McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[OpnCoronet]

Of course, what you originally said was that

I don't see how you get that from the events on the Peninsula.

You really do not seem to read my reply posts very closely.

 

[Saphroneth]

I tend to agree with you. If the Battle of Seven Pines had not been botched McClellan would probably have been defeated, or at least driven back onto his LOC.

The AoP was to strong to be attacked directly, but a portion of it separated by a flooding river, would give a size advantage to the confederates. A good plan and fortunate that Johnston was not able to use his superiority in numbers to his advantage. Using tactics to overcome a disparity in numbers was the ANV's stock in trade, even under Johnston.

Well, avoiding that very problem (of being split by a river), along with waiting until 5th Corps returned, was a lot of what took up time on the Peninsula. McClellan was having his engineers bridge the Chickahominy so that he could respond to an attack either side of the river - had the bridges for 6th Corps been finished (as they probably should have been, given when they started and why there was a work pause) then McClellan would have been able to concentrate 8 of his 10 divisions for a pitched battle in front of Richmond. Or 6 divisions against an attack north of the Chickahominy.

 

[Saphroneth]

You really do not seem to read my reply posts very closely.

Really? Then would you explain from where you get the idea that (as you said) any freshly dug ditch was enough to stop McClellan? He certainly ordered attacks when he reached the Warwick - what stopped him was a position sufficiently well fortified that both column leaders decided it was impractical to even try and attack, even with positive orders, and what we know about the fortifications indicates it was far from a "freshly dug ditch". The inundations alone are a significant barrier!

But feel free to quote from your reply post today that already explained that!

 

[DanSBHawk]

Conversely if you break through the line later on, you don't gain any time at all because Yorktown still needs to be taken to make the advance logistically possible - and breaching the Warwick line doesn't gain you Yorktown. You still need to get through with regular approaches or starving it out, it's a bastion fort with a continuous enciente and an assigned garrison.

This is not true. Lee had no intention on trying to defend Yorktown if the federals got around it. And McClellan would have looked silly conducting a regular siege against a tiny isolated garrison.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Well, avoiding that very problem (of being split by a river), along with waiting until 5th Corps returned, was a lot of what took up time on the Peninsula. McClellan was having his engineers bridge the Chickahominy so that he could respond to an attack either side of the river - had the bridges for 6th Corps been finished (as they probably should have been, given when they started and why there was a work pause) then McClellan would have been able to concentrate 8 of his 10 divisions for a pitched battle in front of Richmond. Or 6 divisions against an attack north of the Chickahominy.

Woulda, coulda, shoulda. In the End Lee never achieved a parity of numbers and had to use superior tactics to overcome a numerically superior AoP; and even with the example of Seven Pines, McClellan let him.

 

[Saphroneth]

This is not true. Lee had no intention on trying to defend Yorktown if the federals got around it. And McClellan would have looked silly conducting a regular siege against a tiny isolated garrison.

Okay, so there's two points here.

1) Magruder certainly intended to garrison Yorktown, and said so explicitly, and ordered troops to go into the garrison if the line was broken. So that's what McClellan would have had to deal with anyway.
2) No, he wouldn't have looked silly - or if he did, it would be without justification owing to the people finding him silly being militarily uninformed. A "tiny isolated garrison" (about 1-2 brigades) on a fortification that blocks the most viable logistical supply route by which you can approach Richmond is very strategically important and needs to be overcome. Otherwise you simply can't advance far enough to threaten Richmond.

This is literally a concern raised about the Peninsular route back in March (that taking Yorktown would involve "a delay of weeks perhaps" - this before they knew about the Warwick line in the first place).

It's also literally how forts worked in the 19th century. This is how Fort Fisher protected Wilmington - it took bombardment and assault to take it, and the first assault failed. This is how Island Number Ten blocked the Mississippi. This is how Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas and Almeida controlled the means by which Spain and Portugal could attack one another - and the time taken to besiege and take those forts was a controlling factor on how fast an offensive could be made from one country into another.

This is 19th century military logic, and indeed it persisted into the 20th century. Witness the intended purpose of Eben-Emael!

 

[OpnCoronet]

Really? Then would you explain from where you get the idea that (as you said) any freshly dug ditch was enough to stop McClellan? He certainly ordered attacks when he reached the Warwick - what stopped him was a position sufficiently well fortified that both column leaders decided it was impractical to even try and attack, even with positive orders, and what we know about the fortifications indicates it was far from a "freshly dug ditch". The inundations alone are a significant barrier!

But feel free to quote from your reply post today that already explained that!

If you had actually read my post carefully, you would have seen the comment was not meant to be taken too seriously.

 

[Saphroneth]

Woulda, coulda, shoulda. In the End Lee never achieved a parity of numbers and had to use superior tactics to overcome a numerically superior AoP; and even with the example of Seven Pines, McClellan let him.

Lee did in fact outnumber McClellan at the Seven Days, by any equivalent measure (one which counts both armies the same way). He certainly had more regiments.


Not at Seven Pines, but of course at Seven Pines Johnston can concentrate his entire army south of the river before McClellan can because McClellan needs to be able to respond if Johnston has chosen to attack north of it. McClellan does not know Johnston's plans before Johnston actually attacks, since for some reason Johnston failed to send him the information.

Of course, the fundamental point here is that the two armies were of similar size in late May and in June.

 

[Saphroneth]

If you had actually read my post carefully, you would have seen the comment was not meant to be taken too seriously.

Oh, I see. So do you actually have a counterargument to my list of things that resulted in McClellan not advancing?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so there's two points here.

1) Magruder certainly intended to garrison Yorktown, and said so explicitly, and ordered troops to go into the garrison if the line was broken. So that's what McClellan would have had to deal with anyway.
2) No, he wouldn't have looked silly - or if he did, it would be without justification owing to the people finding him silly being militarily uninformed. A "tiny isolated garrison" (about 1-2 brigades) on a fortification that blocks the most viable logistical supply route by which you can approach Richmond is very strategically important and needs to be overcome. Otherwise you simply can't advance far enough to threaten Richmond.

This is literally a concern raised about the Peninsular route back in March (that taking Yorktown would involve "a delay of weeks perhaps" - this before they knew about the Warwick line in the first place.

It's also literally how forts worked in the 19th century. This is how Fort Fisher protected Wilmington - it took bombardment and assault to take it, and the first assault failed. This is how Island Number Ten blocked the Mississippi. This is how Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas and Almeida controlled the means by which Spain and Portugal could attack one another - and the time taken to besiege and take those forts was a controlling factor on how fast an offensive could be made from one country into another.

This is 19th century military logic, and indeed it persisted into the 20th century. Witness the intended purpose of Eben-Emael!

And Lee made it very clear that he was ready to pull the plug on the peninsula and concentrate his forces closer to Richmond. He wasn't going to waste troops by letting them become surrounded and taken prisoner. And McClellan would indeed have looked ridiculous if he had conducted a formal siege against a tiny garrison.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Lee did in fact outnumber McClellan at the Seven Days, by any equivalent measure (one which counts both armies the same way). He certainly had more regiments.


Not at Seven Pines, but of course at Seven Pines Johnston can concentrate his entire army south of the river before McClellan can because McClellan needs to be able to respond if Johnston has chosen to attack north of it. McClellan does not know Johnston's plans before Johnston actually attacks, since for some reason Johnston failed to send him the information.

Of course, the fundamental point here is that the two armies were of similar size in late May and in June.

Well little certainly had to believe he was outnumbered to make his ineptitude plausible and his defenders must also. But history has spoken and it, as I must now, moves on. This does not, of course, include the historical fringe elements.

 

[Saphroneth]

And Lee made it very clear that he was ready to pull the plug on the peninsula and concentrate his forces closer to Richmond. He wasn't going to waste troops by letting them become surrounded and taken prisoner. And McClellan would indeed have looked ridiculous if he had conducted a formal siege against a tiny garrison.

When exactly do you mean? Magruder had troops ready to go into the garrison early in April; when is Lee suggesting abandoning the Peninsula entirely, including Yorktown?

As for "looked ridiculous", I'd like to ask you two specific questions.

1) What is the alternative?
If you're not going to conduct a starve-the-enemy-out siege against Yorktown, and you're not going to conduct a regular-approaches batter-down-the-walls siege against Yorktown, what else could anyone (not just McClellan) do in that situation?
Yorktown is still held and has walls that in aggregate are some twenty feet high, and has guns that can seal the York river against supply ships. If Magruder garrisons Yorktown before falling back to the Williamsburg line, or all the way to Richmond, how can the Union army do anything else?

2) Why do you think Yorktown exists in the first place?
I mean the bastion fort, the core fortifications. It was built (before US independence, let alone Confederate) for a reason, but what is that reason?
I think it's because it effectively closes the York river, and that this is strategically important. You seem to think it's a different reason, but what?

 

[Saphroneth]

Well little certainly had to believe he was outnumbered to make his ineptitude plausible and his defenders must also. But history has spoken and it, as I must now, moves on. This does not, of course, include the historical fringe elements.

In the Seven Days, Lee had 2,150 companies (including artillery batteries) in his army, and McClellan had 1,750 by the same measure. You seem to think that this means that Lee is the one who's outnumbered?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Oh, I see. So do you actually have a counterargument to my list of things that resulted in McClellan not advancing?

Do you believe that all the excuses for McClellan will change the perception of the Peninsula Campaign as being a failure for McClellan?

I think the trademark of a successful general is a knack for finding opportunities. Yet in these discussions, you and your friend really just make excuses for McClellan NOT finding opportunities. Anything and everything that McClellan could have tried is just too risky and difficult in your view. McClellan had no option other than to fail, and it was always someone else's fault.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Oh, I see. So do you actually have a counterargument to my list of things that resulted in McClellan not advancing?

You have read my explanation of your lapse of attention to my post in question. You can take it as you will.

Well little certainly had to believe he was outnumbered to make his ineptitude plausible and his defenders must also. But history has spoken and it, as I must now, moves on. This does not, of course, include the historical fringe elements.

 

[DanSBHawk]

When exactly do you mean? Magruder had troops ready to go into the garrison early in April; when is Lee suggesting abandoning the Peninsula entirely, including Yorktown?

As for "looked ridiculous", I'd like to ask you two specific questions.

1) What is the alternative?
If you're not going to conduct a starve-the-enemy-out siege against Yorktown, and you're not going to conduct a regular-approaches batter-down-the-walls siege against Yorktown, what else could anyone (not just McClellan) do in that situation?
Yorktown is still held and has walls that in aggregate are some twenty feet high, and has guns that can seal the York river against supply ships. If Magruder garrisons Yorktown before falling back to the Williamsburg line, or all the way to Richmond, how can the Union army do anything else?

2) Why do you think Yorktown exists in the first place?
I mean the bastion fort, the core fortifications. It was built (before US independence, let alone Confederate) for a reason, but what is that reason?
I think it's because it effectively closes the York river, and that this is strategically important. You seem to think it's a different reason, but what?

I already provided the correspondence from Lee in the other thread. Lee made it very clear that he did not want Magruder getting cut off on the peninsula and that they would concentrate closer to Richmond to make a stand against McClellan.

If McClellan conducted a regular siege when he enjoyed a 40:1 or 50:1 superiority over the garrison, he would have looked ridiculous.

 

[Saphroneth]

You have read my explanation of your lapse of attention to my post in question. You can take it as you will.

So far as I can tell, since you said it was, your response was not meant seriously. So it would appear you don't have a serious counterargument to the list...

 

[Saphroneth]

I already provided the correspondence from Lee in the other thread. Lee made it very clear that he did not want Magruder getting cut off on the peninsula and that they would concentrate closer to Richmond to make a stand against McClellan.

If McClellan conducted a regular siege when he enjoyed a 40:1 or 50:1 superiority over the garrison, he would have looked ridiculous.

Okay, so you haven't answered those specific questions. Do you understand how forts work?

I ask because... well, what is the alternative to a siege? You seem unwilling to specify.

Do you believe that all the excuses for McClellan will change the perception of the Peninsula Campaign as being a failure for McClellan?

I think the trademark of a successful general is a knack for finding opportunities. Yet in these discussions, you and your friend really just make excuses for McClellan NOT finding opportunities. Anything and everything that McClellan could have tried is just too risky and difficult in your view. McClellan had no option other than to fail, and it was always someone else's fault.

Thing is, it's actually quite common in the Civil War for a commander to launch an assault to see what happens, or against a position they eyeball as weak enough to productively attack, and for the result to be a bloody repulse. It's what happens at Second Bull Run, at Fredericksburg, at Gettysburg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, at Vicksburg...

The stronger the case that there was an opportunity there, the better!

 

[Saphroneth]

If McClellan conducted a regular siege when he enjoyed a 40:1 or 50:1 superiority over the garrison, he would have looked ridiculous.

Sorry, I want to check your maths here.



The garrison of Yorktown proper is the 13th Alabama, 6th & 23rd Georgia and some heavy artillery.

In addition, Magruder explicitly named the 26th AL and 46th VA as units he would add to the garrison if they had to fall back. That's as of April 7; note that the 26th AL actually did join the garrison by late April.


Late April effective strengths:

46th Virginia: 356
Other units of infantry: 1,830 (all were in the garrison at that time)
Artillery: 1,151 (in nineteen heavy batteries)

Total: 3,337 effectives.

If you think McClellan had between 133,000 and 167,000 effectives with his army... that might explain some confusion?

 

[67th Tigers]

Seven Pines was botched by both the rebel attack, and Casey's incompetent defence. Given the situation, had Casey's division been handled well, it should have held its' position and repulsed the attack.

The fact is that fighting on the defensive, especially with fortifications, is a combat multiplier. Grant reckoned a man in breastworks was equal to 5 attackers. This is approximately correct. Hence at Vicksburg regiments repelled divisions.

At Seven Pines, the weather meant Johnston could not bring up any artillery. The Federals had artillery already in position. The weather also meant that the water feature securing the Federal right became a "lagoon", preventing intended flanking operations by moving down the (now impassable a few miles east of Richmond) Nine Mile Road.* Everything would be funnelled right and into in front of the main defensive positon. They'd be mounting a frontal assault on works without artillery instead of flanking. Unfortunately, Casey became obsessed with defending an outpost in front of the MDP (which was untenable by flanking, although it was frontally assaulted), even to the point of charging Naglee's brigade from his forward position.

The entire attacking force should only have been 10 bdes (13 with Huger) without artillery, which should have broken in front of the 4th Corps' 6 bdes, and certainly if reinforcements came up (i.e. Kearny) would be impregnable. The disaster was simply caused by Casey's mismanagement, with one Federal division broken for ca. two rebel divisions broken (DH Hill plus reinforcing bdes from Longstreet). This 2 for 1 exchange in the defenders favour was a poor performance caused by giving up much of the defenders primary advantages.

With that out of the way and Sedgwick's division reinforcing, two solid divisions (Couch and Sedgwick) completely repulsed everything thrown at them.

From the Federal POV, Seven Pines is what happens when a divisional general is incompetent. I had a book by Brent Nosworthy in which he dispaired of Casey, who wrote books on tactics, abandoning basic tactics as soon as his blood was up.

However, you can never assume the enemy is going to cooperate...

* The kindest interpretation of Longstreet's shift is he was aware that the Nine Mile Road crossed the "lagoon," and so improvised.