Grant plus rosecrans

[cleb]

I don't think anyone has really addressed that the north probably could have ended the war before late fall of 1863 around October or November. If Grant had somehow convinced Lincoln and the Washington authorities to promote him sooner and not break up his army of some 80k and or had attempted his own campaign whether to reinforce and come with Sherman and attack Johnston and advance all the way to meridian and beyond. Or had taken the river route all the way to Memphis or Columbus and had taken the rail route to Nashville and Murfreesboro he could have assumed command of the united forces of the army of the Cumberland and the army of the Mississippi at peak strength. He could have told Banks and Schofield to guard Vicksburg and port Hudson and the rest of the Mississippi. He would have had some force of 140K to do some kind of super Tullahoma all the way to atlanta while keeping rosecrans subordinate to him and bringing Bragg to battle somewhere in Tennessee or Northern Georgia. Bragg upon hearing reports of Grant and Rosecrans combination would likely retreat to Atlanta or more likely make a mistake that would expose the army of Tennessee to Destruction. And even if somehow Seddon and the Richmond authorities somehow realized the threat and reinforced Bragg with Longstreets 15k and Johnstons 25k and maybe throw in some spare Brigades. That still would only be some 90k for the next late summer campaign. And grant would already seize the initiative. Any thoughts

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't think anyone has really addressed that the north probably could have ended the war before late fall of 1863 around October or November. If Grant had somehow convinced Lincoln and the Washington authorities to promote him sooner and not break up his army of some 80k and or had attempted his own campaign whether to reinforce and come with Sherman and attack Johnston and advance all the way to meridian and beyond. Or had taken the river route all the way to Memphis or Columbus and had taken the rail route to Nashville and Murfreesboro he could have assumed command of the united forces of the army of the Cumberland and the army of the Mississippi at peak strength. He could have told Banks and Schofield to guard Vicksburg and port Hudson and the rest of the Mississippi. He would have had some force of 140K to do some kind of super Tullahoma all the way to atlanta while keeping rosecrans subordinate to him and bringing Bragg to battle somewhere in Tennessee or Northern Georgia. Bragg upon hearing reports of Grant and Rosecrans combination would likely retreat to Atlanta or more likely make a mistake that would expose the army of Tennessee to Destruction. And even if somehow Seddon and the Richmond authorities somehow realized the threat and reinforced Bragg with Longstreets 15k and Johnstons 25k and maybe throw in some spare Brigades. That still would only be some 90k for the next late summer campaign. And grant would already seize the initiative. Any thoughts

I don't think this would have worked without some logistical magic. Confederate cavalry in Mississippi after the fall of Vicksburg enjoyed an overwhelming superiority. Sherman struggled just to protect his line of supply 45 miles to Jackson.

 

[Rhea Cole]

There was a real world Grant & Rosecrans at Iuka & Corinth. Rees Rand was the perfect person to stand up the Army & Department of the Cumberland. Grant was the perfect General to stand up the Army of the Tennessee & Mississippi riverine forces.

When the two armies united for the Atlanta / March to the Sea / Carolinas Campaigns Sherman was the perfect General to command it.

Why argue with success?

 

[Piedone]

Why argue with success?

Because real life isn't perfect…

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I think the proposed time frame is wildly ambitious. The Chickamauga Campaign was going to be underway before there was any substantial move of Grant's army, which means unless Grant rushed reinforcements to Rosecrans we are getting the Battle of Chickamauga and the Siege of Chattanooga. After the delayed launch of the Tullahoma Campaign, Lincoln and Staunton wouldn't want Rosecrans to get reinforced.

Two of Grant's corps, Steele and Parke, were borrowed from other departments (Arkansas and Ohio).

A move from Vicksburg to Meridian simultaneous to Rosecrans flanking Chattanooga and Burnside's move on Knoxville would probably have been a good idea, but I don't know that anyone had seriously considered it in summer 1863. It's also one thing to conduct a raid with two corps as Sherman later did versus an army-size move aimed not only at Meridian, but also Selma, Montgomery, and Columbus. If the navy can't control the Chattahoochee all the way to Columbus then the army is in serious logistical difficulty.

Speaking of logistics: it's one thing to launch an army group offensive in northern Georgia in the spring after five months of planning and logistical preparations. It's quite another to do so with a month or two of preparations as the leaves fall. Among other things, the Union had to rebuild the railroad bridge over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport to even begin stockpiling supplies at Chattanooga. And the rest of the line back to Nashville had to be sufficiently defended against raids by Forrest or Wheeler.

Regardless, the war isn't ending in a Union victory while Lee is still holding the Rappahannock. By June 1863, I don't think it was possible for the Union to win before 1864 unless Lee's army is captured at Falling Waters and Rosecrans wins a smashing victory at Chickamauga, leaving the Confederacy without any intact field armies.

The best point suggested is the elevation of Grant sooner. The Military Division of the Mississippi was created three months after Vicksburg fell, and Grant became General-in-Chief three months after Chattanooga. Swifter promotion on the former maybe results in swifter action against Forts Morgan and Gaines, before CSS Tennessee is ready and thus puts the Mobile Bay attack on hold for six months. Swifter promotion on the latter might scuttle the Red River Campaign or alter the Olustee Campaign, and generally allows more time to better plan an "attack on all points" strategy for May 1864.

P.S. I think I started a thread within the last couple years, which I cannot find now, questioning the apparently idleness after Vicksburg. One or more replies pointed out how many of his forces were used in late 1863, and were not idle.