McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Jamieva]

I think he would have made some type of probe toward Longstreet, and then reported back that Lee/Longstreet were in a position too strong to attack and gone into winter quarters.

Additionally, Jackson being in the valley on his flank would have completely kept him distracted from focusing 100% on overwhelming Longstreet.

 

[Jamieva]

It would perhaps be useful when analyzing McClellan's likely conduct to avoid descending into caricature.


To take for example the question of whether McClellan would have acted aggressively.

The answer seems obvious. McClellan acted quite aggressively on the 17th of September, sending in actual attacks (as in, formation pushed forwards and actually engaged the enemy, generally being repulsed as a consequence) with 3/4 of the brigades in his army present on that date, and he was preparing another assault at the time Burnside was broken.

What this tells us is that McClellan would be unlikely to attack with his whole army, or that he would be unlikely to attack with his last unbroken units, unless it was part of a coordinated move across the whole front of the army. (He was preparing an attack when it would be in concert with Burnside, but not otherwise.) He would be likely to attack with around 3/4 of his army (as this is what he actually did on the 17th).
Any claim that he wouldn't attack with at least that kind of strength in suitable conditions has to face up to the fact that he actually did on the 17th.



Since that date (i.e. since the 17th of September), McClellan's estimate of Lee's actual strength has diminished. This is because McClellan's estimate of Lee's strength already assumed that Lee had (on the 17th) all the forces available - there are no further troops which could be drawn into Lee's army, in McClellan's estimation - and McClellan is aware that he inflicted significant casualties at Antietam, indeed McClellan somewhat overestimated those casualties.

Conversely, McClellan's own army has increased in size. He has gained some reinforcement regiments, and in addition he has the whole of 3rd Corps which has joined his force on top of the divisions of Humphreys and Couch; these more than make up for all the casualties he suffered at Antietam. While McClellan's paperwork says that he had 87,164 men PFD at Antietam (from his report - this is a slight overestimate as he mistakenly included some regiments) as of November 10th the force listed as Burnside's force in the field (which was McClellan's until a few days prior) included 130,500 men PFD, of which 4,500 was on the upper Potomac (Morell) and 11,250 was at Harpers Ferry; however, this report does not include the 3rd Corps division of Birney which was en route to join the Union army. This was a large division and (based on Fredericksburg-era data) was probably around 10,000 PFD.
Consequently, in PFD terms McClellan's field army - discounting 11th Corps which was helping cover his supply lines - was not less than 120,000 PFD, meaning 30,000 stronger than on the 17th at Antietam.

In addition to this, it is simply factual to say that the average quality of McClellan's army has improved. Some of the regiments in McClellan's army at Antietam had been inducted into service less than three weeks earlier, and since then the army has been drilling heavily (as attested in letters home); deficiencies of drill and equipment have been rectified, the latter just before the beginning of the Loudoun Valley campaign.


What this means is that McClellan is stronger than when he faced Lee on the 17th, and knows it, and he knows Lee is weaker. (He also knows as of the 7th that Lee's army is divided, so the force at Culpeper is somewhere around half the Confederate army - not the whole thing - and that the other half is days away.)

It would certainly be valid to say that McClellan would allocate some of his strength to defend his flanks or to meet possible threats such as a counterattack. This is in keeping with the way McClellan actually acted. But the amount of strength McClellan has available to pressure Longstreet at Culpeper is such that an "Antietam-style" attack (of about 75% of McClellan's available forces) would still suffice to destroy Longstreet if Longstreet stood and fought. That, after all, is an attack of equivalent strength to McClellan sending in every single last brigade at Antietam - against half of Lee's army.



Personally, I think considering Lee's possible operational moves in this situation is fascinating. Even if McClellan only commits to the extent he actually did at Antietam (75% of available forces) it will suffice to defeat half of Lee's army if Lee's army is divided - and Lee had ordered Jackson to concentrate with Longstreet via Swift Run Gap, but Jackson wasn't moving.

That's historical.

Short of McClellan not attacking at all - and I think Antietam demonstrates that he would attack - Lee has some very hard decisions to make.

A truly aggressive move would have been to attack on the 16th as you are pursuing a beaten enemy from South Mountain.

 

[JeffBrooks]

I agree that this thread, like all McClellan threads, is likely to descend into an argument about whether the 1,874th Louisiana Sub-Battalion had 297 men or 296 men. If the former, McClellan was a complete and total buffoon and not worthy of being a private. If the latter, he was clearly the greatest general in the history of the human race and neither Napoleon nor Julius Caesar was worthy of polishing his boots.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Additionally, Jackson being in the valley on his flank would have completely kept him distracted from focusing 100% on overwhelming Longstreet.

It's worth remembering the AOTP did not yet have a cavalry corps; as of Antietam it had a cavalry division of 5 brigades. 4,500 cavalry vs. 12,000 during the Gettysburg Campaign.

Holding the Blue Ridge gaps again Jackson would have been a lot more feasible with the latter force, but no so with the former.

 

[Jamieva]

It's worth remembering the AOTP did not yet have a cavalry corps; as of Antietam it had a cavalry division of 5 brigades. 4,500 cavalry vs. 12,000 during the Gettysburg Campaign.

Holding the Blue Ridge gaps again Jackson would have been a lot more feasible with the latter force, but no so with the former.

And McClellan didn't deploy or use them well either.

 

[67th Tigers]

It's worth remembering the AOTP did not yet have a cavalry corps; as of Antietam it had a cavalry division of 5 brigades. 4,500 cavalry vs. 12,000 during the Gettysburg Campaign.

Holding the Blue Ridge gaps again Jackson would have been a lot more feasible with the latter force, but no so with the former.

Actually, these "5 brigades" are task forces rather than the permanent brigades, which was the subject of my research during early COVID. The AoP had two cavalry brigades formed in the aftermath of the Seven Days when they binned the worst generals. The org was:

Division - Stoneman

Averell's Brigade (30 sqns)

• 5th US Cavalry
• 3rd PA Cavalry
• 1st NY Cavalry (minus 2 sqns - escorts to 5th and 6th Corps)
• 4th PA Cavalry

Gregg's Brigade (21 sqns)

• 1st & 6th US Cavalry
• 8th Illinois Cavalry (minus 1 sqn - escort to 4th Corps)
• 8th PA Cavalry
• 6th NY Cavalry (only 2 sqns)

Independent "Corps of Guides" - 6th PA Cavalry & the sqn of 2nd U.S. Cavalry

Barker's independent sqn was assigned to 2nd Corps as escort, and the one random sqn of 5th PA Cav that reached the Peninsula to the 3rd. The one sqn of the 4th US Cavalry remained McClellan's escort. The detachment of the 1st US Cavalry was so understrength that 4 coys (A, E, F & K) were disbanded and the men distributed to the remaining 2 sqns. These two sqns were essentially added to the 6th US.

The 2nd bde absorbed the 3rd Indiana (3 sqns) and Washington, and they set off on the campaign. Two additional units (12th PA, 6 sqns and 1st Massachusetts, 4 sqns) joined at Frederick. However, the division commander (Buford) was injured and the 1st brigade commander (BG Averell) was sick. This left just the 2nd brigade commander (the now BG Pleasonton) to command. Around 12th September, the cavalry was task-org'd on the march as a large detachment was made to go to Gettysburg. The 5 brigades are thus:

1st Bde - a "regular brigade" did not exist on the 17th September. When the 6th US Cavalry (2nd Bde) reached the field on the 21st (it had been attached to 6th Corps and remained on the Maryland Heights) it was paired with the 5th US Cavalry (1st Bde). This lasted until the 24th.

2nd Bde - The 2nd Bde was Pleasonton's own brigade after the detachment of the 1st & 6th US (to 6th Corps) and addition of the 3rd Indiana (only 3 sqns). The 1st Massachusetts (only 4 sqns) was attached at Frederick, and the 8th PA simultaneously detached (listed as "4th Bde").

3rd Bde - the actual 1st Bde, which consisted of the 5th US, 3rd PA, 4th PA & 1st NY, the 6th PA (attached). At Frederick the 1st NY was detached, and at some point the 3rd PA was attached to 1st Corps.

4th Bde - a temporary task force created for a recce to Gettysburg on 13th September that disappeared soon after it returned to the army on the 18th.

5th Bde - this was the 3rd PA, attached to 1st Corps plus the 8th NY Cavalry which had escaped Harper's Ferry and arrived on the right flank at Antietam late morning of the 17th. They fell in with the 3rd PA until the 23rd, when the 8th NY went to Hagerstown, and the 3rd PA remained at Sharpsburg.

At Antietam the actual organisation of the division was:

• Averell's Brigade, under Col. Childs (then Rush, vice Childs KIA)
  • 5th United States (Capt. Whiting)
  • 4th Pennsylvania (Lt Col Kerr, vice Col Childs, brigadier)
  • 6th Pennsylvania (9 coys) (Col Rush, then Lt Col Smith vice Rush, to brigadier)
• Pleasanton's Own Brigade, under Col. Farnsworth
  • 8th Illinois (Maj Medill, vice Col Farnsworth, brigadier)
  • 3rd Indiana (Maj Chapman)
  • 1st Massachusetts (Col Williams)
• Horse Artillery
  • Battery A, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Tidball, 6 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery B&L, 2nd US Artillery (Capt Robinson, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery M(-), 2nd US Artillery (Lt Hains, 4 Ordnance Rifles)
  • Battery C&G(-), 3rd US Artillery (Capt Gibson, 4 Ordnance Rifles, section with 6th US Cavalry by elimination)

Detached was McReynolds command, which was sent on a sweep to Gettysburg and didn't reach Sharpsburg until the 18th:

• 1st New York Cavalry (Maj AW Adams, vice Col McReynolds, acting brigadier)
• 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lt Col AE Griffiths)
• 2 battalions, 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Maj JA Congdon)
• Chapin's section, Bty M, 2nd US Artillery

In addition to the normal escort sqns, four corps had significant cavalry attached:

• 1st Corps - 3rd PA Cavalry (joined by the 8th NY by happenstance in the late morning)
• 2nd Corps - a battalion (2 sqns) of the 12th PA Cavalry
• 6th Corps - 1st & 6th US Cavalry
• 9th Corps - 6th NY Cavalry (3 or 4 sqns)

Post-Antietam, the two permanent brigades were reformed in their original form plus a few extra regts.

In addition to McClellan's two cavalry brigades, Pope had had three, but they were not in a condition for the field. They were Bayard's (the brigade attached to 1st Corps), ex-Buford's (under di Cesnola, 11th Corps' brigade) and Hatch's (12th Corps' brigade). A new brigade of Michigan cavalry were being raised at Washington as well.

Bayard's brigade joined McClellan for the October-November movement, and these three brigades (Averell's, Pleasonton's and Bayard's) were the cavalry of Burnside's army. Di Cesnola's brigade was broken up when Hooker was appointed, and the 5 regts distributed to the three existing brigades. The brigades now having 6-7 regts, each was redesignated a division and divided into two brigades. The regulars were centralised as a reserve. In June, the cavalry was so decreased that the 1st Division & Reserve brigade were amalgated into a division, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were amalgamated into a new 2nd Division. The two remaining brigades at Washington (ex-Hatch's and Custer's Michigan brigade) were sent to the army as a new 3rd Division.

 

[Saphroneth]

Incredible! That is until you recall how Magruder bamboozled him at Yorktown with 13,000. Or was it 130,000?

The estimates McClellan gave of Magruder's strength at Yorktown were all reasonably correct given the actual accumulation of Confederate strength at Yorktown - that is, he gives three estimates and all are roughly correct for the time he gives them. (I say "roughly" because to expect exact precision is unrealistic - some Union commanders not known for overestimating have given single estimates as much as 100% over, but I'd say within 20%-30% is acceptable.)

The error that actually comes in in Confederate strength estimates comes in at Richmond, and is the result largely of a member of his intelligence cell whose efforts to identify Confederate formations present at Richmond leads to double counting. (Specifically 36 "false" infantry regiments are identified.)

There's other factors in play at Richmond, like the unfalsifiable rumours that Beauregard was coming east with part of his forces (Beauregard had been seen in Richmond, but it hadn't been gathered at that time that he was fired) but that double-count of infantry regiments is the high estimate that sticks around. This plus the assumption that Lee had brought his entire disposable force north for the Maryland Campaign, is what leads to subsequent high estimates (which are reduced over time by casualties, I'll note).



There's an actual mechanics to this. We can see how the estimates are generated, and it's not McClellan just making up a big number - we can see how the numbers evolve over time.

 

[Saphroneth]

This is likely to descend into the usual endless and unproductive debating game. As in "what was the other 1/4 doing", "what happened/didn't happen on the 16th", "what happened/didn't happen on the 18th", etc etc etc. Hence I'm categorically not going there because I know to a 99.9% certainty where this is headed.

Simple enough: On the 16th McClellan's forces are mostly not yet arrived on the field; on the 18th McClellan's forces are mostly recovering from a day of shattering combat, and consequently (like many other Union commanders on the offensive) he declines to launch two days of heavy attacks in direct sequence.

I reiterate myself - it is not unrealistic to say that McClellan would attack, so long as these conditions are fulfilled:

- He has enough force on the field that in reality he has an advantage over the Confederate forces there (which, if he is estimating high, means that he is estimating parity - or even a modest disadvantage, depending on what your view of his estimate of the Antietam situation is)
- He is not likely to have a significant improvement to his chances of success by waiting another day (that is, a large fraction of his forces have arrived and are available for attack that day)

This is because that's what he did at Antietam. He didn't attack on the 16th because he didn't have the forces on the field yet; he attacked on the 17th because enough forces were "up" by then or would arrive that day that he'd have what he wanted. Note that he launches the attack on the 17th at a time five divisions haven't arrived yet, but three of them were due to arrive that day and that was good enough; he goes for speed over more prep time on the 17th.

And, in such a situation, it would not be unrealistic for McClellan to commit about three quarters of his total available force (in brigades) because that is how much he actually attacked with on the 17th.


This is a combination that means that Longstreet cannot successfully defend Culpeper against the force McClellan has available - even factoring in whatever extent you think McClellan didn't fully engage at Antietam, the force ratios are about three times better now in reality (McClellan about one-third stronger, Lee took casualties, Lee's army is split in half) and so if Longstreet tries to stand he will be crushed.

 

[rbasin]

I don't see either a Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville if McClellan is in charge.

 

[Saphroneth]

A truly aggressive move would have been to attack on the 16th as you are pursuing a beaten enemy from South Mountain.

This would certainly be the most aggressive option, but the actual forces available to Lee and McClellan on the 16th would tend to indicate that it would be overaggressive.
Of Lee's 2,030 companies in his army, about 60% were on the field on the 16th (Longstreet's command, DH Hill's division, Jackson's division and Ewell's division, plus Walker who arrived at noon about when the fog burned off) amounting to about 1,200 companies (which are largely drawn up in line of battle - in fact the "beaten enemy" had taken up a line of battle on the far side of the Antietam late on the 15th); conversely McClellan has Sykes and Richardson at the middle bridge in the morning (258 companies), and over the course of the day other formations become available, but even all of 1st and 2nd Corps plus Sykes only amount to 923 companies.

Note that by noon Lee has 518 companies (Jackson, Ewell, Walker) who were not at South Mountain and were thus not part of a "beaten enemy".

On the 17th, McClellan has about 2,040 companies on the field (this includes Morell and 6th Corps) while Lee had slightly less than 2,000 (this includes AP Hill). In addition the extra time lets McClellan manoeuvre for a more complex attack - on the 16th there's not time to get troops out to the flanks for a broad-front attack and it amounts to attacking down a single line of advance up a hill.

 

[67th Tigers]

Incredible! That is until you recall how Magruder bamboozled him at Yorktown with 13,000. Or was it 130,000?

Whilst Magruder probably only had about 13,000 in mid-March by his February return (ca. 13,600 present after deducting units that went with Cobb), he had been reinforced. McClellan's estimates were totally correct or a bit under during this period:

Source	Date	Estimate	Actual Strength (Present) at the Time at Yorktown etc.	Probable Source
Heintzelman (to McClellan)	29th March	15,000 to 20,000	ca. 16,000	Wool and prisoner interrogations
McClellan (to Sumner)	3rd April	15,000​	ca.20,000	Heintzelman and Wool
Paris (an Int analyst at HQ)	4th April	25,000​	ca. 25,000	?
McClellan (via Wool)	7th April	30,000​	ca. 33,000	Prisoner interrogations giving a strength of 30-40,000
McClellan (to Burnside)	20th April	80,000​	75-85,000	General estimate minus detached forces?

 

[Saphroneth]

So looking at what McClellan knows (or thinks) at this time, as in, around the 7th November.


The Union cavalry report at this point (as of the 6th) is that Jackson's corps is "in Chester Gap and beyond". Pleasonton's report gives the situation as:

At this time and from the 7th instant my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within 6 miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank pickets toward Chester and Thornton's Gaps extended to Gaines' Cross-Roads and Newby's Cross-Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville.
The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet with his command being at Culpeper, while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah Valley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expecting us to attempt to pass through and attack them.

McClellan later gave the report of positions as:

When I gave up the command to General Burnside the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpeper; Jackson, with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their three west of the Blue Ridge.

Given Pleasonton's report, I would tend to consider this to be correct - at least, that it's known that Jackson and the Hills are west of the Blue Ridge and that Longstreet is at Culpeper.


Looking at Lee's plans and situation:



Lee's interpretation of McClellan's movements, to Stuart, is that he's either operating by his right flank entirely or moving his whole army along the Blue Ridge (neither is currently strictly true, McClellan has broken away from the Blue Ridge). He also says that if McClellan does push Lee back he'd have Longstreet fall back through Madison to make a junction with Jackson coming out of Swift Run Gap (repeating a theme he made to Jefferson Davis).



To GW Randolph, Lee reports that McClellan is advancing and will probably reach the Hazel tomorrow. His only information on Union infantry (aside presumably from Warrenton) is two brigades of infantry at Orleans on the 6th. Interestingly this is an understatement - two divisions reached Orleans on the 6th and the other two divisions reached Waterloo.

On the 9th November, Lee told Stuart that there were dispatches to the effect that McClellan was concentrated "in the vicinity of Piedmont" (a theme he repeated to Jackson on 9th November and the Confederate SecWar on 10th November).

Marked in blue above: actual Union corps positions as of the 9th. Note that on the 8th and 9th the army was fulfilling previous march orders by McClellan; since 1st didn't get any new march orders it didn't move.


Full positions on the 7th November:

The other half of Hood has smallpox and is quarantined at Gordonsville, to the south.
Between the 7th and 9th the main change in Confederate positions is that Walker moves to Madison Court House.



If McClellan moves for Culpeper, then either there's a battle there or Lee retires. Lee retiring is I think plausible, he said he was going to fall back to Madison and had Walker moving in that direction already. This would be with the intent of uniting with Jackson via Swift Run Gap, but Jackson wasn't moving historically and wouldn't for another couple of weeks despite Lee's orders.

What happens next is - well, interesting, because it depends on whether McClellan would split his forces or not. He could leave a couple of corps around Culpeper and take the rest to Fredericksburg, and if he does that then Lee has a choice between uniting with Jackson or blocking the way to Richmond. (There's no manoeuvre forces between McClellan and Richmond at that point, so it's a difficult choice.) The choice still exists if McClellan doesn't split his forces, but there's no scope for McClellan to interpose a pair of corps between Jackson and Longstreet if he doesn't leave them at Culpeper.



It's really a very tricky manoeuvre situation for Lee to be in. He has a strong interest to avoid battle until he can unite the halves of his army, but for Jackson to join with him is going to take a long time - the line of the Rappahannock is never as vulnerable as this to a Union army at any point in the whole war.

 

[Belfoured]

Simple enough: On the 16th McClellan's forces are mostly not yet arrived on the field; on the 18th McClellan's forces are mostly recovering from a day of shattering combat, and consequently (like many other Union commanders on the offensive) he declines to launch two days of heavy attacks in direct sequence.

I reiterate myself - it is not unrealistic to say that McClellan would attack, so long as these conditions are fulfilled:

- He has enough force on the field that in reality he has an advantage over the Confederate forces there (which, if he is estimating high, means that he is estimating parity - or even a modest disadvantage, depending on what your view of his estimate of the Antietam situation is)
- He is not likely to have a significant improvement to his chances of success by waiting another day (that is, a large fraction of his forces have arrived and are available for attack that day)

This is because that's what he did at Antietam. He didn't attack on the 16th because he didn't have the forces on the field yet; he attacked on the 17th because enough forces were "up" by then or would arrive that day that he'd have what he wanted. Note that he launches the attack on the 17th at a time five divisions haven't arrived yet, but three of them were due to arrive that day and that was good enough; he goes for speed over more prep time on the 17th.

And, in such a situation, it would not be unrealistic for McClellan to commit about three quarters of his total available force (in brigades) because that is how much he actually attacked with on the 17th.


This is a combination that means that Longstreet cannot successfully defend Culpeper against the force McClellan has available - even factoring in whatever extent you think McClellan didn't fully engage at Antietam, the force ratios are about three times better now in reality (McClellan about one-third stronger, Lee took casualties, Lee's army is split in half) and so if Longstreet tries to stand he will be crushed.

And AAWWWWAAAAYYYYYYYY we go - get the headlamps as we descend into the eternal, unending "explanation" of everything McClellan didn't do.

 

[Saphroneth]

And AAWWWWAAAAYYYYYYYY we go - get the headlamps as we descend into the eternal, unending "explanation" of everything McClellan didn't do.

Dear me, are you interested in actual discussion or are you interested in loudly proclaiming that your viewpoint is correct while also loudly proclaiming that any argument to the contrary is hilarious nonsense? The latter is hardly intellectually robust... if you don't want a point to be up for debate, then the fair thing to do is to not make it in the first place.

But the fact of McClellan attacking on the 17th, with 3/4 of the brigades that were available that day (including those which had not arrived at the start of the day) is fact, and that means that any claim he wouldn't attack with at least that much strength is an incorrect caricature - since, well, it's a thing he did.

Exploring the situations under which he might attack, or might not, is certainly something we could do. That might however lean dangerously close to an explanation.



I reiterate myself - under circumstances where McClellan considers himself to have at least the same strength relative to Lee as he had on the 17th September (whatever you think that consideration may be) he would be willing to attack with at least 3/4 of his available strength, by brigade. This is not the same as the caricature that McClellan was unwilling to attack, but has the virtue of being, you know. True.

 

[Belfoured]

Dear me, are you interested in actual discussion or are you interested in loudly proclaiming that your viewpoint is correct while also loudly proclaiming that any argument to the contrary is hilarious nonsense? The latter is hardly intellectually robust... if you don't want a point to be up for debate, then the fair thing to do is to not make it in the first place.

But the fact of McClellan attacking on the 17th, with 3/4 of the brigades that were available that day (including those which had not arrived at the start of the day) is fact, and that means that any claim he wouldn't attack with at least that much strength is an incorrect caricature - since, well, it's a thing he did.

Exploring the situations under which he might attack, or might not, is certainly something we could do. That might however lean dangerously close to an explanation.



I reiterate myself - under circumstances where McClellan considers himself to have at least the same strength relative to Lee as he had on the 17th September (whatever you think that consideration may be) he would be willing to attack with at least 3/4 of his available strength, by brigade. This is not the same as the caricature that McClellan was unwilling to attack, but has the virtue of being, you know. True.

You're not interested in discussion. You're interested in debate. You think that those are the same thing. They're not. Whenever the topic is McClellan, you concede nothing and we get endless "explanations" for everything he did/did not do. There are numerous threads along those lines.

I've agreed in other threads that Stanton/Lincoln screwed up in Spring 1862 in decisions regarding the Valley, etc; that based on research and analysis by others, McClellan did not fail to move to take advantage of the Lost Orders on September 13; etc. That's "discussion".

 

[JeffBrooks]

And AAWWWWAAAAYYYYYYYY we go - get the headlamps as we descend into the eternal, unending "explanation" of everything McClellan didn't do.

If someone were to post a thread about McClellan's horse, it would dissolve into dueling estimates of Magruder's strength at Yorktown within a dozen posts or so.

 

[Saphroneth]

You're not interested in discussion. You're interested in debate. You think that those are the same thing. They're not. Whenever the topic is McClellan, you concede nothing and we get endless "explanations" for everything he did/did not do. There are numerous threads along those lines.

The first step in understanding is to understand why someone did something; your response to my point about McClellan attacking with 3/4 of his brigades on the 17th was to bring up that he didn't on the 16th and the 18th.

Quite frankly anything that addresses that is going to be an explanation, or an "explanation" if you prefer to put it in quotes - it is going to be looking into why McClellan didn't do something. If you don't want it discussed then don't mention it; either it is relevant (in which case the question is under what conditions McClellan would attack or not) or it is not (in which case, why post it? We know McClellan would attack under some conditions because he did on the 17th.)


For the example of why McClellan didn't attack on the 16th, the answer is related to the arrival of forces on the field on that date and the relative buildup of Union and Confederate strength - both in McClellan's perception and in reality. That is why he didn't attack on the 16th - the balance of forces and the movement of his troops, as far as he was concerned, indicated that he would have a better opportunity to attack on the 17th. He could also have delayed until the 18th, by which time he would have his whole force available, but he didn't do that either. He opted for the 17th as his judgement of the best balance between speed and mass.
Whether this is a good idea is separate; you probably have a guess about what I think, and you're certainly at liberty to disagree.

It doesn't change what McClellan did on the 17th. It might affect what he'd do during the phase of his arrival at Culpeper in November, though.



Here is how we might use that information.

In an alternate historical situation, on the 11th McClellan's columns approach Culpeper from two directions. 9th leads 1st on the pike road down from Warrenton, having crossed the Hazel at Rixeyville; 2nd leads 5th on the road from Rappahannock Station, having crossed the Rappahannock by the bridge there. By noon the leading corps of each column has arrived, is deploying and is available to fight that day, but the second corps of each column is far enough behind that it is not available to fight that day (at least, in McClellan's judgement).

Would McClellan attack on the 11th or delay until the 12th?

That depends on whether he thinks he has the strength available to prosecute a successful attack. He has about the same strength ratio (in reality) as he had at Antietam on the 17th, or maybe a bit more, so he might go for it; however, he might instead wait until the 12th if he thinks that an attack on the 11th would be liable to be repulsed.


That is the kind of situation where, based on Antietam, we might see McClellan opting for a delay.


On the other hand, if 1st and/or 5th are likely to be available to fight that day, in McClellan's judgement, I see no reason why he wouldn't just go for it.

 

[121st PA Vols]

They did have good plans, but so did McClellan. His amphibious plan to approach Richmond from the southern route was well conceived but failed in its execution. As did Burnside's and Hooker's plans. As far as Burnside is concerned, Lincoln and the military administration's insistence on the overland route, its obsession with protecting Washington, and its prodding to undertake another offensive campaign before the onset of winter put Burnside in an untenable position. Those factors, and Burnside's re-organization of the AotP and the need to refill numerous slots of officers lost at Antietam didn't bode well for his Fredericksburg operation, notwithstanding Burnside's own tactical errors. But a McClellan still in command would likely have a greater handle on the organization and loyalty of the AotP; his innate cautiousness might have allowed him to withstand the pressure to commit troops unlike Burnside, who plowed ahead with the Rappahannock crossing even after the late arrival of the pontoons spelled clear disaster.

Interesting views jack62.
Mine focused in on a fast overview of what I think are key personality tells.
** Allowing Magruder to utterly baffle him at Yorktown speaks to his crippling 'hesitancy' trait.
** Johnston attacking him (Seven Pines), not McClellan attacking Johnston, while catching his army straddling the Chickahominy. Sidebar: this is a great eg of a man (Johnston) seizing the opportunity to act completely out of character. Johnston attacking!??!
** Lee (June 1st take over) attacking with little help from Jackson (via Valley) shows what an aggressive man can do. McClellan was not this man! Of course he resisted to save the army. But it was with the James River in mind, heading south, retreating. This was essentially Lee's first battle where he completely showed up McClellan.
Edited to say; That's an interesting view McClellan's timidness (prudence) may have helped were he at Fredericksburg and not Burnside.

 

[Saphroneth]

** Allowing Magruder to utterly baffle him at Yorktown speaks to his crippling 'hesitancy' trait.
** Johnston attacking him (Seven Pines), not McClellan attacking Johnston, while catching his army straddling the Chickahominy. Sidebar: this is a great eg of a man (Johnston) seizing the opportunity to act completely out of character. Johnston attacking!??!

In both cases these are related more to the fortifications than anything...

** Lee (June 1st take over) attacking with little help from Jackson (via Valley) shows what an aggressive man can do. McClellan was not this man! Of course he resisted to save the army. But it was with the James River in mind, heading south, retreating. This was essentially Lee's first battle where he completely showed up McClellan.

...and this, I think (the whole post), is part of why McClellan threads tend to "devolve". It's because - well, what am I supposed to do? To go into the details about what McClellan's actual situation and options were would take up a whole thread each, easily, but people are quite happy to present them as if they were fact.

For example, Magruder only "baffled" McClellan at Yorktown if you consider it to be the case that the fortifications and defences were so weak that they could have been easily rolled over by attacks and McClellan failed to order any. In fact McClellan did order attacks on the 5th, but for both columns their commander decided that the strength of the enemy defences was not amenable to attack in their sector; McClellan's estimates of total enemy strength in this period were basically correct.

But the idea that Magruder "baffled" McClellan is presented here as fact.

 

[damYankee]

I figured somebody would pick up on that after I did the post! Obviously we are speaking only of Virginia; the western seat of war was a different matter altogether.

The western seat the war was just as important as the eastern seat. I understand that to many the only thing that mattered was Virginia. Lee was one of those who mistakenly believed that as well.
Without control of the Mississippi and the southern states that provided support to Lee and Virginia was critical to the success of the Union.