McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[jackt62]

President Lincoln relieved George McClellan as AotP commander on November 5, 1862. Many of Lincoln's cabinet had long advocated such a step, and Lincoln's displeasure with McClellan's desultory pursuit of Lee's army after the battle of Antietam was the final straw. But in the aftermath of McClellan's relief, his 2 subsequent commanders (Burnside and Hooker) failed abysmally in offensive campaigns against the ANV. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville met sanguinary ends along the Rappahannock River and halted any possibility of Union success from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863. So the question is thus: if Lincoln had retained McClellan in command of the AotP, would the outcome have been any less successful than that of his successors Burnside and Hooker? Is there reason to believe that McClellan, dispute his flaws, would have attained greater results? Given that the administration was steadfast in its belief that the overland route was the only feasible military path, what would McClellan have done?

 

[JeffBrooks]

He would have concluded, from intelligence reports, that Lee had a million men, backed up with a thousand M1A2 main battle tanks and several squadrons of A-10 Warthogs.

 

[121st PA Vols]

President Lincoln relieved George McClellan as AotP commander on November 5, 1862. Many of Lincoln's cabinet had long advocated such a step, and Lincoln's displeasure with McClellan's desultory pursuit of Lee's army after the battle of Antietam was the final straw. But in the aftermath of McClellan's relief, his 2 subsequent commanders (Burnside and Hooker) failed abysmally in offensive campaigns against the ANV. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville met sanguinary ends along the Rappahannock River and halted any possibility of Union success from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863. So the question is thus: if Lincoln had retained McClellan in command of the AotP, would the outcome have been any less successful than that of his successors Burnside and Hooker? Is there reason to believe that McClellan, dispute his flaws, would have attained greater results? Given that the administration was steadfast in its belief that the overland route was the only feasible military path, what would McClellan have done?

I think it would have been worse had McClellan retained command knowing he only showed aggression for the offensive against Lee once he found the 'Lost Orders'. Prior to that, he gave us a preview of Chancellorsville (Hooker-esk), initiating a sound campaign on the Peninsula before hesitating. See JeffBrooks above!
Whatever you might say about Burnside and Hooker, both had good plans despite not being brought to fruition per lost pontoons for Burnside (simplifying) and hesitancy by Hooker. Both went after Lee.

 

[Belfoured]

I think it would have been worse had McClellan retained command knowing he only showed aggression for the offensive against Lee once he found the 'Lost Orders'. Prior to that, he gave us a preview of Chancellorsville (Hooker-esk), initiating a sound campaign on the Peninsula before hesitating. See JeffBrooks above!
Whatever you might say about Burnside and Hooker, both had good plans despite not being brought to fruition per lost pontoons for Burnside (simplifying) and hesitancy by Hooker. Both went after Lee.

It's always worth keeping in mind that McClellan - nearly 6 months after Antietam - was still making the absurd claim under oath before the JCCW that on September 17 "we fought pretty close upon 100,000 men". At a numerical disadvantage of 25,000-30,000, of course, based on his statement that he had between "70,000 to 75,000". Report of the JCCW at 441.

Anybody who thinks that the incessant whining about numbers would not have been a factor in post-November 7 campaigning needs an intervention.

 

[jackt62]

Whatever you might say about Burnside and Hooker, both had good plans despite not being brought to fruition per lost pontoons for Burnside (simplifying) and hesitancy by Hooker. Both went after Lee.

They did have good plans, but so did McClellan. His amphibious plan to approach Richmond from the southern route was well conceived but failed in its execution. As did Burnside's and Hooker's plans. As far as Burnside is concerned, Lincoln and the military administration's insistence on the overland route, its obsession with protecting Washington, and its prodding to undertake another offensive campaign before the onset of winter put Burnside in an untenable position. Those factors, and Burnside's re-organization of the AotP and the need to refill numerous slots of officers lost at Antietam didn't bode well for his Fredericksburg operation, notwithstanding Burnside's own tactical errors. But a McClellan still in command would likely have a greater handle on the organization and loyalty of the AotP; his innate cautiousness might have allowed him to withstand the pressure to commit troops unlike Burnside, who plowed ahead with the Rappahannock crossing even after the late arrival of the pontoons spelled clear disaster.

 

[damYankee]

But in the aftermath of McClellan's relief, his 2 subsequent commanders (Burnside and Hooker) failed abysmally in offensive campaigns against the ANV. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville met sanguinary ends along the Rappahannock River and halted any possibility of Union success from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863.

Correction;
Your post should have read;

Halted any possibility of Union success in Virginia from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863.

 

[jackt62]

Correction;
Your post should have read;

Halted any possibility of Union success in Virginia from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863.

I figured somebody would pick up on that after I did the post! Obviously we are speaking only of Virginia; the western seat of war was a different matter altogether.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan continues another month?

On AH.com Saphroneth wonders what would happen if McClellan had been allowed to continue in command of the Army of the Potomac for another month (to December 1862). The thread kicked up some nonsense, with even the discredited mythical "18 hour delay" brought up. I thought I'd consider the options.

Situation, 7th November 1862

The strengths of the rebel forces are in Lee's 10th November 1862 field return. These list "combat effective strength" which is a bit different from how the Federals listed theirs. Essentially Longstreet and Jackson both commanded forces of 30,000 effectives. Stuart's cavalry is listed at 7,000 strong, but 75% of the horses are afflicted with hoof and mouth. This disease had crippled McClellan's cavalry and artillery a month before, and the epidemic had transferred to the rebels. Indeed, much of Jackson's slowness was due to his transport horses breaking down and him literally be physically unable to move his forces.

McClellan's forces have a return also dated 10th November (as Burnside's force). Converted to the same measure as the rebels Slocum's 12th Corps is about 9,000 effectives, and Morell's force is about 3,500 effectives. The infantry force McClellan has concentrated at Warrenton is around 77,000 effectives (inc. Whipple's small division). The cavalry is about 4,000-5,000 effective mounted men. A division of 3rd Corps under Stoneman (7,500 effectives) is marching down from Washington to join McClellan. At Washington is the rest of 3rd Corps and all of 11th Corps (probably 20,000 effectives between them), plus a huge (40,000 men +) garrison.

Dispositions of McClellan's and Lee's forces on 7th November 1862​

McClellan had been delayed in his planned movement by two factors. Firstly, the need to let the Potomac rise so as to prevent the rebels recrossing the Potomac, which required him to spread his army out to block the crossing points. Secondly, the War Department monsterously screwed up the supply of fodder and clothing. Whilst food and ammunition for the troops arrived, the quartermaster at Washington issued all the Army of the Potomac's clothing, shoes and camp equipment to the depot of the Washington defences, who had no need for it and left it on rolling stock around Baltimore and Washington. This wasn't detected until mid-October when Stanton asked the assistant sec'y of war, Thomas Scott, to investigate McClellan's complaints that his large numbers of his troops were barefoot, had no winter clothing and no tents etc. Prof. Wm. Starr Myers (in the best study of McClellan's personality) located an 1880 letter by Scott describing the events, with Scott noting that within two weeks of them finding the problem McClellan was invading Virginia again.

McClellan left 12th Corps (Slocum) at Harper's Ferry and a detachment under Morell on the upper Potomac to prevent the enemy gaining his rear and threatening Baltimore. Here one should note that the one truly vulnerable link in Washington's defences was the railway junction (Washington Junction) SW of Baltimore thus:

The communications of Washington​

If you want to threaten Washington you need to do it from the north. This is why in Trent War type scenarios Washington is completely untenable; a squadron of British ships defeating the antique Fort McHenry (which famously resisted a British attack half a century before, but had not been substantially improved) would compel the surrender of Washington.

McClellan of course had no concerns about the safety of Washington south of the Potomac. There Washington is practically invulnerable. Slocum and Morell block recrossing the Potomac by Jackson to threaten Baltimore. Washington is completely safe.

McClellan's forces had moved to Warrenton as a "flying column". Rather than relaying wagon trains to a depot the whole force had carried ten days supplies in their wagons, detached from their depots and marched with their wagons. As they concentrated at Warrenton the wagons were empty, and McClellan was refilling them for the next move. Hence the 7th November was a pause, whilst the quartermasters refilled the wagons for the next move.

Lee had sent Longstreet to block McClellan, and traveled with him. His order to Longstreet to move to Culpeper with part of his force is dated 28th October. Half of Hood's division had a smallpox epidemic ongoing and had been quarenteed and ordered to Gordonsville. Walker's division was to remain at Upperville covering the Winchester depot. Thus instead of 30,000 Longstreet was marching with ca. 24,500. Longstreet's lead division reached Culpeper on 5th November after seven days marching, along with Lee's HQ. On the 6th Richmond orders Longstreet to send a brigade to Weldon, NC and he sends Evans' (ref) with ca. 1,100 men (ref), leaving him 23,400 men against McClellan.. Jackson remains in the Shenandoah, as does Jackson's cavalry.

Thus when McClellan is relieved, he has concentrated nearly 80,000 combat effectives against Longstreet with 23,400 effectives. Jackson is a full weeks marching away. McClellan knows he has divided Lee's force.

Would McClellan attack Longstreet? How would it go?

The answer is probably. About seven weeks previously he'd faced exactly the same situation; a portion of the enemy army behind an easily crossable river. The resulting battle of Antietam saw almost equal forces (between 1:1 and 3:2 force ratios, depending on assumptions and methodologies) fight a bloody battle, with McClellan making massive force commitments (as high as Lee at Gettysburg before Pickett's charge). There is no reason to think McClellan wouldn't do so again knowing Jackson was a full weeks march away rather than half a days forced march.

The best indication of McClellan's intent is his movements with the cavalry. On the 7th he had his cavalry shift from screening the Blue Ridge and seize the crossings of the Hazel River, securing them with detachments of 9th Corps. His post-war writings indicate his plan was to separate Longstreet from Jackson by crossing the Hazel with at least a large portion of his army west of Longstreet's position. This is consistent with his cavalry movements.

McClellan has odds of about 4:1. Making matters even worse for Longstreet is that he's had to spread out his 23,000 men on a broad frontage to cover all possible approaches. The situation was so bad that on the 8th November Longstreet was preparing to abandon the position, ordering his trains and baggage south - the standard method of preparing to "break contact". The intention was to withdraw to Gordonsville 30 miles SSW. Lee is completely misreading McClellan, thinking the force at Warrenton is a detachment, and that the main thrust will be against Jackson (hence him telling Jackson as late as 9th November to be prepared for it). It is the 10th November that Lee detected that the Federals had stopped.

Thus what would probably happen is that around 9th-10th McClellan would have advanced Burnside with three corps (1st, 2nd and 9th) to Sperryville across the Hazel threatening Longstreet from the west and cutting all communication between Longstreet and Stuart. The other wing under Porter (5th, 6th and 11th corps) would threaten Longstreet from the north.

In all probability Longstreet would not stand at Culpeper, and would retreat to Gordonsville. If he did stand there is no doubt McClellan would have attacked him there.

What about Jackson?

Historically Jackson didn't start moving until 22nd November, arriving in the vicinity of Fredericksburg 29th. If McClellan makes any movement towards Longstreet then Jackson is cut off from Longstreet. Lee will have to make the longer movement via Staunton and Charlottesville to concentrate with Longstreet at Gordonsville. If things are going really bad Jackson may have to march down to Lynchburg and get a train to Richmond and get into the fortifications (this movement would take 14 days or more, the wing has to march 170-180 miles before reaching the rail line).

From the Federal POV the absolute best course of action Jackson could take is to assume an offensive against Washington. If Jackson forced the gaps in the Blue Ridge, McClellan could hold the gaps in the Catoctin Mountains and send 11th Corps down the Shenandoah on a raid to destroy Jackson's supply base. Jackson of course would never do this.

In mid-November Jackson is an irrelevance. The best case scenario for the rebels is that he will join Longstreet at Charlottesville/ Gordonsville at the end of November. The middling scenario is that he goes to Richmond, arriving mid-December. The worst is his destruction in the Loudoun Valley.

McClellan's movement post-Hazel?

There are two options. If Longstreet has taken a beating McClellan can follow up in an effort to gain Gordonsville. The position of Gordonsville on the Orange and Alexandria makes it a superb jumping off point against Richmond, and also blocks Jackson (option 1).

Railroads of Virginia. Those marked red were used by the US Military Railroad during the war.​

However, from Gordonsville McClellan would have to turn east and march to the Fredericksburg and Richmond RR. His other option (2) is simply to march to Fredericksburg, cross the river there (trivial once Longstreet is pushed back) and go down the R&FRR.

The main differences between the options is that (1) is slower, requires waiting for the O&ARR to be repaired but would push Longstreet out of the way. Option (2) is rapid, and gives the possibility of occupying Richmond before Longstreet can get back to it. If McClellan shifts to and advances down the R&FRR then the furthest north Longstreetcan move to block McClellan is Hanover Junction, behind the North Anna. Such a move by Longstreet risks McClellan simply getting their first, in which case Richmond simply falls as there is nothing Longstreet can do to stop McClellan any more. If Longstreet does get there then he has a small force in what we know (from Grant's 1864 campaign) is a terrible defensive position, and he will get run over by a Federal steamroller.

The other option for Longstreet is to simply entrain for Richmond, and accept that they can't stop McClellan getting before Richmond. Whether rapidly (McClellan reaches Richmond before Jackson's forces) or slowly (Jackson and Longstreet both get back in time to take positions in the defensive lines) Richmond will fall.

The Results

So, one month on from 7th November. The best case result for the Federals is the complete destruction of Lee's Army and the occupation of Richmond, with the Confederacy collapsing before Spring 1863. The worst case scenario is that Lee is able to concentrate his forces back in Richmond and McClellan has to reopen regular approaches. Unlike Grant, McClellan has a sufficient understanding of engineering to prepare and make deliberate assaults on fortified lines. Richmond will fall about one month, maybe six weeks, after McClellan arrives in force (it took McClellan about two-three weeks of preparation before he was ready to assault at both Yorktown and Richmond).

There are middling course, for example if Longstreet retreats to Staunton and joins Jackson Lee allows Richmond to be captured but keeps his army intact.

However, all of the reasonable possibilities are far better than Burnside on the Rappahanock....

​

 

[bamaman]

He would have concluded, from intelligence reports, that Lee had a million men, backed up with a thousand M1A2 main battle tanks and several squadrons of A-10 Warthogs.

And he still would have lost; and found someone else to blame!

 

[1SGDan]

What Would McClellan Have Done?

He would have asked for reinforcements then do nothing . His usual. The war may have concluded in time for the US entry into WWII.

 

[Belfoured]

What Would McClellan Have Done?

He would have asked for reinforcements then do nothing . His usual. The war may have concluded in time for the US entry into WWII.

This is my favorite from that stew of cult-driven fantasies:

"The best case result for the Federals is the complete destruction of Lee's Army and the occupation of Richmond, with the Confederacy collapsing before Spring 1863."

Time for that quote attributed to P. T. Barnum about "suckers". Lee, having stared McClellan squarely in the face with his crippled army on September 18, his back to a river, and having paid no price for that, surely would have been quaking in his boots.

 

[Saphroneth]

It would perhaps be useful when analyzing McClellan's likely conduct to avoid descending into caricature.


To take for example the question of whether McClellan would have acted aggressively.

The answer seems obvious. McClellan acted quite aggressively on the 17th of September, sending in actual attacks (as in, formation pushed forwards and actually engaged the enemy, generally being repulsed as a consequence) with 3/4 of the brigades in his army present on that date, and he was preparing another assault at the time Burnside was broken.

What this tells us is that McClellan would be unlikely to attack with his whole army, or that he would be unlikely to attack with his last unbroken units, unless it was part of a coordinated move across the whole front of the army. (He was preparing an attack when it would be in concert with Burnside, but not otherwise.) He would be likely to attack with around 3/4 of his army (as this is what he actually did on the 17th).
Any claim that he wouldn't attack with at least that kind of strength in suitable conditions has to face up to the fact that he actually did on the 17th.



Since that date (i.e. since the 17th of September), McClellan's estimate of Lee's actual strength has diminished. This is because McClellan's estimate of Lee's strength already assumed that Lee had (on the 17th) all the forces available - there are no further troops which could be drawn into Lee's army, in McClellan's estimation - and McClellan is aware that he inflicted significant casualties at Antietam, indeed McClellan somewhat overestimated those casualties.

Conversely, McClellan's own army has increased in size. He has gained some reinforcement regiments, and in addition he has the whole of 3rd Corps which has joined his force on top of the divisions of Humphreys and Couch; these more than make up for all the casualties he suffered at Antietam. While McClellan's paperwork says that he had 87,164 men PFD at Antietam (from his report - this is a slight overestimate as he mistakenly included some regiments) as of November 10th the force listed as Burnside's force in the field (which was McClellan's until a few days prior) included 130,500 men PFD, of which 4,500 was on the upper Potomac (Morell) and 11,250 was at Harpers Ferry; however, this report does not include the 3rd Corps division of Birney which was en route to join the Union army. This was a large division and (based on Fredericksburg-era data) was probably around 10,000 PFD.
Consequently, in PFD terms McClellan's field army - discounting 11th Corps which was helping cover his supply lines - was not less than 120,000 PFD, meaning 30,000 stronger than on the 17th at Antietam.

In addition to this, it is simply factual to say that the average quality of McClellan's army has improved. Some of the regiments in McClellan's army at Antietam had been inducted into service less than three weeks earlier, and since then the army has been drilling heavily (as attested in letters home); deficiencies of drill and equipment have been rectified, the latter just before the beginning of the Loudoun Valley campaign.


What this means is that McClellan is stronger than when he faced Lee on the 17th, and knows it, and he knows Lee is weaker. (He also knows as of the 7th that Lee's army is divided, so the force at Culpeper is somewhere around half the Confederate army - not the whole thing - and that the other half is days away.)

It would certainly be valid to say that McClellan would allocate some of his strength to defend his flanks or to meet possible threats such as a counterattack. This is in keeping with the way McClellan actually acted. But the amount of strength McClellan has available to pressure Longstreet at Culpeper is such that an "Antietam-style" attack (of about 75% of McClellan's available forces) would still suffice to destroy Longstreet if Longstreet stood and fought. That, after all, is an attack of equivalent strength to McClellan sending in every single last brigade at Antietam - against half of Lee's army.



Personally, I think considering Lee's possible operational moves in this situation is fascinating. Even if McClellan only commits to the extent he actually did at Antietam (75% of available forces) it will suffice to defeat half of Lee's army if Lee's army is divided - and Lee had ordered Jackson to concentrate with Longstreet via Swift Run Gap, but Jackson wasn't moving.

That's historical.

Short of McClellan not attacking at all - and I think Antietam demonstrates that he would attack - Lee has some very hard decisions to make.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Has anyone written a book about the period from the end of the Maryland Campaign to McClellan's dismissal? Now that Jeffrey William Hunt has covered the period after Gettysburg and Hampton Newsome covered Southern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign this seems like the biggest overlooked period in the Virginia Theater.

If McClellan lasts to the end of 1862 I don't see him staying on after that, especially with the Emancipation Proclamation.

I can imagine Mac coming up with a plan like Hooker's at Chancellorsville, and playing out the same way for the same reasons.

I do think McClellan would have been more attentive to detail with his pontoons and avoided the delay debacle of Burnside. He also would not have attacked Marye's Heights.

 

[Saphroneth]

I can imagine Mac coming up with a plan like Hooker's at Chancellorsville, and playing out the same way for the same reasons.

I do think McClellan would have been more attentive to detail with his pontoons and avoided the delay debacle of Burnside. He also would not have attacked Marye's Heights.

I don't think the Union is likely to have trouble getting over the Rappahannock at all! The problem with getting over the Rappahannock is fundamentally associated with the fact that Burnside delayed to cross the river until the pontoons arrived, which gave Jackson long enough to arrive, and also that Burnside didn't occupy the south bank with any troops at all (which gave time for Longstreet's corps to rush north from the North Anna)

Lee expected Burnside to cross the Rappahannock, either south of Culpeper or at Fredericksburg, well before Jackson arrived, which is why he initially moved Longstreet to the North Anna and only rushed north once he saw Burnside hadn't crossed; even if McClellan moves to Falmouth instead of pressing south (and I'll go into why he might have been about to press south in a moment) he'd still be likely to cross the Rappahannock before the pontoons arrived, relying on fords and occupying Marye's Heights. And this is why.


McClellan has a "command pattern" (a thing he does a lot) of pushing a force over a river in advance of crossing it with the bulk of his force. A non-exhaustive list is:

4th Corps across the Chickahominy in May.
The Pennsylvania Reserves across the James in July, when he was planning on crossing there (upon the arrival of Burnside's force)
1st Corps across the Antietam on 16th September.
5th Corps across the Potomac on 19th September.
9th Corps across the Potomac at the opening of the Loudoun Valley movement.
9th Corps across the upper Rappahannock at Waterloo, while repairing the bridge there.

If he moved to Falmouth then he'd likely do the same thing, occupying Marye's Heights.

But note that last one - crossing 9th Corps over the upper Rappahannock at Waterloo while repairing the bridge there. That's by no means conclusive, but it's circumstantial evidence that suggests (in concert with the movements of his cavalry) that he was planning to press south against Longstreet's corps at Culpeper. Lee certainly seems to have thought it was plausible, moving his baggage to the rear (to Gordonsville).

 

[Saphroneth]

In the interest of providing information about McClellan's command style and limitations in the post-Antietam period, I should note that he was asked by Halleck on the morning of the 7th October to give what his plans were for an offensive, for Halleck's approval.

McClellan replied the same day with a plan to attack into the Shenandoah Valley, towards Winchester, with the intent of either forcing a battle or forcing the Confederate army to abandon the northern section of the Valley. In the latter case, he would then adopt a new plan with the threat of Lee recrossing the Potomac now eliminated.

The reason this plan was not adopted is that Halleck didn't do anything with it. It's certainly a concept of operations which entails the Union army, under McClellan, launching an attack - and it's one which has a manoeuvrist bent to it. McClellan is proposing a move where the enemy response will benefit him, either because they'll give him a battle or because they won't.


Though I don't say conclusively that McClellan planned it, a move on Culpeper would have many of the same benefits. Either Longstreet fights it out, or he doesn't, and no matter what happens the Union benefits significantly!

 

[Belfoured]

It would perhaps be useful when analyzing McClellan's likely conduct to avoid descending into caricature.


To take for example the question of whether McClellan would have acted aggressively.

The answer seems obvious. McClellan acted quite aggressively on the 17th of September, sending in actual attacks (as in, formation pushed forwards and actually engaged the enemy, generally being repulsed as a consequence) with 3/4 of the brigades in his army present on that date, and he was preparing another assault at the time Burnside was broken.

What this tells us is that McClellan would be unlikely to attack with his whole army, or that he would be unlikely to attack with his last unbroken units, unless it was part of a coordinated move across the whole front of the army. (He was preparing an attack when it would be in concert with Burnside, but not otherwise.) He would be likely to attack with around 3/4 of his army (as this is what he actually did on the 17th).
Any claim that he wouldn't attack with at least that kind of strength in suitable conditions has to face up to the fact that he actually did on the 17th.



Since that date (i.e. since the 17th of September), McClellan's estimate of Lee's actual strength has diminished. This is because McClellan's estimate of Lee's strength already assumed that Lee had (on the 17th) all the forces available - there are no further troops which could be drawn into Lee's army, in McClellan's estimation - and McClellan is aware that he inflicted significant casualties at Antietam, indeed McClellan somewhat overestimated those casualties.

Conversely, McClellan's own army has increased in size. He has gained some reinforcement regiments, and in addition he has the whole of 3rd Corps which has joined his force on top of the divisions of Humphreys and Couch; these more than make up for all the casualties he suffered at Antietam. While McClellan's paperwork says that he had 87,164 men PFD at Antietam (from his report - this is a slight overestimate as he mistakenly included some regiments) as of November 10th the force listed as Burnside's force in the field (which was McClellan's until a few days prior) included 130,500 men PFD, of which 4,500 was on the upper Potomac (Morell) and 11,250 was at Harpers Ferry; however, this report does not include the 3rd Corps division of Birney which was en route to join the Union army. This was a large division and (based on Fredericksburg-era data) was probably around 10,000 PFD.
Consequently, in PFD terms McClellan's field army - discounting 11th Corps which was helping cover his supply lines - was not less than 120,000 PFD, meaning 30,000 stronger than on the 17th at Antietam.

In addition to this, it is simply factual to say that the average quality of McClellan's army has improved. Some of the regiments in McClellan's army at Antietam had been inducted into service less than three weeks earlier, and since then the army has been drilling heavily (as attested in letters home); deficiencies of drill and equipment have been rectified, the latter just before the beginning of the Loudoun Valley campaign.


What this means is that McClellan is stronger than when he faced Lee on the 17th, and knows it, and he knows Lee is weaker. (He also knows as of the 7th that Lee's army is divided, so the force at Culpeper is somewhere around half the Confederate army - not the whole thing - and that the other half is days away.)

It would certainly be valid to say that McClellan would allocate some of his strength to defend his flanks or to meet possible threats such as a counterattack. This is in keeping with the way McClellan actually acted. But the amount of strength McClellan has available to pressure Longstreet at Culpeper is such that an "Antietam-style" attack (of about 75% of McClellan's available forces) would still suffice to destroy Longstreet if Longstreet stood and fought. That, after all, is an attack of equivalent strength to McClellan sending in every single last brigade at Antietam - against half of Lee's army.



Personally, I think considering Lee's possible operational moves in this situation is fascinating. Even if McClellan only commits to the extent he actually did at Antietam (75% of available forces) it will suffice to defeat half of Lee's army if Lee's army is divided - and Lee had ordered Jackson to concentrate with Longstreet via Swift Run Gap, but Jackson wasn't moving.

That's historical.

Short of McClellan not attacking at all - and I think Antietam demonstrates that he would attack - Lee has some very hard decisions to make.

You dislike some of the "caricature" because, unfortunately, like good caricature, it has a basis in reality. Just for example, consistent decision-making based on marked and repeated overestimates of enemy strength throughout his tenure. Or perhaps you believe that a statement on March 3, 1863 that Lee had 100,000 men in the fight on September 17 and outnumbered McClellan by 25,000-30,000 was plausible. And no, don't even try ....

 

[Saphroneth]

You dislike some of the "caricature" because, unfortunately, like good caricature, it has a basis in reality. Just for example, consistent decision-making based on marked and repeated overestimates of enemy strength throughout his tenure. Or perhaps you believe that a statement on March 3, 1863 that Lee had 100,000 men in the fight on September 17 and outnumbered McClellan by 25,000-30,000 was plausible. And no, don't even try ....

Regardless of what strength Lee had or McClellan thought Lee had, McClellan still attacked him on the 17th with 3/4 of his army - that's not McClellan being unwilling to attack.

To say McClellan's estimates were higher than the true value (though not consistently, since at times he gives correct values) is staying within the realm of fact. To say he wouldn't attack because his estimates were higher than the true value is more in the realm of caricature, because he attacked on September 17 - that is, in a situation similar to the caricature (McClellan's estimation of Lee's army) he acted differently (by attacking)

 

[Belfoured]

Regardless of what strength Lee had or McClellan thought Lee had, McClellan still attacked him on the 17th with 3/4 of his army - that's not McClellan being unwilling to attack.

To say McClellan's estimates were higher than the true value (though not consistently, since at times he gives correct values) is staying within the realm of fact. To say he wouldn't attack because his estimates were higher than the true value is more in the realm of caricature, because he attacked on September 17 - that is, in a situation similar to the caricature (McClellan's estimation of Lee's army) he acted differently (by attacking)

This is likely to descend into the usual endless and unproductive debating game. As in "what was the other 1/4 doing", "what happened/didn't happen on the 16th", "what happened/didn't happen on the 18th", etc etc etc. Hence I'm categorically not going there because I know to a 99.9% certainty where this is headed.

Am I saying there is no/zero/non-existent chance McClellan would attack Lee in November/December 1862? Of course not. But anybody who simply discards the notion that McClellan would be overestimating Lee's actual strength at the time and would be accounting for that while he was making triple sure that literally everything was in place is simply fooling themselves. That's just who he was. And that affects outcomes.

 

[JerryD]

What Would McClellan Have Done?

He would have asked for reinforcements then do nothing . His usual. The war may have concluded in time for the US entry into WWII.

We have a winner!

 

[121st PA Vols]

It's always worth keeping in mind that McClellan - nearly 6 months after Antietam - was still making the absurd claim under oath before the JCCW that on September 17 "we fought pretty close upon 100,000 men". At a numerical disadvantage of 25,000-30,000, of course, based on his statement that he had between "70,000 to 75,000". Report of the JCCW at 441.

Anybody who thinks that the incessant whining about numbers would not have been a factor in post-November 7 campaigning needs an intervention.

Incredible! That is until you recall how Magruder bamboozled him at Yorktown with 13,000. Or was it 130,000?