Russian navy

[TFSmith121]

that gives the RN 9 more 'cruisers" (to use the term that came about soon enough anyway)

Bottom line, the force ratios are not overwhelming enough to prevent serious damage to British commerce

One would assume that many raiders will be lost, as well as a number of British commerce protection ships as well. As this is an age when sail power extends range (for economical cruising), and prizes can be stripped of their coal as well (happened in World War I in OTL as well), the lack of overseas bases will hurt the Russian / American raiders, but probably not enough to prevent the serious damage likely to occur.

True. What's interesting is that thanks to the fine folks at Google, the actual published Navy List books for the RN in this period are available, down to and including the officers of said ships in commission, in reserve, laid up, etc. The data is there, and makes it clear that however numerous the RN was on paper, the actual operational strength of the force at any point, absent mobilization, was vastly smaller than its paper strength. Obviously, mobilization is not something that occurs in a democracy absent public comment, which puts all the "bolt from the blue" and comparison by raw numbers alone bilge into perspective.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

And so? The Canadian and South American traffic, as well as around-Africa traffic are still perfectly here.

Excellent point. Unless the British enact an embargo against their own colonies in North America and the Caribbean, and the South American economies they had spent much of the previous five decades prying open, presumably there would be plenty of British flag merchant ships, sail and steam, to prey upon...

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Excellent point. Unless the British enact an embargo against their own colonies in North America and the Caribbean, and the South American economies they had spent much of the previous five decades prying open, presumably there would be plenty of British flag merchant ships, sail and steam, to prey upon...

Exactly. Even if North American traffic would be completely reduced to convoy operations from Britain to Canada, it would means only that the North Atlantic became less target-rich. But the mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic would be still full of Britain's cargo ships - maybe even more, because Britain would be heavily pressed to compensate the loss of US market and goods. The China, the India merchant routes, that came around Africa... The South America... The Australia, after all.

I suppose, that Union Navy would adopt some sort of late-French strategy; use limited forces of ironclads & coastal ships to punch through the blockade line, and let raiders to run away and disperse. To allow raiders to enter, the similar operations could be mantained on pre-determined pattern (i.e. raider captain knew, that Norfolk Mobile Force, for example, would went out and engage the nearby British blockade squadron at 8 august, so if he want to came in harbor - it would be a perfect opportunity to slip through the blockade). The Union shipbuliding would probably be diverted from river & harbour monitors toward larger, at least partially sea-capable ironclads and monitors, to provide active forces for such attacks - and, as they actually do, large fast screw frigates.

Let's not forget, up to the 1865 the Britain have (in terms of ironclads):

* Warrior (1861)
* Black Prince (1862)
* Defence (1861)
* Resistance (1862)
* Royal Oak (1863)
* Hector (1864)
* Achilles (1864)
* Prince Consort (1864)
* Researhc (1864, small)
* Enterprize (1864, small)
* Royal Sovereign (1864, coastal)
* Caledonia (1865)
* Scorpion (1865, coastal)
* Wyvern (1865, coastal)

Assuming that the British would boost the production, we could also consider possible to comission some additional ironclads in late 1865; "Ocean", "Lord Clyde", "Lord Warden", "Pallas", "Zealous" & "Bellerophon".

What could the Union Navy provide in terms of at least partially sea-capable ironclads? Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865:

* New Ironsides (1862)
* Galena (1862, small)
* Keokuk (1862, small)
* Roanok (1863)
* Onondaga (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.1 from Webb) (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.2 from Webb) (1864)
* Dictator (1864)
* Agamenticus (1864)
* Monadnock (1864)
* Miantonomoh (1865)
* Tonawanda (1865)

Assuming that the Union would also boost production, and cancel river monitor program (Casco-class were useless anyway) they would probably be able to bring "Dunderberg", "Puritan", and Steven's Battery in comission in 1865. Maybe even some from "Kalamazoo"-class - I have little data about them, so I'm not sure, in what state they were.

So, while the Union ironclad fleet undoubtedly being smaller and less capable than Royal Navy, they still have pretty enough ironclads to provide protection of Union coastal waters. The ratio between USN and RN ironclad fleets would be about 1:1,5-1,7. And the Union did not have to worry about the France...

 

[Tielhard]

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

Quod erat demonstrandum? War gaming is most unlikely to work.

 

[TFSmith121]

Exactly. Even if North American traffic would be completely reduced to convoy operations from Britain to Canada, it would means only that the North Atlantic became less target-rich. But the mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic would be still full of Britain's cargo ships - maybe even more, because Britain would be heavily pressed to compensate the loss of US market and goods. The China, the India merchant routes, that came around Africa... The South America... The Australia, after all.

I suppose, that Union Navy would adopt some sort of late-French strategy; use limited forces of ironclads & coastal ships to punch through the blockade line, and let raiders to run away and disperse. To allow raiders to enter, the similar operations could be mantained on pre-determined pattern (i.e. raider captain knew, that Norfolk Mobile Force, for example, would went out and engage the nearby British blockade squadron at 8 august, so if he want to came in harbor - it would be a perfect opportunity to slip through the blockade). The Union shipbuliding would probably be diverted from river & harbour monitors toward larger, at least partially sea-capable ironclads and monitors, to provide active forces for such attacks - and, as they actually do, large fast screw frigates.

Let's not forget, up to the 1865 the Britain have (in terms of ironclads):

* Warrior (1861)
* Black Prince (1862)
* Defence (1861)
* Resistance (1862)
* Royal Oak (1863)
* Hector (1864)
* Achilles (1864)
* Prince Consort (1864)
* Researhc (1864, small)
* Enterprize (1864, small)
* Royal Sovereign (1864, coastal)
* Caledonia (1865)
* Scorpion (1865, coastal)
* Wyvern (1865, coastal)

Assuming that the British would boost the production, we could also consider possible to comission some additional ironclads in late 1865; "Ocean", "Lord Clyde", "Lord Warden", "Pallas", "Zealous" & "Bellerophon".

What could the Union Navy provide in terms of at least partially sea-capable ironclads? Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865:

* New Ironsides (1862)
* Galena (1862, small)
* Keokuk (1862, small)
* Roanok (1863)
* Onondaga (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.1 from Webb) (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.2 from Webb) (1864)
* Dictator (1864)
* Agamenticus (1864)
* Monadnock (1864)
* Miantonomoh (1865)
* Tonawanda (1865)

Assuming that the Union would also boost production, and cancel river monitor program (Casco-class were useless anyway) they would probably be able to bring "Dunderberg", "Puritan", and Steven's Battery in comission in 1865. Maybe even some from "Kalamazoo"-class - I have little data about them, so I'm not sure, in what state they were.

So, while the Union ironclad fleet undoubtedly being smaller and less capable than Royal Navy, they still have pretty enough ironclads to provide protection of Union coastal waters. The ratio between USN and RN ironclad fleets would be about 1:1,5-1,7. And the Union did not have to worry about the France...

There's also the minor geographic and hydrographic reality that the US eastern seaboard between Cheasapeake Bay and the Gulf of Maine is (very) roughly the same extent as that of the Western European coast from the Iberian Peninsula to the Irish Sea... To believe a coal burning steam navy, largely of wooden-hulled vessels, could mount an effective blockade of such, 3,000 miles from any naval shore establishment worth the name, in the 1860s, is ludicrous.

The USN alone could not have done so in the 1940s, even with underway replenishment and the service force establishment of the 3rd and 5th fleets in 1944-45. To pretend the RN could have done so eighty years earlier is just that - pretense.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Quod erat demonstrandum? War gaming is most unlikely to work.

If only there was some real world evidence of how the various combatants fared in combat in this era...

Oh wait, there is - the Americans (both US and otherwise) won in the 1860s, the rebels and French and Spanish lost in the 1860s, and the British were the third (or fourth) string against the Russians in the 1850s. Good thing for them the French and Turks (with help from the Sardinians) did all the heavy lifting, and the Austrians were in the offing.

Ad Astra per Ardua, y'all

 

[Dilandu]

There's also the minor geographic and hydrographic reality that the US eastern seaboard between Cheasapeake Bay and the Gulf of Maine is (very) roughly the same extent of the Western European coast from the Iberian Peninsula to the Irish Sea... To believe a coal burning steam navy, largely of wooden-hulled vessels, could mount an effective blockade of such, 3,000 miles from any naval shore establishment worth the name, in the 1860s, is ludicrous.

Excellent point. And it must be also noted, that there weren't any suitable bases for large RN squadrons anywhere nearby the Union coastlines. The Confederacy ports were rather shallow, and have only a limited facilities (and only a VERY limited supply of coal) - clearly not on the level required to mantain several large steam warships. There were no significant repair capabilities outside of Halifax or Bermudas.

In such conditions, even a small force of coastal ironclads, based on Norfolk and New York harbour, could drive off much larger blocking fleet. Simply because the Union ships would operate near their bases, where supplies and repair capabilities were in abundance - while the Royal Navy ships would be forced to travel hundreds of miles to get supplies or repair. Damaged Union ships could be repaired in several weeks at most, while it would took several weeks for RN damaged ships simply to sail where they could be repaired.

 

[Dilandu]

Oh wait, there is - the Americans (both US and otherwise) won in the 1860s, the rebels and French and Spanish lost in the 1860s, and the British were the third (or fourth) string against the Russians in the 1850s. Good thing for them the French and Turks did all the heavy lifting.

Quite true) Without Britain, France and Ottomans could still pull the Crimean Campaing (maybe not as effective... but after all, it wasn't very effective even with British troops )Without France and Ottomans, the best that Britain could do is the blockade (and probably not as effective, because the numerical superiority would not be so great) and some nuisanse raids.

 

[TFSmith121]

Excellent point. And it must be also noted, that there weren't any suitable bases for large RN squadrons anywhere nearby the Union coastlines. The Confederacy ports were rather shallow, and have only a limited facilities (and only a VERY limited supply of coal) - clearly not on the level required to mantain several large steam warships. There were no significant repair capabilities outside of Halifax or Bermudas.

In such conditions, even a small force of coastal ironclads, based on Norfolk and New York harbour, could drive off much larger blocking fleet. Simply because the Union ships would operate near their bases, where supplies and repair capabilities were in abundance - while the Royal Navy ships would be forced to travel hundreds of miles to get supplies or repair. Damaged Union ships could be repaired in several weeks at most, while it would took several weeks for RN damaged ships simply to sail where they could be repaired.

Yep. It's also worth remembering that in the 1860s, both New York and Philadephia-Delaware Bay amounted to vertically-integrated shipyard complexes quite capable and experienced in building modern screw steamers, including with composite and iron hull construction, to the point that European navies bought warships and designs (including of ironclads) there via competitive bids. The Delaware was known as "America's Clyde" and New York, Brooklyn, and the adjacent ports on Upper and Lower New York bays and Long Island Sound were comparable in scale. Add that to the lesser but still significant industrial centers on the Gulf of Maine, Cape Cod and Massachusetts bays, and the Chesapeake, and it's as if the USN of 1944-45 was trying to maintain a naval blockade of the British Isles from Clydebank to Portsmouth.

The RN's own Achill exercises in the 1870s and 1880s make it clear how brittle a close blockade at North Sea/Channel distances would have been in the early steam era; the realities of 1914-15 make it clear why the British abandoned close blockade against Germany and came to see their only chance was a distant blockade.

Pretending they could have sustained anything even along those lines at trans-Atlantic distances is a fantasy.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Quite true) Without Britain, France and Ottomans could still pull the Crimean Campaing (maybe not as effective... but after all, it wasn't very effective even with British troops )Without France and Ottomans, the best that Britain could do is the blockade (and probably not as effective, because the numerical superiority would not be so great) and some nuisanse raids.

Yeah, all one has to do is look at the troop numbers in Kinglake (Volume IX, IIRCj; 100,000 French troops, 45,000 Turks, 28,000 British, and 15,000 Sardinians...

When the military powerhouse known as the Kingdom of Sardinia could deploy and sustain an expeditionary force almost half the size of the British "Army of the East" it's pretty clear how much of a "threat" Britain presented as an independent actor to a Western enemy in this period.

Given the fouled up British Army logistics and the general incompetency of Raglan et al, it's arguable the Allied cause in the conflict would have been better served if the British had stayed home or been sent to the Baltic, instead, and a French CinC been given the Black Sea command, along with the French infantry division that took Bomarsund. The British merchant marine was useful, of course, but the RN's impact was generally negligible and the British Army was a wasting asset from Varna onwards.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Pretending they could have sustained anything even along those lines at trans-Atlantic distances is a fantasy.

Moreover, it could be a quite dangerous fantasy - if the Americans got lucky (and who could guarantee that they could't?!) they could surprize the close blockading squadron and smash it really hard. The tactis of ironclad combat was still in development, so basically both sides were incompetent on similar scale.

 

[TFSmith121]

Moreover, it could be a quite dangerous fantasy - if the Americans got lucky (and who could guarantee that they could't?!) they could surprize the close blockading squadron and smash it really hard. The tactis of ironclad combat was still in development, so basically both sides were incompetent on similar scale.

Yep. Lissa began with an Italian amphibious operation (littoral operation) and turned into a melee that destroyed the Italian squadron...

Didn't do the Austrians any good, since the war was decided on land, but it is an instructive real world example.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Yep. Lissa began with an Italian amphibious operation (littoral operation) and turned into a melee that destroyed the Italian squadron...

Didn't do the Austrians any good, since the war was decided on land, but it is an instructive real world example.

Exactly. Of course, Italians do quite a lot for their own defeat (I really doubt that RN's wooden warships would just stay away of battle, because they are inferior in comairson ironclads! ) but the main problem was, that the ironclad tactics in 1860s was a complete mystery. The old ship-of-the-line tactics mean basically nothing for ironclads; the superiority of 1860s armor over artillery made traditional line combat just a waste of powder. The new tactics weren't actually developed yet at all.

 

[Tielhard]

If only there was some real world evidence of how the various combatants fared in combat in this era...

Oh wait, there is - the Americans (both US and otherwise) won in the 1860s, the rebels and French and Spanish lost in the 1860s, and the British were the third (or fourth) string against the Russians in the 1850s. Good thing for them the French and Turks (with help from the Sardinians) did all the heavy lifting, and the Austrians were in the offing.

Ad Astra per Ardua, y'all

TFSmith121,

Thank you for really driving home the point of my previous posts but it really was not necessary. Your previous post had already made it very clear.

 

[TFSmith121]

Exactly. Of course, Italians do quite a lot for their own defeat (I really doubt that RN's wooden warships would just stay away of battle, because they are inferior in comairson ironclads! ) but the main problem was, that the ironclad tactics in 1860s was a complete mystery. The old ship-of-the-line tactics mean basically nothing for ironclads; the superiority of 1860s armor over artillery made traditional line combat just a waste of powder. The new tactics weren't actually developed yet at all.

True; however, the loss of Vanguard in 1875 and Victoria in 1893 makes it clear that even the largest steam navy in this era was still learning how to operate squadrons of such ships at sea in real world conditions; even in peacetime, it was hardly a simple process, and doctrine - which rarely springs forth full-grown from the brow of Zeus - was non existent. What's interesting, of course, is when a fast burner like Tryon consciously tried to create new doctrine for such a force (the TA system) it so obviously misfired, and Tryon went down with the ship (literally).

Actually, Tryon and Colley could make for an interesting parallel study of professional military education and the career paths of regular officers in the Victorian era British Army and Navy; interesting how two such highly regarded individuals performed when reality - in the form of his own peers for Tryon and a rag tag bunch of volunteer militia fighting on their own ground for Colley - intruded.

Again, historical reality is rather significantly different than the imaginary contests armchair admirals and board game generals come up with.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Do you discount evaluating the evidence of history over pretense, then, for some reason? Because one has to say, the evidence of history in terms of real world actions where real enemies were shooting back with real weapons seems rather more pertinent than imaginary musings that depend greatly on myth...

Otherwise, the bomber would have always gotten through, victory would be achieved through air power, and one's strength is the strength of ten because of the righteousness of the cause ... Unfortunately for all the bilge-spewing spiritual warrior types, one can't fight tanks with bayonets.

Best,

TFSmith121,

Thank you for really driving home the point of my previous posts but it really was not necessary. Your previous post had already made it very clear.

 

[Tielhard]

Why does you assume, that the war would be a complete surprize for the Union side? Just the diplomatic exchange would took a lot of time between London and Washington.

Why do you assume that there needs to be a state of war for hostilities to begin? That was not the British intention during the Trent Affair. It is unlikely to be the case in an 1863/4 war. The RN will just sail against the Union blockade and leave London to issue the declaration of war to the Union Minister in London.

As I have already pointed out it is not in the interest of the poverty stricken Russian Empire or the over extended Union fighting a Civil War to engage the British in hostilities if they can possibly help it. In the former case it might result in the loss of Poland in the latter the loss of the Confederacy and California. The British do however potentially have reasons for going to war with both of the other parties. A British attack (on either one of the other parties is at least is credible, if not both) so one would expect the British to have the element of surprise.

NB - Best communication time between London and Washington in this period is 8.5 days, cable to Queenstown (now Cobh) and mail ships Queenstown to St John's Newfoundland then via cable to Washington. Worst credible transit of the Atlantic by diplomatic dispatches is 14 days in foul weather in mid-winter. If you are talking about physical dispatches or diplomats making the full crossing you can add at most 6 days even with the bridge out on the Washington approach. It is worth remembering that the British Locomotives that brought the news of the Unions humbling and bowing to the British demands over the Trent Affair from Holyhead to London smashed the land speed record.

 

[TFSmith121]

Why do you assume that there needs to be a state of war for hostilities to begin? That was not the British intention during the Trent Affair. It is unlikely to be the case in an 1863/4 war. The RN will just sail against the Union blockade and leave London to issue the declaration of war to the Union Minister in London.

As I have already pointed out it is not in the interest of the poverty stricken Russian Empire or the over extended Union fighting a Civil War to engage the British in hostilities if they can possibly help it. In the former case it might result in the loss of Poland in the latter the loss of the Confederacy and California. The British do however potentially have reasons for going to war with both of the other parties. A British attack (on either one of the other parties is at least is credible, if not both) so one would expect the British to have the element of surprise.

NB - Best communication time between London and Washington in this period is 8.5 days, cable to Queenstown (now Cobh) and mail ships Queenstown to St John's Newfoundland then via cable to Washington. Worst credible transit of the Atlantic by diplomatic dispatches is 14 days in foul weather in mid-winter. If you are talking about physical dispatches or diplomats making the full crossing you can add at most 6 days even with the bridge out on the Washington approach. It is worth remembering that the British Locomotives that brought the news of the Unions humbling and bowing to the British demands over the Trent Affair from Holyhead to London smashed the land speed record.

Please provide an example of a conflict between Western powers in this era that did not include a lengthy series of diplomatic and political maneuvers and military mobilization before hostilities broke out; even better would an example where hostilities began without such preliminaries in a mixed maritime and expeditionary conflict at transoceanic distances.

The causus belli in 1853 was Sinope; it took four months before war was declared. The French intervention in Mexico, Spanish in the Dominican Republic, and the Spanish campaign against the Latin American republics in the Southeast Pacific all took months to ramp up.

The British debated intervening on the part of the Danes in 1864 in Parliament before Palmerston acknowledged the British Army was hopeless in such a situation, which received a fair amount of public attention, of course.

Please provide an example of a bolt from the blue in an era before radio communications - and especially at transatlantic distances.

Thanks in advance.

 

[Dilandu]

Actually, I really doubt that the Britain would be eager to launch the military campaing without formal declaration... They have France on the other side of the Channel, and the idea that France may be worried by such... unpleasant actions, and deside that "c'est un bon temps pour un peu de couteau dans le dos (it's a good time for a little backstabbing"

 

[TFSmith121]

Actually, I really doubt that the Britain would be eager to launch the military campaing without formal declaration... They have France on the other side of the Channel, and the idea that France may be worried by such... unpleasant actions, and deside that "c'est un bon temps pour un peu de couteau dans le dos (it's a good time for a little backstabbing"

True. Again, even in "what ifs" it's necessary to acknowledge the historical examples, precedents, doctrines, and policies; otherwise it is presentism at best and fantasy at worse.

And if the latter is all that one is after, go full boat, make it a parable, and bring in the beautiful elf princesses, hideous trolls, and comic relief dragons with stentorian diction...

Or time travelers with Sten guns; it's about the same level of realism.

Best,