Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[American87]

Thanks for your response.
I don't believe he did change his plans to assault the center of the US position. When circumstances changed, he executed that portion of his original plan.
Lee clearly described the situation on July 3, 1863:

The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.
General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p.m.​

<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
So Lee planned a simultaneous attack on both the US right and center. However, the attack on the US right was abandoned after US forces initiated an exhausting action early in the morning of July 3, 1863. Lee adjusted his plan, deciding to rely on only the assault on the US center.

Thanks for your response.

Read the report again. Lee said Longstreet was supposed to resume the attack on the morning of the 3rd, but that his dispositions were not made as early as expected. Later on, he says the attack on the enemy's left (Longstreet's front) was not made, allowing the Union troops to defend their right (at least that's how Lee saw it.)

What Lee didn't mention is that he met Longstreet in person and told him to resume the attack, but Longstreet bickered and bickered, until Lee decided to call the plan off. That's not responding to circumstance, that's responding to an insubordinate lieutenant. Granted Longstreet didn't disobey any direct orders, he still refused Lee's verbal suggestions until he got his way.

 

[WJC]

Thanks for your response.

Read the report again. Lee said Longstreet was supposed to resume the attack on the morning of the 3rd, but that his dispositions were not made as early as expected. Later on, he says the attack on the enemy's left (Longstreet's front) was not made, allowing the Union troops to defend their right (at least that's how Lee saw it.)

What Lee didn't mention is that he met Longstreet in person and told him to resume the attack, but Longstreet bickered and bickered, until Lee decided to call the plan off. That's not responding to circumstance, that's responding to an insubordinate lieutenant. Granted Longstreet didn't disobey any direct orders, he still refused Lee's verbal suggestions until he got his way.

Thanks for your response,
None of this causes doubt of Lee's assertion that his "general plan was unchanged." In detail, the plan was modified because of changing circumstances. As he himself described these changing circumstances:

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p.m.
General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.​

<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
Lee clearly describes how he was forced to adapt the details of his general plan because of changing circumstances.
As to the oft-repeated claim that "Longstreet bickered" or somehow intimidated Lee, Lee certainly saw no need to discuss it at the time or afterward. My conclusion is that Lee was exercising his admirable leadership, listening to suggestions and alternatives, but reserving for himself the final decision. Further, it is clear that once Lee had listened to Longstreet and made his decision, Longstreet put every effort into faithfully carrying out Lee's plan.

 

[OpnCoronet]

As to the oft-repeated claim that "Longstreet bickered" or somehow intimidated Lee, Lee certainly saw no need to discuss it at the time or afterward. My conclusion is that Lee was exercising his admirable leadership, listening to suggestions and alternatives, but reserving for himself the final decision. Further, it is clear that once Lee had listened to Longstreet and made his decision, Longstreet put every effort into faithfully carrying out Lee's plan.

So Longstreet was 'Gung Ho' to plan and execute Pickett's attack on the Union center, and did everything in how power to see his attack succeeded?

 

[cash]

So Longstreet was 'Gung Ho' to plan and execute Pickett's attack on the Union center, and did everything in how power to see his attack succeeded?

Are you saying he deliberately ensured its failure?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Are you saying he deliberately ensured its failure?

My reply was to WJC's Post, as noted in my post. Do you think Longstreet did everything he could to faithfully carry out Lee's plan, on Day 3?

 

[Rebforever]

My reply was to WJC's Post, as noted in my post. Do you think Longstreet did everything he could to faithfully carry out Lee's plan, on Day 3?

NO!

 

[cash]

My reply was to WJC's Post, as noted in my post. Do you think Longstreet did everything he could to faithfully carry out Lee's plan, on Day 3?

I have seen no credible evidence to suggest he didn't.

So are you claiming he deliberately ensured its failure? I ask because if he didn't do everything he could think of for its success then he deliberately ensured its failure.

 

[Yankeedave]

Interesting thread.

 

[Northern Light]

So Longstreet was 'Gung Ho' to plan and execute Pickett's attack on the Union center, and did everything in how power to see his attack succeeded?

Not being Gung Ho and deliberately sabotaging the plan are two different creatures. He may have disagreed and worried about the attack, but that doesn't mean he didn't do his duty.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Not being Gung Ho and deliberately sabotaging the plan are two different creatures. He may have disagreed and worried about the attack, but that doesn't mean he didn't do his duty.

But, did he exert every effort to insure the success of Lee's plan Lee's plan, or did he do the bare minimum?

I am not claiming Longstreet sabotaged(a deliberate action) the attack on Day 3, merely that by what he did and did not do, made success less likely, i.e., from the evidence its seems that Longstreet expected the attack to fail, and sat back and watched it fail.

 

[Northern Light]

But, did he exert every effort to insure the success of Lee's plan Lee's plan, or did he do the bare minimum?

I am not claiming Longstreet sabotaged(a deliberate action) the attack on Day 3, merely that by what he did and did not do, made success less likely, i.e., from the evidence its seems that Longstreet expected the attack to fail, and sat back and watched it fail.

Okay, can you provide evidence of this alleged "sitting back" from accounts of the battle?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Okay, can you provide evidence of this alleged "sitting back" from accounts of the battle?

Do you know where Longstreet was, and, what he doing while Lee and Pickett were impatiently awaiting the order to attack?

Is there reliable evidence that Longstreet, could even bring himself to order the attack?

 

[Northern Light]

Do you know where Longstreet was, and, what he doing while Lee and Pickett were impatiently awaiting the order to attack?

Is there reliable evidence that Longstreet, could even bring himself to order the attack?

No, I don't, which is why I asked you. You made an accusation, I asked you to show me where I could find the evidence that you mentioned.

 

[Saint Jude]

It seems as though on that particular day, Lee just wanted the whole thing over was willing to take a huge risk to make his wish come true. But, who can know? His ill health may just have impeded his judgment.

 

[American87]

Thanks for your response,
None of this causes doubt of Lee's assertion that his "general plan was unchanged." In detail, the plan was modified because of changing circumstances. As he himself described these changing circumstances:

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p.m.
General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.​

<Lee's Last Official Report For The Battle of Gettysburg, O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44].
http://civilwarhome.com/leelastgettysburgor.htm>
Lee clearly describes how he was forced to adapt the details of his general plan because of changing circumstances.
As to the oft-repeated claim that "Longstreet bickered" or somehow intimidated Lee, Lee certainly saw no need to discuss it at the time or afterward. My conclusion is that Lee was exercising his admirable leadership, listening to suggestions and alternatives, but reserving for himself the final decision. Further, it is clear that once Lee had listened to Longstreet and made his decision, Longstreet put every effort into faithfully carrying out Lee's plan.

Lee's general plan was unchanged in the sense that he was still attacking the Union position. But he went from attacking their left flank to launching Pickett's Charge. That is a change on some level. Longstreet bickered and bickered and refued Lee's repeated suggestions to attack the Union left. Lee was against arresting officers. He didn't know what to do. He ordered Pickett's Charge. Longstreet drank alcohol during the Charge and gave orders under the influence. This confused the Confederate rally as they were preparing for a Union counterattack. Lee was lucky the Unionists did not counterattack, because his corps commander in that sector was intoxicated and blistering mad!

 

[American87]

No, I don't, which is why I asked you. You made an accusation, I asked you to show me where I could find the evidence that you mentioned.

Longstreet was napping, or as he described it, 'laying down with my eyes closed.' He was also drunk later when he was arranging troops for a possible Union counterattack. It was pitiful. Gettysburg National Park has a statue on the site commemorating him. They should take it down.

 

[American87]

Do you know where Longstreet was, and, what he doing while Lee and Pickett were impatiently awaiting the order to attack?

Is there reliable evidence that Longstreet, could even bring himself to order the attack?

I forget the detail, but he tried having Alexander issue the attack. It was immature. Longstreet should've done his duty and followed orders. Instead he had a fetish for the tactical defense and wasted valuable time trying to take command in the West. Longstreet was an idiot. He had some tactical skills, definitely, but he could not cooperate with others and he was a complete buffon with his strategic-tactical defensive plans.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Longstreet was napping, or as he described it, 'laying down with my eyes closed.' He was also drunk later when he was arranging troops for a possible Union counterattack. It was pitiful. Gettysburg National Park has a statue on the site commemorating him. They should take it down.

Drunk.
That is a very serious accusation that you need to back up with primary sources...

And really "fetish for the tactical defense" sound to me like you only ever read popular history of the war.
(Jackson was the attacking guy and Longstreet the defensive guy)

At 2nd Bull run it was Longstreets attack that broke the union army. (after Jackson had held the line against heavy attacks)
Arguably Lee's greatest victory.

At Chickamauga is was also Longstreets attack that broke the Union army.

At the Wilderness Longstreets counterattack causes serious damage to Grants army.

Longstreet commanded some of the most effective CSA attacks of the war.

 

[datameister]

Stand by the Excalibur Brigade monument in the Peach Orchard and look at the Union Line to the north/northeast. How can you conclude that well coordinated artillery fire from three sides could not have delivered effective fire to support the attack to a successful conclusion? I can't. However, well coordinated artillery was not in the usurper's cards that day. Perhaps such coordination and dare I use the term I drove into HQ staff heads, "synchronization", was not practicable given the dysfunction of Lee's command and control.

 

[WJC]

Longstreet bickered and bickered, until Lee decided to call the plan off. That's not responding to circumstance, that's responding to an insubordinate lieutenant. Granted Longstreet didn't disobey any direct orders, he still refused Lee's verbal suggestions until he got his way.

What is your contemporaneous source for this?