Russian navy

[Dilandu]

I really, really despise peoples, who lied about data that could be easily verified. This is not only dishonestly - this is extremely stupid. And I don't like that.

http://www.randewy.ru/nk/kliperbf.html

«Алмаз». 7 пушек. Длина между перпендикулярами 76,2 м. Ширина 9,4 м. Осадка 4/4,7 м(нос/корма). Водоизмещение 1585 т. Машина мощностью 350/ 1453 (номинальных/индикаторных) л. с. Скорость 12,5 уз. (по другим данным, 7,5 уз.).


Заложен 31 декабря 1860 г. на Галерном Островке в С.-Петербурге, спущен 5 октября 1861 г. 8 декабря 1879 г. сдан Кронштадтскому порту. Исключен из списков судов флота 7 ноября 1881 г. и продан на слом.


Вооружение. В 1860-х гг.: 3—60-фн пушки № 1 и 4—8-фн нарезные пушки.

В 1869 г. установлены нарезные орудия: 3-6-дм обр. 1867 г. и 4—4-фн обр. 1867 г. К 1871 г.: 3-6-дм обр. 1867 г., 2-8-фн.

К 1875 г.: 8-фн пушки заменены на 4— 9-фн. обр. 1867 г.

The 60-pdr guns were of Nikolay Baumgart desing shell guns, 1857 pattern, No.1.

 

[Tielhard]

I really, really despise peoples, who lied about data that could be easily verified. This is not only dishonestly - this is extremely stupid. And I don't like that.

Dear Dilandu,

You are taking a rather unwise position here especially as much of the information you have presented has been shown to be wrong. I think one should always assume good faith from another poster, unless the contrary has clearly been demonstrated. A much better approach would be to find out why there is a difference between what you are presenting and what others (I presume 67th Tigers) is presenting. As I understand it you are disputing what exactly? Tigers seems to be talking about entry in to service, your article shows completion - that does not seem to be a conflict at all - if I have understood the issue properly. So:

1) Exactly what data are you disputing?
2) Where did your article and subsequent come from?
3) Tigers, if you would be so kind where did your information come from?
4) Lastly, and mostly for my own information but none the less quite relevant to this question - can you explain what the process would be for a Russian ship as it moved from being completed to being rigged, armed, powdered and provisioned and then commissioned in this period? I have absolutely no idea what it might be, indeed I don't even know if Russian ships were commissioned as such but I suspect they were.

You should be aware that the batteries, sail plans, often boilers and sometimes engines changed over a ship's life and the changes are not always well recorded. It is trivial to find examples of conflicting ship histories on the net and the very devil to extract the truth from them.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Problem is always how the parameters are set up, and GIGO can result.

So there is no way out of this nightmare?

 

[Tielhard]

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

You would think that was a way forward wouldn't you? To my knowledge it has been partially attempted once and a second attempt ended in deadlock over the rules and starting conditions.

The first effort was made at West Point as a training exercise. It has been very hard to find much information on it. I understand that it only covered land warfare (I am unclear if this was Union against BNA and the CSA or just the BNA), it did not take any account of Union supply issues and the Union won. Given the nature of the institution running the game I am not unduly surprised at the result. You don't really want the next military leaders of a nation to be traumatised by losing a game like this.

The second attempt I am aware of just ended in a quagmire of arguments over rules and the initial conditions. This is hardly surprising given the distance between the views of say TFSmith121 and 67th Tigers over the number of available militia in BNA as an example.

In actual fact it would be a very difficult thing to do. First you have to have a set of military rules, a set of naval rules and a very good interface between the two in order to account for amphibious operations and naval operations against coastal forts. Frankly that is the easiest bit. The next thing you need is an economic engine to calculate the effect of war on the participants finances and production capacity. This could be software or simply an algorithm but it does have to be quite complex. A morale engine that works at the strategic level based on the progress of war and the economy is also needed in order to force surrender. Hard but not that hard.
Then you need a neutral referee who's first job is to agree the initial conditions and strength of the various forces involved.
Next you need a large number of players with several days to spare. You need players for the British, BNA, Union, CSA, probably French, Juarista Mexican and Neutral cabinets, you need all the high level land commanders and naval commanders, you are looking at well over 30 people.
So to game it would be great fun and very informative but the referee would probably be the best candidate for the next UN Secretary General.

 

[Tielhard]

So there is no way out of this nightmare?

That was well timed! On the basis of my last post I would have to say probably not.

 

[Dilandu]

I think one should always assume good faith from another poster,

I really would like to. But unfortunately, 67th Tiger have a tendency to make preposterous (and usualy highly dubious) claims, reject anything that did not constitent with his point of view as "propaganda" and hammer his point of view by constant repetition, not with confirming data. Unfortunately, my patience is not unlimited.

1) Exactly what data are you disputing?

Quite a lot of his data. For example, russian sources ("Morskaya Gvardia Otecehstva" by Chernyshev A.A., about the Russian Navy Guard-state Ships) stated that clipers of "Almaz" series were comissioned in 1862-1863. ("Izumrud", for example, in august 1863)This consisted perfectly with Convay, and also with average shipbuilding experience of this era.

You should be aware that the batteries, sail plans, often boilers and sometimes engines changed over a ship's life and the changes are not always well recorded.

The weaponry of russian ships of this era is relatively well known. I have absolutely no idea, why Tiger decided that 60-pdr gun of 1857 pattern was not a shell gun, and moreover - that she was of Switzerland design (!!!) If he was mislead by the name of Baumgart (who was the cannon's developer), well, he should better check his sources.

 

[galveston bay]

Here you'll note you have a 605 tons displacement cruising vessel. You've set a bar. So why do you exclude a Royal Navy 877 ton cruising vessel? A surprisingly similar ship in many ways.



You undersell the armament. The 60 pdrs weren't shell guns but rather 60 pdr heavy shot guns (= 54 English pounds), built in Switzerland post-Crimean and essentially equivalent to an old 54 pdr. The rifles were 3.4" (not 4.2") Blakely rifles from the UK, nominally rated at 4 pdr on the French system, but were 12 pdrs on the Anglo system.



This class were completed with an all rifle armament (although only the lead ship is actually in service in 1863). 3x 6" (Blakely 70 pdrs), 2x 4.2" (Blakely 20 pdr) and 2x 3.4" (Blakely 12 pdr).

that gives the RN 9 more 'cruisers" (to use the term that came about soon enough anyway)

Bottom line, the force ratios are not overwhelming enough to prevent serious damage to British commerce

One would assume that many raiders will be lost, as well as a number of British commerce protection ships as well. As this is an age when sail power extends range (for economical cruising), and prizes can be stripped of their coal as well (happened in World War I in OTL as well), the lack of overseas bases will hurt the Russian / American raiders, but probably not enough to prevent the serious damage likely to occur.

 

[67th Tigers]

3) Tigers, if you would be so kind where did your information come from?

Conways 1860-1905, supplemented with Russian Warships in the Age of Sail 1696-1860

This little spat seems to be over him wishing to exclude large numbers of RN cruising vessels on the basis of them being smaller than the largest clipper as far as I can see, or something. It started when he made some odd claims about RN strength in 1863. He seems to be using Conways, but not being complete, thus:

For screw frigates he claims 24, excluding those fitted as mortar frigates. Indeed on page 43 of Conway there is a list of 28 frigates, including 4 fitted with mortars. However, pages 45-6 list another 18 frigates which on a much closer inspection I see the authors have been inconsistent with whether they are in both sections or not, and five frigates are listed on the 1860 list and also in the later additions.

The full list of screw frigates in 1863 is:

Pg 43
Amphion
Arrogant
Bacchante
Chesapeake
Curacoa
Dauntless
Diadem* (* = double count)
Doris*
Emerald
Eurotas (M, mortar equipped)
Euryalis
Forte
Forth (M)
Horatio (M)
Imperieuse
Liffey
Melpomene
Mersey*
Narcissus*
Phaeton
Phoebe
Seahorse (M)
Severn
Shannon
Sutlej*
Termagant
Topaze
Tribune

Pg 45-6 (exc/ double counts)
Ariadne
Galatea
Orlando
Immortalite
Bristol
Glasgow
Newcastle
Undaunted
Arethusa
Constance
Octavia
Aurora

So in 1863 there were 40 frigates in service, and if you wish to exclude the mortar frigates than 36. Dilandu says 24, because he excludes vessels completed after 1860 in his 1863 numbers.I overcounted because I checked 3-4 names and they weren't replicated, and assumed consistency. Mea culpa.

In screw corvettes there is one double count (HMS Jason) and the same in sloops (HMS Rattler).

Correcting my mistake the RN has 199 cruisers vs 36 Russian cruisers.

 

[Tielhard]

galveston bay,

I am uncomfortable with your scenario above for all sorts of reasons but let's start with the bigger ones:

1) If the British move first (which is the most likely scenario even in winter 63/4) a large part of the Union Navy would be lost on the east coast of the CSA.
2) It would be a matter of days before the RN have blockaded the Chesapeake, Delaware bay and the approaches to New York City. There is a likelihood they would not have enough ships to blockade further north. It might be two or even three further weeks before New England could be blockaded. Of course most of the Union Navy would be blockaded further south.
3) The first question is would the Union commits to commerce raiding? It would mean weakening the defence of its coast line
4) The second question is how many commerce destroyers might the Union want to commit and what sort of ships would they be? Clearly they would not be steam frigates as they would be needed to defend the coast, nor could most of steam sloops be spared. The double enders and gunboats are not big enough, using sailing ships is suicidal so all that is left are a few (last time I checked this is, it was for 1862 and I found 8) ex-merchant steam ships. This is a potential force of no more than 20 ships.
5) The third question is how many commerce destroyers might get out of the Chesapeake and New York and past the blockade? One? Two? The situation is better in New England which would not be blockaded for some time but we are talking no more than what? 5-8 ships tops.
6) Once they are out past the blockade where do they go to find British shipping? The Atlantic off the Union coast will be largely empty as no British commerce will be going to the Union and the British will have initiated the blockade off the coast of Europe. One would suspect the British would be waiting for them off the Confederate coast in the western approaches.
7) The British will be waiting in the Caribbean too.
8) If they want to get out of the Atlantic they have to traverse the Brazil Africa gap which would be defended by both the SECoSA Station and the West Africa division. Then to get into the Indian ocean they have to pass the Cape and its division. If they go round the Horn then they are likely to find picket ships waiting in the good weather.

 

[galveston bay]

galveston bay,

I am uncomfortable with your scenario above for all sorts of reasons but let's start with the bigger ones:

1) If the British move first (which is the most likely scenario even in winter 63/4) a large part of the Union Navy would be lost on the east coast of the CSA.
2) It would be a matter of days before the RN have blockaded the Chesapeake, Delaware bay and the approaches to New York City. There is a likelihood they would not have enough ships to blockade further north. It might be two or even three further weeks before New England could be blockaded. Of course most of the Union Navy would be blockaded further south.
3) The first question is would the Union commits to commerce raiding? It would mean weakening the defence of its coast line
4) The second question is how many commerce destroyers might the Union want to commit and what sort of ships would they be? Clearly they would not be steam frigates as they would be needed to defend the coast, nor could most of steam sloops be spared. The double enders and gunboats are not big enough, using sailing ships is suicidal so all that is left are a few (last time I checked this is, it was for 1862 and I found 8) ex-merchant steam ships. This is a potential force of no more than 20 ships.
5) The third question is how many commerce destroyers might get out of the Chesapeake and New York and past the blockade? One? Two? The situation is better in New England which would not be blockaded for some time but we are talking no more than what? 5-8 ships tops.
6) Once they are out past the blockade where do they go to find British shipping? The Atlantic off the Union coast will be largely empty as no British commerce will be going to the Union and the British will have initiated the blockade off the coast of Europe. One would suspect the British would be waiting for them off the Confederate coast in the western approaches.
7) The British will be waiting in the Caribbean too.
8) If they want to get out of the Atlantic they have to traverse the Brazil Africa gap which would be defended by both the SECoSA Station and the West Africa division. Then to get into the Indian ocean they have to pass the Cape and its division. If they go round the Horn then they are likely to find picket ships waiting in the good weather.

the timeline requires triggering events that lead to not only the Russian Empire entering a war with the British Empire, but the United States doing so as well.

This will of course include the crisis that raises tensions with the US (we will assume the Polish one for UK/Russia), timeframes for diplomatic notes, deployment times for the British (one would assume that the Lincoln Administration is not going to sit passive for this either), and a whole range of other factors

There is no transatlantic cable yet, so message times are by courier ship between North America and Europe

Its a matter of conjecture who will be waiting for whom

 

[67th Tigers]

The weaponry of russian ships of this era is relatively well known. I have absolutely no idea, why Tiger decided that 60-pdr gun of 1857 pattern was not a shell gun, and moreover - that she was of Switzerland design (!!!) If he was mislead by the name of Baumgart (who was the cannon's developer), well, he should better check his sources.

Because the 60 pdr was a heavy "shot" gun massing 300 poods (97 cwt), and the old 60 pdr shell gun massed 196 poods (63 cwt). The newer gun could take heavy charges, but the former could not. This is why some later 60 pdrs have what you called "supercharges".

 

[67th Tigers]

Yeah, the Royal Navy was really dissatisfied with the effect of 9-inch and 7-inch RML Palliser shots. They were supposed to be armor-piercing guns, after all, and achieve at least some penetration. But the only real hit they achieved was the penetration of one 3,5-inch plate. Despite more than 30 heavy shell hit.

The hit in question was a 9" common shell (not a Palliser shot or shell) at about 4,000 yds (it was the first shot to clear the guns). It had a similar terminal effect to the 15" hit on Atlanta etc.

Shah fired 32-9in (2 common, 19 Palliser shot, 11 Palliser shell), 149-7in (4 common, 145 Palliser shot) and 56-64pdr. Amethyst fired 190-64pdr common. About 16-19% hit at ranges of 1,500-2,500 yds (at least 50 are known and normal estimates are 70-80 hits). The Huascar was far faster and more agile than any US monitor (she was making 11 kts and could make a 180 in 2 mins).

The terminal effects were as expected. The issue was the Shah couldn't come close enough for the 7" to be effective, and only the 9" would pierce her turret at that range, and no 9" hit there.

The Huascar was smothered by a wall of fire and her gunnery was completely ineffective due to the suppression.

Also, must point out: discussing about firing from "Warrior" against the "Monitor", we must not forget about the angles. The sides of the "Monitor" were quite low, and it was pretty hard even from small distances to hit them at right angles. The deck were almost impenetrable for the rifled guns of this time - their shots would simply glance. And the turret not only was pretty heavy armored (8 layers of 1-inch armor on "Monitor", 11 layers on "Passaic"'s), but also have rounded sides, which acted like sloped armor.

See both the Battle of Hampton Roads and the Bombardment of Charleston, the monitors took a lot of deck hits and if the fight was in a seaway most would have gone to the bottom.

Monitor was built with 8x 1" layers on the turret, and was uparmoured with three more after the armour was insufficient at Hampton Roads. The Passaics had 5x 2" layers.

 

[Tielhard]

the timeline requires triggering events that lead to not only the Russian Empire entering a war with the British Empire, but the United States doing so as well.

This will of course include the crisis that raises tensions with the US (we will assume the Polish one for UK/Russia), timeframes for diplomatic notes, deployment times for the British (one would assume that the Lincoln Administration is not going to sit passive for this either), and a whole range of other factors

There is no transatlantic cable yet, so message times are by courier ship between North America and Europe

Its a matter of conjecture who will be waiting for whom

Dear Galveston bay,

Frankly I have trouble in coming up with any scenario where the Union and the Russian Empire decide to go to war with the British Empire simultaneously. I suspect it needs serious work by the Ms Brookes little flying friends from beyond the stars. I have certainly never seen a viable scenario (yes I am throwing out a challenge). In the cases one can imagine i.e. one party is already fighting the British when the second goes to war with them then the British clearly have the advantage of a blockade already in place or they have a large number of ships chasing a very few number of raiders and a Union blockade observation fleet in place.

Similarly I cannot conceive a situation in '63/4 when it is not in the interests of both the Union and the Russian Empire to avoid war with the British in order to achieve their historical aims. I can however foresee a number of circumstances in which the British are sufficiently threatened by either the Union or the Russian Empire (but not both) to go to war with them. Thus I conclude that in any credible scenario I can think of the British would strike first. Happy to see a credible scenario where this is not the case in '63/4.

Think the cable is a red herring in this case. I believe Russian diplomatic mail was mostly carried in British and Union mail liners across the Atlantic.

 

[Tielhard]

that gives the RN 9 more 'cruisers" (to use the term that came about soon enough anyway)

Bottom line, the force ratios are not overwhelming enough to prevent serious damage to British commerce

One would assume that many raiders will be lost, as well as a number of British commerce protection ships as well. As this is an age when sail power extends range (for economical cruising), and prizes can be stripped of their coal as well (happened in World War I in OTL as well), the lack of overseas bases will hurt the Russian / American raiders, but probably not enough to prevent the serious damage likely to occur.

galveston bay,

Your bottom line is rather one sided. Assuming the fantastical simultaneous wars of the Russian Empire and the Union on the British Empire. Much of the Union fleet capable of raiding is destroyed in the first days of the war. Most of the rest are blockaded, possibly the Russians too. The north Atlantic hunting grounds are almost empty due to the blockade in Europe and the fact Britain has ceased to trade with the Union. There are no friendly ports anywhere for the raiders. They are trapped in the Atlantic unless they run the gap and then the Cape or the Horn. The bottom line is there will be a few raiders that break out or escape the build up of the blockade. They will sink or bond a few ships, they will be trapped and they will be run down one by one. The threat will be controlled in 3 months and eliminated in a year, assuming the Union managed to fight on for that long.

 

[Dilandu]

Your bottom line is rather one sided. Assuming the fantastical simultaneous wars of the Russian Empire and the Union on the British Empire. Much of the Union fleet capable of raiding is destroyed in the first days of the war.

Why does you assume, that the war would be a complete surprize for the Union side? Just the diplomatic exchange would took a lot of time between London and Washington.

 

[Dilandu]

The north Atlantic hunting grounds are almost empty due to the blockade in Europe and the fact Britain has ceased to trade with the Union.

And so? The Canadian and South American traffic, as well as around-Africa traffic are still perfectly here.

 

[Dilandu]

Some data about 60-pdr Baumgart's gun of 1855 pattern (quoted by Dotsenko V.D. "Galleys, sailships, ironclads"):

* Calibre - 7,7 inches
* Bore lenght - 15 calibres No.2 model, 13 calibres No.1 model
* Mass - 4,9 tons No.2 model, 3,2 tons No.1 model
* Powder charge - 6,5 kg (14,3 pdr) 8,6 kg (18,9 pdr) (only for model No.2, supercahrged)
* Mass of projectiles:
- steel shot - 30,3 kg (66,8 pdr)
- cast-iron shot - 26,2 kg (57,8 pdr)
- cast-iron bomb - 18,7 kg (41,2 pdr), bursting charge - 1,23 kg (2,7 pdr)
* Muzzle velocity of steel shot - 550 m/s (1804 fps) supercharged

Makievsky gun of 1857 pattern:

* Calibre - 7,7 inches
* Bore lenght - 15 calibres
* Mass - 6,2 tons
* Powder charge - 8,6 kg (18,9 pdr)
* Mass of projectiles:
- steel shot - 30,3 kg (66,8 pdr)
- cast-iron shot - 26,2 kg (57,8 pdr)
- cast-iron bomb - 18,7 kg (41,2 pdr), bursting charge - 1,23 kg (2,7 pdr)

Those guns werethe primary battery armament of russian screw frigates and ships-of-the-line. and pivot armament of corvettes and clippers.

Both guns were proved for ability to penetrate 4,5-inch armor with steel shot, when supercharged, but have problems with wooden backing penetration.

 

[67th Tigers]

Some data about 60-pdr Baumgart's gun of 1855 pattern (quoted by Dotsenko V.D. "Galleys, sailships, ironclads"):

* Calibre - 7,7 inches
* Bore lenght - 15 calibres No.2 model, 13 calibres No.1 model
* Mass - 4,9 tons No.2 model, 3,2 tons No.1 model
* Powder charge - 6,5 kg (14,3 pdr) 8,6 kg (18,9 pdr) (only for model No.2, supercahrged)
* Mass of projectiles:
- steel shot - 30,3 kg (66,8 pdr)
- cast-iron shot - 26,2 kg (57,8 pdr)
- cast-iron bomb - 18,7 kg (41,2 pdr), bursting charge - 1,23 kg (2,7 pdr)
* Muzzle velocity of steel shot - 550 m/s (1804 fps) supercharged

Makievsky gun of 1857 pattern:

* Calibre - 7,7 inches
* Bore lenght - 15 calibres
* Mass - 6,2 tons
* Powder charge - 8,6 kg (18,9 pdr)
* Mass of projectiles:
- steel shot - 30,3 kg (66,8 pdr)
- cast-iron shot - 26,2 kg (57,8 pdr)
- cast-iron bomb - 18,7 kg (41,2 pdr), bursting charge - 1,23 kg (2,7 pdr)

Those guns werethe primary battery armament of russian screw frigates and ships-of-the-line. and pivot armament of corvettes and clippers.

Both guns were proved for ability to penetrate 4,5-inch armor with steel shot, when supercharged, but have problems with wooden backing penetration.

The 1857 pattern were coastal defence guns not carried certainly on any wooden ship. These are essentially equivalent to the British 68 pdr 112 cwt.

Russia had three 60 pdrs in 1863:

Shell gun of 63 cwt - general issue to ships
Shot gun of 97 cwt - chaser and on issue to a few ships
Coast defence gun of 120 cwt - not issued to ships

 

[Dilandu]

Most of the rest are blockaded

Let's talk about the blokade a bit. What kind of blockade of Union coastline Royal Navy could enfore in 1863 - with 6 (six) sea-capable ironclads in comission?

Their ships-of-the-line would be next thing to useless for such job; they aren't suited to stand against 11-inch Dahlgrens or 100-pdr Parrots, so even the squadron of sloops & gunboats could inflict a lot of damage against them. Recall the experience of CSS "Florida/Selma" against USS "Massachussets". The impressive boardsides of screw ships-of-the-line aren't suited for long-distance combat.

To enforce any kind of blockade against Union coastlines, the Royal Navy would need a large force of screw sloops & gunboats, supported by heavy units AND ironclads. Problem is, in 1863-1864 the total number of ironclads that Royal Navy could deploy in any kind of operation is six. And the US Navy have two large ironclads ("New Ironsides" and "Roanok"), two small ironclads ("Galena" and "Keokuk") and nine "Passaic"-class monitors in 1863, more coming in 1864.

 

[TFSmith121]

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

Does the setup for said intellectual exercise include the historical reality that the men in the US government and in the US armed forces fought and won a complete victory (unconditional surrender) in a total war stemming from an existential political crisis, on a continental scale, with mass mobilization and related actions in almost every ocean, and against a Western peer competitor, all in a period of 48 months ... While the men in the rebel government and forces lost said conflict?

And that those in the posited British government and forces, on their own, never faced a peer enemy in the entire period?

The obvious issue is that the evidence is in hand for the performance of the US and rebel nations, as well as - for that matter - the other major actors in North America at this point, the Mexican, French Imperial, Russian Imperial, Spanish Imperial, Comanche, Dakota, Dominican rebels, etc. as well as minor actors like the assorted provincial and colonial governments of British North America, the Fenian irregulars, etc.

What is not available, however, is any real world evidence of the performance of the British Imperial elements against Western peer enemies in the 1860s, other than second-hand at Ridgway and Fort Erie (where the Canadian provincial forces, under British strategic direction, failed miserably at the operational and tactical level against irregular non-state actors, despite four years of supposed mobilization against the very threat they faced with the Fenians and as many years of training under the aegis of the "professional" regular British Army) or against non-western enemies like the Chinese in 1859 (where the Royal Navy failed miserably, losing multiple warships in action for the first time since Lake Champlain in 1814) or in 1860, where they required an 18,000 man expeditionary force, including 7,000 French troops, and French naval support to achieve anything against the Chinese.

The 1854-56 conflict (24 months, inconclusive result) of the Allies against the Russians doesn't apply, of course, given that without the French (who outnumbered the British on the ground in the only significant campaign by 100,000 to 28,000, according to the British official history) the Turks (45,000, also a much larger commitment) and even the Sardinians, who managed to deploy an expeditionary force of 15,000, more than 50 percent that of the British Army), the British alone would have been laughed at by the Russians.

Then there's the minor historical reality that ironclad navies were not war winners in this era in conflicts between Western enemies (if ever) as witness the courses of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, much less the Franco-Mexican and Spanish-Dominican conflicts. All four were lost by the power with maritime superiority or even supremacy; the Austrians won the only ironclad squadron action worth the name fought in European waters, conclusively, and still lost their war against the Prussians and Italians. The French navy was useless in any real terms in 1870-71, and the Mexicans and Dominicans had no maritime resources whatsoever compared to the "European professionals" of France and Spain, and yet both European imperial powers lost those wars in the 1860s as well.

The historical evidence is such that:

A) Ironclad navies had little to no influence on conflicts between Western powers in the 1850s and 1860s; and
B) conflicts between Western powers in the 1850s and 1860s came down to military power ashore, which in turn depended upon population, economic resources, and mass mobilization in the theaters where the conflicts were fought. The imaginary advantages of any "professional" army never made any difference on the battlefield.

The above is the historical record, repeated multiple times, in the very period under discussion, and in the real world of mud and rain and salt spray and the boredom and blood and terror of actual conflict, not in intellectual armchair advocacy.

So if a simulation came up with any sort of result that did not mimic those of the actual, historical, real-world conflicts that were fought and won or lost by actual flesh and blood in the same period, it obviously would be flawed.

Best,