McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[67th Tigers]

Your basic premise is flawed. It was after 3 yrs of an increasingly brutal war, that the secession had to be 'overwhelmed' . It might have been overwhelmed much more cheaply in the first years of the War, if McClellan had been up to his job of actually doing it.

So, when the Confederacy was less damaged by warfare and relatively stronger, it would have been easier to defeat?

In the east, the main army and Richmond survived literally right up until the final collapse. No general managed to capture Richmond and destroy the main rebel army until the final disintegration of the country.

Now, McClellan is interesting, because he, by far, got the closest to doing it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well, that is all very good but does not really show my points as wrong.

Your argument was that:

We know exactly the results of retaining McClellan after Antietam. We have the evidence of little mac's generalship and state of mind between the Antietam and his final dismissal, i.e., what did during that time is what he would be doing if his command had been affirmed.

McClellan was a bitter, burnt out shell of the ebullient and confident young general that entered Washing being touted as the 'savior of the Union' . He only wanted out and the only reason he did not resign, was his love and concern for His Army of the Potomac.
He considered he was fighting to sustain a Commander In Chief, he could not trust and an administration he despised, in support of policies he believed was leading the country to destruction.

By the time of his final removal, only a complete overhauls of Lincoln's administration and a major reversal on most of its policies, could have induced McClellan to give any further 'good' service to the Union War effort as then presently constituted. , i.e., as far as Lincoln and his administration was concerned, little mac was gone , and, Good Riddance.

But the thing is, this doesn't really seem to jibe with the actual situation, and in particular the events of the Loudoun Valley campaign. If I may:

17 September: Antietam. McClellan launches 3/4 of his army present on the day on actual attacks, comparable to other Union commanders on the offensive against Lee.

18 September: no major action, comparable to one of the days at Spotsylvania (etc.) where the armies recover from their ordeal.
19-20 September: Lee retires over the Potomac overnight 18-19, McClellan advances at dawn. McClellan sends 6th and 2nd Corps to secure other crossings, 5th Corps crosses at Shepherdstown and is repulsed smartly by a ten-brigade force of Confederate troops. This shows Lee is still able to manoeuvre and fight - he is not a beaten force, and can deploy a force of about 3 Union divisions to resist a crossing (this is what he demonstrated, he still has another ~30 bdes he didn't use there).

Over the next few days, McClellan plans to bridge the Potomac at Harpers Ferry. He intends to let the Potomac rise so he doesn't have to worry about Lee crossing into Maryland, then attack Winchester (and effectively outflank Lee

On 26 September, Halleck says he's worried about a whole other rebel army that might attack Washington, and he's refusing to send previously-agreed reinforcements plus isn't going to approve McClellan's requisitions to bridge the Potomac until McClellan's plans are "agreed upon" (i.e. by him).

In this period McClellan is working on an offensive plan, until Halleck contests it.

From 26 September to 6th October, McClellan has sent his plan to Halleck and Halleck hasn't replied either approving it or disapproving it; Lincoln visits the army on 1st October and sees how poorly supplied it is. (There's a food riot.)

In this period McClellan recorded that he was not under pressure from Lincoln to mount an immediate offensive, and Stoltemyer found confirmatory accounts that supported McClellan's view. There is work that could be done to improve the army's condition and of course those bridges are needed.

On 7th October Halleck orders McClellan to give his plans for an offensive. (That is what the order was. He was directed to cross the Potomac and attack, but the order was to immediately send how he was going to do that to Halleck for approval.)

Same day, McClellan sends back his plan for an offensive movement (into the Shenandoah).

Halleck does not reply to this plan. At all. He sends other messages, but he neither approves nor rejects McClellan's plan for an offensive.


From the 7th to the 23rd, the supply crisis in the AoP deepens until it's finally resolved towards the end of the month.


On the 22nd October, McClellan sends a different offensive plan, and this one Halleck approves late the following day.
McClellan begins his offensive movement on the 24th, throwing a bridge over the Potomac starting on that day and crossing his first troops on the 26th; from that point to McClellan's relief the army is in continuous motion south.


So no, there's basically a period of 50 days from Antietam to McClellan's relief. Of that time, 26 September to 22 October (26 days) is McClellan waiting for Halleck to approve a plan to attack into the Shenandoah (while using the time to rigourously drill his army), and 23 October to 7 November (15 days) is McClellan actively conducting the operations of the Loudoun Valley campaign, moving south on the offensive line Lincoln had asked for (as opposed to the one McClellan had originally preferred and asked for).

There's only a very few days where McClellan isn't either on the offensive or waiting for an approval (or rejection) of how to go on the offensive.

 

[OpnCoronet]

So, when the Confederacy was less damaged by warfare and relatively stronger, it would have been easier to defeat?

In the east, the main army and Richmond survived literally right up until the final collapse. No general managed to capture Richmond and destroy the main rebel army until the final disintegration of the country.

Now, McClellan is interesting, because he, by far, got the closest to doing it.

So, when the Confederacy was less damaged by warfare and relatively stronger, it would have been easier to defeat?

In the east, the main army and Richmond survived literally right up until the final collapse. No general managed to capture Richmond and destroy the main rebel army until the final disintegration of the country.

Now, McClellan is interesting, because he, by far, got the closest to doing it.

One of the main arguing points against McClellan is, how close he got to Richmond and yet failed to take it.

Historically, you might study more closely what Davis, Johnston and Lee thought about the relative strengths of the two armies on The Peninsula.

 

[Saphroneth]

It should be pointed out of course that this is the pattern of McClellan's offensive against Richmond:

Jan: McClellan has sketched out the Urbana plan, which is a movement by 12 divisions plus army troops and which is intended to bypass the Yorktown position.

mid-March: Urbana plan is rejected, Peninsular plan is substituted (not by McClellan). This is a movement by 12 divisions, plus army troops, plus the forces at Fort Monroe, but it is known that reducing Yorktown might cause a delay of weeks in opening up the York.

mid-March: a division is removed from McClellan's army (Blenker).
end of March: a division (the Fort Monroe forces) are removed from McClellan's army.
early April: three divisions (1st Corps) are removed from McClellan's army, as are much of his cavalry.

early April: McClellan gets back one of the five lost divisions (Franklin). He is now down four on the original planning figure.
mid-May: McClellan gets back one of the five lost divisions (the Fort Monroe forces). He is now down three on the original planning figure.
mid-May: everyone consulted, from cabinet members (who went to check) to McDowell to Scott, agrees that McClellan needs to be reinforced by McDowell's whole force. At this point McDowell's whole force is about three divisions counting Shields (explicitly mentioned in this context). McClellan is told this.
mid-June: McClellan gets back one of the five lost divisions (McCall). He is now down two on the original planning figure (though is also still a bit low on cavalry)
last week of June: McClellan is putting heavy guns on the heights over Richmond.
last week of June: the largest Confederate army that ever fought in one place successfully forces McClellan away from Richmond through dint of superior numbers
end of June: McClellan is promised 56,000 reinforcements by Lincoln. He gets a couple of brigades.
July: over the following few weeks, the 56,000 promised reinforcements become 41,000, then are slimmed down to just Burnside's forces.
July: Burnside's forces never arrive.
Late July/early August: as soon as he is informed that Burnside is not going to arrive, McClellan begins advancing again.
early August: McClellan is recalled.


At no point in this entire campaign is McClellan as strong as he was supposed to be in the planning stages. After he gets through Yorktown he is regularly promised reinforcements that he simply does not get, and in fact there is no point between about 15-20 May and 1 August (a period of about 70-75 days) when he is not "owed" at least two divisions that he has been promised but he does not get.


This of course makes it a bit hard to plan.

 

[Saphroneth]

One of the main arguing points against McClellan is, how close he got to Richmond and yet failed to take it.

But that's circular! It says it's easy because even McClellan got that close, but that McClellan is a poor general because he failed to do something easy.

The only remaining task is to take a city held by an army of about the same size. That's not something you can just do through willpower, it requires engineering and time.

Historically, you might study more closely what Davis, Johnston and Lee thought about the relative strengths of the two armies on The Peninsula.

We can count regiments and companies. As of the Seven Days Lee has about 2,150 companies to dispose of, while McClellan has about 1,830 - a difference of roughly one strong binary corps or a weak triangular one.

Fundamentally speaking, Yorktown is something that it was warned before the start would cause a delay of weeks -that's Yorktown the town, not the Warwick line, as it's a bastion fort that blocks the York. Once that pre-warned delay has elapsed around early May, McClellan is facing an army that is of a similar size to his own (not always as big, but of the same scale) and Johnston retreats to Richmond to gain further reinforcement. By Seven Pines Johnston v McClellan is basically four Union corps' worth of men (Johnston in the Richmond defences) versus five, and over the course of June the balance of raw numbers is flipped (so now it's Lee who has the stronger army by about one corps, and he still has the forts).

 

[OpnCoronet]

Your argument was that:


But the thing is, this doesn't really seem to jibe with the actual situation, and in particular the events of the Loudoun Valley campaign. If I may:

17 September: Antietam. McClellan launches 3/4 of his army present on the day on actual attacks, comparable to other Union commanders on the offensive against Lee.

18 September: no major action, comparable to one of the days at Spotsylvania (etc.) where the armies recover from their ordeal.
19-20 September: Lee retires over the Potomac overnight 18-19, McClellan advances at dawn. McClellan sends 6th and 2nd Corps to secure other crossings, 5th Corps crosses at Shepherdstown and is repulsed smartly by a ten-brigade force of Confederate troops. This shows Lee is still able to manoeuvre and fight - he is not a beaten force, and can deploy a force of about 3 Union divisions to resist a crossing (this is what he demonstrated, he still has another ~30 bdes he didn't use there).

Over the next few days, McClellan plans to bridge the Potomac at Harpers Ferry. He intends to let the Potomac rise so he doesn't have to worry about Lee crossing into Maryland, then attack Winchester (and effectively outflank Lee

On 26 September, Halleck says he's worried about a whole other rebel army that might attack Washington, and he's refusing to send previously-agreed reinforcements plus isn't going to approve McClellan's requisitions to bridge the Potomac until McClellan's plans are "agreed upon" (i.e. by him).

In this period McClellan is working on an offensive plan, until Halleck contests it.

From 26 September to 6th October, McClellan has sent his plan to Halleck and Halleck hasn't replied either approving it or disapproving it; Lincoln visits the army on 1st October and sees how poorly supplied it is. (There's a food riot.)

In this period McClellan recorded that he was not under pressure from Lincoln to mount an immediate offensive, and Stoltemyer found confirmatory accounts that supported McClellan's view. There is work that could be done to improve the army's condition and of course those bridges are needed.

On 7th October Halleck orders McClellan to give his plans for an offensive. (That is what the order was. He was directed to cross the Potomac and attack, but the order was to immediately send how he was going to do that to Halleck for approval.)

Same day, McClellan sends back his plan for an offensive movement (into the Shenandoah).

Halleck does not reply to this plan. At all. He sends other messages, but he neither approves nor rejects McClellan's plan for an offensive.


From the 7th to the 23rd, the supply crisis in the AoP deepens until it's finally resolved towards the end of the month.


On the 22nd October, McClellan sends a different offensive plan, and this one Halleck approves late the following day.
McClellan begins his offensive movement on the 24th, throwing a bridge over the Potomac starting on that day and crossing his first troops on the 26th; from that point to McClellan's relief the army is in continuous motion south.


So no, there's basically a period of 50 days from Antietam to McClellan's relief. Of that time, 26 September to 22 October (26 days) is McClellan waiting for Halleck to approve a plan to attack into the Shenandoah (while using the time to rigourously drill his army), and 23 October to 7 November (15 days) is McClellan actively conducting the operations of the Loudoun Valley campaign, moving south on the offensive line Lincoln had asked for (as opposed to the one McClellan had originally preferred and asked for).

There's only a very few days where McClellan isn't either on the offensive or waiting for an approval (or rejection) of how to go on the offensive.

Out of this verbiage; When exactly did Lee get his entire army to the South Side of the Potomac and when exactly did McClellan get the AoP across the same river?

Historically, the record of McClellan is clearly noted from The Peninsula to Antietam and beyond, from where would come any confidence that there would be any change in McClellan's generalship(actions) if he had remained in command?

 

[67th Tigers]

One of the main arguing points against McClellan is, how close he got to Richmond and yet failed to take it.

This is a circular argument (NB: Saph beat me to it).

Historically, you might study more closely what Davis, Johnston and Lee thought about the relative strengths of the two armies on The Peninsula.

What people thought about relative is a subjective matter, because no-one knows the enemy strength. Further, due to the combat mutlipliers afforded by entrenchments, a small force can hold off a much larger one.

"The Peninsula" means operations around Yorktown. Johnston was, of course, arguing that that position was so strong they shouldn't sent Longstreet, GW Smith and Whittings' divisions there, but instead roll north together with reinforcements from NC (i.e. J.R. Anderson's division), link up with Jackson and Ewell, and operate against Banks with 6 divisions. Meanwhile, the forces at Yorktown and Norfolk would be strong enough to hold the Richmond defences if they had to pull back. This force (Magruder and Huger) would still be bigger than the force that neutralised Grant at Petersburg etc. in 1864.

The force on the Warwick was sufficient to prevent any open assault, and more men didn't answer the problem of the Navy or the siege artillery. Hence, Johnston wanted to play for time at Yorktown, and in the meantime transfer the war back to northern VA and MD at the head of six divisions (Longstreet, GW Smith, Whitting, JR Anderson, Jackson and Ewell).

In terms of simple balance of divisions of roughly the same size, the Federals had 16 divisions* in VA (inc. Norfolk), WV and MD, and the rebels had 13.** Of those, 8 were with McClellan, neutralised by 5 at Yorktown. Johnston wanted to take 6 divisions, and fall on Banks' 2 divisions or McDowell's 3.

* 8 with McClellan, 3 with McDowell, 2 with Banks, 2 with Fremont and 1 with Wool.
** 5 with Magruder on the Peninsula, 3 near Richmond under Johnston before 14th April, 2 under Jackson in the Shenandoah, 1 at Norfolk, 1 in the Kanawha valley and one en route from NC under JR Anderson, released from facing Burnside.

 

[Saphroneth]

Out of this verbiage; When exactly did Lee get his entire army to the South Side of the Potomac and when exactly did McClellan get the AoP across the same river?

Lee crossed his army over the course of the 15th-19th September (mostly the wagons etc. took up the time), with the fighting echelon crossing on the night of the 18th/19th into clear territory. McClellan could not do the same because it would be a crossing into territory controlled by the enemy.

Note that McClellan's actual intent after the 20th was to cross at Harpers Ferry and try to cut Lee off. To cross his whole force over at Shepherdstown would have been a good idea if Lee's army had been too shattered for major combat, but the battle of Shepherdstown sort of indicates that Lee could still fight.

McClellan's army began crossing on the 26th October shortly after he got approval for an offensive.

Let me ask you this - should McClellan have crossed the river during a period of time his offensive plan had been submitted for approval, but not approved?

 

[OpnCoronet]

But that's circular! It says it's easy because even McClellan got that close, but that McClellan is a poor general because he failed to do something easy.

The only remaining task is to take a city held by an army of about the same size. That's not something you can just do through willpower, it requires engineering and time.


We can count regiments and companies. As of the Seven Days Lee has about 2,150 companies to dispose of, while McClellan has about 1,830 - a difference of roughly one strong binary corps or a weak triangular one.

Fundamentally speaking, Yorktown is something that it was warned before the start would cause a delay of weeks -that's Yorktown the town, not the Warwick line, as it's a bastion fort that blocks the York. Once that pre-warned delay has elapsed around early May, McClellan is facing an army that is of a similar size to his own (not always as big, but of the same scale) and Johnston retreats to Richmond to gain further reinforcement. By Seven Pines Johnston v McClellan is basically four Union corps' worth of men (Johnston in the Richmond defences) versus five, and over the course of June the balance of raw numbers is flipped (so now it's Lee who has the stronger army by about one corps, and he still has the forts).

But, historically speaking, what did Davis, Johnston and Lee think about the relative strengths of the two Armies?

Well at least it is encouraging that the two armies appear to be only comparable to some. Now if only Johnston and Lee had known that, i.e., If at any time Lee had ever determined that the ANV was comparable in size to the AoP he would have insisted that Johnston attack.

 

[Saphroneth]

Historically, the record of McClellan is clearly noted from The Peninsula to Antietam and beyond, from where would come any confidence that there would be any change in McClellan's generalship(actions) if he had remained in command?

I'm not arguing there would be any change in McClellan's generalship or actions, I'm arguing that the conditions had changed, because McClellan's generalship means that:

McClellan advances on the enemy under the following conditions.

1) His army is not right up against the enemy already.
2) Advancing does not immediately put his army into an untenable position (e.g. mounting a crossing of a river where Lee's whole army can fall upon part of his force.)
3) He has submitted an offensive plan and had it approved, OR
4) He has not been asked to submit an offensive plan for approval
In addition:
5) He is not currently waiting on promised reinforcements that he has been told will arrive shortly.


McClellan attacks the enemy under the following conditions.

1) His army is close to the enemy.
2) Attacking is not counterproductive to his overall strategic aims.
3) The enemy is not in a strongly fortified position (either a series of major forts or a significant physical barrier to assault) which is (actually) strongly garrisoned and has no flanks to bypass.
4) UNLESS McClellan has done the engineering work to set this up.


He can certainly be stopped by a strongly fortified line (i.e. a major physical barrier to attack, garrisoned), but no such strongly fortified line is in his way on the 7th November.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well at least it is encouraging that the two armies appear to be only comparable to some. Now if only Johnston and Lee had known that, i.e., If at any time Lee had ever determined that the ANV was comparable in size to the AoP he would have insisted that Johnston attack.

Ever heard of Seven Pines? It happened on May 31-June 1 and saw Johnston attacking McClellan.

 

[DanSBHawk]

One of the main arguing points against McClellan is, how close he got to Richmond and yet failed to take it.

And at a time when the fortifications had not been built up to the point they were two years later.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I'm not arguing there would be any change in McClellan's generalship or actions, I'm arguing that the conditions had changed, because McClellan's generalship means that:

McClellan advances on the enemy under the following conditions.

1) His army is not right up against the enemy already.
2) Advancing does not immediately put his army into an untenable position (e.g. mounting a crossing of a river where Lee's whole army can fall upon part of his force.)
3) He has submitted an offensive plan and had it approved, OR
4) He has not been asked to submit an offensive plan for approval
In addition:
5) He is not currently waiting on promised reinforcements that he has been told will arrive shortly.


McClellan attacks the enemy under the following conditions.

1) His army is close to the enemy.
2) Attacking is not counterproductive to his overall strategic aims.
3) The enemy is not in a strongly fortified position (either a series of major forts or a significant physical barrier to assault) which is (actually) strongly garrisoned and has no flanks to bypass.
4) UNLESS McClellan has done the engineering work to set this up.


He can certainly be stopped by a strongly fortified line (i.e. a major physical barrier to attack, garrisoned), but no such strongly fortified line is in his way on the 7th November.

What I get out of all this are excuses to explain the otherwise inexplicable slow advance up the Peninsula as Davis, Johnston and Lee were desperately scouring Va., for every soldier they could find.

In fact though, it appears any freshly dug ditch was enough to stop McClellan. Seriously though, We do not in fact know if any of the confederate defensive works were invincible, because McClellan almost always chose Not To Test them, to determine if they were, or not.

 

[Saphroneth]

What I get out of all this are excuses to explain the otherwise inexplicable slow advance up the Peninsula as Davis, Johnston and Lee were desperately scouring Va., for every soldier they could find.

In fact though, it appears any freshly dug ditch was enough to stop McClellan. Seriously though, We do not in fact know if any of the confederate defensive works were invincible, because McClellan almost always chose Not To Test them, to determine if they were, or not.

What do you mean? There's two defensive positions which stop McClellan for any appreciable period of time during the Peninsular campaign - the Warwick line (which is, along its entire length, either covered by a wide river artificially deepened or has a ten foot deep trench fronting a parapet which in aggregate means a twenty foot climb - far stronger than any fieldworks in the open field could possibly be) and the main defences of Richmond itself.

Williamsburg doesn't delay him more than a single day. He bypasses it up the York.


As I mentioned, he can be stopped by a major physical barrier to attack, garrisoned. That's the Warwick Line on the Peninsula, and of course Richmond is heavily fortified.

No such barrier is present in front of him in November 1862.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Ever heard of Seven Pines? It happened on May 31-June 1 and saw Johnston attacking McClellan.

I think Seven Pines would seem to proved Johnston's trepidations concerning the relative strengths of the two armies, even if not their commanders. Unfortunately only Johnston was replace.


P.S. Yes I know Johnston was wounded; giving Davis the chance to do what he was probably already contemplating.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think Seven Pines would seem to proved Johnston's trepidations concerning the relative strengths of the two armies, even if not their commanders. Unfortunately only Johnston was replace.

Sorry? You said that if Johnston or Lee ever knew that his army was about the same size as McClellan's, they'd have attacked.

Johnston did.

That the attack was heavily botched, in that only a small part of the Confederate force was engaged (most of it sees zero casualties, the fighting is overwhelmingly on a small part of the attacking force), doesn't prove anything about the Union army being significantly stronger than the Confederate one as you seem to suggest it does.

Then, of course, Lee attacks in late June, once the weather clears.


The events of Seven Pines and the Seven Days are all in accordance with the two armies being of roughly equal size.

ED: in fact, they meet your conditions, which is the point you seem to be missing.

 

[OpnCoronet]

What do you mean? There's two defensive positions which stop McClellan for any appreciable period of time during the Peninsular campaign - the Warwick line (which is, along its entire length, either covered by a wide river artificially deepened or has a ten foot deep trench fronting a parapet which in aggregate means a twenty foot climb - far stronger than any fieldworks in the open field could possibly be) and the main defences of Richmond itself.

Williamsburg doesn't delay him more than a single day. He bypasses it up the York.


As I mentioned, he can be stopped by a major physical barrier to attack, garrisoned. That's the Warwick Line on the Peninsula, and of course Richmond is heavily fortified.

No such barrier is present in front of him in November 1862.

We are in the same boat as McClellan, in not knowing whether the weak spots chosen by McClellan's Engineers and noted by Johnston, could actually have been breached by a strong coordinated attack or not, because little mac did not try to determine it, one way or the other.

 

[Saphroneth]

We are in the same boat as McClellan, in not knowing whether the weak spots chosen by McClellan's Engineers and noted by Johnston, could actually have been breached by a strong coordinated attack or not, because little mac did not try to determine it, one way or the other.

Okay, so what were those weak spots? And what benefit would actually have resulted from a "strong coordinated attack", and what kind of cost can be expected?

I'm being serious here. Breaking through the Warwick line very early on might well accelerate the fall of Yorktown, but it means attacking without either strength or coordination because of the fact that organizing a strong coordinated attack takes time to do (you need to get the troops in place, set up engineering support etc). It took several days just to recce the line, after all.

Conversely if you break through the line later on, you don't gain any time at all because Yorktown still needs to be taken to make the advance logistically possible - and breaching the Warwick line doesn't gain you Yorktown. You still need to get through with regular approaches or starving it out, it's a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and an assigned garrison.

As against this, the cost is - well, quite a lot of casualties. At Vicksburg the assaults cost several thousand casualties, though if you have a better model of a geographically strong position broken into easily then I'm all ears.

 

[Saphroneth]

We are in the same boat as McClellan, in not knowing whether the weak spots chosen by McClellan's Engineers and noted by Johnston, could actually have been breached by a strong coordinated attack or not, because little mac did not try to determine it, one way or the other.

Of course, what you originally said was that

In fact though, it appears any freshly dug ditch was enough to stop McClellan.

I don't see how you get that from the events on the Peninsula.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Sorry? You said that if Johnston or Lee ever knew that his army was about the same size as McClellan's, they'd have attacked.

Johnston did.

That the attack was heavily botched, in that only a small part of the Confederate force was engaged (most of it sees zero casualties, the fighting is overwhelmingly on a small part of the attacking force), doesn't prove anything about the Union army being significantly stronger than the Confederate one as you seem to suggest it does.

Then, of course, Lee attacks in late June, once the weather clears.


The events of Seven Pines and the Seven Days are all in accordance with the two armies being of roughly equal size.

ED: in fact, they meet your conditions, which is the point you seem to be missing.

I tend to agree with you. If the Battle of Seven Pines had not been botched McClellan would probably have been defeated, or at least driven back onto his LOC.

The AoP was to strong to be attacked directly, but a portion of it separated by a flooding river, would give a size advantage to the confederates. A good plan and fortunate that Johnston was not able to use his superiority in numbers to his advantage. Using tactics to overcome a disparity in numbers was the ANV's stock in trade, even under Johnston.