Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[rpkennedy]

3) On the second day of the battle, Confederate forces had, albeit briefly, actually broken through the Union line atop Cemetery Ridge before being driven back. If a few Confederate brigades could succeed in temporarily breaching the Union line, then a few divisions surely should be able to secure a decisive breakthrough.

In all fairness, we don't know that Lee even knew how far that Wright got on July 2. While it's true that Wright was not one to keep his opinions to himself, there simply is no evidence that Lee was aware of it. That being said, Wright did tell Pickett what he was facing, commenting that it wasn't so hard to get there but very difficult to stay there.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

To me, Lee's plans on all three days, were solid, it was in their execution that was flawed, and, to me, the flaws originated, with Lee's refusal(or inability) to exercise his command responsibilities. in a timely manner.

While I tend to agree that the execution was the problem, I don't think that it was failure to execute at the corps level. Longstreet was following Lee's orders, perhaps too faithfully in that he stubbornly stuck to the plan even when flexibility may have been a better course. Ewell (IMO) did a pretty good job at Gettysburg making the correct decision on July 1 given the circumstances. Hill, while sick, stayed near Lee for much of the battle and seems to have been shuffled away from command on July 2 and 3. Now, there were issues further down the chain at the division and brigade level that needed to be addressed and that's where the execution got spotty.

Ryan

 

[OpnCoronet]

While I tend to agree that the execution was the problem, I don't think that it was failure to execute at the corps level. Longstreet was following Lee's orders, perhaps too faithfully in that he stubbornly stuck to the plan even when flexibility may have been a better course. Ewell (IMO) did a pretty good job at Gettysburg making the correct decision on July 1 given the circumstances. Hill, while sick, stayed near Lee for much of the battle and seems to have been shuffled away from command on July 2 and 3. Now, there were issues further down the chain at the division and brigade level that needed to be addressed and that's where the execution got spotty.

Ryan

A pretty good synopsis of the facts that, lead me to believe it was Lee's lack of control that defeated Lee's own plans.

On Day one, Ewell exercised his command responsibilities and did not make the final push to take Cemetery Hill, which Ewell did not think he could without reinforcements and Lee did not exercise his command responsibility, by withholding those reinforcements Or, overriding Ewell and ordering the attack anyway.

Lee seemed content to have the ineffective(for whatever reason) beside him, rather seeing a fresh and aggressive officer was in temporary command of Hill's Corp

Lee's command style, placed a premium on the initiative and flexibility of the offices executing his plans and when, at Gettysburg, that initiative and flexibility, was absent, Lee had no answer, i.e., he could(would) not override faltering commanders or impose his will on reluctant generals, when needed.

 

[AUG]

Let's also remember that Lee studied Napoleonic tactics at West Point. He was also a top student, so it must have sunk-in. Couple that with his experiences in the War with Mexico. Concentrated frontal assaults were successful and in vogue prior to "rifled" weaponry which made frontal assaults and Napoleonic tactics of that order relatively obsolete. Lee hadn't quite realized this yet and paid the price in addition to the other points made on this thread.

Not to derail the thread, but I think it was lack of better coordination and communication among other factors that often bungled frontal assaults in the ACW more so than the rifled musket. Some of the Federal troops on Cemetery Ridge were armed with smoothbore muskets and, loaded with buck and ball rounds, wreaked havoc on the Confederate troops attacking to their front just as much if not more so than those armed with rifles. As I recall, a few units actually preferred the smoothbore armed with buck and ball over the rifle.

Of course Pickett's Charge was bound to fail, regardless of what the defenders were armed with; others could have succeeded if things were done differently. A frontal assault somewhere is often necessary, but it depends on the context in which it is done.

I think we under estimate how fast the killing power of all the armies increased in 1863-1864. People learned to shoot and accepted the concept of shooting to kill.
By 1863 United States artillery was trained through experience.
The armies became professionalized both with respect to handling their weapons and in utilizing cover.

While I agree that the armies did learn some things from experience by 1863-64, I don't think "killing power" necessarily increased. The early battles were just as bloody as the later; what about the Seven Days battles, Shiloh, Stones River, Antietam, Fredericksburg? Plus, there were also troops with little combat experience at Gettysburg, like the 26th NC and 24th MI which both still fought hard and suffered heavy losses going head-to-head.

 

[rpkennedy]

On Day one, Ewell exercised his command responsibilities and did not make the final push to take Cemetery Hill, which Ewell did not think he could without reinforcements and Lee did not exercise his command responsibility, by withholding those reinforcements Or, overriding Ewell and ordering the attack anyway.

Or Lee felt that Ewell on the ground had the responsibility and judgment to make the call whether an attack was feasible. If Lee wanted an attack, he could have ordered one but not being there and with a lack of intelligence about what was in front of them, Ewell had to make the call.

Lee seemed content to have the ineffective(for whatever reason) beside him, rather seeing a fresh and aggressive officer was in temporary command of Hill's Corp

In all fairness, Hill's division commanders did not exactly cover themselves with glory at Gettysburg. The only real option to replace Hill was Richard Anderson and he had his own issues that July. Pender did ok on July 1 and Heth was out of commission. An ailing Hill was sadly the best option.

Lee's command style, placed a premium on the initiative and flexibility of the offices executing his plans and when, at Gettysburg, that initiative and flexibility, was absent, Lee had no answer, i.e., he could(would) not override faltering commanders or impose his will on reluctant generals, when needed.

Other than a sick A.P. Hill, who faltered or was reluctant at Gettysburg? Longstreet followed Lee's orders and Ewell was effective in doing what was asked of him.

Ryan

 

[WJC]

Ewell had to make the call.

I believe that, given the circumstances, Ewell made the right call. Ewell has been badly treated by 'Monday morning quarterbacks', in much the same way Meade has been badly treated for 'letting Lee get away'. Both men had a better appreciation of the task and the condition of their troops than those not on the scene or since.

 

[WJC]

I read a collection of essays about Gettysburg and one of them addressed Lee's motivations for attacking on the third day.

This historian argued that Lee....

Who was the historian?

 

[FZ11]

Union Artillery:

First Corps: 12 Napoleons, 16 3" Rifles
Second Corps: 12 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 4 10-lb Parrotts
Third Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 10-lb Parrotts
Fifth Corps: 12 Napoleons, 8 3" Rifles, 6 10-lb Parrotts
Sixth Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 18 10-lb Parrotts
Eleventh Corps: 16 Napoleons, 10 3" Rifles
Twelfth Corps: 10 Napoleons, 10 10-lb Parrotts
Cavalry Corps: 50 3" Rifles
Artillery Reserve: 2 12-lb Howitzers, 44 Napoleons, 40 3" Rifles, 8 4.5" Rifles, 4 James Rifles, 10 10-lb Parrotts, 6 20-lb Parrotts

TOTALS
2 12-lb Howitzers
142 Napoleons
144 3" Rifles
60 10-lb Parrotts
6 20-lb Parrotts
8 4.5" Rifles
4 James Rifles

144 smoothbores
222 rifles

Ryan

Great info,Thanks!.

 

[rpkennedy]

I believe that, given the circumstances, Ewell made the right call. Ewell has been badly treated by 'Monday morning quarterbacks', in much the same way Meade has been badly treated for 'letting Lee get away'. Both men had a better appreciation of the task and the condition of their troops than those not on the scene or since.

I agree. Considering what Ewell could see and what he knew, I also think that he made the right call. Ewell was receiving reports that Union troops were sighted off to the east on the Hanover Road and that took Smith and later Gordon out of the action. That leaves him with Hays and Avery from Early's Division and only a few elements of Rodes' Division to make an attack. He can see a lot of guns on Cemetery Hill, Union troops rallying and forming on the slope and crest of the hill, and has zero information about what else is on or behind the hills. He's been told all day to be careful not to bring on a general engagement and thus must be careful about how his attack occurs. In addition, Lee's orders are to attack if possible and Ewell is willing to do so but asks for asks for support on his right from Hill and is told that he is on his own. Lastly, any attack that he makes has to be formed up south of Gettysburg so that the town itself doesn't break up the formation and south of town is directly under the muzzles of all those cannon and rifles on Cemetery Hill.

So, Ewell is left with a relative handful of troops to make an attack, they have to form up within range of the enemy, and he's not going to have any support. I understand why Ewell wanted to wait for Johnson's Division to arrive before acting.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Great info,Thanks!.

You are welcome.

Ryan

 

[Yankeedave]

Sun Tzu
"Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground."

"But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first."

"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."

Longstreet also knew this.

 

[FZ11]

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

I vote for "Desperation" and your last sentence. "It doesn't make sense." Day 1 Lee was lucky. Day 2 was a ridiculous attack,Uphill, against a much larger force, awaiting the attack. Meade has interior lines and will always counter any attack with more men than Lee can concentrate. Further, the Federal troops are marching from the South toward the battlefield..... so on Day 2 there is a possibility Lee could have been flanked from the right and rear by Federals marching to Gettysburg. Day 3 was a slaughter, see Day 2. Like somebody said,"Get there first with the most men." Lee, simply, couldn't do that on Days 2 and 3 with his position vs. Meade's position.

 

[cash]

Sun Tzu
"Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground."

"But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first."

"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."

Longstreet also knew this.

Which Civil War generals had read Sun Tzu? I guess then, that according to Sun Tzu the confederates should not have attacked at Chancellorsville, and the Federals should not have attacked at Five Forks, both of them strong defensive positions that were key positions for each army.

 

[Yankeedave]

Which Civil War generals had read Sun Tzu? I guess then, that according to Sun Tzu the confederates should not have attacked at Chancellorsville, and the Federals should not have attacked at Five Forks, both of them strong defensive positions that were key positions for each army.

Read Sun Tzu's various forms of ground and you find why Chancellorsville worked for Lee. Read the various types of troops and armies on those grounds for Five Forks.
Dennis Hart Mahan would have counciled Lee on his choices at G'burg. Maybe Longstreet learned it there?

 

[cash]

Read Sun Tzu's various forms of ground and you find why Chancellorsville worked for Lee. Read the various types of troops and armies on those grounds for Five Forks.
Dennis Hart Mahan would have counciled Lee on his choices at G'burg. Maybe Longstreet learned it there?

Again, which Civil War generals read Sun Tzu?

Longstreet likely learned very little from Dennis Hart Mahan. West Point wasn't a school for generals, it was a school for lieutenants of engineering.

 

[cash]

No one knew more about what the military theorists of the time said than Henry W. Halleck. Look where that got him.

As to Longstreet, he wasn't the genius depicted in the movie Gettysburg or the novel The Killer Angels. "That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of the two men." [Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Civil War, p. 231]

 

[ErnieMac]

Let's take a look at Lee's campaigns since taking command of the ANVa.

Seven Days - In a week Lee forces McClellan back to the protection of his gunboats despite setbacks at Mechanicsville and Malvern Hill.

2nd Manassas - Jackson holds off Pope in two days of fighting. Lee drives Pope from the field on the third day.

Antietam - Lee on defense, no real opportunity for offensive action.

Fredericksburg- Lee on defense, no real opportunity for offensive action.

Chancellorsville - two days of attacks drive Hooker across the Rappahannock. The following day sees success against Sedgwick.

So what is it in this track record that would cause Lee to say an attack is impossible.

 

[Zack]

Who was the historian?

You know I'm absolutely blanking and the book is in a different state from me. I want to say it was one of the Gary Gallagher essay collections.

 

[FZ11]

Track record? Mostly on Defense on Familiar terrain. Fighting on Familiar soil with a Sympathetic Populace makes a big difference. As Lincoln said "Men fight better on their own Dunghill". Heck, even Hood knew he couldn't take Little Round Top. Lee was said to be not himself, Heart issues,Wild Cherries,and Desperation.

 

[Greywolf]

Or Lee felt that Ewell on the ground had the responsibility and judgment to make the call whether an attack was feasible. If Lee wanted an attack, he could have ordered one but not being there and with a lack of intelligence about what was in front of them, Ewell had to make the call.



In all fairness, Hill's division commanders did not exactly cover themselves with glory at Gettysburg. The only real option to replace Hill was Richard Anderson and he had his own issues that July. Pender did ok on July 1 and Heth was out of commission. An ailing Hill was sadly the best option.



Other than a sick A.P. Hill, who faltered or was reluctant at Gettysburg? Longstreet followed Lee's orders and Ewell was effective in doing what was asked of him.

Ryan

Do you think Pender could have done any better than Hill? He certainly was aggressive and was well regarded.