Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[Yankeedave]

Napoleon may have attacked like Lee at Gettysburg see Austerlitz. But the union troops were better than the troops Napoleon faced. Meade imho was better than the Allies.
Lee held the high ground at Chancellorsville.
Mahan taught engineering and knew not to attack like that.
Longstreet knew what to do at Gettysburg. Lao Tzu was able to put in words what many people knew.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Do you think Pender could have done any better than Hill? He certainly was aggressive and was well regarded.

Except it isnt going to happen.

Prior to the reorganisation Pender commanded a brigade in A.P.Hill's division. Thus when A.P.Hill is promoted to Corps Command then Pender is promoted to Divisional command and they just aren't going to have him jump two levels thereby leapfrogging A.P.Hill.

But yes he was well regarded. So was A.P.Hill... in the main... and Jackson's opinion no longer counts...

 

[WJC]

You know I'm absolutely blanking and the book is in a different state from me. I want to say it was one of the Gary Gallagher essay collections.

Thanks for your response.
Been there. If you think of it, let us know. Sounds interesting.

 

[FZ11]

Which Civil War generals had read Sun Tzu? I guess then, that according to Sun Tzu the confederates should not have attacked at Chancellorsville, and the Federals should not have attacked at Five Forks, both of them strong defensive positions that were key positions for each army.

The point was: Defense is easier to manage than Offense is to accomplish. This was common knowledge no matter which books were on their reading list. Chancellorsville can't be compared to Gettysburg. Chancellorsville was a surprise attack thru forested terrain.

 

[cash]

The point was: Defense is easier to manage than Offense is to accomplish. This was common knowledge no matter which books were on their reading list. Chancellorsville can't be compared to Gettysburg. Chancellorsville was a surprise attack thru forested terrain.

Gettysburg Day 2 was a surprise attack from forested terrain.

 

[Yankeedave]

Chancellorsville was bringing bringing superior numbers onto a smaller force-Jackson on Howard. This flanked the contested ground-Haze Grove. Once this final high ground was taken, artillery was bought up and Hooker is ringed in. Lee did not directly attack the contested ground.
I think Lee might have had a chance on Day 2, at least in Longstreet's sector. In away he is flanking the contested ground using open ground.

 

[rpkennedy]

Do you think Pender could have done any better than Hill? He certainly was aggressive and was well regarded.

Potentially. He did ok on July 1 but Pender's brigade commanders carried the water in the attack on Seminary Ridge (there is some evidence that Pender did not leave Herr's Ridge until after the collapse of the First Corps and ordering two of Perrin's regiments back from the town to Seminary Ridge). But if Lee picks Pender to take over the corps, he's going to be p***ing off a lot of division commanders, especially Richard Anderson. Anderson had been a major general since July 1862 and was the senior major general in the army other than Lafayette McLaws (major general, May 23, 1862 which was senior to A.P. Hill by 3 days). In fact, Lee had considered Anderson for corps command before deciding on Hill.

If Hill was going to excuse himself due to illness, Anderson has to take the corps and Gettysburg wasn't exactly a bright spot for Anderson.

Ryan

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

All five points listed may have influenced Lee's decision, but I submit that none of the five is actually a good argument.

1) Two months prior, Union forces had successfully executed a frontal assault against well entrenched Confederate forces atop Marye's Heights during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

During the Second Battle of Fredericksburg, the Union did indeed seize Marye's Heights but they outnumbered the Confederates better than 2:1 and still inflicted more casualties on the Union (1100 vs 700, the latter presumably including captured).

2) On the second day of the battle, Lee had launched aggressive assaults against the left and right flank of the Union army. This likely meant that Meade had to strip forces from the center of his line in order to bolster the flanks.

If he could strip his center to bolster his flanks on July 2nd why could he not also strip his flanks to bolster his center on July 3?

3) On the second day of the battle, Confederate forces had, albeit briefly, actually broken through the Union line atop Cemetery Ridge before being driven back. If a few Confederate brigades could succeed in temporarily breaching the Union line, then a few divisions surely should be able to secure a decisive breakthrough.

The breakthrough occurred near the end of the fighting on a second of the ridge that was essentially undefended when it was reached.

4) Lee had no way of knowing that the artillery bombardment was going to fail. He believed that his concentrated bombardment would break up Union defenses along Cemetery Ridge and aid the breakthrough. With the amount of smoke and dirt and dust kicked up by the bombardment, combined with a slowing of Union artillery fire, the bombardment seemed at the time to have done its job.

Lee should have known better than to rely on Confederate artillery. Was there ever a land battle in the Civil War in which Confederate artillery was decisive? Antietam maybe?

5) Pickett's Charge, better Longstreet's Assault, was not the only attack planned for the third day of the battle. It was to be combined with a renewed assault against the Union right flank on Culp's Hill. I'm writing this from memory, but I recall that there is some debate over whether Lee knew the attack had failed when Longstreet's Assault began. I wish I had the book with me so I could remember how the historian argued this point, but I do remember him discussing it in some way.

Didn't the fighting on Culp's Hill go on overnight and pretty much fizzle out when the Confederates were driven back from their captured works shortly after dawn? Didn't Lee alter his original plan of attack on July 3 specifically for that reason?

Either there was a communication breakdown and Lee was not aware of the situation on Culp's Hill, or he was overconfident in what Ewell's Corps could accomplish when they were essentially fought out by early July 3.

 

[cash]

Chancellorsville was bringing bringing superior numbers onto a smaller force-Jackson on Howard. This flanked the contested ground-Haze Grove. Once this final high ground was taken, artillery was bought up and Hooker is ringed in. Lee did not directly attack the contested ground.
I think Lee might have had a chance on Day 2, at least in Longstreet's sector. In away he is flanking the contested ground using open ground.

Gettysburg Say 2 was bringing superior numbers onto a smaller force, and they captured the high ground of the Peach Orchard and brought artillery up into the Peach Orchard.

 

[ErnieMac]

Jackson's attack at Chancellorsville (May 2, 1863) is what everyone remembers of that battle. The following day was much bloodier for both sides as Lee launched repeated attacks on the Federal lines to reunite his divided army and to drive them of the high ground at Fairview (Hooker had already ceded Hazel Grove). There was no surprise on May 3. Assaulting the Federal lines had worked.

 

[Yankeedave]

Stuart.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Or Lee felt that Ewell on the ground had the responsibility and judgment to make the call whether an attack was feasible. If Lee wanted an attack, he could have ordered one but not being there and with a lack of intelligence about what was in front of them, Ewell had to make the call.
In all fairness, Hill's division commanders did not exactly cover themselves with glory at Gettysburg. The only real option to replace Hill was Richard Anderson and he had his own issues that July. Pender did ok on July 1 and Heth was out of commission. An ailing Hill was sadly the best option.

Other than a sick A.P. Hill, who faltered or was reluctant at Gettysburg? Longstreet followed Lee's orders and Ewell was effective in doing what was asked of him.

Ryan

I am not particularly faulting Lee, I am trying to explain why I think he failed at Gettysburg, so completely so soon after his extraordinary defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville.

Lee's plans, as I have said, were Not the problem, it was his style of command, that worked with a Jackson and an agreeable Longstreet, but, proved inadequate for two freshly minted corps commanders and a reluctant Longstreet.

IMO, all three corps commanders were, for different reasons perhaps, faltering on all three days. Hill was content to doing nothing. Was Ewell on time with any of his attacks,? None of Lee's senior commanders had their heads in the game.




PS. I, myself, believer there was an extenuating circumstance that precluded Lee exercising complete control of the ANV during the Gettysburg campaign, but, tht does not change the reason I believe it failed.

 

[BlueandGrayl]

There was a political reason as to why Lee attacked at Gettysburg just like what he attempted to do in Maryland in September 1862 the campaign in July was meant to bring a big victory for the Confederacy and to help boost the Copperhead Democrat movement right after Chancellorsville.

 

[Yankeedave]

Lee also felt that despite beating both Burnside and Hooker, that his losses were essentially for nothing as both times both armies ended up where they started. Lee argued argued to fight and win on their ground.
In this he is totally correct (imho) and supported by Davis. It can be argued that troops should have been sent westerly tho.
Having said this, Hooker was proving to be blindly aggressive, and would want to attack Richmond. I don't think any one could take Richmond quickly at this time.
I don't know if D.C. was the correct target if Lee was going to finish a masterful campaign with Pickett's Charge...

 

[Stone in the wall]

Most of Lee's victories were fruitless. He took the easy victory at Fredericksburg knowing he could not follow Burnside. The guns over the river would blow his advance apart. Now he has let the strong enemy army escape to fight another day. Same at 2nd Manassas, Lee and Longstreet watch Jackson get hammered afternoon of the 29th and most of the day on the 30th. Late afternoon they finally attack, darkness saves Pope from total destruction. Lee and Longstreet could not see the golden opportunity that was in front of them. The road North would have been much easier.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Jackson's attack at Chancellorsville (May 2, 1863) is what everyone remembers of that battle. The following day was much bloodier for both sides as Lee launched repeated attacks on the Federal lines to reunite his divided army and to drive them of the high ground at Fairview (Hooker had already ceded Hazel Grove). There was no surprise on May 3. Assaulting the Federal lines had worked.

It was usually much easier to defeat the AoP Commanders than to beat the AoP itself.

 

[BigMuddy]

Could Meade have been another factor? Maybe Lee expected Meade to act as previous Commanders and was surprised that he stayed in the fight.

Dan

 

[Stone in the wall]

Could Meade have been another factor? Maybe Lee expected Meade to act as previous Commanders and was surprised that he stayed in the fight.

Dan

Maybe, but Meade had no need to leave, and would be would be hard pressed to find any place more to his advantage to fight from

 

[Stock]

I think the answer is rather complex and may well never be known for the only person who really knows is Robert E Lee.

However some things can be said.

First he had a really good day on Day One. Victory looks to be within his grasp. Maybe it is chimerical but it certainly looks like he had a chance to destroy the Union army. Indeed as Day Two dawns it looks like he still has that opportunity for what scouting reports he has suggest that the Union left flank is in the air (See the various threads on the subject such as https://civilwartalk.com/threads/i-dont-understand-lees-orders-for-day-2.148046/ - There are many more) That means he can perhaps repeat Chancellorsville, this time with his dependable old warhorse Longstreet in the role of Jackson.

Of course it doesnt turn out like that.

Second, I also think we have to remember that by inclination Lee was an aggressive General and I think Gettysburg is the price Lee ends up paying for something that has previously worked well for him.

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence and the sub standard performance of a number of his subordinates.

Fourth, Lee may well not have been feeling very well. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that. Imagine trying to command so many people while under the weather.[/QUOT

I think the answer is rather complex and may well never be known for the only person who really knows is Robert E Lee.

However some things can be said.

First he had a really good day on Day One. Victory looks to be within his grasp. Maybe it is chimerical but it certainly looks like he had a chance to destroy the Union army. Indeed as Day Two dawns it looks like he still has that opportunity for what scouting reports he has suggest that the Union left flank is in the air (See the various threads on the subject such as https://civilwartalk.com/threads/i-dont-understand-lees-orders-for-day-2.148046/ - There are many more) That means he can perhaps repeat Chancellorsville, this time with his dependable old warhorse Longstreet in the role of Jackson.

Of course it doesnt turn out like that.

Second, I also think we have to remember that by inclination Lee was an aggressive General and I think Gettysburg is the price Lee ends up paying for something that has previously worked well for him.

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence and the sub standard performance of a number of his subordinates.

Fourth, Lee may well not have been feeling very well. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that. Imagine trying to command so many people while under the weather.

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

I would add that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was as strong as it was going to be, especially while he was in Pennsylvania. He wasn't going to be able to recruit more troops as long as he was there. Spirits were good. He had the AoP in front of him while his army was very strong and tactically, if he could beat them in Gettysburg, it was a path to Washington. It is such a complex situation with the failures of some and hindsight for us, but I think Lee saw this as a golden opportunity of he succeeded.

 

[American87]

Lee face different circumstances on days 2 and 3.

On day 2, Lee planned to take Cemetery Hill from the flank and rear as early as possible. Had Longstreet been up much earlier than he was, the Union position would've been weak enough to take. However, as Longstreet had all night to march and still arrived about four hours after sunrise, the Union troops had time to be reinforced, and they strengthened Cemetery Ridge.

When Lee had to come up with a new plan after Longstreet arrived, he based it off faulty intelligence. He was under the impression that the southern end of Cemetery Ridge was clear of Union troops, and he sent Longstreet down there to turn the flank. Longstreet, however, found the position occupied. Longstreet made the decision to attack without notifying Lee of the changed situation, and his attack was piecemeal. Had he ordered Hood and McLaws to advance in some formation they might have succeeded, or maybe the position was too strong no matter what he did.

As for day 3, Lee's original plan was to resume the attack of July 2nd. Longstreet, again, argued and bickered until Lee called it off. Even Freeman, Lee's chief biographer, called Lee's amiability a "positive weakness."

That doesn't quite explain Pickett's Charge though. Lee didn't have many options left-Longstreet refused to attack the right unless positively ordered to do so, and even then his heart wouldn't be in it; Ewell had already attacked left and didn't achieve that much. The only place Lee had left was the center, and he placed Longstreet there.

In my opinion Lee's amiability got the better of him. Longstreet took advantage of this and resisted orders until Lee fell back on the least desirable option. Lee wasn't going to leave Gettysburg without a fight, and he accomated his lieutenants as much as possible without actually abandoning the field.