Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[Green Owl]

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

I think the answer is rather complex and may well never be known for the only person who really knows is Robert E Lee.

However some things can be said.

First he had a really good day on Day One. Victory looks to be within his grasp. Maybe it is chimerical but it certainly looks like he had a chance to destroy the Union army. Indeed as Day Two dawns it looks like he still has that opportunity for what scouting reports he has suggest that the Union left flank is in the air (See the various threads on the subject such as https://civilwartalk.com/threads/i-dont-understand-lees-orders-for-day-2.148046/ - There are many more) That means he can perhaps repeat Chancellorsville, this time with his dependable old warhorse Longstreet in the role of Jackson.

Of course it doesnt turn out like that.

Second, I also think we have to remember that by inclination Lee was an aggressive General and I think Gettysburg is the price Lee ends up paying for something that has previously worked well for him.

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence and the sub standard performance of a number of his subordinates.

Fourth, Lee may well not have been feeling very well. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that. Imagine trying to command so many people while under the weather.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

Additionally, and respectfully, the Union line was not (other than Greene's Brigade on Culp's Hill) fortified. Now I am not saying it wasnt a strong position backed by plentiful artillery (because it was) but at this point in the war neither army dug in as standard. It's coming and coming soon but has not yet arrived though a few Union units did very slightly 'improve their positions' by canibalising nearby fence posts and rails should they be behind a fence line of their own. It certainly was not universal and mostly the Union army made use of any local walls and fences rather than creating their own.

I would also add that Longstreet's reminiscence is post war and may have been influenced by post war factors.

 

[rpkennedy]

I would argue that Gettysburg is vintage Lee and absolutely not an anomaly. Lee demonstrated repeatedly during the war that he was willing to make risky gambles in order to achieve greater results. In another time and profession, Lee would have been a master riverboat gambler. The difference at Gettysburg was that the dice did not fall the way that Lee expected for a number of reasons (the Army of the Potomac fought the battle of the war, a lack of accurate intelligence, major failures of generalship, officer casualties at extremely inconvenient times, etc.).

As for Longstreet's statement, it's pure fantasy from a time when he was defending himself from attacks that blamed him for losing the war at Gettysburg. To believe that Lee would go into a campaign and promise to limit his tactical options is, to be frank, absurd. Lee was nothing if not flexible in what he was willing to try in an attempt to gain a victory.

Ryan

 

[Drew]

Now I am not saying it wasnt a strong position backed by plentiful artillery (because it was)

Yes, but the Union artillery was overwhelmingly rifled and could not effectively deliver cannister that was so devastating to an infantry charge. Confederate scouts knew it, they could see it with their 'looking glasses.'

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Yes, but the Union artillery was overwhelmingly rifled and could not effectively deliver cannister that was so devastating to an infantry charge. Confederate scouts knew it, they could see it with their 'looking glasses.'

Overwhelmingly?

Apologies for this if I am wrong but while I accept rifled artillery was in the majority I wouldnt go so far as to say overwhelmingly so. I say this because I have read quite some on the make up of the Union artillery and indeed have just gone looking for a book that I know breaks this down. Annoyingly I can't find it (must have put it somewhere 'safe') so I am not in a position to provide the hard numbers I would have liked. Do you happen to have the numbers?

From memory I thought it was that other than in the Artillery Reserve (which was pretty much rifled) there was about a three to two ratio rifled/ 12pdr Napoleon smoothbore) in the Corps artillery. Can anyone support that? Can I find the darned book that I want and that would make this so much easier...

 

[rpkennedy]

Union Artillery:

First Corps: 12 Napoleons, 16 3" Rifles
Second Corps: 12 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 4 10-lb Parrotts
Third Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 10-lb Parrotts
Fifth Corps: 12 Napoleons, 8 3" Rifles, 6 10-lb Parrotts
Sixth Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 18 10-lb Parrotts
Eleventh Corps: 16 Napoleons, 10 3" Rifles
Twelfth Corps: 10 Napoleons, 10 10-lb Parrotts
Cavalry Corps: 50 3" Rifles
Artillery Reserve: 2 12-lb Howitzers, 44 Napoleons, 40 3" Rifles, 8 4.5" Rifles, 4 James Rifles, 10 10-lb Parrotts, 6 20-lb Parrotts

TOTALS
2 12-lb Howitzers
142 Napoleons
144 3" Rifles
60 10-lb Parrotts
6 20-lb Parrotts
8 4.5" Rifles
4 James Rifles

144 smoothbores
222 rifles

Ryan

 

[Lusty Murfax]

It all comes down to a lack of mobility and poor communications. Tactics were governed by the ability or inability to advantageously deploy your own massed troops to engage the enemy before he could concentrate his forces against you. Once a plan was put in motion it was difficult to effectively correct deployments on a timely basis. There must have been lots of ah-sh!t moments for era commanders.

 

[Jimklag]

Yes, but the Union artillery was overwhelmingly rifled and could not effectively deliver cannister that was so devastating to an infantry charge. Confederate scouts knew it, they could see it with their 'looking glasses.'

According to Henry Hunt, who ought to know, 364 guns were present. 142 were smoothbores plus 2 howitzers (39.5%) Out of 220 rifles: 150 were 3inch, 4 were James and 66 were Parrotts- 10 and 20lb (60.5%). So, 140+ smoothbore guns ought to be able to deliver plenty of canister.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Union Artillery:

First Corps: 12 Napoleons, 16 3" Rifles
Second Corps: 12 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 4 10-lb Parrotts
Third Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 10-lb Parrotts
Fifth Corps: 12 Napoleons, 8 3" Rifles, 6 10-lb Parrotts
Sixth Corps: 18 Napoleons, 12 3" Rifles, 18 10-lb Parrotts
Eleventh Corps: 16 Napoleons, 10 3" Rifles
Twelfth Corps: 10 Napoleons, 10 10-lb Parrotts
Cavalry Corps: 50 3" Rifles
Artillery Reserve: 2 12-lb Howitzers, 44 Napoleons, 40 3" Rifles, 8 4.5" Rifles, 4 James Rifles, 10 10-lb Parrotts, 6 20-lb Parrotts

TOTALS
2 12-lb Howitzers
142 Napoleons
144 3" Rifles
60 10-lb Parrotts
6 20-lb Parrotts
8 4.5" Rifles
4 James Rifles

144 smoothbores
222 rifles

Ryan

Many thanks.

142 Napoleons. That's a not inconsiderable number available though for Day 2 at a minimum we need to lose the 18 from 6th Corps. Still, lets put the number readily available at over 100...

And of course as I write this Jimklag says pretty much the same thing.

 

[Jimklag]

Many thanks.

142 Napoleons. That's a not inconsiderable number available though for Day 2 at a minimum we need to lose the 18 from 6th Corps. Still, lets put the number readily available at over 100...

And of course as I write this Jimklag says pretty much the same thing.

From Hunt's report in the OR.

 

[rpkennedy]

Confederate Artillery:

First Corps: 1 6-lb gun, 9 12-lb Howitzer, 4 24-lb Howitzers, 41 Napoleons, 16 3" Rifles, 12 10-lb Parrotts, 4 20-lb Parrotts
Second Corps: 28 Napoleons*, 29 3" Rifles, 16 10-lb Parrotts, 6 20-lb Parrotts
Third Corps: 15 12-lb Howitzers, 30 Napoleons, 27 3" Rifles**, 10 10-lb Parrotts, 2 Whitworth rifles
Cavalry: 2 Napoleons, 6 3" Rifles, 4 10-lb Parrotts, 3 Blakely rifles (8 guns of unknown composition)

* 2 guns are classified as "12 pound light guns" which may or may not be Napoleons specifically.
** 4 guns are classified as a "3-inch Navy rifle"

TOTALS
1 6-lb gun, 24 12-lb Howitzers, 4 24-lb Howitzers, 101 Napoleons, 78 3" Rifles, 42 10-lb Parrotts, 10 20-lb Parrotts, 3 Blakely rifles, 2 Whitworth rifles

130 smoothbores
135 rifles

Ryan

 

[bdtex]

"Those people" were there. It think it's that simple.

 

[wausaubob]

If Gettysburg is viewed as separate, then bdtex is accurate.
However, past about May 25, 1863 the approximate date at which Pemberton would have to surrender was known. Past the 17th of June is was obvious that Sherman could out fortify Johnston and any attempt Johnston made to relieve Vicksburg would be deflected southward, and would be, most likely unsuccessful.
Military efforts were co-ordinated with an attempt to get recognition in Britain based on the invasion of Pennsylvania.
In addition a naval raid up the coast produced some panic in the United States.
We will never know, but the dates of the draft selections in New York were known in advance. There were abundant Confederate sympathizers there to take advantage of the inevitable unrest.
Summer was always the best season for the Confederates to fight.
In my view, he took an appropriate gamble to attempt to win the war for his government. By July 7, 1863 it would have been too late. By July 2, 1863, all General Meade had to accomplish was stay between Lee and Washington, D.C. I think July 7, 1863 is about the date the news came over the wire that Vicksburg had fallen to the US forces.
Also consider that by June 17, 1863 General Rosecrans was beginning his movements, which meant that General Bragg had to be careful, and the chance to further reinforce Johnston was gone.
Rocecrans moves about the same time Grant relieves McClernand. By that time the invasion is last the chance the Confederates have to win the war.

 

[Drew]

According to Henry Hunt, who ought to know, 364 guns were present. 142 were smoothbores plus 2 howitzers (39.5%) Out of 220 rifles: 150 were 3inch, 4 were James and 66 were Parrotts- 10 and 20lb (60.5%). So, 140+ smoothbore guns ought to be able to deliver plenty of canister.

"Present?" OK, but where? I've not seen reports of Confederate infantry mowed down with cannister at Gettysburg.

Quite the opposite.

 

[Jimklag]

"Present?" OK, but where? I've not seen reports of Confederate infantry mowed down with cannister at Gettysburg.

Quite the opposite.

A significant percentage of the casualties in the PPT charge were from canister. The last 400 yards of that attack, Union guns had a field day.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

"Present?" OK, but where? I've not seen reports of Confederate infantry mowed down with cannister at Gettysburg.

Quite the opposite.

Then just off the top of my head I respectfully suggest you examine the 'work' of Heckmans Battery K Ohio Light Artillery (ok that's day one) or the effectiveness of the 18 Napoleons of 3rd Corps on Day two.

 

[rpkennedy]

"Present?" OK, but where? I've not seen reports of Confederate infantry mowed down with cannister at Gettysburg.

Quite the opposite.

Even rifles could be effective with canister, although not as effective as smoothbores. The 5th Maine Battery (along with 3 Napoleons from Battery B, 4th United States Artillery and the rallied regiments from the Iron Brigade and the Bucktails) devastated General Alfred Scales' North Carolinians in their attack against Seminary Ridge on July 1st. In a matter of minutes, at least 40% of Scales' men fell, leaving the brigade in a "...depressed, dilapidated, and almost unorganized condition." - Colonel William Lowrance, 34th North Carolina.

In addition, Captain Andrew Cowan's 3rd New York Battery (3" Rifles) ripped apart Pickett's men just south of the Copse of Trees when they unloaded with canister and then double canister.

Various batteries of Napoleons ripped apart Pettigrew and Pickett's men around and north of the Angle. Several batteries of Napoleons put a serious hurt on Kershaw and Semmes when they attacked towards the Rose Woods.

Ryan

 

[cash]

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

Back to the actual topic of the thread. As pointed out, the Union position wasn't fortified.

On July 1 Lee enjoyed a great victory, defeating and nearly destroying two corps of the Army of the Potomac and forcing a retreat through the town onto Cemetery Hill. This came almost two months after his victory at Chancellorsville.

On July 2, Lee had the following choices:

1. Retreat
2. Maneuver
3. Stay in place
4. Attack

He considered each alternative carefully and came to the logical decision that attack was his best option. He was trying to win the war, after all, and a retreat would not do that. Maneuvering without cavalry was too dangerous. Staying in place was dangerous as well, since the Union Army was getting stronger with time while he was not going to get any stronger. Attack, then, was his best option for July 2.

On that day, he came very close to winning. The Union line was almost broken in several places, and only the last second arrival of new troops in various places was able to stave off Union defeat.

On July 3, he had the same options:

1. Retreat
2. Maneuver
3. Stay in place
4. Attack.

Again, he considered each alternative carefully.
Retreat would not help him win the war.
He now had Stuart's cavalry to help with maneuver, but he needed to know what road system he would use, which he didn't know and didn't have time to find out.
He still would not get any stronger by staying in place, while Union reinforcements were still coming and the Union force would continue to get stronger. Additionally, his foraging was now limited, having cleaned out the area where he was. Staying there much longer would not do.

So he decided once again, logically, that attack was his best option, remembering his men had broken the Union line two days before and had almost broken the Union line again in several places the day before.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I don't think Lee's decision to attack on July 2 was any different than his m.o. in previous battles. The only times he stood strictly on the defensive was when he had no real choice (Antietam) and no room for maneuver (Fredericksburg). Withdrawing was not in his nature. He had limited options for maneuver on July 2 -- especially since his army was not fully concentrated at Gettysburg until well into the day. Lee's plan was solid, and although there were problems in its execution (as there were in almost every attack during the war) I think those problems were less than is sometimes stated. As Pickett would later say, I think the Union army had something to do with Lee's failure to win a great victory at Gettysburg. In my opinion, from top to bottom, Gettysburg was the best performance the Army of the Potomac had during a battle between 1861 and the final campaigns in the spring of 1865.