Russian navy

[67th Tigers]

Dilandu,

The Russian Imperial Navy had a few (1 or 2 ISTR) combat clippers in the Pacific, these were powerful raiders but there were not nearly enough of them. The Pacific Ocean is huge and the shipping routes were not that busy, mostly around the rim - not that good a hunting ground. The Boyarins (Sp.?) were not what I would call fast or indeed a corvette, well built well designed screw sloops but not particularly good raiders. Almost anything the British had that could catch them could destroy them.

When Russia surveyed the fleet in 1863 it was found only three of the clippers were in a condition to be Commissioned, two of the Pacific (Gaidamak, 7 and Abrek, 5) and one of the Baltic Fleet (Almaz, 7). There were six more completed, four in the Pacific (Razboinik, Strelok, Dzhigit and Nayezdnik, all 3 with a single heavy 60 pdr on a pivot and a pair of 24 pdrs, one each side) and two in the Baltic (Vsadnik and Zhemchug). Two of the three clippers in the Baltic were ordered to accompany the fleet to New York, but neither was found to be seaworthy on survey. The four in Siberia were in no state for sea either, having been hastily constructed of green wood and hence opening badly to the sea.

The orders to Lisovskii from Krabbe were:

" Your fleet is to consist of three frigates, three clippers, and two
corvettes. In case of war destroy the enemy's commerce and attack
his weakly defended possessions. Although you are primarily ex-
pected to operate in the Atlantic, yet you are at liberty to shift your
activities to another part of the globe and divide your forces as you
think best. After leaving the Gulf of Finland proceed directly to
New York. It would be preferable to keep all the ships in that
port, but if such an arrangement is inconvenient for the American
government you may, with the advice of our representative in
Washington, dispose of the vessels among the various Atlantic ports
of the United States. When you learn that war has been declared
it is left to you how to proceed, where to rendezvous, etc. Our
minister will help you in the matter of supplies ; he will have on hand
a specially chartered boat to keep you informed of what is going on.
Should you find out on the way that war has broken out begin
operations at once. If soon after reaching New York you deem it
wise to go to sea try to keep your fleet together until war is
actually declared, but avoid the enemy, even commercial ships, so as
to cover your tracks. If through our minister or some other re-
liable source you are told of the opening of hostilities, dispose of
your ships and plan your campaign as may seem best. Captain
Kroun is preceding you to America to prepare for your coming.
Study the Treaty of Paris so as to be well informed on matters of
neutrality. Should you meet with Rear-Admiral Popov consult
with him as to the course to be pursued. Communicate in cipher.
Hand in person your secret instructions to the officers. Whether
there is war or not make a study of the commercial routes, of the
strength and weakness of the European colonies, of desirable coaling
stations for our fleet, and of the economic and military importance
of our own possessions. These instructions are made purposely
general in order to give you a free hand to act according to your
judgment and discretion."

As you can see, all three clippers with the Baltic fleet were ordered to go, but only Almaz was in any condition to go. They also wanted to send three frigates from the Baltic, but on inspection only two were seaworthy, the Alexander Nevskii and Peresvet. One of the three frigates in the Mediterranean (Oslyabya) was ordered to NY to make up the difference, leaving the General-Admiral and Oleg there.

Popov had decided to go to SF even before he was ordered too, and gathered every available seaworthy ship and set off from Hong Kong. His thinking apparently was that SF was the only port in the Pacific that hasn't hostile and could protect his squadron, and certainly he didn't want to remain at Hong Kong.

We have Lisovskii's sailing orders, and they can be condensed thus:

Alexander Nevskii - would cruise off the Brazilian coast
Peresviet - would cruise off the West African coast
Variag - would cruise the South Pacific
Vitiaz - would cruise from the Cape to St. Helena
Almas- would cruise off Venezuela

As Oslyabya was joining we don't have her instructions. His logistical arrangements were that some hired steamers carrying coal and supplies would be at the island of Santa Catharina, Brazil from 1st-20th November,
Lobito Bay, West Africa around 15th March 1864 and San Matias Bay, Argentina around 15th July 1864. Popov's arrangements were supply ships at Kodiak Island, Alaska permanently.

 

[Dilandu]

//Let me emphasise once again that the Union Monitors are unseaworthy rafts with primitive large guns.//

And the RN ironclads are clumsy semi-admired frigates with primitive rifled guns. Seems like an even match)

//None of these rafts was a match for a Crimean era floating battery//

Oh really? And what could the gloating battery do - with her non-AP guns and vertical sides? Run away? I doubt that.

This constant attempts to undermine the military value of monitors, frankly, started to be boring. They weren't perfect; but they were superior units for coastal opeartions. They were agile, well-protected (due to low hull and rounded sides of turret), and armed with reliable guns. Which means quite a lot this era.

//the monitors can be rammed by anything bigger than a steam frigate,//

Sigh. How?

With all respect, but may I suggest you a test? Install "world of warships" game on your PC and try to ram slower but more agile ship with faster but with larger circulation.

This game isn't very good, but it represents good enough approximation. Warships have inertia. Fast and long warships have larger circulation radius than shorter and slower. While monitor could, basically, turn around her own lenght, the " Warrior" or any other large ling frigate have terrible circulation radius.

Simply speaking - monitor would be easily able to avoid such attempt, by simply turning at last moments.

 

[matthew mckeon]

That is very interesting, apart from historical interest in means that virtually every set of wargame rules that includes the ACW, including my own, has serious errors.

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

 

[Dilandu]

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

It would be pretty interesting, indeed!

 

[67th Tigers]

//Let me emphasise once again that the Union Monitors are unseaworthy rafts with primitive large guns.//

And the RN ironclads are clumsy semi-admired frigates with primitive rifled guns. Seems like an even match)

//None of these rafts was a match for a Crimean era floating battery//

Oh really? And what could the gloating battery do - with her non-AP guns and vertical sides? Run away? I doubt that.

Vertical sides? The Erebus class had a slope of above 30 degrees.

Non-AP guns? They carried the 68 pdr 95 cwt gun.

The sides of an Erebus would resist shot at around 37 ft-tons/in on a parallel course, and a Monitor turret (5x2") at around 28 ft-tons/in at the front (and obviously more as the shot moves out from the centre due to curvature). This means the 11" gun will never penetrate an Erebus, but a 15" one would out to ranges it could hit (3-400 yds). Meanwhile the 68 pdrs of the Erebus should be able to make a clean penetration of a monitor turret (centre) out to the range where her shot's velocity drops to 1,200 fps striking velocity (around 3-500 yds) and effectively destroy the turret out to ca. 1,000 yards or more by jamming the key, dismounting guns by shock and by spalling killing the gun crews.

However, just assume you drop a monitor and an Erebus 300 yds from each other (where the 15" is point blank and so can hit). Erebus puts out 9 shot a minute that can cleaning penetrate a monitor turret, and the monitor puts out one shot every 10-15 minutes than can penetrate the Erebus. Obviously the Erebus has around 100 times the effective firepower of the monitor. Chances are that before the monitor could load their guns (or reload) the turret would be jammed, the guns dismounted and the guncrews dead, the pilothouse and stack destroyed, and the deck ripped to pieces and admitting the sea.

This constant attempts to undermine the military value of monitors, frankly, started to be boring. They weren't perfect; but they were superior units for coastal opeartions. They were agile, well-protected (due to low hull and rounded sides of turret), and armed with reliable guns. Which means quite a lot this era.

Not that agile. The Warrior could turn 180 in 2.5 minutes, but it would take a Passaic 4-5 minutes to do a 180. True, the Passaic will only by 350 yds left/right of the previous course compared to the Warrior's 760 yds.

However, what this means is that unless in a river (unlikely) the Warrior can hold per range and maintain a fire on a monitor, whilst the monitor is totally unable to close thus:

Monitor is approaching at 2.5 yds/sec (5 kts). Warrior pulling a series of turns at 14 kts averages 5 yds/sec away from the monitor. To maintain range the Warrior thus has to do a 180 away from the monitor, which opens the range by 375 yds. She then has 2.5 minutes to loose off three salvos allowing the monitor to close that 375 yds it has lost before performing another turn.

Hence the Warrior can indefinitely hold the range open at whatever her captain wants, and the monitor can only close to effective range if the Warrior allows or something prevents Warrior from moving. Since Warrior carried 133 rounds per gun she'll get to fire roughly 5,000 shots at the monitor before she has to move off for lack of ammunition. In this time the monitor (assume Passaic) would have managed about 36x 11" shots, and would never have gotten within 15" range.

//the monitors can be rammed by anything bigger than a steam frigate,//

Sigh. How?

With all respect, but may I suggest you a test? Install "world of warships" game on your PC and try to ram slower but more agile ship with faster but with larger circulation.

This game isn't very good, but it represents good enough approximation. Warships have inertia. Fast and long warships have larger circulation radius than shorter and slower. While monitor could, basically, turn around her own lenght, the " Warrior" or any other large ling frigate have terrible circulation radius.

Simply speaking - monitor would be easily able to avoid such attempt, by simply turning at last moments.

A Passaic has a turning circle of 350 yds and a top speed of about 2.5 yds/sec. Being 200 yds long it takes the ship 80 seconds to fully pass one spot. There's basically no chance of dodging, the Passaic is far too slow and has terrible agility.

If a Passaic turned away early enough all that will happen is the ram will hit the screw rather than the side, because the closing speed of the frigate will be 2.5-5 yds/second (so the Passaic won't even have time to get two shots off from the 15")

 

[67th Tigers]

Clearly the only solution to this hypothetical war is to war game it.

Problem is always how the parameters are set up, and GIGO can result.

 

[67th Tigers]

Actually, we have three of them on Pacific) Plus three corvettes and frigate - all modern, all screw. So, we could send seven fast, heavy-armed raiders, each much more dangerous than "Shenandoah" on the loose against British Empire communications.

Here you have to note the only reason Confederate raiders were effective is that essentially all ports were open to them, and that the USN had very few ships available to hunt them.

The case for Russia or the US is the opposite. Essentially all ports are closed to them, and the RN has large numbers of cruisers everywhere.

Expecting the US or Russians to replicate the qualified success of the CSN under far more difficult circumstances seems unlikely. Every place Lisovskii sent a ship to cruise a much larger RN force was already present.

But the point is to catch them) And this is a problem, real problem, before radio appeared. The disperced raiders are very hard to find. Yes, you could destroy them quite easily - but to catch them you would need several times more ships to even have a good chance. To catch seven Russian warships, Royal Navy would be forced to detach about 20 of their own - nearly half of all avaliable fleet of screw frigates and corvettes! And what would remain for other theatres?

As mentioned, each warship is going to an area already patrolled by an RN squadron. If the USN had dozens of cruisers available to protect lines of communication then the CS raiders would not have done anything like the damage they did.

 

[Dilandu]

Ok, let's do some numbers.

As it was stated previously, the Royal Navy have in comission & reserve about 24 screw frigates (not counting mortar units), 22 screw corvettes and 24 screw sloops in 1860. The average frigate was over 2500 tons, the average corvette was between 1500 and 2500 tons, and the average sloop was below 1500 tons.

Up to 1863, they obtained 7 screw frigates, 2 screw corvettes and 7 screw sloops. Several old and worn-out units were decomissioned around this time also, so the actual number of units remained more or less the same.

The Union Navy have, in 1863, 4 screw frigates commisioned, 16 screw corvettes and about 14 screw sloops.

The Russian Imperial Navy, in 1863, have 8 screw frigates comissioned, 22 screw corvettes and about 12 clippers (screw sloop analogue)

And what do we have?

Frigates: 24 RN / 4+8=12 Union+Russia

Corvettes: 22RN / 16+22=38 Union+Russia

Sloops: 24 RN /14+12=26 Union+Russia

Total: 70 RN / 76 Union+Russia

I.e. we have generally equival numbers of raiders & counter-raiders from both sides. Nowhere even near the Royal Navy numerical superiority. Of course, the number of Russian units would be blocked in Black & Baltic seas in case of war, but the number of Royal Navy small units would also be used in blockade duty, in Mediterranean and thus unavaliable for commerce-protection patrols.

So the average situation is, Royal Navy didn't have even a fraction of light combat ship they needed to provide complete counter-raider coverage. They have pretty powerful battleline, thought)

 

[67th Tigers]

Ok, let's do some numbers.

Frigates are all large combat vessels, having evolved far from more general cruisers. I'm guessing you're pulling this all from Conways.

So, from Conway:

RN has (1860+ready by 1863)

Screw frigates: 28+19 = 47 (several of these went straight in reserve and never Commissioned for active service)
Paddle frigates: 16
Screw corvettes: 22+6 = 28 (the last of the Jasons not complete until early 1864)
Screw sloops: 26+15 = 41
Paddle sloops: 36

Or rather 168 cruising ships completed. However, you've counted clippers as sloop equivalents, and they were really equivalent to gunvessels, which were also counted as cruisers by the RN. The RN disposed of quite a few gunvessels in 1862 leaving 44 with the new Eclipses and Philomels. We now have 212 cruising ships.

Russia had, at the end of 1863:

6 Paddle frigates
8 Screw frigates
11+9 Screw corvettes (the 9 are in the Black Sea and bottled up)
1 Paddle corvette
1 Clippers (some of which would be classified as gunboats by the RN and some as gunvessels)

= 36 cruisers

In terms of cruisers Russia is outnumbered about 6:1 overall. However, at the end of 1863 the effective cruising force of Russia was 13 ships of which 6 were in NY, 5 in SF and 2 in Greek waters. Every ship of the Baltic Fleet not capable of being sent out with those 13 (except the 3 screw 3-deckers) was sunk or prepared to be sunk to block the channels to Kronstadt. The 9 vessels in the Black Sea are of no consequence.

 

[galveston bay]

Vertical sides? The Erebus class had a slope of above 30 degrees.

Non-AP guns? They carried the 68 pdr 95 cwt gun.

The sides of an Erebus would resist shot at around 37 ft-tons/in on a parallel course, and a Monitor turret (5x2") at around 28 ft-tons/in at the front (and obviously more as the shot moves out from the centre due to curvature). This means the 11" gun will never penetrate an Erebus, but a 15" one would out to ranges it could hit (3-400 yds). Meanwhile the 68 pdrs of the Erebus should be able to make a clean penetration of a monitor turret (centre) out to the range where her shot's velocity drops to 1,200 fps striking velocity (around 3-500 yds) and effectively destroy the turret out to ca. 1,000 yards or more by jamming the key, dismounting guns by shock and by spalling killing the gun crews.

However, just assume you drop a monitor and an Erebus 300 yds from each other (where the 15" is point blank and so can hit). Erebus puts out 9 shot a minute that can cleaning penetrate a monitor turret, and the monitor puts out one shot every 10-15 minutes than can penetrate the Erebus. Obviously the Erebus has around 100 times the effective firepower of the monitor. Chances are that before the monitor could load their guns (or reload) the turret would be jammed, the guns dismounted and the guncrews dead, the pilothouse and stack destroyed, and the deck ripped to pieces and admitting the sea.



Not that agile. The Warrior could turn 180 in 2.5 minutes, but it would take a Passaic 4-5 minutes to do a 180. True, the Passaic will only by 350 yds left/right of the previous course compared to the Warrior's 760 yds.

However, what this means is that unless in a river (unlikely) the Warrior can hold per range and maintain a fire on a monitor, whilst the monitor is totally unable to close thus:

Monitor is approaching at 2.5 yds/sec (5 kts). Warrior pulling a series of turns at 14 kts averages 5 yds/sec away from the monitor. To maintain range the Warrior thus has to do a 180 away from the monitor, which opens the range by 375 yds. She then has 2.5 minutes to loose off three salvos allowing the monitor to close that 375 yds it has lost before performing another turn.

Hence the Warrior can indefinitely hold the range open at whatever her captain wants, and the monitor can only close to effective range if the Warrior allows or something prevents Warrior from moving. Since Warrior carried 133 rounds per gun she'll get to fire roughly 5,000 shots at the monitor before she has to move off for lack of ammunition. In this time the monitor (assume Passaic) would have managed about 36x 11" shots, and would never have gotten within 15" range.



A Passaic has a turning circle of 350 yds and a top speed of about 2.5 yds/sec. Being 200 yds long it takes the ship 80 seconds to fully pass one spot. There's basically no chance of dodging, the Passaic is far too slow and has terrible agility.

If a Passaic turned away early enough all that will happen is the ram will hit the screw rather than the side, because the closing speed of the frigate will be 2.5-5 yds/second (so the Passaic won't even have time to get two shots off from the 15")

You have a couple of mistakes in your calculations... the Miantonomoh class (the ocean going ships I mentioned before) were only 258 feet long (not yards, that would be 600 feet in your statement), and while her and her sisters show up in 1865, they were capable of oceanic operations, indeed the lead ship visited several European ports. She has a speed of 7 knots and had twin screws, 10 inches of armor in her turrets and 4 x 15 inch guns.

The Canonicus class were only 224 feet long, slightly faster at 8 knots and a single screw, were also capable of coastal deep water operations (steaming routinely to the Caribbean post war), with a speed of 7 knots and 10 inches of armor for her pilot house and turret (and 2 x 15 inch guns). This class is in service in 1864, indeed one was lost at Mobile Bay to a torpedo (mine)

The British frigates have a top speed of 10-12 knots (looking at the Undaunted, the final of her type built) are 250 feet long as well, and are single screw ships. The Warrior and her successors are just over 400 feet long, rated at 14 knots, with a single screw.

A difference in speed of 3-5 knots overall which matters but is not exactly charging through the water. That means that all of the ships above are slow enough to be within accurate artillery range of each other for a considerable period, and here the larger target profile of the British ships is going to matter.

In a period 1863-65, the RN would not be fighting the USS Monitor (as it has already sunk), but the successor ships. While we can debate endlessly about the penetration of guns vs armor, we know that wooden ships are obviously vulnerable to heavy guns of this era.

 

[Dilandu]

In a period 1863-65, the RN would not be fighting the USS Monitor (as it has already sunk), but the successor ships. While we can debate endlessly about the penetration of guns vs armor, we know that wooden ships are obviously vulnerable to heavy guns of this era.

Basically yes. Since the 11-inch Dahlgren and 100-pdr Parrots appeared, all screw ship-of-the-lines basically became giant floating deathtraps. A screw sloop, armed with few pivoted heavy guns could disable the wooden ship-of-the-line without actually coming in the latter boardside. So, the 50+ on RN's ship-of-the-line... were just giant, costly waste of manpower.

 

[Dilandu]

Some data about russian screw clippers:

1) "Razboynik" (eng. "Highwayman") -class. Build in 1856-1857. Displacement 615 tons, about 8-9 knots under steam (more under sails).

Armed with one 60-pdr shell gun and two 24-pdr semi-carronades.

Six in series: "Razboynik", "Strelok", "Djigit", "Oprichnik", "Plastun", "Naezdnik". "Oprichnik" lost in strom in 1861, "Plastun" destroyed by accidental (there is an urban myth about diversion) explosion of gunpowder in 1860. All remaining decomissioned in 1866.

2) "Gaydamak"-class. Actually, not a single class, but series of similar ships, some foreing-build, build in 1858-1860. Displacement 1050-1070 tons, about 10,5-11,5 knots.

Armed with three 60-pdr shell guns and four light 8-pdr rifles.

Three in series: "Gaydamak" (build in Britain), "Abrek", "Vsandyk". All in comission in 1863.

3) "Almaz"-class. Build in 1861-1862. Displacement 1585 tons, about 12-13 knots under steam.

Armed with three 60-pdr shell guns and four light 8-pdr rifles.

Four in series: "Almaz", "Jemchug", "Izumrud" and "Yahont". All in comission in 1863.

 

[67th Tigers]

You have a couple of mistakes in your calculations... the Miantonomoh class (the ocean going ships I mentioned before) were only 258 feet long (not yards, that would be 600 feet in your statement),

Fair point.

and while her and her sisters show up in 1865, they were capable of oceanic operations, indeed the lead ship visited several European ports. She has a speed of 7 knots and had twin screws, 10 inches of armor in her turrets and 4 x 15 inch guns.

However, they had to caulk her turret and tow her (USS Augusta being the towing vessel). A 3.5 ft wooden hull had to be built forward other wise waves breaking over her would have inundated the ship and sunk her. She could not unseal her turret to fight in a seaway. As her captain wrote:

"I think if a vessel is to go to sea, or go from port to port, in all weathers and at short notice, a higher freeboard would be better. The precautions that have to be taken on each occasion that the 'Miantonomoh' goes to sea are very great, and entail a great deal of work , much of which would be obviated by having a higher freeboard."

Essentially she could make a voyage if prepared to do such, but couldn't fight in such conditions.

With a tow and with the engines running for much of the voyage she made an average of 7 kts crossing the Atlantic. No idea if her actual speed was ever measured, but apparently she hit 6.5 kts under her own power in ideal conditions.

The Canonicus class were only 224 feet long, slightly faster at 8 knots and a single screw, were also capable of coastal deep water operations (steaming routinely to the Caribbean post war), with a speed of 7 knots and 10 inches of armor for her pilot house and turret (and 2 x 15 inch guns). This class is in service in 1864, indeed one was lost at Mobile Bay to a torpedo (mine)

Indeed, the Canonicus is a fully working monitor, and come into service in 1864. US speed figures are notoriously exaggerated, and whilst the Canonicus was designed for 13 kts when Peru took them over they were properly measured and found to be 6 knotters.

It is not uncommon to find "slower" vessels overhauling faster ones due to different measurement parameters (even depth changes things). For example quoted German speed in WW1 were for short periods at maximum overload with special coal, whereas British ships quoted speeds were sustained at normal power and normal fuel. Hence Kent easily ran down the nominally faster Nurnburg in a stern chase at the Falklands. Unless ships are compared under identical conditions you don't know which is faster.

In a period 1863-65, the RN would not be fighting the USS Monitor (as it has already sunk), but the successor ships. While we can debate endlessly about the penetration of guns vs armor, we know that wooden ships are obviously vulnerable to heavy guns of this era.

and the RN would not be carrying 68 pdr smoothbores but RML shunt guns capable of exploding a shell behind a monitors turret armour at over 1,000 yds.

 

[TFSmith121]

Ok, let's do some numbers.

As it was stated previously, the Royal Navy have in comission & reserve about 24 screw frigates (not counting mortar units), 22 screw corvettes and 24 screw sloops in 1860. The average frigate was over 2500 tons, the average corvette was between 1500 and 2500 tons, and the average sloop was below 1500 tons.

Up to 1863, they obtained 7 screw frigates, 2 screw corvettes and 7 screw sloops. Several old and worn-out units were decomissioned around this time also, so the actual number of units remained more or less the same.

The Union Navy have, in 1863, 4 screw frigates commisioned, 16 screw corvettes and about 14 screw sloops.

The Russian Imperial Navy, in 1863, have 8 screw frigates comissioned, 22 screw corvettes and about 12 clippers (screw sloop analogue)

And what do we have?

Frigates: 24 RN / 4+8=12 Union+Russia

Corvettes: 22RN / 16+22=38 Union+Russia

Sloops: 24 RN /14+12=26 Union+Russia

Total: 70 RN / 76 Union+Russia

I.e. we have generally equival numbers of raiders & counter-raiders from both sides. Nowhere even near the Royal Navy numerical superiority. Of course, the number of Russian units would be blocked in Black & Baltic seas in case of war, but the number of Royal Navy small units would also be used in blockade duty, in Mediterranean and thus unavaliable for commerce-protection patrols.

So the average situation is, Royal Navy didn't have even a fraction of light combat ship they needed to provide complete counter-raider coverage. They have pretty powerful battleline, thought)

There's also the issue of armed merchant cruisers, as well; take a seagoing Blue Riband winning Atlantic or Pacific liner of 1860 (almost all of which retained masts and yards, so useful for cruising and maintaining coal for action), fit her with a few guns, fill her with stores and a crew, and voila; USS Vanderbilt, which (in technical terms) would be quite capable of running down and capturing or destroying 90 percent of the ships (I.e., the sailing vessels) that made up the British flag merchant marine in the early 1860s without breaking a sweat.

There were (at least) 40 similar large, ocean-going passenger steamers in the US merchant marine at the time, split roughly between the Atlantic and Pacific; some were taken over and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers for the blockade or for use as troopers in 1861-62... Presumably there were some equivalents in the Russian merchant marine as well.

And of course, the RN's frigates, corvettes, sloops, and large gunboats are exactly the vessels needed as blockaders (against the US, Russia, both, whatever), plus as escorts for British troop convoys and blockade and expeditionary force supply convoys, as well as dispatch vessels, station keepers in Imperial waters that aren't under direct threat, etc. so, some roles and missions become priorities, others do not; the RN will not sweep all before it. It is physically impossible.

The British are in a hole they can't dig their way out of, because both the US and the Russians can build as well.

The most obvious counterpoint to all this bilge was the French experience in Mexico; they had absolute supremacy at sea and still had to build their army in theater up to near parity (31,000 troops vs. 32,000) before they even attempted a second try at Puebla in 1863 after their defeat there in 1862 (despite being "professionally trained European troops" who outnumbered the locals close to 2-1, they still got their heads handed to them courtesy of the Mexican Army ), and it still took them a year to manage the build-up even with absolute supremacy at sea - which is not what they'd face against the US or Russian navies at this time, obviously.

Likewise, it makes clear the importance of the French, Turkish, and Sardinian armies to the Allied cause in 1855-56; as made clear in the official British history, when the French brought 100,000 troops to the fray, the Turks 45,000, and the Sardinians 15,000, at a point when the British Army of the East in the Crimea numbered all of 28,000, it makes clear what a military pygmy the British Army was ... Despite all the paroxysms of mythmaking about the "thin red line," the only armies that mattered in the Crimen War were the Russian, French, and Turkish (and the Austrians hovering off to the west in the Balkans)...

Absent the Allies in 1854-56, the British would have stayed home; quite clear they would have done the same in the 1860s.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Because we are talking about monitors, must point out that "Shah", armed with boardside of 9-inch and 7-inch RML that would make "Warrior"-of-1860s pale, was able to do exactly nothing against "Huascar". The penetration power of early RML was pathetic. All 7-inch and 9-inch guns that pounded "Huascar" - with Palliser shots! - were able to achieve ONE SINGLE penetration of 3,5-inch armor plate.

Later, the mighty 9-inch RML of chilean ironclads, firing Palliser shots and shells agains the same "Huascar" were able to achieve penetration only from the distances of less than 300 yards.

Of course, the layered armor of Union monitors were less resistant than "Huascar" solid plates, but in compairson to the thickness, they provided similar level of protection.

 

[Dilandu]

There's also the issue of armed merchant cruisers, as well; take a seagoing Blue Riband winning Atlantic or Pacific liner of 1860 (almost all of which retained masts and yards), fit her with a few guns, fill her with stores and a crew, and voila; USS Vanderbilt, which (in technical terms) would be quite capable of running down and capturing or destroying 90 percent of the ships (I.e., the sailing vessels) that made up the British flag merchant marine in the early 1860s without breaking a sweat.

Exactly. The main advantage of the raider - she doesn't need to be able to defeat enemy warships, while the counter-raider must have such ability. The raider's main target is generally unarmed cargo ships, and in combat with warship the goal of raider is not to destroy, but to disable the enemy and ran away. The counter-raider must have the ability to destroy the raider in battle, or counter-raider would be useless.

 

[TFSmith121]

Because we are talking about monitors, must point out that "Shah", armed with boardside of 9-inch and 7-inch RML that would make "Warrior"-of-1860s pale, was able to do exactly nothing against "Huascar". The penetration power of early RML was pathetic. All 7-inch and 9-inch guns that pounded "Huascar" - with Palliser shots! - were able to achieve ONE SINGLE penetration of 3,5-inch armor plate.

Later, the mighty 9-inch RML of chilean ironclads, firing Palliser shots and shells agains the same "Huascar" were able to achieve penetration only from the distances of less than 300 yards.

Of course, the layered armor of Union monitors were less resistant than "Huascar" solid plates, but in compairson to the thickness, they provided similar level of protection.

And it's worth noting, de Horsey's RN force outnumbered the Peruvians 2-1, and they still could not run Huascar - operating as a commerce raider, in fact, not even as a coast defense ship - to ground.

Amazing how historical reality tends to bely all this armchair admiral mythmaking...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Exactly. The main advantage of the raider - she doesn't need to be able to defeat enemy warships, while the counter-raider must have such ability. The raider's main target is generally unarmed cargo ships, and in combat with warship the goal of raider is not to destroy, but to disable the enemy and ran away. The counter-raider must have the ability to destroy the raider in battle, or counter-raider would be useless.

And yet, even then, sometimes the raider can win in a ship to ship action over an enemy that - on paper - is a vastly more capable ship - as witness the loss of HMAS Sydney.

The ability of even a single well-handled raider to cause operational and financial loss to the enemy is undeniable; along with the rebel raiders in 1861-65, Thomas Boyle and the Chasseur in 1812-15 comes to mind. Taking 18 British prizes in a single cruise in British and Irish waters, causing the assignment of 14 British warships to patrol and escort duty in those same waters, etc. It was a very effective tactic.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

And it's worth noting, de Horsey's RN force outnumbered the Peruvians 2-1, and they still could not run Huascar - operating as a commerce raider, in fact, not even as a coast defense ship - to ground.

Yeah, the Royal Navy was really dissatisfied with the effect of 9-inch and 7-inch RML Palliser shots. They were supposed to be armor-piercing guns, after all, and achieve at least some penetration. But the only real hit they achieved was the penetration of one 3,5-inch plate. Despite more than 30 heavy shell hit.

Also, must point out: discussing about firing from "Warrior" against the "Monitor", we must not forget about the angles. The sides of the "Monitor" were quite low, and it was pretty hard even from small distances to hit them at right angles. The deck were almost impenetrable for the rifled guns of this time - their shots would simply glance. And the turret not only was pretty heavy armored (8 layers of 1-inch armor on "Monitor", 11 layers on "Passaic"'s), but also have rounded sides, which acted like sloped armor.

 

[67th Tigers]

Some data about russian screw clippers:

1) "Razboynik" (eng. "Highwayman") -class. Build in 1856-1857. Displacement 615 tons, about 8-9 knots under steam (more under sails).

Armed with one 60-pdr shell gun and two 24-pdr semi-carronades.

Six in series: "Razboynik", "Strelok", "Djigit", "Oprichnik", "Plastun", "Naezdnik". "Oprichnik" lost in strom in 1861, "Plastun" destroyed by accidental (there is an urban myth about diversion) explosion of gunpowder in 1860. All remaining decomissioned in 1866.

Here you'll note you have a 605 tons displacement cruising vessel. You've set a bar. So why do you exclude a Royal Navy 877 ton cruising vessel? A surprisingly similar ship in many ways.

2) "Gaydamak"-class. Actually, not a single class, but series of similar ships, some foreing-build, build in 1858-1860. Displacement 1050-1070 tons, about 10,5-11,5 knots.

Armed with three 60-pdr shell guns and four light 8-pdr rifles.

Three in series: "Gaydamak" (build in Britain), "Abrek", "Vsandyk". All in comission in 1863.

You undersell the armament. The 60 pdrs weren't shell guns but rather 60 pdr heavy shot guns (= 54 English pounds), built in Switzerland post-Crimean and essentially equivalent to an old 54 pdr. The rifles were 3.4" (not 4.2") Blakely rifles from the UK, nominally rated at 4 pdr on the French system, but were 12 pdrs on the Anglo system.

3) "Almaz"-class. Build in 1861-1862. Displacement 1585 tons, about 12-13 knots under steam.

Armed with three 60-pdr shell guns and four light 8-pdr rifles.

Four in series: "Almaz", "Jemchug", "Izumrud" and "Yahont". All in comission in 1863.

This class were completed with an all rifle armament (although only the lead ship is actually in service in 1863). 3x 6" (Blakely 70 pdrs), 2x 4.2" (Blakely 20 pdr) and 2x 3.4" (Blakely 12 pdr).