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- Feb 20, 2005
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Ever watched a puppy chase its tail?
Your response suggests that you are inconsistent. Since then we've had your admission that your overlooking Rosecrans's persistent efforts to have his commission backdated was an example of shoddy research.
Perhaps that is why you want me to block you. You find the criticism of your work painful. What would a courageous historian do?
You are, of course, entitled to your opinion.Well, Rosecrans' request to have his Commission backdated is a very minor point, and doesn't particularly alter things. There's an unfortunate trend amongst some to try and pick a minor fault and then declare the entire work wrong. This is a formal logical fallacy: the Fallacy of Composition.
So, DM didn't mention a letter to Lincoln in his book, but this doesn't materially alter his arguments as far as I can see.
Wasn't it you who was recently curious about opium eating by Rosecrans?
As you know, when Grant was offered command of the brand-new Military Division of the Mississippi, he was given the choice to retain William S. Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland or to replace him with George H. Thomas. What would you have done, and why? Was it fair to replace Rosecrans after all he had done?
"Politcal leaders
Love seeing you on here Dave. For those interested, in Volume III of Dave's Trilogy, he wrote a great appendix on this. It is well worth reading for everyone.While in his memoirs Grant claimed that he made the final decision, I think there is strong evidence that Rosecrans's fate was already determined by Stanton.
Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton met with Stanton at the depot in Indianapolis, before Grant's train arrived. Morton would later claim that Stanton told him that Rosecrans was being replaced because Rosecrans had lost the will to fight. Stanton based this conclusion (very erroneously, or perhaps maliciously, on a telegram Rosecrans sent to Lincoln on about October 3rd, proposing a truce and amnesty offer to CSA soldiers.)
Stanton told Morton that Rosecrans had suggested a general amnesty and truce, further suggesting that Rosecrans thought the war was unwinnable. That is of course not at all the content of the original telegram, but rather Stanton's "spin" on the matter.
In short, I suspect that Grant received those two orders as a way for the government to have political cover, but in reality, Grant only had one real choice. Stanton was unlikely to be satisfied with Rosecrans's retention.
Morton's story appeared in an Indianapolis newspaper in the 1870s. Lamers cites it as well.
Dave Powell has put forth the argument that the decision may have already been all but made by the time that Grant met with Stanton, but that is a more complex discussion.Grant releived Rosecrans before he arrived. He met Stanton on the train while travelling across the midwest. Stanton offered him two orders -- one kept Rosecrans; one replaced him with Thomas. Grant picked the second one before he had communicated with either general. This is how Grant described it in his memoirs:
"Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the "Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in the south-west. One order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter."
Thomas was an excellent defensive minded general, but was hesitant on occasion to attack. Thomas was easily a better choice than Rosecrans for the command.What ever you may say about Grant,he was a fighter and Rosecrans running from the field to not fit Grants mold.easy Rosecrans ran,Thomnas fought.no brainer here.
I disagree. Armies led by George Thomas broke through Confederate lines at Chattanooga and Nashville. He was careful. And George Thomas seems to have been right.Thomas was an excellent defensive minded general, but was hesitant on occasion to attack. Thomas was easily a better choice than Rosecrans for the command.
1864 - Nashville, proves my point. Grant had literally begged Thomas to attack Hood's weaker army. Grant was actually in the process of relieving Thomas when Thomas finally attacked Hood. Grant certainly believed that Thomas was hesitant to attack.I disagree. Armies led by George Thomas broke through Confederate lines at Chattanooga and Nashville. He was careful. And George Thomas seems to have been right.
But Grant was wrong about Nashville. The commander on the scene has to be given the benefit of the doubt. Grant did not do that with Thomas at Nashville because Grant was obsessively worried about Sherman. General Thomas won the two battle. Sherman's force contacted the US navy. And Grant forgot about his worries. In the end I think Thomas was tired of all the troubles and took the post in San Francisco which was probably considered a desk job in that era.1864 - Nashville, proves my point. Grant had literally begged Thomas to attack Hood's weaker army. Grant was actually in the process of relieving Thomas when Thomas finally attacked Hood. Grant certainly believed that Thomas was hesitant to attack.
Thomas won two battles? Or do you mean a two day battle?But Grant was wrong about Nashville. The commander on the scene has to be given the benefit of the doubt. Grant did not do that with Thomas at Nashville because Grant was obsessively worried about Sherman. General Thomas won the two battle. Sherman's force contacted the US navy. And Grant forgot about his worries. In the end I think Thomas was tired of all the troubles and took the post in San Francisco which was probably considered a desk job in that era.
Here again, wausaubob, YOU may be right. Grant, however, thought he had given the commander on the scene ample resources and opportunities and time to act, and had Thomas' replacement enroute when Thomas finally attacked. I'll agree with Grant and disagree with you this time (although I truly respect your opinions on this and other issues).But Grant was wrong about Nashville. The commander on the scene has to be given the benefit of the doubt. Grant did not do that with Thomas at Nashville because Grant was obsessively worried about Sherman. General Thomas won the two battle. Sherman's force contacted the US navy. And Grant forgot about his worries. In the end I think Thomas was tired of all the troubles and took the post in San Francisco which was probably considered a desk job in that era.
Grant was able to relieve John McClernand and then Grant finished the Vicksburg operation successfully. By October 1863 Grant knew the old army game as Halleck had taught him. And Grant had his Major General of Regulars rank. Even Rosecrans had to know what was going to happen.I'm late to this thread, but regarding the idea that Stanton had already predetermined replacing Rosecrans ... is there any doubt that Grant would have replaced Rosecrans if Stanton wasn't pushing that outcome?
Grant already had a sneaking suspicion that Rosecrans was talking smack behind his back. While it's not true that Rosecrans' criticisms made their way into the press, he certainly did nothing to squelch any ill will towards Grant festering in the Army of the Mississippi and his later testimony to congress evinced his toxic attitude towards Grant's decision at Iuka without admitting an iota of fault of his own.
Grant was building a circle of trust, and "doesn't play well with others" was a speedy way to get excluded from that circle of trust (see: Charles Hamilton in early 1863).
Two day battle. Elder moment. Sorry.Thomas won two battles? Or do you mean a two day battle?
I think that although Thomas obviously handled Nashville just fine, that still Grant's concerns were legitimate about whether Thomas was being aggressive enough. Grant didn't feel the need to prod every general.