McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Saphroneth]

That's "one principle of military science". As I'm certain you know, there are many others, and some subordinate the one you've isolated. Eisenhower was presumably aware of that one on June 5, 1944, to the extent that he drafted an alternative "press release" in the event the landings failed. As we know, he still went forward.

The point is rather that if you attack it should be with a good reason to it, and with a chance of success commensurate with what is gained. Eisenhower's attack on D-Day was a gamble, but it was one which was based on both the benefits of what could be gained and an evaluation of the risk of failure - and, of course, on the fact that the planning had been going on for over a year.

To attack on the afternoon of the 16th at Antietam, for example, would mean (inherently) not attacking on the 17th, not with the same troops (as per Spotsylvania, a day's recovery is needed after a failed assault). In addition, after the series of failed attacks at Second Bull Run, the morale of the army as a whole is somewhat in doubt - a repulse on the 16th (or on the afternoon of the 15th, as part of a pursuit being stopped by Lee's forces over the Middle Bridge) would further harm the morale that the successes of the 14th have only begun to redress.

It's not the only principle, certainly - I don't think I've argued otherwise - but it's one of the reasons why attacking to see if the enemy might have made a mistake (when, if they have not made a mistake, you'll be repulsed) is often not a good plan.

 

[Belfoured]

I'm not surprised that you would blame the subordinates rather than the commander. It's the same thing you do with McClellan.

There also appears to be some confusion about the facts in that post. As anybody familiar with the campaign knows, Halleck was in overall command of three "wings" under Buell, Pope, and Thomas. Grant occupied what essentially was the position of a supernumerary without specific portfolio. Any entrenching was the product of Halleck's consistent directives. Notwithstanding that, Sherman actually advocated attacking on a couple of occasions.

The point is rather that if you attack it should be with a good reason to it, and with a chance of success commensurate with what is gained. Eisenhower's attack on D-Day was a gamble, but it was one which was based on both the benefits of what could be gained and an evaluation of the risk of failure - and, of course, on the fact that the planning had been going on for over a year.

To attack on the afternoon of the 16th at Antietam, for example, would mean (inherently) not attacking on the 17th, not with the same troops (as per Spotsylvania, a day's recovery is needed after a failed assault). In addition, after the series of failed attacks at Second Bull Run, the morale of the army as a whole is somewhat in doubt - a repulse on the 16th (or on the afternoon of the 15th, as part of a pursuit being stopped by Lee's forces over the Middle Bridge) would further harm the morale that the successes of the 14th have only begun to redress.

It's not the only principle, certainly - I don't think I've argued otherwise - but it's one of the reasons why attacking to see if the enemy might have made a mistake (when, if they have not made a mistake, you'll be repulsed) is often not a good plan.

Of course that's how it works. Your post singled out one "principle" without noting the counterbalancing principles. But thanks for correcting the impression created by that post.

 

[DanSBHawk]

An observation that may be useful - or informative, at least - in understanding McClellan is that a principle of military science is that a failed attack is damaging to the morale of the unit that did it and the formation to which it belongs, and this is more pronounced the more seriously the attack was pressed and the more complete the repulse (i.e. the less was gained for it). An individual failed attack is something that the morale of a unit can often survive, long term - it means they're exhausted for the day but can keep going afterwards - but a pattern of failed attacks is quickly corrosive to the morale and effectiveness of the unit.

This is useful to keep in mind as an explanation of why McClellan did or didn't launch attacks when he did or didn't do so.

In the other thread, Barnard makes that same point regarding the Peninsula Campaign and how the repeated failures had wrecked the morale of the Union army while elevating the morale of the rebels:

"When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the élan which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success."

 

[Belfoured]

In the other thread, Barnard makes that same point regarding the Peninsula Campaign and how the repeated failures had wrecked the morale of the Union army while elevating the morale of the rebels:

"When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil and so much disaster had deprived it of the élan which results from success alone. It was, moreover (as well as our forces elsewhere), sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army from its first low state had risen to be an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success."

The other interesting aspect is that McClellan - unlike truly great commanders - was utterly incapable of assessing his opponent's real vulnerabilities rather than focusing on his own. His obsessive caution allowed opponents time to address their vulnerabilities. It happened on the Peninsula and it happened again on September 16, giving Lee time to desperately gather much (but still not all) of his scattered forces for the defense on September 17. As we know and expect, a bundle of fact-obscuring charts, maps, and interminable posts can be baked from scratch in the McClellan family kitchen to "explain" this but that's the simple fact after all the smoke and dust is cleared.

 

[jackt62]

his obsessive caution allowed opponents time to address their vulnerabilities.

Probably McClellan's greatest weakness. A bolder commander would have thrown as much of his army as possible into the fight at Antietam.

 

[Belfoured]

Probably McClellan's greatest weakness. A bolder commander would have thrown as much of his army as possible into the fight at Antietam.

Playing "shrink" 150 years later is always speculative but I also think the guy had a built-in siege mentality, firmed up by Sevastopol. If that's the mindset, you see time as your necessity and advantage, to build up your extensive works, lines, etc., and giving your opponent time to "prepare" generally doesn't change much. In open maneuver for a battle, giving a disorganized, outnumbered enemy that same time can make the difference.

 

[Sbc]

McClellan threads have a pattern. They often quickly get derailed by a Gish gallop of accusations against McClellan. It's very easy to make a variety of short accusations, and the refutation often requires a lot of fact-checking which takes time and energy. Usually, this is then followed by a refusal to even read the evidence in question. Ultimately, someone will say something along the line of the above - Grant would have done better. This unfortunately doesn't go well for Grant because, as you will observe, he was actually far less aggressive than claimed (for example, never attacking two days consecutively), and the result of the Overland Campaign was a stalemate that, in the mid-term, favoured the rebels.

How long was Grant before Richmond and Petersburg making effectively no progress and asking for reinforcements? Let's remember, McClellan had a plan to capture Richmond that would have taken a couple of months, assuming the "Army of Virginia" could only keep Jackson busy. Grant had no conception of how to attack Petersburg other than surround it with a huge force and starve it out. Hence he took no significant action for just about nine months, complaining he was too weak and needed huge reinforcements which were busy chasing Early. If McClellan had sat before Richmond for nine months, imagine the uproar!

You are conflating attack and offense with seizing the strategic initiative. After day one of the Wilderness Lee never again dictated how the campaign would play out. He was subject to Grant's moves while on other fronts the Confederacy was slowly strangled. All Grant had to do was hold Lee at bay, something your hero could never accomplish.

 

[Sbc]

The other interesting aspect is that McClellan - unlike truly great commanders - was utterly incapable of assessing his opponent's real vulnerabilities rather than focusing on his own. His obsessive caution allowed opponents time to address their vulnerabilities. It happened on the Peninsula and it happened again on September 16, giving Lee time to desperately gather much (but still not all) of his scattered forces for the defense on September 17. As we know and expect, a bundle of fact-obscuring charts, maps, and interminable posts can be baked from scratch in the McClellan family kitchen to "explain" this but that's the simple fact after all the smoke and dust is cleared.

Could not have written it more cogently.

 

[Belfoured]

You are conflating attack and offense with seizing the strategic initiative. After day one of the Wilderness Lee never again dictated how the campaign would play out. He was subject to Grant's moves while on other fronts the Confederacy was slowly strangled. All Grant had to do was hold Lee at bay, something your hero could never accomplish.

Gordon Rhea has done a nice, balanced assessment of this.

 

[67th Tigers]

You are conflating attack and offense with seizing the strategic initiative. After day one of the Wilderness Lee never again dictated how the campaign would play out. He was subject to Grant's moves while on other fronts the Confederacy was slowly strangled. All Grant had to do was hold Lee at bay, something your hero could never accomplish.

No, I'm not. You can seize the initiative in many ways, not all of which are attacking. In fact, in many circumstances the enemy wants you to attack at disadvantage, and so not attacking is seizing the initiative. Indeed, we can find multiple times McClellan seized the initiative by not attacking, and times he did. For, example, at Harrison's Landing he had pinned Lee to Richmond, throttling off his strategic options, every bit as much as Grant did at Petersburg. The sad thing was that, in their zeal to remove McClellan, the Washington government removed the army from Harrisons and gave the initiative back to Lee, allowing him to crush Pope.

 

[67th Tigers]

The other interesting aspect is that McClellan - unlike truly great commanders - was utterly incapable of assessing his opponent's real vulnerabilities rather than focusing on his own. His obsessive caution allowed opponents time to address their vulnerabilities. It happened on the Peninsula and it happened again on September 16, giving Lee time to desperately gather much (but still not all) of his scattered forces for the defense on September 17. As we know and expect, a bundle of fact-obscuring charts, maps, and interminable posts can be baked from scratch in the McClellan family kitchen to "explain" this but that's the simple fact after all the smoke and dust is cleared.

The problem is that many of the "opponent's real vulnerabilities" were created post-facto and either didn't exist at the time, or are overplayed in the manner of a lawyer's brief. I remember that I offered you the chance to demonstrate how McClellan would have overcome the Warwick Line quickly, and you complained that the conditions of the test were wrong, because the conditions, which were the real ones, didn't allow you to find one. Basically you argued that the Warwick had to be lowered to make it easier. McClellan had to fight his battles in the real world, with an enemy that refused to co-operate.

"If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving live men like blocks.
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,
They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.
It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind,
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow
To move, when they start they take too long on the way -
The General loses his stars, and the block-men die
In unstrategic defiance of martial law
Because still used to just being men, not block parts.

From John Brown's Body
by Stephen Vincent Benet.

 

[Sbc]

No, I'm not. You can seize the initiative in many ways, not all of which are attacking. In fact, in many circumstances the enemy wants you to attack at disadvantage, and so not attacking is seizing the initiative. Indeed, we can find multiple times McClellan seized the initiative by not attacking, and times he did. For, example, at Harrison's Landing he had pinned Lee to Richmond, throttling off his strategic options, every bit as much as Grant did at Petersburg. The sad thing was that, in their zeal to remove McClellan, the Washington government removed the army from Harrisons and gave the initiative back to Lee, allowing him to crush Pope.

You are being ratioed to death here and it's a reflection of decades of historical research. History generally highlights meritocracy and your guy fails to measure up. Your position is one of the most torturous twists of logic I have ever come across in years. Ranks second imo to the Warren Report.

 

[Belfoured]

The problem is that many of the "opponent's real vulnerabilities" were created post-facto and either didn't exist at the time, or are overplayed in the manner of a lawyer's brief. I remember that I offered you the chance to demonstrate how McClellan would have overcome the Warwick Line quickly, and you complained that the conditions of the test were wrong, because the conditions, which were the real ones, didn't allow you to find one. Basically you argued that the Warwick had to be lowered to make it easier. McClellan had to fight his battles in the real world, with an enemy that refused to co-operate.

"If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving live men like blocks.
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks
And flat maps turn into country where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,
They are tired and rest, they straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hand and move them.
It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind,
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow
To move, when they start they take too long on the way -
The General loses his stars, and the block-men die
In unstrategic defiance of martial law
Because still used to just being men, not block parts.

From John Brown's Body
by Stephen Vincent Benet.

Welcome to the excuse-making McClellan bakery. At long last the source of all the alleged military analysis is revealed - a poem written by a guy with a B.A. from Yale. Fair enough. Let's use some more of the poet's "analysis":

"The new general is crazy — neat, handsome McClellan,
Ex-railroad president too, but a better railroad;
The fortunate youth, the highly-modern boy-wonder,
The snapping-eyed, brisk banner-salesman of war
With all the salesman's gifts and the salesman's ego;
Great organizer, with that magnetic spark
That pulls the heart from the crowd—and all of it spoiled
By the Napoleon-complex that haunts such men.
There never has been a young banner-salesman yet
That did not dream of a certain little cocked-hat
And feel it fit. McClellan felt that it fitted. —After a year and a day, the auditors come,
Dry auditors, going over the books of the company,
Sad auditors, with groups of red and black figures
That are not moved by a dream of precious cocked hats.
And after the auditors go, the board of directors,
Decides, with a sigh, to do without banner-salesmen
—
It is safer to dream of a rusty Lincoln stovepipe.
That dream has more patience in it.
And yet, years later,
Meeting the banner-salesman in some cheap street
With the faded clippings of old success in his pocket3
One cannot help feeling sorry for the cocked hat
So briefly worn in a dream of luck and the ego.
One cannot help feeling sorry for George McClellan,
He should have been a hero by every rule.
He looked the part—he could have acted the part
Word perfectly. He looked like an empire-maker.
But so few empire-makers have looked the part.
Fate has a way of picking unlikely material,
Greasy-haired second lieutenants of French artillery,
And bald-headed, dubious, Roman rake-politicians.
Her stiff hands were busy now with an odd piece of wood,
Sometime Westpointer, by accident more than choice,
Sometime brevet-captain in the old Fourth Infantry,
Mentioned in Mexican orders for gallant service
And, six years later, forced to resign from the Army
Without enough money to pay for a stateroom home.
Turned farmer on Hardscrabble Farm, turned bill-collector,
Turned clerk in the country-store that his brothers ran,
The eldest-born of the lot, but the family-failure,
Unloading frozen hides from a farmer's sleigh
With stoop-shouldered strength, whittling beside the stove,
And now and then turning to whiskey to take the sting
From winter and certain memories.
It didn't take much.
A glass or two would thicken the dogged tongue
And flush the fair skin beneath the ragged brown beard.
Poor and shabby—old "Cap" Grant of Galena,
Who should have amounted to something but hadn't so far
Though he worked hard and was honest.
A middle-aged clerk,
A stumpy, mute man in a faded army overcoat,
Who wrote the War Department after Fort Sumter,
Offering them such service as he could give
And saying he thought that he was fit to command
As much as a regiment, but getting no answer.

"And, after that, the chunky man from the West,
Stranger to you, not one of the men you loved
As you loved McClellan, a rider with a hard bit,
Takes you and uses you as you could be used,
Wasting you grimly but breaking the hurdle down.
You are never to worship him as you did McClellan,
But at the last you can trust him. He slaughters you
But he sees that you are fed. After sullen Cold Harbor
They call him a butcher and want him out of the saddle,
But you have had other butchers who did not win
And this man wins in the end."

 

[OpnCoronet]

President Lincoln relieved George McClellan as AotP commander on November 5, 1862. Many of Lincoln's cabinet had long advocated such a step, and Lincoln's displeasure with McClellan's desultory pursuit of Lee's army after the battle of Antietam was the final straw. But in the aftermath of McClellan's relief, his 2 subsequent commanders (Burnside and Hooker) failed abysmally in offensive campaigns against the ANV. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville met sanguinary ends along the Rappahannock River and halted any possibility of Union success from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863. So the question is thus: if Lincoln had retained McClellan in command of the AotP, would the outcome have been any less successful than that of his successors Burnside and Hooker? Is there reason to believe that McClellan, dispute his flaws, would have attained greater results? Given that the administration was steadfast in its belief that the overland route was the only feasible military path, what would McClellan have done?

We know exactly the results of retaining McClellan after Antietam. We have the evidence of little mac's generalship and state of mind between the Antietam and his final dismissal, i.e., what did during that time is what he would be doing if his command had been affirmed.

McClellan was a bitter, burnt out shell of the ebullient and confident young general that entered Washing being touted as the 'savior of the Union' . He only wanted out and the only reason he did not resign, was his love and concern for His Army of the Potomac.
He considered he was fighting to sustain a Commander In Chief, he could not trust and an administration he despised, in support of policies he believed was leading the country to destruction.

By the time of his final removal, only a complete overhauls of Lincoln's administration and a major reversal on most of its policies, could have induced McClellan to give any further 'good' service to the Union War effort as then presently constituted. , i.e., as far as Lincoln and his administration was concerned, little mac was gone , and, Good Riddance.

Burnside and Hooker were finally carrying out Lincoln's wishes for the AoP to be an offensive weapon to win the war, it took only 3 tries to find a commander to do it, within a Year.

 

[67th Tigers]

Burnside and Hooker were finally carrying out Lincoln's wishes for the AoP to be an offensive weapon to win the war, it took only 3 tries to find a commander to do it, within a Year.

Ah yes, those great successes Burnside and Hooker. Oh, and Pope who was effectively commander for a short while.

Then Meade, and then (effectively Grant) who managed to get to the position McClellan was in after the Seven Days with only about 70,000 casualties (to 2nd Petersburg), and then of course promptly took Richmond in a mere ten months.

The administration wanted a different commander, sure, but they never found a better one than McClellan.

 

[Saphroneth]

The evidence rather suggests that beating the main Confederate army in the east is not something you can do easily on a budget. It's that old fast, cheap, good thing - if you want to beat the enemy convincingly, quickly then you need to invest a lot of resources (McClellan's strategy of overwhelming), while if you want to beat the enemy convincingly and without a massive investment of resources then you need to accept that it will take a while (this is sort of what the Overland is, since none of the land battles actually destroy the Confederate field army - they force the majority of it back into defending Richmond, but it then takes months to siege out Richmond and Petersburg).

If you want to beat the enemy quickly and cheaply (i.e. without a massive investment of resources, and quickly) then what you get is - well, you might get victories, but they're unlikely to destroy all enemy resisance.


The question is, what is a massive investment of resources? I.e. what is the point at which you can expect to convincingly beat the enemy in a short period of time?
It depends on how strong the enemy is and how short the period of time, and of course the skill of the general, but I would submit:

If the mission is "From the start, force the Army of Northern Virginia into a state where all it can do is focus on the defence of Richmond, except for small forces detached to raid"
the resources are "a 30% advantage to the offensive commander, in manpower, over total enemy strength counting all reinforcements"
And the time frame is "Three months from the moment the offensive is decided upon"

Then McClellan does this with less*, while Grant does not do this (he has significantly greater than a 30% advantage) but does fulfil the mission and timeframe. Nobody else comes close.

*n.b. McClellan also has to open up the York, which consumes much of the time he takes, while Grant starts with the York already opened up

It would be interesting to try and define a mission, time and amount of resources where Grant (or some other Union commander) achieved it while McClellan did not.

 

[Saphroneth]

Another possible question is to ask what odds ratio would be necessary for a commander to be confident of defeating a defending Lee (where by defeat I mean in a tactical sense, and to a greater extent than at Antietam) assuming that Lee is holding a position that is not of great natural strength (i.e. the main line of resistance is not basically a river line or similar) and that has not been fortified by the application of effort over many weeks or months (i.e. there is no serious ditch or curtain, and no major bastion forts, but there may be trenches or embrasures).
Essentially a position with no more than fieldworks.

I would assert that for McClellan to do this, it only really takes that he has an odds ratio somewhat greater than he had at Antietam. Counting in the same way for both sides the numbers at Antietam come out as somewhere between a 7:6 advantage and a 4:3 advantage, though some may wish to claim the odds were as lopsided as 3:2. More than that I think means to apply straggling to only one side, which is not comparing like with like.

I would say that if Lee fights a battle of this kind with McClellan where (in terms of forces actually available to fight) McClellan has a 2:1 advantage or a 5:2 advantage then Lee is going to suffer a serious defeat, and thus that Lee would not fight such a battle in the first place. But if he did, he would (as noted) suffer a serious defeat.

Based on other engagements in which Lee was defending, this is actually not doing particularly badly. At Fredericksburg Lee benefitted from Marye's Heights, which are beneficial defensive terrain but not very much so, the force ratio approaches 2:1 in favour of the Union; at Spotsylvania, the force ratio approaches 3:1 in favour of the Union. This would seem to indicate that the missing factor at Antietam is not that McClellan's ability to attack Lee was especially poor, but rather that attacking Lee is quite hard.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Ah yes, those great successes Burnside and Hooker. Oh, and Pope who was effectively commander for a short while.

Then Meade, and then (effectively Grant) who managed to get to the position McClellan was in after the Seven Days with only about 70,000 casualties (to 2nd Petersburg), and then of course promptly took Richmond in a mere ten months.

The administration wanted a different commander, sure, but they never found a better one than McClellan.

Well, that is all very good but does not really show my points as wrong.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The evidence rather suggests that beating the main Confederate army in the east is not something you can do easily on a budget. It's that old fast, cheap, good thing - if you want to beat the enemy convincingly, quickly then you need to invest a lot of resources (McClellan's strategy of overwhelming), while if you want to beat the enemy convincingly and without a massive investment of resources then you need to accept that it will take a while (this is sort of what the Overland is, since none of the land battles actually destroy the Confederate field army - they force the majority of it back into defending Richmond, but it then takes months to siege out Richmond and Petersburg).

If you want to beat the enemy quickly and cheaply (i.e. without a massive investment of resources, and quickly) then what you get is - well, you might get victories, but they're unlikely to destroy all enemy resisance.


The question is, what is a massive investment of resources? I.e. what is the point at which you can expect to convincingly beat the enemy in a short period of time?
It depends on how strong the enemy is and how short the period of time, and of course the skill of the general, but I would submit:

If the mission is "From the start, force the Army of Northern Virginia into a state where all it can do is focus on the defence of Richmond, except for small forces detached to raid"
the resources are "a 30% advantage to the offensive commander, in manpower, over total enemy strength counting all reinforcements"
And the time frame is "Three months from the moment the offensive is decided upon"

Then McClellan does this with less*, while Grant does not do this (he has significantly greater than a 30% advantage) but does fulfil the mission and timeframe. Nobody else comes close.

*n.b. McClellan also has to open up the York, which consumes much of the time he takes, while Grant starts with the York already opened up

It would be interesting to try and define a mission, time and amount of resources where Grant (or some other Union commander) achieved it while McClellan did not.

Your basic premise is flawed. It was after 3 yrs of an increasingly brutal war, that the secession had to be 'overwhelmed' . It might have been overwhelmed much more cheaply in the first years of the War, if McClellan had been up to his job of actually doing it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Your basic premise is flawed. It was after 3 yrs of an increasingly brutal war, that the secession had to be 'overwhelmed' . It might have been overwhelmed much more cheaply in the first years of the War, if McClellan had been up to his job of actually doing it.

But surely this needs to be demonstrated? Your argument is that McClellan's task was easier despite his having to do more (open up the York, for example, which nobody else then had to do as it was done) with fewer resources, and facing a stronger enemy.

It's not like the Confederate armies were easy to beat in 1861 at First Bull Run, after all.