Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[wausaubob]

General Lee thought that somehow land battles would nullify the effect of the US total naval dominance.
I am not clear how a student of Napoleonic history could think that.

 

[trice]

Yes, and that was exactly one of Lee's main goals. Destroy the AotP on norhern soil.

With some refining detail, yes. He didn't really care where he destroyed the AoP (or savagely mauled it). He just thought Pennsylvania might offer a way to do it.

In May 1863, Lee was frustrated that he could defeat the Yankees time and again, but could not find a good way follow-up his victories and truly damage them. Looking at the poundings he gave the Yankees in the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville might make that seem hard to understand. What Lee wanted was to get to the next level, to break up his bloodied opponent, to destroy whole units and hopefully a whole army (see what Grant does at Donelson, Vicksburg, Chattanooga and the Five-Forks-to-Appomattox Campaign).

In particular, Lee is upset that all four of his victories above end up with the Yankees able to move to a protected position where his ANV can't get at them: the guns of the Union Navy at Harrison's Landing, the guns of the Union artillery on Stafford Heights at Fredricksburg, the fortress of Washington after 2nd Manassas, behind the Rappahannock after Chancellorsville.

So Lee is looking for elbow-room to work in, far away from Union fortresses (Washington and Baltimore) and the guns of the Union Navy. He needs to draw them away from those, which means away from northern Virginia and most of Maryland. To do that, he needs to go after a point they simply cannot let him have -- so he heads for Harrisburg. That appears to be where he was headed in 1862 before he got brought to heel at Sharpsburg on the Antietam. That is where he and Jackson both wanted to go, and where they spent the Winter planning to go. (Jackson and Lee were clearly working on this in January and February; I have never seen an indication Longstreet knew about it until May, after Chancellorsville.)

Hooker/Meade are ordered to relieve Harrisburg in June. Meade considers it his first objective, which he believes he has accomplished with his rapid march north and reports to Halleck on the 29th (IIRR). Lee was right about the Federal reaction, but Meade has surprised Lee with his speed. Lee thinks he would have taken Harrisburg and had Ewell/Stuart joined up facing South with Longstreet and Hill in position to support them before the AoP could get up.

If that had happened, Lee would have his foot on the vital East-West routes of the Union. The B&O RR is cut down on the Potomac; the Penn Central RR is cut at Harrisburg; the massive RR shop complex at Harrisburg will be destroyed; only the NY Central RR and Erie Canal will be running. Economic disruption will be huge. Example: coal shipments to the Northeast will be stopped, leading to a heating crisis when Winter comes.

So far, it looks like a plan Sherman would love -- but this is Robert E. Lee. What Lee wants is to get the AoP to come to him, on ground of his choosing.

Lee is confident his ANV will defeat them. When it does, he wants them far away from a place to rally or reinforcements. What he wants this time is to beat them and then pursue them, to bring them to earth and destroy them. In preparation for that, he has had his mapmaker and Jackson's develop detailed maps from the Shenandoah up through Maryland into Pennsylvania, up through Chambersburg and Carlisle to Harrisburg, starting back around February. This is why Lee has gathered seven brigades of cavalry: for a campaign of maneuver, battle and pursuit.

He almost got what he wanted. If Meade had been a little slower, if Ewell had gotten in touch with Stuart on June 30, maybe he would have. As it was, an aggressive Lee, pushing forward on July 1st, almost made it happen. Just not quite, not enough, and July 1 was a victory, but not complete. July 2 was an almost, again not quite enough -- and so we come to July 3.

But if July 1 is a bigger Confederate victory, if Howard/Hancock can't hold Cemetery Hill, then Meade is staring at a disaster. Lee's ANV will be coming down the Baltimore Pike or the Taneytown road. He will be in position to split the AoP into two halves with his united force between them. He will be pursuing the battered remnants of I, XI and XII Corps. This would offer untold opportunity to Lee (even more so if Stuart were somehow a day earlier in joining up).

 

[WJC]

On Sherman ... Sherman was not a good offensive tactician -- more importantly, he himself felt he was not a good offensive tactician. His maneuvers were aimed at defeating the enemy by means other than battle (largely by disruption of the enemy LOC, industrial and economic warfare). Sherman's record is filled with lost opportunities on the battlefield because of it, he rarely convinces himself to attack with his whole strength (and when he does it is a bloody failure). The Atlanta Campaign by itself shows at least three opportunities to destroy the enemy that Sherman let slip away. His last battle of the war at Bentonville shows the same. Sherman was a determined soldier, a stout defender, excellent on operational and strategic matters, but did not see the enemy's army as his chief aim (Grant, for example, saw Johnston's army as Sherman's objective in the Atlanta Campaign; Sherman saw Atlanta as the objective, was content to take it and let Hood escape after Jonesborough.

Sherman was an important factor in winning the war, worked well with Grant, helped crush Confederate morale. He was not a destroyer of armies on the battlefield.

Thanks for your response.
Sherman's intent, though not successful, was to destroy Johnston's Army. To Johnston's credit, he gave up ground to save his army to fight another day. In many ways, the capture of Atlanta was a convenient 'consolation prize' for Sherman's failure to destroy Johnston's army.
The March to the Sea, on the other hand, was intended to capture and destroy productive farmland and industry that supported the rebellion.
The eventual capture of Johnston's army at Bentonville was the result of Sherman's focus on destroying the rebel army, not capturing land.
When one considers Sherman's campaigns against the ever elusive Johnston it becomes easy to appreciate why Sherman held Johnston in such high esteem.

 

[WJC]

He didn't really care where he destroyed the AoP (or savagely mauled it). He just thought Pennsylvania might offer a way to do it.

Yes and no.
Lee certainly wanted foremost to destroy the Army of the Potomac. He also recognized that doing so in a state loyal to the Union, particularly one so important to the Union cause as Pennsylvania, could well end the war. He was probably correct in his assessment that a similar victory in Virginia, or even Maryland, would not be nearly as monumental as one in Pennsylvania.

 

[GeneralRobertEdwardLee]

I am going to start a thread after work called "the Proper Concert of Action" to discuss the size of Lee's staff and the issues they had between each other at Gettysburg.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Lee's intention in June-July 1863 was to bring on a battle with the Army of the Potomac. He was confident of victory and believed that a victory in Pennsylvania could win the war.
Unfortunately for Lee, when he did encounter the AofP at Gettysburg, his forces were dispersed over a wide area. This positioning of his army and the inability to quickly move such large forces over the roads leading into Gettysburg was a far greater problem for him than some alleged intransigence by Longstreet.
Further, if Lee was concerned about Longstreet's lack of enthusiasm for the assault on July 3, 1863, he should have put another officer in charge, one who supported the plan. Early was just such a general. Yet given the opportunity to make a change, he entrusted the assault to Longstreet.

I do not necessarily disagree with your post, but, it does not really address my point.

In fact, Lee's dispersed forces fit neatly into the events that led to the confederate successes on Day 1 that put the AoP in a vise, that could have crushed the Union forces at Gettysburg on Day 2, if Lee could have induced(or forced) Longstreet to launch his attack as originally wanted as planned by Lee.

 

[OpnCoronet]

In all fairness, Lee didn't really seem to be in a rush to get things done either. There didn't seem to be a sense of urgency for many in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Ryan

Actually, Lee was deeply disappointed that Ewell could not find it withinhimself to make a final push to take Cemetary Hill on the evening of Day 1.

Lee, was also, anxious and annoyed at the delays of Longstreet's attacks on Days 2 and 3, Both.

 

[trice]

Yes and no.
Lee certainly wanted foremost to destroy the Army of the Potomac. He also recognized that doing so in a state loyal to the Union, particularly one so important to the Union cause as Pennsylvania, could well end the war. He was probably correct in his assessment that a similar victory in Virginia, or even Maryland, would not be nearly as monumental as one in Pennsylvania.

I am sure Lee would have known a big victory on Northern soil would have had a major impact and Jackson was already talking about bringing the torch of war north of the Potomac in early 1861, before Virginia seceded. Both would agree with you about the extra impact of winning north of the Potomac. I just think they both would have seen the most important issue as winning the big victory and based their choice of a battleground on the ability to win.

Lee would also have known a big victory anywhere would have a major impact. To him, the practical matter was being able to follow-up his initial victory, to complete it. He was frustrated he could not get his plans to work on the Peninsula. The lack of strategic space in northern Virginia to do extend his victory was a major factor to him. He and Jackson were discussing that after 2nd Manassas-Chantilly. They discuss it again after Fredricksburg, frustrated by their inability to counter-attack. Lee, again frustrated after Chancellorsville that he can't get decisive results from his victories, complaining about bloody victories that don't advance the Confederate cause, is determined to fight his next battle where he can.

After 2nd Manassas, Lee went North for most of the same reasons he did it again in June 1863. He was aiming further North, up into PA, up the Cumberland Valley, towards Harrisburg. McClellan's rapid reorganization and rapid (for McClellan) movement out of Washington surprised Lee, brought on a fight Lee hadn't really wanted. In Lee's mind, the further away from the Washington-Baltimore defenses, the better his chances to do real damage and complete his plans. He wants a Napoleonic battle of maneuver and hard blows, where he thinks his troops will triumph. The more closed his battleground is, the more limited Lee thinks he will be.

The area around Harrisburg is good for this plan. If Lee takes Harrisburg, the Union can't let him keep it. They will have to come to get him and Lee will have a strong position to operate from. South Mountain will protect his LOC and right flank up to Cashtown and Carlisle. Lee can stand on the high ground if Meade trys to come up after him. Adams county becomes a no-man's land where Lee will either be back at Big Pipe Creek or forward at Gettysburg, because no one will maneuver in Adams County without going through Gettysburg.

If Lee wants to, this can work as the type of tactical defensive-offensive fight Longstreet wants. He can hide behind the mountain, wreck the Penn Central and the Harrisburg shops, forage widely to the north and west behind the shield of South Mountain. Meade can try to come at him as McClellan did before Antietam, but Lee will be stronger and better prepared; bloody Meade at the gaps and then counter-attack.

Of course, Meade moved a little too fast for that to happen comfortably. Stuart was out-of-touch on the other side of Meade, unable to communicate. Lee pulls Ewell back from Harrisburg, needing to concentrate with Meade approaching and Stuart's whereabouts unknown. Gettysburg happens: the devil is in the details.

 

[trice]

General Lee thought that somehow land battles would nullify the effect of the US total naval dominance.
I am not clear how a student of Napoleonic history could think that.

I don't think he did; at least, I have never seen any indication anywhere that he was thinking along those lines.

Rather, I think Lee understood that there was little the Army could do to affect the balance of naval power except to try to defend the inland waterways. On the rivers or in a harbor or bay, perhaps they could limit or obstruct Union naval power. Outside of that, the Army was a non-factor.

Lee also saw that the Union Navy could have little effect on land warfare away from the coast and big waterways. Down on the James, the Union Navy could play a big part, succor McClellan, even evacuate him if need be. Up near Harrisburg, the Union Navy was could do nothing to help the Yankee army.

As a student of Napoleonic warfare and a veteran of Mexico, Lee knew at least something about how naval power worked. The Royal Navy kept Britain safe from invasion and allowed the British to act widely. Lee also knew that Britain would have been over-run by Napoleon if it had been connected to the rest of Europe by land. Naval power has limits as well. "The North" wasn't an island protected by the English Channel and the North Sea. Lee could get his troops into it and fight far away from the ships; the Union Navy cannot prevent an invasion the way the Royal Navy could.

All that leaves aside the growing power of the blockade, which requires time to gain full force. It ignores the power of the Union riverine fleet on deeper waters, which Lee did not need to face in the East. As a Theater commander, Union naval power was a small part of his operational worries he rarely needed to consider, and then only close to the Chesapeake and the rivers along it. Realistically, it only had a tactical impact during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862, peripheral parts of the Overland Campaign and during the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. On the Virginia front, Union naval power rarely mattered in combat.

 

[glkr56]

Big Blue (AOP) had a lot to say at Gettysburg. Lee made a Kamikaze attempt to bring Lincoln to the table. Lee knew this was his last best chance to do so.

 

[wausaubob]

I don't think he did; at least, I have never seen any indication anywhere that he was thinking along those lines.

Rather, I think Lee understood that there was little the Army could do to affect the balance of naval power except to try to defend the inland waterways. On the rivers or in a harbor or bay, perhaps they could limit or obstruct Union naval power. Outside of that, the Army was a non-factor.

Lee also saw that the Union Navy could have little effect on land warfare away from the coast and big waterways. Down on the James, the Union Navy could play a big part, succor McClellan, even evacuate him if need be. Up near Harrisburg, the Union Navy was could do nothing to help the Yankee army.

As a student of Napoleonic warfare and a veteran of Mexico, Lee knew at least something about how naval power worked. The Royal Navy kept Britain safe from invasion and allowed the British to act widely. Lee also knew that Britain would have been over-run by Napoleon if it had been connected to the rest of Europe by land. Naval power has limits as well. "The North" wasn't an island protected by the English Channel and the North Sea. Lee could get his troops into it and fight far away from the ships; the Union Navy cannot prevent an invasion the way the Royal Navy could.

All that leaves aside the growing power of the blockade, which requires time to gain full force. It ignores the power of the Union riverine fleet on deeper waters, which Lee did not need to face in the East. As a Theater commander, Union naval power was a small part of his operational worries he rarely needed to consider, and then only close to the Chesapeake and the rivers along it. Realistically, it only had a tactical impact during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862, peripheral parts of the Overland Campaign and during the siege of Petersburg and Richmond. On the Virginia front, Union naval power rarely mattered in combat.

General Lee was hoping that a land battle of the type Napoleon was so good at in the early part of the year would create a political victory before sea power produced a military victory for the United States. He was clearly advocating that in 1863.
With plenty of press support in New York and on the East Coast generally, it could have worked.
He underestimated the effect that control of the Mississippi would have politically.
The Midwest became a base for Lincoln and Grant. Commercial interests in Arkansas, Louisiana and Tennessee began to shy away from the war.
The implicit cease fire boundaries all over the west would have held if Lincoln had just left Louisiana alone.
The victory at Vicksburg was like an earthquake. The shifting plates may not be visible, but the shockwaves spread in all directions, reaching even Sacramento and London.
The whole plan was to co-ordinate with the French to recognize the Confederacy and pressure the British into doing the same thing. But Parliament was on to the plan. Our British friends have related the details for us in other threads.

 

[wausaubob]

General Lee's tactics at Gettysburg were probably the best option under circumstances in which the option of waiting out the US was looking questionable. If the Confederates wanted to fight for their independence, Gettysburg was the last, best chance to do so.

 

[wausaubob]

Big Blue (AOP) had a lot to say at Gettysburg. Lee made a Kamikaze attempt to bring Lincoln to the table. Lee knew this was his last best chance to do so.

I agree completely.

 

[wausaubob]

If Lee does not succeed at Gettysburg, Lincoln has a pretty good chance of installing Unionist governments in Arkansas, Tennessee and Louisiana. With admission of West Virginia pending, and setting an example, the country is tending towards a 23/12 ratio of paid labor states to slave states. Nebraska looks like a possible state, and slavery is very shaky in Missouri and Maryland, where Confederate sympathizers have left the states.

 

[wausaubob]

Unfortunately, Gettysburg was almost the ideal battle for the army McClellan had built. There was not much movement required and there were often good lines for the artillery to fire. In Pennsylvania local intelligence favored the Army of the Potomac, and the local railroads could handle at least part of the logistical load.

 

[wausaubob]

All three, Johnston, Bragg and Lee tried to design operations that stayed away from the coast and the federal rivers.
Grant thwarted some of those plans, but the US began to substitute railroad power for naval power, because it could.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Big Blue (AOP) had a lot to say at Gettysburg. Lee made a Kamikaze attempt to bring Lincoln to the table. Lee knew this was his last best chance to do so.

I, myself, tend to agree that was Lee's (unexpressed)plan, But, he was to good a general to indulge in any kind of Kamikaze(suicide) campaign.