Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Why not simply take Long streets advice and move around the Union position southwest towards Washington? Meade would have followed and been forced to attack. Given a strong defensive position, there is no reason Lee could not have been able to score victory. Remember, Meade had prepared just such a defensive position at Pipe Creek.

This has been repeatedly debated here and there are many excellent threads upon the issue.

However I would say that by Day 2 of Gettysburg the Pipe Creek Circular has been superseded. In fact Meade's plan by this point is to (if necesary) retreat but only slightly onto ground he considered equally as strong as 'The Fishhook' along the line of Rock Creek (EDIT). See https://civilwartalk.com/threads/ge...-a-hypothesis-about-the-retreat-order.144081/

This is because he is at least somewhat concerned by exactly the movement that Longstreet suggested.

There are also a number of issues with any such plan. Firstly it requires Ewell to relinquish the ground he captured on Day One (If he does not he can be destroyed in detail) and Ewell according to Sears amongst others refuses to do this.

Secondly any movement in that direction will be moving towards the fast arriving Union Sixth Corps which is the largest (and mostly veteran) Corps in the AoP.

Thirdly... what is Longstreet to face if he does do this movement around the flank? Remember Lee has no Cavalry (or no Cavalry that his small staff is able to use efficiently) and any such movement needs to be suitably screened. It also requires a knowledge of the road network and this isnt Virginia. This is Pennsylvania and not home territory.

EDIT and Cash ninja's me as I hit the reply button
EDIT getting Rock Creek and Plum Run confused... stupid typos

 

[Bigjeep]

Visiting Gettysburg many times, one does not need to be a military expert to see that Pickets charge was nothing more then suicide! That open field was covered by artillery from all sides. From Cemetery Hill to Round Top. And the Union forces were able to move troops easily while the Confederates couldn't.

 

[Jamieva]

That's the maneuver option. He couldn't maneuver on July 2 because he had no cavalry to screen his movement and find out where the Union army was. He couldn't maneuver on July 3 because he had no idea about the road system, which would have to be scouted.

It's easy to say just maneuver around, and it was very easy for Longstreet to say it, since he had no responsibility for the safety of the army when it was on the move. Lee, however, couldn't just pick up and move. He had to ensure he had a safe route for his army to travel so it wouldn't be attacked on the move when it was weakest. And which strong defensive position would he have used? Lee had no idea where this mythical strong position would be located. Again, it's easy for Longstreet to say, "we'll just go find one" because he didn't have the responsibility for finding one. Lee, however, would have that responsibility. Lee wasn't on the distribution list for the Pipe Creek Circular, so he had no idea what the Pipe Creek Line was or where it was.

And you're assuming Meade allows Lee to maneuver between him and Washington. Meade's orders specified he was to always remain between Lee and Washington/Baltimore. Meade had his cavalry as well as signal stations set up in the surrounding area and would be able to tell when Lee was trying to maneuver to the south.

Such a move was fraught with danger and would likely have failed.

And we also have to remember that where Lee thought Meade's forces were dispositioned on the morning of July 2 is different from where they actually were.

 

[Billy Yank]

Let's also remember that Lee studied Napoleonic tactics at West Point. He was also a top student, so it must have sunk-in. Couple that with his experiences in the War with Mexico. Concentrated frontal assaults were successful and in vogue prior to "rifled" weaponry which made frontal assaults and Napoleonic tactics of that order relatively obsolete. Lee hadn't quite realized this yet and paid the price in addition to the other points made on this thread.

 

[wausaubob]

I think we under estimate how fast the killing power of all the armies increased in 1863-1864. People learned to shoot and accepted the concept of shooting to kill.
By 1863 United States artillery was trained through experience.
The armies became professionalized both with respect to handling their weapons and in utilizing cover.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Strategically, Lee had to secure the Road Net, if he was to continue his invasion of Pa.

Tactically, he attacked, because, in the absence of reliable intel reports from Stuart, he could only reasonably assume, from previous experience he could only assume that he was facing only a part of the AoP thus, had it heavily outnumbered.

Day 2, was the culmination of Lee's supreme confidence that properly any properly planned attack, properly positioned and properly led, the AoP could not stand against a full-blooded assault by the high morale ANV.(the attack was not properly planned, not properly positioned or properly led, so we will never know whether Lee's confidence was misplaced, or not),

 

[Carronade]

Why not simply take Long streets advice and move around the Union position southwest towards Washington? Meade would have followed and been forced to attack. Given a strong defensive position, there is no reason Lee could not have been able to score victory. Remember, Meade had prepared just such a defensive position at Pipe's Creek.

We should always be skeptical of plans which depend on the enemy doing what you want them to do.

In this case, the premise is that if Lee settles into a defensive position that the AofP cannot possibly successfully attack, the AofP will attack. I'll agree there would be political pressure, but the only way Meade would "have to" attack is if the position itself encompassed something vital to the Federals, sitting on the railroad north from Washington for example. If the game is just "who can get a few miles closer to Washington", then as soon as the rebels stop marching and start digging in, Meade can move around their flank. Lee would also have to sustain his army without being able to forage or receive supplies once the Federals were in close proximity. And if his strategy was not successful, he might be in a more dangerous situation than he was after Gettysburg.

 

[Irishtom29]

Day 2, was the culmination of Lee's supreme confidence that properly any properly planned attack, properly positioned and properly led, the AoP could not stand against a full-blooded assault by the high morale ANV.(the attack was not properly planned, not properly positioned or properly led, so we will never know whether Lee's confidence was misplaced, or not),

I know what you're getting at but I submit that because, in the event, the attack wasn't properly planned, positioned or led that Lee's confidence in his army was misplaced—the failures were in the very nature of Lee and his army.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

I know what you're getting at but I submit that because, in the event, the attack wasn't properly planned, positioned or led that Lee's confidence in his army was misplaced—the failures were in the very nature of Lee and his army.

You make three statements. Let's examine them:

Was the attack properly planned?

The plan is simple. An echelon attack falling like a series of domino's working its way up the Union life from its left flank all the way up to Cemetary Hill (Lee's real target). At the same time Ewell would launch a series of diversionary attacks on the Union right flank so that reinforcements can't be sent from there.

In theory this should work perfectly. However it is created before Midday (accounts differ as to whether it was created before or after Lee left to go to speak to Ewell - certainly it was being mentioned beforehand but as Longstreet (later) claimed there was no consensus for an attack until after Lee's return. (Even then Longstreet claims not to have been in favor though he does - slowly - set the plan in motion. As a result the troops dont get into position until 3/4 PM and by then the situation has changed markedly (Sickles). There is also the problem that the intelligence report that the plan is based on is dubious to say the least. However even with this if the plan had been adhered to I think there is a reasonable chance of success.

Was the attack properly positioned?

In hindsight which is an exact science no. But it was not egregiously wrong.

Was the attack properly led?

The problems as I see it are in the Leadership and there is plenty of blame to go around to borrow/paraphrase a phrase from the esteemed Eric Wittenburg (admittedly not one he used about this particular incident)... but still it seemed apt.

To begin with Lee seems to be having an off day. Everyone is allowed one now and then but for the ANV it will be a major problem. As a result when Longstreet and later Ewell start questioning his judgment he doesnt take it well and apparently does something that he just doesnt do. He issues orders to McLaws that bypass Longstreet. This runs counter to his usually laissez faire command style.

Longstreet appears to get in a huff about this and pedanticly follows his orders to the letter. (The Countermarch. Waiting on Laws brigade) He also does not seem to have bothered scouting either the route or the location of the attack that at the least he was aware Lee was contemplating attacking.

Ewell is being equally hard headed and pretty much refuses to give up the ground he gained on Day One. He also delays his diversionary attack until way after Longstreet's attack has begun. Thereby negating its effectiveness as a diversionary attack but increasing its own chance of success. A coincidence? I think not.

A.P. Hill. Who? Where? The mystery man of Gettysburg. Yes he is new to Corps Command but especially on Day 2 and 3 he doesnt seem to bother... May also have been ill but that mostly seems to be post war speculation. Lee was also supposedly keeping an eye on him... If so it isnt very effective.

Hood and McClaws then perform magnificently, the echelon attack that is two brigades deep along the front doing all that can be asked of it and more in that it attracts troops from 6 Union Corps! Only Eleventh and the Cavalry don't send troops. Ok its not perfect and Hood going down is a major blow but even so... 6 Corps!

Then comes Anderson's division. Having a jolly little picnic (literally) while your division is going forward is not generally considered to be the right thing to do. Having only 3 and a bit of your 5 brigades charge is also inexcusable. (The troops that do charge do so very heroically and their sacrifice is oft overlooked) They also reach Cemetary Ridge in places but without support (Mahone should never have commanded again after his shameful refusal to advance IMHO) are persuaded to retire.

Rodes/ Early do well but it's supposed to be a diversion so havent brought enough men when they encounter unexpected success. This is quickly snuffed out.

Allegheny Johnson is unfortunate/ a victim of Ewell's decision to delay the attack in that he comes across bad terrain and faces the only fortified Union position. Then darkness comes robbing him of the ability to attack/ see quite where he is and how vulnerable the Union supply lines are. (This has changed by first light).

All through this Confederate troops fight bravely and yet the people above them have some serious questions to answer and IMHO that starts with Lee. However in the Confederate Mythos and especially the post war Lost Cause Mythos he is bulletproof therefore the problems must be elsewhere...

So I would say Lee is right to have confidence in the fighting abilities of the men of the ANV. Maybe he is not so correct in having confidence in some of its leadership... and perhaps that day his own...

EDIT - punctuation/ clarity

 

[OpnCoronet]

I know what you're getting at but I submit that because, in the event, the attack wasn't properly planned, positioned or led that Lee's confidence in his army was misplaced—the failures were in the very nature of Lee and his army.

If you re saying that Lee's failure at Gettysburg was inherent in the fact of Lee's aggressiveness and the ANV's high morale, I am not sure I can agree.

I think, the failure was due to the chances for success, were vitiated by Lee's command decisions, i.e., failure was not due to Lee being too aggressive or the ANV being too confident, but, because, basically, Lee, to all intents and purposes, could not(or would not) command his corps commanders.

 

[WJC]

Lee, to all intents and purposes, could not(or would not) command his corps commanders.

My assessment as well. When close control of the situation was required, Lee chose to not to exercise his command prerogatives.

 

[WJC]

You make three statements. Let's examine them:

Was the attack properly planned?

The plan is simple. An echelon attack falling like a series of domino's working its way up the Union life from its left flank all the way up to Cemetary Hill (Lee's real target). At the same time Ewell would launch a series of diversionary attacks on the Union right flank so that reinforcements can't be sent from there.

In theory this should work perfectly. However it is created before Midday (accounts differ as to whether it was created before or after Lee left to go to speak to Ewell - certainly it was being mentioned beforehand but as Longstreet (later) claimed there was no consensus for an attack until after Lee's return. (Even then Longstreet claims not to have been in favor though he does - slowly - set the plan in motion. As a result the troops dont get into position until 3/4 PM and by then the situation has changed markedly (Sickles). There is also the problem that the intelligence report that the plan is based on is dubious to say the least. However even with this if the plan had been adhered to I think there is a reasonable chance of success.

Was the attack properly positioned?

In hindsight which is an exact science no. But it was not egregiously wrong.

Was the attack properly led?

The problems as I see it are in the Leadership and there is plenty of blame to go around to borrow/paraphrase a phrase from the esteemed Eric Wittenburg (admittedly not one he used about this particular incident)... but still it seemed apt.

To begin with Lee seems to be having an off day. Everyone is allowed one now and then but for the ANV it will be a major problem. As a result when Longstreet and later Ewell start questioning his judgment he doesnt take it well and apparently does something that he just doesnt do. He issues orders to McLaws that bypass Longstreet. This runs counter to his usually laissez faire command style.

Longstreet appears to get in a huff about this and pedanticly follows his orders to the letter. (The Countermarch. Waiting on Laws brigade) He also does not seem to have bothered scouting either the route or the location of the attack that at the least he was aware Lee was contemplating attacking.

Ewell is being equally hard headed and pretty much refuses to give up the ground he gained on Day One. He also delays his diversionary attack until way after Longstreet's attack has begun. Thereby negating its effectiveness as a diversionary attack but increasing its own chance of success. A coincidence? I think not.

A.P. Hill. Who? Where? The mystery man of Gettysburg. Yes he is new to Corps Command but especially on Day 2 and 3 he doesnt seem to bother... May also have been ill but that mostly seems to be post war speculation. Lee was also supposedly keeping an eye on him... If so it isnt very effective.

Hood and McClaws then perform magnificently, the echelon attack that is two brigades deep along the front doing all that can be asked of it and more in that it attracts troops from 6 Union Corps! Only Eleventh and the Cavalry don't send troops. Ok its not perfect and Hood going down is a major blow but even so... 6 Corps!

Then comes Anderson's division. Having a jolly little picnic (literally) while your division is going forward is not generally considered to be the right thing to do. Having only 3 and a bit of your 5 brigades charge is also inexcusable. (The troops that do charge do so very heroically and their sacrifice is oft overlooked) They also reach Cemetary Ridge in places but without support (Mahone should never have commanded again after his shameful refusal to advance IMHO) are persuaded to retire.

Rodes/ Early do well but it's supposed to be a diversion so havent brought enough men when they encounter unexpected success. This is quickly snuffed out.

Allegheny Johnson is unfortunate/ a victim of Ewell's decision to delay the attack in that he comes across bad terrain and faces the only fortified Union position. Then darkness comes robbing him of the ability to attack/ see quite where he is and how vulnerable the Union supply lines are. (This has changed by first light).

All through this Confederate troops fight bravely and yet the people above them have some serious questions to answer and IMHO that starts with Lee. However in the Confederate Mythos and especially the post war Lost Cause Mythos he is bulletproof therefore the problems must be elsewhere...

So I would say Lee is right to have confidence in the fighting abilities of the men of the ANV. Maybe he is not so correct in having confidence in some of its leadership... and perhaps that day his own...

EDIT - punctuation/ clarity

I agree with your assessment, with one caveat: resolving these problems involving his subordinates was solely Lee's responsibility. His failure to take firm control and get everyone 'onboard' was a crucial mistake.

 

[Irishtom29]

If you re saying that Lee's failure at Gettysburg was inherent in the fact of Lee's aggressiveness and the ANV's high morale...

I'm not. The problems with Lee and his army were other things.

 

[Irishtom29]

I agree with your assessment, with one caveat: resolving these problems involving his subordinates was solely Lee's responsibility. His failure to take firm control and get everyone 'onboard' was a crucial mistake.

Lee didn't have enough "grip" on his army, as Montgomery might've put it.

 

[WJC]

Lee didn't have enough "grip" on his army, as Montgomery might've put it.

Thanks for your response.
Exactly!

 

[rpkennedy]

A thought about Lee taking a firmer grip on his corps commanders:

To my mind, the corps commanders weren't the problem at Gettysburg. While the argument can be made that Longstreet acted pouty, he still carried out Lee's orders nearly to the letter (he received permission to await Law's arrival before setting off on July 2, his attack went in how Lee wanted given the variables on the ground). Ewell used the prerogative that Lee's orders allowed to determine that an attack on July 1 was not feasible, especially since he was denied support from Hill on his right. If Lee thought that Ewell should have attacked, the orders would have been much less vague with less wiggle-room. Frankly, if Lee's orders weren't being carried out, his orders may be the reason and not the corps commanders' failures.

Ryan

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

If you re saying that Lee's failure at Gettysburg was inherent in the fact of Lee's aggressiveness and the ANV's high morale, I am not sure I can agree.

I think, the failure was due to the chances for success, were vitiated by Lee's command decisions, i.e., failure was not due to Lee being too aggressive or the ANV being too confident, but, because, basically, Lee, to all intents and purposes, could not(or would not) command his corps commanders.

Why not both? I agree the second is the greater factor, but Pickett's Charge has a strong wiff of overconfidence at the least (did anyone besides Longstreet tell Lee it was a mistake when he ordered it?). So do Lee's movements prior to the battle. Lee's hands-off treatment of Ewell and Hill, new corps corps commanders, is also a kind of overconfidence.

 

[klongstreet]

I can't think of any other answer that has not been mentioned, taken as a whole every reason has been mentioned. I would have thought that Lee would have planned the invasion with more care or at least used more intel regarding the area's he would have to pass. Gettysburg was an accident I know, however the intel gathering was very shoddy at the least once battle had started, was it too difficult to asked if any men in the army knew the area, ( we know of 2 at least) and gained better information regarding the terrain. I know it is hindsight but good intel at valuable times may have changed the outcome instead of going in blind.

 

[Zack]

I read a collection of essays about Gettysburg and one of them addressed Lee's motivations for attacking on the third day.

This historian argued that Lee was likely considering a few factors in making the decision to attack:
1) Two months prior, Union forces had successfully executed a frontal assault against well entrenched Confederate forces atop Marye's Heights during the Battle of Chancellorsville.
2) On the second day of the battle, Lee had launched aggressive assaults against the left and right flank of the Union army. This likely meant that Meade had to strip forces from the center of his line in order to bolster the flanks.
3) On the second day of the battle, Confederate forces had, albeit briefly, actually broken through the Union line atop Cemetery Ridge before being driven back. If a few Confederate brigades could succeed in temporarily breaching the Union line, then a few divisions surely should be able to secure a decisive breakthrough.
4) Lee had no way of knowing that the artillery bombardment was going to fail. He believed that his concentrated bombardment would break up Union defenses along Cemetery Ridge and aid the breakthrough. With the amount of smoke and dirt and dust kicked up by the bombardment, combined with a slowing of Union artillery fire, the bombardment seemed at the time to have done its job.
5) Pickett's Charge, better Longstreet's Assault, was not the only attack planned for the third day of the battle. It was to be combined with a renewed assault against the Union right flank on Culp's Hill. I'm writing this from memory, but I recall that there is some debate over whether Lee knew the attack had failed when Longstreet's Assault began. I wish I had the book with me so I could remember how the historian argued this point, but I do remember him discussing it in some way.

These factors, combined with those listed by other posters, such as how close he had come to victory on the first two days, his faith in the ability of his army, the strategic situation of the war, and so on, all likely contributed to Lee's decision to launch an assault on the third day of the battle.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Why not both? I agree the second is the greater factor, but Pickett's Charge has a strong wiff of overconfidence at the least (did anyone besides Longstreet tell Lee it was a mistake when he ordered it?). So do Lee's movements prior to the battle. Lee's hands-off treatment of Ewell and Hill, new corps corps commanders, is also a kind of overconfidence.

My feelings about Pickett's Charge on Day3, are ambivalent. To me it can be seen as overconfidence, but, it can also, be seen as an act of desperation, a last throw of the dice to retrieve all that had been lost in one final throw.. Sometimes I see it one way and the other at another time(I tend to lean towards desperation, more often than not).

To me, Lee's plans on all three days, were solid, it was in their execution that was flawed, and, to me, the flaws originated, with Lee's refusal(or inability) to exercise his command responsibilities. in a timely manner.