Josh The Lighthouse Guy
Major
- Joined
- Apr 30, 2012
- Location
- Jupiter, FL
Small but Important Riots: The Cavalry Battles of Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville
by Robert F. O'Neill
Potomac Books (2023) - heavily updated & revised version of a book of a similar title by the same author published in 1994
Forget Winchester and Romney; Middleburg, Virginia changed hands seven times in five days!
This is story of "three" cavalry battles (actually at least double that, depending how you count) you've probably never heard. It shouldn't even be described as three (or more) different battles, anymore than Gettysburg should be described as the Battle of Seminary Ridge on July 1, the Battle of Little Round Top on July 2, etc. I would argue this series of engagements deserves to be called the Second Battle of the Loudoun Valley. The First Battle of the Loudoun Valley was fought in early Nov 1862 and is generally referred to as the Battle of Unison or Battle of Union, and is even more forgotten but it was the finally straw leading to McClellan being fired. But I digress.
How did five days of fighting in Virginia, between JEB Stuart and two thirds of the AotP cavalry corps, with Alfred Pleasonton actually commanding in the field and Strong Vincent's brigade being engaged (and Longstreet's corps nearly being engaged) get forgotten? Hampton, Buford, Custer, Kilpatrick. The severe wounding of Heros von Borcke. Despite the difficult topography, there were some fierce saber-to-saber cavalry clashes. Yet sandwiched between the titanic clashes at Brandy Station and Gettysburg, these were engagements fought by regiments and brigades rather than corps, with casualties measured in the hundreds instead of the thousands, with complicated and inclusive results. Not bloody enough to make hallowed ground, not triumphant enough for either side to be celebrated. And yet: consequences.
Stuart already hated Beverly Robinson; now he was good reason to hold him in contempt. Wade Hampton shows his stuff. The Confederate cavalry is worn down and will not be properly rested before Stuart goes off on his infamous raid. Stuart, already hot from criticism over Brandy Station, fought the kind of defense-in-depth trading-space-for-time delaying action that Eric Wittenberg would gush about, only to be criticized by his peers and the press. Yet he achieved a strategic victory: the Union had no intelligence on the Shenandoah Valley for five days and only had a very small amount at the end.
Pleasanton showed his mediocrity. Yet he tried to do the right thing, strategically. Kilpatrick shows why he was both Old Kil and KilCavalry. Most importantly, the AotP Cavalry Corps had not fully recovered from Stoneman's Raid when it fought at Brandy Station, and it had not recovered from Brandy Station when it fought in the Loudoun Valley. You get a better sense of why, for example, Buford had to withdraw from Gettysburg to refit for a day.
Hooker is the surprise goat (not GOAT; the old meaning) of these events as he's not only chaffing at Halleck and Lincoln, but he's paranoid Lee is going to pull a Second Manassas and lunge through the Bull Run Mountain gaps at either the AotP or Washington. Maybe Joe Hooker really did loose confidence in Joe Hooker.
The book is well-researched, although there are places where clearly the source material is lacking a bit, despite decades of effort by the author. It seems the events before and after overshadowed some of what happened here in the minds of the men involved too. The book is brisk read, with the solid writing aided by many short chapters. The maps are okay. Endnotes are extensive and including commentary.
Strong recommendation for this hidden gem.
by Robert F. O'Neill
Potomac Books (2023) - heavily updated & revised version of a book of a similar title by the same author published in 1994
Forget Winchester and Romney; Middleburg, Virginia changed hands seven times in five days!
This is story of "three" cavalry battles (actually at least double that, depending how you count) you've probably never heard. It shouldn't even be described as three (or more) different battles, anymore than Gettysburg should be described as the Battle of Seminary Ridge on July 1, the Battle of Little Round Top on July 2, etc. I would argue this series of engagements deserves to be called the Second Battle of the Loudoun Valley. The First Battle of the Loudoun Valley was fought in early Nov 1862 and is generally referred to as the Battle of Unison or Battle of Union, and is even more forgotten but it was the finally straw leading to McClellan being fired. But I digress.
How did five days of fighting in Virginia, between JEB Stuart and two thirds of the AotP cavalry corps, with Alfred Pleasonton actually commanding in the field and Strong Vincent's brigade being engaged (and Longstreet's corps nearly being engaged) get forgotten? Hampton, Buford, Custer, Kilpatrick. The severe wounding of Heros von Borcke. Despite the difficult topography, there were some fierce saber-to-saber cavalry clashes. Yet sandwiched between the titanic clashes at Brandy Station and Gettysburg, these were engagements fought by regiments and brigades rather than corps, with casualties measured in the hundreds instead of the thousands, with complicated and inclusive results. Not bloody enough to make hallowed ground, not triumphant enough for either side to be celebrated. And yet: consequences.
Stuart already hated Beverly Robinson; now he was good reason to hold him in contempt. Wade Hampton shows his stuff. The Confederate cavalry is worn down and will not be properly rested before Stuart goes off on his infamous raid. Stuart, already hot from criticism over Brandy Station, fought the kind of defense-in-depth trading-space-for-time delaying action that Eric Wittenberg would gush about, only to be criticized by his peers and the press. Yet he achieved a strategic victory: the Union had no intelligence on the Shenandoah Valley for five days and only had a very small amount at the end.
Pleasanton showed his mediocrity. Yet he tried to do the right thing, strategically. Kilpatrick shows why he was both Old Kil and KilCavalry. Most importantly, the AotP Cavalry Corps had not fully recovered from Stoneman's Raid when it fought at Brandy Station, and it had not recovered from Brandy Station when it fought in the Loudoun Valley. You get a better sense of why, for example, Buford had to withdraw from Gettysburg to refit for a day.
Hooker is the surprise goat (not GOAT; the old meaning) of these events as he's not only chaffing at Halleck and Lincoln, but he's paranoid Lee is going to pull a Second Manassas and lunge through the Bull Run Mountain gaps at either the AotP or Washington. Maybe Joe Hooker really did loose confidence in Joe Hooker.
The book is well-researched, although there are places where clearly the source material is lacking a bit, despite decades of effort by the author. It seems the events before and after overshadowed some of what happened here in the minds of the men involved too. The book is brisk read, with the solid writing aided by many short chapters. The maps are okay. Endnotes are extensive and including commentary.
Strong recommendation for this hidden gem.
Last edited:
Bringing the