Russian navy

[galveston bay]

Exactly. Even if North American traffic would be completely reduced to convoy operations from Britain to Canada, it would means only that the North Atlantic became less target-rich. But the mid-Atlantic and South Atlantic would be still full of Britain's cargo ships - maybe even more, because Britain would be heavily pressed to compensate the loss of US market and goods. The China, the India merchant routes, that came around Africa... The South America... The Australia, after all.

I suppose, that Union Navy would adopt some sort of late-French strategy; use limited forces of ironclads & coastal ships to punch through the blockade line, and let raiders to run away and disperse. To allow raiders to enter, the similar operations could be mantained on pre-determined pattern (i.e. raider captain knew, that Norfolk Mobile Force, for example, would went out and engage the nearby British blockade squadron at 8 august, so if he want to came in harbor - it would be a perfect opportunity to slip through the blockade). The Union shipbuliding would probably be diverted from river & harbour monitors toward larger, at least partially sea-capable ironclads and monitors, to provide active forces for such attacks - and, as they actually do, large fast screw frigates.

Let's not forget, up to the 1865 the Britain have (in terms of ironclads):

* Warrior (1861)
* Black Prince (1862)
* Defence (1861)
* Resistance (1862)
* Royal Oak (1863)
* Hector (1864)
* Achilles (1864)
* Prince Consort (1864)
* Researhc (1864, small)
* Enterprize (1864, small)
* Royal Sovereign (1864, coastal)
* Caledonia (1865)
* Scorpion (1865, coastal)
* Wyvern (1865, coastal)

Assuming that the British would boost the production, we could also consider possible to comission some additional ironclads in late 1865; "Ocean", "Lord Clyde", "Lord Warden", "Pallas", "Zealous" & "Bellerophon".

What could the Union Navy provide in terms of at least partially sea-capable ironclads? Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865:

* New Ironsides (1862)
* Galena (1862, small)
* Keokuk (1862, small)
* Roanok (1863)
* Onondaga (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.1 from Webb) (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.2 from Webb) (1864)
* Dictator (1864)
* Agamenticus (1864)
* Monadnock (1864)
* Miantonomoh (1865)
* Tonawanda (1865)

Assuming that the Union would also boost production, and cancel river monitor program (Casco-class were useless anyway) they would probably be able to bring "Dunderberg", "Puritan", and Steven's Battery in comission in 1865. Maybe even some from "Kalamazoo"-class - I have little data about them, so I'm not sure, in what state they were.

So, while the Union ironclad fleet undoubtedly being smaller and less capable than Royal Navy, they still have pretty enough ironclads to provide protection of Union coastal waters. The ratio between USN and RN ironclad fleets would be about 1:1,5-1,7. And the Union did not have to worry about the France...

that Union Navy strategy was doctrine for a period post War of 1812 until the Civil War. The earlier period was that several large powerful heavy ships of the line would break the blockade so that frigates, sloops and privateers could make their runs to sea and attack British commerce

So basically this is not a change in warplan, just a change in ship types and technologies

Now the US Navy never was fully equipped for that war plan (some of the liners were never even completed), but that was the doctrine. The rise and fall of naval appropriations has been a political thing in the United States from the very beginning.

1864-65 was one of the brief periods when the USN could have actually carried out that plan

 

[TFSmith121]

that Union Navy strategy was doctrine for a period post War of 1812 until the Civil War. The earlier period was that several large powerful heavy ships of the line would break the blockade so that frigates, sloops and privateers could make their runs to sea and attack British commerce

So basically this is not a change in warplan, just a change in ship types and technologies

Now the US Navy never was fully equipped for that war plan (some of the liners were never even completed), but that was the doctrine. The rise and fall of naval appropriations has been a political thing in the United States from the very beginning.

1864-65 was one of the brief periods when the USN could have actually carried out that plan

Yep; what makes it crystal clear are the expenditures on the eight big twin turreted monitors and the fast cruisers in 1864-66.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Now the US Navy never was fully equipped for that war plan (some of the liners were never even completed), but that was the doctrine. The rise and fall of naval appropriations has been a political thing in the United States from the very beginning.

Well, it seems like exactly the trick that USN could pull out in 1860s. Their large monitors and ironclads were the new big smashers, while the next-generation steam frigates - "Wampanoag" and company - were supposed to run through and hunt cargo ships.

P.S. Interesting question - how good as commerce raider could be "Galena"? Yes, her armor wasn't very good, but in open sea combat she would probably show herself better.

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, it seems like exactly the trick that USN could pull out in 1860s. Their large monitors and ironclads were the new big smashers, while the next-generation steam frigates - "Wampanoag" and company - were supposed to run through and hunt cargo ships.

P.S. Interesting question - how good as commerce raider could be "Galena"? Yes, her armor wasn't very good, but in open sea combat she would probably show herself better.

Yep, pretty much. The execution of the USN's late war programs was far from perfect, but the strategy is clear.

Galena could have been useful as a raider, or a semi-prototype for "chainclad" conversions of the screw steam frigates, sloops, and large gunboats for coast defense duty, as opposed to the total conversion of Roanoke.

The best raiders would have been the sidewheel steamers with masts and yards, both the older steam sloops like Susquehanna and Powhatan and the converted merchant liners like Vanderbilt and Santiago de Cuba; steam for action, sails for cruising, and appearances that could easily mimic any number of merchantmen.

To try and get things slightly back on the track of the OP, paradoxically, some of the older USN and/or IRN sailing sloops, brigs, and even frigates could have been very effective, as well. Seadler made it out of Germany as late as December, 1916, after all, was at sea for 225 days, and took no less than 15 Allied merchantmen (~30,000 tons of shipping), the majority of which were steamers, under Luckner.

Someone (Tielhard, IIRC) up above suggested sailing commerce raiders would be ineffective in the 1860s ("suicidal" IIRC); given, yet again, the historical reality that was not true as late as 1916-17, it's always interesting to compare the actual historical record to the opinions of war gamers and commentators...

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Galena could have been useful as a raider, or a semi-prototype for "chainclad" conversions of the screw steam frigates, sloops, and large gunboats for coast defense duty, as opposed to the total conversion of Roanoke.

Quite probably. While doctrine of "heavy armored raider" weren't invented yet, the "Galena", due to her armor and heavy rifles, would probably be on pair with much larger wooden frigate or corvette.

Paradoxically, some of the older USN and IRN sailing sloops, brigs, and even frigates could have been very effective, as well. Seadler made it out of Germany as late as December, 1916, after all, was at sea for 225 days, and took no less than 15 Allied merchantmen (~30,000 tons of shipping), the majority of which were steamers, under Luckner.

Hm, not sure about them. On Pacific - maybe, but on Atlantic - there are too many RN's steamships for sail raider to act. My IMHO, "Seadler" was effective generally because the mere idea of sailing raider was unortodox in 1916, thus this kind of threat weren't even considered - and, she was still equipped with auxilary engine.

 

[TFSmith121]

Quite probably. While doctrine of "heavy armored raider" weren't invented yet, the "Galena", due to her armor and heavy rifles, would probably be on pair with much larger wooden frigate or corvette.

Hm, not sure about them. On Pacific - maybe, but on Atlantic - there are too many RN's steamships for sail raider to act. My IMHO, "Seadler" was effective generally because the mere idea of sailing raider was unortodox in 1916, thus this kind of threat weren't even considered - and, she was still equipped with auxilary engine.

True, but it is worth remembering that 90 percent of the British flag merchant marine was still purely under sail in the 1860s... there's a on-line history of steam in the British merchant marine that lays it out; very interesting. Half of the ocean-going steamers added to British registry in the 1840s and 1850s were already gone by the 1860s, for example, because of the pace of change in terms of technology and equipment, sales to foreign service, marine casualties, etc. Less than 1,000 of the 10,000 or so British merchantmen (less tugs, towboats, rivercraft, etc.) registered as such in 1860-61 (IIRC) were steamers. The other 9,000 or so were sailing ships.

And the difference in appearance between a sailing sloop of war and a ocean-going clipper ship or the like was not huge.

Then consider the huge numbers of coastal sailing cargo vessels on the Atlantic coast of British North America or in the Caribbean... it would be open season.

As an aside, Wikipedia has an interesting list function of (for example) shipwrecks by year. Granted, its Wikipedia, but the point is if one looks at the detail available there, you can get an interesting snapshot of where cargo was still being moved largely by sail in any given year. Pretty interesting...

As far as the Pacific goes, according to the 1861 Navy List, the last RN sailing warship under full commission, a corvette, was on the southeast Pacific station. Interestingly enough, the USN's Pacific Squadron still had two sailing sloops of war the same year ... could have been the end of an era.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Hm. Good points!

So, the USN could use full-sail raiders as cheap long-range hunters in Pacific and Indian Ocean, fast screw and paddle steamers for Central and South Atlantic hunting grounds, and probably also put some semi-armored units to make things more interesting for the Royal Navy. And they seems to have enough ironclads to at least break through blockade.

But I still think that close blockade of Union coastlines is highly unlikely, because of logistic problems for RN. No adequate basing system nearby... And one ironclad, that operated from well-supplied base have more combat value than two ironclads without such base.

 

[TFSmith121]

Hm. Good points!

So, the USN could use full-sail raiders as cheap long-range hunters in Pacific and Indian Ocean, fast screw and paddle steamers for Central and South Atlantic hunting grounds, and probably also put some semi-armored units to make things more interesting for the Royal Navy. And they seems to have enough ironclads to at least break through blockade.

But I still think that close blockade of Union coastlines is highly unlikely, because of logistic problems for RN. No adequate basing system nearby... And one ironclad, that operated from well-supplied base have more combat value than two ironclads without such base.

Probably all true. Sailing ships were not obsolete as cargo carriers in the 1860s, which means sailing warships were certainly not obsolete as hunters of their brethren in the same period...

No one will ever know, but the potential for a very costly war on their trade for the British when facing the Americans or the Russians in this era is entirely realistic, given the historical precedents of 1803-15 and 1914-18. Given the historical realities of how hard pressed Britain was by trade warfare in the world wars, and the obvious indicators that both the Americans and the Russians were fully prepared and planned to go that route in the 1860s, and it's simple acceptance of those realities to expect the RN would have to deal with an active commerce raiding campaign in the event of war.

Likewise, the idea the RN could mount a successful close blockade of the US northeastern coast in the 1860s is completely belied by the realities of time and distance, the standing advantage of the defender over the blockader in the steam era, and the historical realities of transoceanic combat operations in the steam era, from the Spanish maritime war against Chile and Peru in the 1860s through the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese wars to both world wars. It's fantasy, pure and simple, to suggest otherwise, which anyone who has ever spent any time at sea recognizes.

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

Let's do a little more calculations: how many ships the RN would need to mantain blockade of major North ports and naval bases?

For example, let's take Norfolk and Hampton-Roads. Due to the value of Norfolk and Cheasapeake Bay, and the existence of numerous shipyards nearby, we could assume that this region would be heavily protected with Union mobile forces - and the existence of Cheaspeake-Delaware channel also.

So, if blockade squadrons were recalled, it would means that both "New Ironsides" and "Roanoke" (and, probably, "Keokuk") would stand here, aided with "Minesotta" and "Wabash" and at least twenty or more both screw and sidewheel gunboats.

To block such force, the Royal Navy, of course, would be forced to send no less than two ironclads just to have similar numbers. To have some superiority, they would need to send three.

But would three ironclads suffice? Let's assume that Union forces sortie, clash with RN ironclads, make serious damage to one, and escape back. Both Union ironclads would, probably, be damaged also, but they have their shipyards nearby. But the closest British shipyard is about 700 nm away from Hampton-Roads. Which means, that it would took almost a week for RN ironclad just to came here. And, with all respect to the British engineers, but naval bases on Bermuda and in Halifax just could not have the same capabilities as Union mainland shipyards.

So, it would took much longer to repair RN damaged ironclad, than Union. Which means, that RN must have more ships in blockade. Say, four ironclads vs two Union's.

The problem is, that this number is exactly two-thirds of all avaliable RN ironclads in 1863. And all those ships are used to blockade one single points.

Now, let's assume that in 1864 the Union would have two "italians" in New York and "Onondaga" also here... Which would means that the Royal Navy would be forced to send at least six ironclads to watch over New York and still have at least four to block Hampton-Roads.

And Royal Navy simply haven't got as many ironclads. They only have 11 ironclads in 1864, of which two are small ironclad sloops and one - coastal unit, unfit for long ocean campaing. So, they basically have only nine ironclads.

(Must also note, that due to East River, the Royal Navy might also need to have more ironclads near New York, to block both Lower Bay and Long Island smultaneously)

In late 1864, the Royal Navy would also be forced to deal with "Dictator" in New York, "Agameticus" and "Monadnock" in Boston (not counting coastal units), which would require sixteen ironclads to blockade them. They obviously haven't got that kind of sea power. Even in early 1865, the number of comissioned Royal Navy ironclads was barely 14 (counting the coastal and small units).

The Union bases gave the smaller Union Navy large advantage - which, basically, made close blockade for Royal Navy... impractical. Just the ability to repair ships fast and close to their combat field, would basically double the combat value of Union ironclads. And must also point out; to sucsessfully blockade Union bases without their own bases nearby, the Royal Navy would be forced to use large, sea-capable ironclads - while the Union could suffice with much cheaper large monitors.

The most probable outcome is, that Royal Navy would be forced to abandon blockade, instead concentrating on sea denial strategy - i.e. by positioning squadrons of sea-capable ironclads in Canada and in Confederacy ports, to block any Union naval advance against such regions. They lose initative, of course - but it's best than lose ironclads in unspecified numbers. The disadvantage, of course, would be that Union would be able to concentrate the forces - and also that the Union raiders would be able to exit and enter Union ports unopposed. But it seems to be more viable strategy, than risking destruction of Royal Navy battleline piece by piece in prolonged war of attrition!

 

[TFSmith121]

Let's do a little more calculations: how many ships the RN would need to mantain blockade of major North ports and naval bases?

For example, let's take Norfolk and Hampton-Roads. Due to the value of Norfolk and Cheasapeake Bay, and the existence of numerous shipyards nearby, we could assume that this region would be heavily protected with Union mobile forces - and the existence of Cheaspeake-Delaware channel also.

So, if blockade squadrons were recalled, it would means that both "New Ironsides" and "Roanoke" (and, probably, "Keokuk") would stand here, aided with "Minesotta" and "Wabash" and at least twenty or more both screw and sidewheel gunboats.

To block such force, the Royal Navy, of course, would be forced to send no less than two ironclads just to have similar numbers. To have some superiority, they would need to send three.

But would three ironclads suffice? Let's assume that Union forces sortie, clash with RN ironclads, make serious damage to one, and escape back. Both Union ironclads would, probably, be damaged also, but they have their shipyards nearby. But the closest British shipyard is about 700 nm away from Hampton-Roads. Which means, that it would took almost a week for RN ironclad just to came here. And, with all respect to the British engineers, but naval bases on Bermuda and in Halifax just could not have the same capabilities as Union mainland shipyards.

So, it would took much longer to repair RN damaged ironclad, than Union. Which means, that RN must have more ships in blockade. Say, four ironclads vs two Union's.

The problem is, that this number is exactly two-thirds of all avaliable RN ironclads in 1863. And all those ships are used to blockade one single points.

Now, let's assume that in 1864 the Union would have two "italians" in New York and "Onondaga" also here... Which would means that the Royal Navy would be forced to send at least six ironclads to watch over New York and still have at least four to block Hampton-Roads.

And Royal Navy simply haven't got as many ironclads. They only have 11 ironclads in 1864, of which two are small ironclad sloops and one - coastal unit, unfit for long ocean campaing. So, they basically have only nine ironclads.

In late 1864, the Royal Navy would also be forced to deal with "Dictator" in New York, "Agameticus" and "Monadnock" in Boston (not counting coastal units), which would require sixteen ironclads to blockade them. They obviously haven't got that kind of sea power. Even in early 1865, the number of comissioned Royal Navy ironclads was barely 14 (counting the coastal and small units).

The Union bases gave the smaller Union Navy large advantage - which, basically, made close blockade for Royal Navy... impractical. Just the ability to repair ships fast and close to their combat field, would basically double the combat value of Union ironclads. And must also point out; to sucsessfully blockade Union bases without their own bases nearby, the Royal Navy would be forced to use large, sea-capable ironclads - while the Union could suffice with much cheaper large monitors.

The most probable outcome is, that Royal Navy would be forced to abandon blockade, instead concentrating on sea denial strategy - i.e. by positioning squadrons of sea-capable ironclads in Canada and in Confederacy ports, to block any Union naval advance against such regions. They lose initative, of course - but it's best than lose ironclads in unspecified numbers. The disadvantage, of course, would be that Union would be able to concentrate the forces - and also that the Union raiders would be able to exit and enter Union ports unopposed. But it seems to be more viable strategy, than risking destruction of Royal Navy battleline piece by piece in prolonged war of attrition!

Yep. There's a reason every planner from Corbett to Mahan recommended concentration of the (respective) fleets in the event of hostilities; otherwise, the detachments were vulnerable to defeat in detail.

The British, of course, followed exactly that doctrine against Germany after they gave up on close blockade; if (through whatever "alternative" vagaries of the Alliance system one can imagine) they found themselves facing a Franco-German alliance, it means twice as many ships, half facing the French in the Channel and/or Biscay coast and half facing the Germans across the North Sea... And the British have to think long and hard about what they can leave in the Med to face the French there... Who, in turn, have to consider the Italians and Austrians and Turks (depending on who THEY all ally with, or if they even still exist as independent actors, in a truly alternate world...

If through some other butterfly the Russians aligned as well, the Baltic fleet reinforces the Germans, and the numbers climb higher...

The British could face practically all of Europe in a period of wooden hulled sailing vessels, albeit at significant cost; when steam came along, however, it got much more expensive.

Include transoceanic conflicts or threats, and the strategic situation looks more like 1940-41 for thecBritish than anything else ...

Best,

 

[Dilandu]

I think, I would move the ironclads & blockade posts in separate topic.

 

[TFSmith121]

I think, I would move the ironclads & blockade posts in separate topic.

Naw, this one is fine. It's actually on point, since the question is what would the impact of the Russian squadrons be on the strategic decision making in the 1860s of all sides, and the answer is the overseas squadrons and the Russian "home" squadrons would have differing impacts...

But impact they would certainly have.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

Let's not forget, up to the 1865 the Britain have (in terms of ironclads):

* Warrior (1861)
* Black Prince (1862)
* Defence (1861)
* Resistance (1862)
* Royal Oak (1863)
* Hector (1864)
* Achilles (1864)
* Prince Consort (1864)
* Researhc (1864, small)
* Enterprize (1864, small)
* Royal Sovereign (1864, coastal)
* Caledonia (1865)
* Scorpion (1865, coastal)
* Wyvern (1865, coastal)

Assuming that the British would boost the production, we could also consider possible to comission some additional ironclads in late 1865; "Ocean", "Lord Clyde", "Lord Warden", "Pallas", "Zealous" & "Bellerophon".

Shall we correct this list? Assuming early 1865:

Warrior
Black Prince
Defence
Resistance
Hector
Valiant * (in first class reserve)
Achilles
Minotaur * (in first class reserve)
Royal Oak
Prince Consort
Caledonia
Ocean * (been in first class reserve since 1864)
Research
Enterprize
Favorite* (first class reserve in early 1865)
Zealous * (first class reserve)

Royal Alfred and Lord Clyde are fitting out in early 1865

Royal Sovereign
Prince Albert
Scorpion
Wivern
Thunder
Aetna
Erebus
Thunderbolt
Terror

I think the issue is that you are assuming a different definition of "Commissioned". Vessels could (and did) go straight into reserve. The RN thus had a bunch of ready vessels that were not Commissioned, whereas Russia, for example, Commissioned vessels during the building process, and thus has a bunch of Commissioned ships not capable of rendering service.

What could the Union Navy provide in terms of at least partially sea-capable ironclads? Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865:

* New Ironsides (1862)
* Galena (1862, small)
* Keokuk (1862, small)
* Roanok (1863)
* Onondaga (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.1 from Webb) (1864)
* (Italian ironclad No.2 from Webb) (1864)
* Dictator (1864)
* Agamenticus (1864)
* Monadnock (1864)
* Miantonomoh (1865)
* Tonawanda (1865)

Galena had been stripped of her armour and converted to an unarmoured wooden cruiser. Keokuk was sunk. New Ironsides of course burnt in late 1865. Onondaga was designed as a coastal monitor, and when transported to France they used her as a harbour defence ship - she is no more seaworthy than a Passaic.

The 5 large monitors could not fight in a seaway. They could be transferred between ports if significant additions were made (breakwater built forward, turret caulked etc.), best with a tow. Dictator was designed for a large coal bunker (1,000 tons), but the others weren't, and only had a steaming range of 750-800 nm (one way).

The two Webb frigates were taken off their builders hands in autumn 1864 still unplated. The Italian government was sick of Webbs ineptitude and sent them to La Seyne to be completed, which included a complete rebuild of the engines because they didn't work. Similarly the French took the Dunderburg off Webbs hands and found that she was useless.

The Stevens Battery is still in frame in 1865, and would be several years from completion if restarted, and would be essentially like the Atlanta in her then design.

Puritan was essentially abandoned in 1865, and was very far from complete.

New Ironsides was a floating battery, and barely capable of steering.

The sum total of US ironclads that can challenge an RN warship on the open seas in 1865 is zero. Now for harbour defence of course the issue is different, with 8 remaining Passaics and 4 Canonicus available giving a total of 18 effective monitors for that duty by the end of 1865.

I worry about the fact you included the like of Keokuk in a list of 1865 US ironclads.....

 

[Dilandu]

I really worry about the apparent inability of 67th Tiger to notice/understood simple &obvious phrases:

"Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865"

 

[67th Tigers]

I really worry about the apparent inability of 67th Tiger to notice/understood simple &obvious phrases:

"Assuming no losses in ironclads during 1863-1865"

The US was in a war, and lost ships, because during a war you send ships in harms way. Hell, merely going to sea entails some risk.

If they were not in a war they wouldn't have built the ironclads at all.

Essentially you're dealing with a fantasy where you magic Keokuk etc. back into existence.

 

[Dilandu]

Essentially, I'm calculating. Since the exact divergence point was never stated, I have any rights to put it prior to "Keokuk" sinking. Or after. What I'm trying to show is the number of iron lads COMISSIONED - not handwaved, as you constantly do with Royal Navy, by just claiming that "they actually have more, honestly" without any proofs.

Please don't bother me anymore with this mess of unconfirmed data. As long as you couldn't provide proofs, all this is nothing more than highly dubious claims.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Quod erat demonstrandum? War gaming is most unlikely to work.

Yeah, not like the amazing progress we're making here.

 

[67th Tigers]

The word "Commissioned" means different things in different navies.

In the RN a ship was Commissioned when it joined a station or squadron on active duty, and decommissioned thereafter. Hence ships went in and out of Commission constantly, they swap between "In Commission" and "In Ordinary".

With steam engines an additional category arose. Since steam engines need constant maintenance steamers went in "Steam Reserve" instead, and always had at least a skeleton maintenance crew. The steam reserve was divided into several categories:

First class steam reserve - ships are ready for sea at less than 24 hrs notice, lacking only a full crew and their powder stores.
Second class steam reserve - seaworthy ships requiring a crew, powder and general stores or coal. Normally reckoned at upto a week to place into full Commission
Third class steam reserve - ships which are not ready for rapid Commissioning due to required work, some of these will be available at a few weeks notice and some may need three months before Commissioning.

Take the case of HMS Orlando, a very large frigate. She entered first class steam reserve in early 1859, and had been fully stored and ready for sea for over two years with a skeleton maintenance crew to keep her ready. In December 1861 she was ordered into Commission for North America and was assigned a ships company and was making steam for the American coast the next day.

The same is true for many RN ironclads. They were not needed at sea and so were kept in reserve, but fully maintained and stored. Many of these "uncommissioned" vessels could be taking to sea in anger within a few days of the Admiralty deciding so.

In Russian and United States practice the meanings were different. In Russia a ship was "commissioned" if a captain and revisor (essentially the ships political officer or commissar) had been assigned to him, irrespective of the state of the vessel. Since captains were assigned well before vessels were complete, and remained with the vessel when there were out of service until they were condemned and put fully out of service.

As pay for the crew (including the captain) was linked to the state of the ship there was a strong incentive to lie about the state of the ship so not as to lose pay. The revisor of course was meant to be the accountant of public funds, but in practice he was easily bribed. The crews of course were almost entirely made up of Greeks and Polish Jews, and had little love of Russia and only did it for the money, but this started to change in the period in question and actual Russians started taking up posts in the fleet around the mid-19th century (perhaps as many of a third of the Tsars Navy were Russians by the 1860's).

Thus when you compare navies this must be borne in mind. We have an unusual amount of information for 1863 and we know the Russian Navy had 14 seaworthy cruisers in the summer of that year. Twelve of these were sent to the US (where the Novik was promptly wrecked), and the other two were in Greek waters.

 

[67th Tigers]

Galena could have been useful as a raider, or a semi-prototype for "chainclad" conversions of the screw steam frigates, sloops, and large gunboats for coast defense duty, as opposed to the total conversion of Roanoke.

"Chainclads" in a nonsense.

It derives from the USS Kearsarge. The design of the Kearsarge was very bad in that she had a vertical boiler above the waterline (RN screw ships of the time put a horizontal boiler below the waterline). Obviously one shot amidships that penetrated the boiler would instantly put the whole ship out of action as scalding hot steam filled the entire internal volume.

To give some degree of protection the captain of the Kearsarge draped his anchor chains over the second that the boiler was in to provide some additional protection. This didn't stop Alabama's shells.

 

[Dilandu]

In Russian and United States practice the meanings were different. In Russia a ship was "commissioned" if a captain and revisor (essentially the ships political officer or commissar)

That's enough. I'm not sure about the US navy, but you obviously didn't knew ANYTHING about Russian Navy.

The "revisor" is NOT a "ships political officer or commissar"! The "revisor" means "auditor"! On Russian ships - and only on 1-st and 2-nd rank ships - this men was basically the ships secretary, purser and supply&maintenance officer.

The crews of course were almost entirely made up of Greeks and Polish Jews, and had little love of Russia and only did it for the money, but this started to change in the period in question and actual Russians started taking up posts in the fleet around the mid-19th century (perhaps as many of a third of the Tsars Navy were Russians by the 1860's).

This is absolutely fiction. I couldn't understood, from where you could just take this nonsense - especially considering that the seamans in Russian Empire were recruits (or, later, conscripts).

Now, I knew perfectly, that all your knowlege worth nothing. Thanks for final clarification.