ousting of McClellan was complete. Instead of Lincoln assuming personal command, what had happened was that Stanton had seized command of the armies.
With the amphibious movement continually approved, Lincoln and Stanton had no choice but to assent. The initial movement was slow, because Stanton and Meigs were in charge of providing shipping. Stanton had already embarrassed himself with purchasing a large number of schooners etc., and having them loaded with rocks to block the Potomac against the
Virginia ("Stanton's Navy" as Lincoln called it, and that it was "as useless as the paps of a man to a sucking child"). There is some confusion in the historiography, as "Stanton's Navy" and the Peninsula transports are almost always conflated. The War Department procured large numbers of schooners in late February and early March for "Stanton's Navy", but these sat at Washington being filled with rocks, and weren't available as transports.
Ingalls received the first transports on 4th March - 2 small propellers and 2 schooners, all needing refitting. They came in slowly, and by 17th March there was enough transportation to embark one division. Hamilton's division embarked on the 18th. Another divisions worth of transports was acculumated and Porter's division embarked on the 22nd when the return convoy from the Hamilton movement arrived (only the Naval escort went immediately back). The movement of division is best explained by a table:
View attachment 582039
Table 1: Notional transport groups for the Peninsula movement. Eventually transports for three divisions were acquired (groups 1-3), with the 3 groups making their first movements on the 18th, 22nd and 27th March respectively. It took one day to embark a division, another to run it to Ft Monroe, two days to offload, and then another to run back, so each group could move one division every 5 days. On 29th March it was asked whether to embark Hooker etc., or 1st Corps. A storm disrupted movement for several days, and when it cleared Richardson's division had been on ship and went. On the 4th McClellan sent to embark "at least Franklin" and as much else as could be embarked and land them at Gloucester. Franklin's division got off the ships on the 5th. For cavalry, the capacity to transport two regiments was acquired (groups 4 and 5). There was excess capacity for one "battalion" of artillery (group 5), which was used for a lift of the Reserve. Casey's division moved without artillery or heavy equipment.
On 27th March, Stanton asked the War Board if McClellan had left Washington perfectly secure. They concluded that he had. Not liking that answer, he asked Wadsworth to write him a brief explaining Washington's weakness, and then asked Hitchcock and Lorenzo Thomas to reassess. They concluded he hadn't, by applying a much higher standard than that agreed by Lincoln. Stanton ambushed Lincoln with this brief and asked to suspend the movement of 1st Corps, which he assented to. Franklin's division were actually ordered off the transports.
Initial Conclusions
In examining the Lincoln-McClellan relationship, it's worth noting several things:
1. Lincoln was not a strong leader. Whilst he made quips etc., he did not "lead" cabinet or policy. He was mostly lead by others.
2. Chase moved to create a parallel command structure to usurp Scott before McClellan came to Washington. When McClellan arrived, he was used to create another parallel command structure usurping Scott.
3. Before January '62 McClellan, Cameron and Lincoln had a perfect understanding of their relative responsibilities, and enacted them.
4. Bates was pushing a theory that overturned the existing relationship between POTUS and the GinC. When Stanton replaced Cameron he was on board with this, but with the twist that the SECWAR was a necessary intermediary (proving that the GinC role was necessary, it's just the SECWAR wanted it).
5. With McClellan ill, another attempt was made to create a parallel command structure, reinstating the pre-McClellan committee.
6. Although not mentioned above, in late January Congress authorised two additional Assistant SECWARs, and these took on the traditional role of SECWAR.
7. From his appointment, Stanton intrigued to usurp the GinC position for himself. He succeeded when McClellan took to the field. He then intrigued to create an army for himself.
Bringing the