I think defeating that confederate army would have been considered the true prize.They were called in by Rosecrans to take part in the defense of Chattanooga..
Chattanooga was the prize not the battlefield.
I think defeating that confederate army would have been considered the true prize.They were called in by Rosecrans to take part in the defense of Chattanooga..
Chattanooga was the prize not the battlefield.
And yet the specific question was about Grangers opinion of of the removal of Rosecrans. But yet again you feel the need to change the subject to an attack on Grant, Sherman, and Dana.Granger did in 1864. Referring to the fact that it was Granger's troops that swept the rebels off missionary Ridge he wrote:
this made poor Sherman and the miserable satellites which surround him and Grant including that loathsome pimp Dana fearful, jealous and nothing would satisfy them except my destruction which they have accomplished as you are aware. Baldy Smith was also in the clique and did his best to ruin me-- he is a bad man, a hypocrite beware of him.
Nothing in this about Rosecrans being disgraced etc. A lot about collusion and jealousy among officers.
By that do you mean destroying it?I think defeating that confederate army would have been considered the true prize.
Don't know. You have any thoughts and citations?So Rosecrans and at least some of the AOC "leaders", who I assume to be corps/division commanders, disagreed that the "enemy" would have retired from Chickamauga had the Union army remained on the field.
I meant what I said... "Defeating."By that do you mean destroying it?
When did that happen in the war?
I think defeating that Confederate army would have been considered the true prize.
I have tried to look at Rosecrans objectively over the years, and I always come to the same conclusion. I don't fault him for the defeat at Chickamauga, the opening that occurred (at the worst possible place and moment) could have potentially happened to any commander. Where he dropped the ball in my opinion is how he reacted. Taking off and leaving the field, for any reason that can be argued in favor or against, just looks BAD. It was the aftermath, being holed up in Chattanooga, with supplies running low, food scarce, and he seemed frozen. ("Like a duck hit on the head") Lincoln summed it up best. If he IS stunned, frozen in place, do you want to retain him in said command?
I meant what I said... "Defeating."
I meant what I said... "Defeating."
I think your opinions are based on conclusions that were written before recent research has been published. The chewing out story involving Wood has been been questioned by recent scholars like David Powell and Glenn Robertson. Take a look at more recent research. Cozzens' documentation is weak on that incident.We can run over and over but Rosecrans failed at the battle... his order to move Wood regiment would have been ignore but in the past Rosecrams had chew Wood butt for not following orders. Even thou he and officers know the order was missed guided Wood followed it bringing ruin to the Army and Rosecrans. I have not found the other times Rosecrans chewed Wood butt but they came back to huant them both.
Based on his letters, it seems to me it was the other way around -- Opdycke influenced Dana... Opdycke seems to have been greatly influenced by Charles Dana. ...
Does a letter from Dana saying Rosecrans was about to retreat from Chattanooga exist?
My gg-grandfather was at Chickamauga which has led me to read a lot about the battle and the subsequent battle of Chattanooga/Missionary. He was a member of the Pioneer Brigade, A of C. I recently read a study of the related campaigns beginning with Stones River. I think Rosecrans is a general worthy of praise for many decisions, but I think he fell victim to his propensity to overwork/worry which led him to undue fatigue. Consequently his judgement was clouded. He simply was a victim of input overload and probably mental exhaustion characterized by the Lincoln comment. Sherman suffered the same malady in Kentucky earlier in the war. Imagine the mental stress of command. I believe Thomas was the right choice.
Based on his letters, it seems to me it was the other way around -- Opdycke influenced Dana
October 16th: "Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. "
October 18th: "If the effort which Rosecrans intends to make to open the river should be futile, the immediate retreat of this army will follow"
Both of the above can be found in the Official Records.
In his Recollections of the Civil War, Dana wrote that on the 19th (the day after writing about the potential for "immediate retreat") he wrote that he sent another message warning that Rosecrans was about to retreat.
The evidence is that this message existed.
The author of the message said he wrote and sent it; someone at the other end says he read it.The message doesn't exist but you choose to believe it exists.
I claim it never existed because no one has ever seen it.The author of the message said he wrote and sent it; someone at the other end says he read it.
Yet you claim it never existed just because it upsets you.
Clearly the person who read it claimed to have seen it. That's how reading works.I claim it never existed because no one has ever seen it.