Replacing Rosecrans with Thomas: October 1863

Should Grant have removed Rosecrans?

  • Yes

    Votes: 41 85.4%
  • No

    Votes: 7 14.6%

  • Total voters
    48
Thomas won two battles? Or do you mean a two day battle?

I think that although Thomas obviously handled Nashville just fine, that still Grant's concerns were legitimate about whether Thomas was being aggressive enough. Grant didn't feel the need to prod every general.
By December 1865 I think all the US generals were tired of the killing. It may have affected Thomas' readiness to pursue the defeated Confederates. I think it affected Sherman's strategic choice. Still there had to be at least one more big killing to put General Lee's army on the run.
 
I'm late to this thread, but regarding the idea that Stanton had already predetermined replacing Rosecrans ... is there any doubt that Grant would have replaced Rosecrans if Stanton wasn't pushing that outcome?

Grant already had a sneaking suspicion that Rosecrans was talking smack behind his back. While it's not true that Rosecrans' criticisms made their way into the press, he certainly did nothing to squelch any ill will towards Grant festering in the Army of the Mississippi and his later testimony to congress evinced his toxic attitude towards Grant's decision at Iuka without admitting an iota of fault of his own.

Grant was building a circle of trust, and "doesn't play well with others" was a speedy way to get excluded from that circle of trust (see: Charles Hamilton in early 1863).

Charles Hamilton was politicking against McPherson, whose command he wanted, and refused to serve under McClernand during the Vicksburg campaign. Had he accepted the assignment as a McClernand subordinate, Hamilton could potentially have risen to command a division whenever McClernand "hung" himself, but he decided to resign instead. Grant accepted his resignation when it was offered, Why should he have done otherwise?
 
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So far my conclusion is that the administration favored removing Rosecrans. Otherwise, why give Grant that option? And if you give him that option, why restrict the commander he could select to replace him with to Thomas? Simple answer, the resulting substitution of Thomas for Rosecrans is exactly what the administration wanted.

As to why not do the substitution himself? That's easy, Lincoln was trying to shield himself from political repercussions. Rosecrans was a known Salmon P. Chase protégé, Chase was a Lincoln adversary, and Rosecrans was a popular Ohioan war hero in the middle of a combustible political situation with Vallandiham creating troubles. Lincoln tread lightly, fearing the political backlash. Thus, he let Grant make that decision (knowing in all likelihood what it would be). In this way, the decision was left to a general who made it based on military necessity, and the political axe fell on someone else — who didn't care for politics at this point in time.

————

Lincoln could have ordered Grant to Chattanooga to fix the situation with whoever was in command. Grant normally worked with what he had, and rarely asked the President for anything. In those cases he did, it was promotions for officers who had earned them and who he trusted — a reasonable request considering the level of discretion and authority Grant had and the kind of tasks he'd be delegating to these subordinates.

Exhibit 1. I present to you the case of Joe Hooker, who Grant distrusted, calling him a "dangerous man." For his own preference, he would have sent Hooker back. In fact one of Hooker's subordinates refused to serve under him, which created problems Grant had to deal with, without being able to remove any of them. Grant worked with a man he distrusted and used the resources he was given.

Exhibit 2. In the list of commanders appointed by Lincoln who had vendettas against Grant, I present to you: Gen. McClernand. This particular political general was the senior-most subordinate to Grant, which created problems for everyone else, specially Sherman, who Grant considered his right hand. Yet, McClernand proceeded to undermine and slander Grant every chance he got and had the President's ear for his vainglorious accounts of his abilities. It's evident he was seeking Grant's removal for his own appointment early on, but when Grant proved a formidable rival he couldn't dislodge, he switched tactics to ask the President for an independent command.

Grant worked with him even after Lincoln created a problematic situation promising McClernand an independent command in an area that was under Grant's control. Lincoln completely undermined Grant here, yet Grant politely managed the "embarrassment" of the situation as best he could. Conducted an entire campaign this way and only relieved McClernand when the general proceeded to "hang himself" violating regulations concerning the press.

Exhibit 3. In spite of his personal preferences, Grant was a subordinate soldier who worked with Lincoln's choices of commanders. In 1864 Grant was compelled to rely on the questionable abilities of Banks, Siegel and especially Butler for key roles in his campaign against Lee. None of these he was free to remove because the President held that power and he had political reasons. Only after the election did Grant remove Butler for justified military reasons. Siegel was removed after his failure in the Shenandoah, with the President's consent. Even then, Grant wasn't free to appoint who he wanted and Gen. Hunter was approved and decided upon by the President. Only after giving full opportunity to the President's choices, and all of them failing did Grant get his protégé promoted in Sheridan.

Lincoln also afterwards rehabilitated and reinstated McClernand and Rosecrans to commands, even though he knew Grant would prefer not to have either as a subordinate.

Anyways, I had to cite these examples because this theory that Grant only worked with his favorites is overdone and simply incorrect. He would have worked with Rosecrans if that was what he was ordered to do, but if given the choice, why would he choose Rosecrans?

Stanton gave Grant a personal briefing that described in detail the situation at Chattanooga, and the battle of Chickamauga as reported by Dana, together with Lincoln's appraisal of the stunned duck hit on the head. In his memoirs Grant recalled learning that Rosecrans had been run off the field with a large portion of his army, while Thomas put up a strong resistance and retreated in an orderly fashion. This was the reason he cited for the removal. It was a justifiable military reason given to him by Stanton. The fact Rosecrans had plotted against him, and he couldn't trust him was probably the icing in that cake, but as shown by the McClernand situation and other examples I cited, mutual dislike wouldn't have been enough to remove him.
 
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This video Civil War - the Chattanooga Campaign has an incredible discussion around minute 1:09:30 about whether or not Rosecrans should have been removed. The historians in that panel are Peter Cozzens, William Glenn Robertson, Brooks D. Simpson, and Wiley Sword.

Since this was a video on Chattanooga I was not expecting the panel to answer questions and give opinions about Rosecrans, nor was I watching it for that purpose. However, it was a very interesting discussion, as they have different perspectives. They also talked about President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton, Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana, Generals Halleck, Garfield, Wood, Thomas, and Grant of course, etc.

The video has interesting discussions about Chattanooga with an emphasis on terrain and the drama of each army's command situation at the battle.
 
Its likely that Edwin Stanton was taking over the Tennessee theater, and his power was increasing at the expense of Salmon Chase. Stanton was an administrator and not a politician. Lincoln probably gave Stanton considerable discretion. Together with Meigs, Stanton replaced not only the division commander, but also moved Robert Allen from St. Louis to Louisville to handle the quartermaster duties.
Railroad improvements that would have benefitted Rosecrans' operation were also completed.
Its notable that the administration wanted to retain General Thomas. He was a notable Virginian, as well as a capable commander. There was an important symbolic message in retaining Thomas, in that the US was fighting the Confederacy, not southerners.
 
Its likely that Edwin Stanton was taking over the Tennessee theater, and his power was increasing at the expense of Salmon Chase. Stanton was an administrator and not a politician. Lincoln probably gave Stanton considerable discretion. Together with Meigs, Stanton replaced not only the division commander, but also moved Robert Allen from St. Louis to Louisville to handle the quartermaster duties.
Railroad improvements that would have benefitted Rosecrans' operation were also completed.
Its notable that the administration wanted to retain General Thomas. He was a notable Virginian, as well as a capable commander. There was an important symbolic message in retaining Thomas, in that the US was fighting the Confederacy, not southerners.
There are several dispatches sent from Dana stating that there was a "fermentation" problem in the AoC. The officers had lost confidence in Rosecrans, while Thomas — the "rock of Chickamauga" — stood higher than ever in their eyes. Some believed only Thomas could get them out of their trouble.

I think both Stanton and Lincoln were worried and favored anything to turn things around. Thomas was a Halleck favorite too. Halleck would have recommended him highly.

In contrast, Rosecrans had antagonized every superior he had and hadn't inspired confidence in the aftermath of his battle. The reports from Dana were damning and Rosecrans wasn't dispelling the image that there was unresolved trouble. There's a dispatch IIRC where he states our fate is in the hands of God - things of that nature.
 
Here again, wausaubob, YOU may be right. Grant, however, thought he had given the commander on the scene ample resources and opportunities and time to act, and had Thomas' replacement enroute when Thomas finally attacked. I'll agree with Grant and disagree with you this time (although I truly respect your opinions on this and other issues).
I'm also not exactly clear on how much Grant was seriously worried, and how much he was responding to Lincoln and Stanton's demands for battle now. He was certainly getting a lot of pressure from them to do something to prod Thomas into action.
 
So far my conclusion is that the administration favored removing Rosecrans. Otherwise, why give Grant that option? And if you give him that option, why restrict the commander he could select to replace him with to Thomas? Simple answer, the resulting substitution of Thomas for Rosecrans is exactly what the administration wanted.

As to why not do the substitution himself? That's easy, Lincoln was trying to shield himself from political repercussions. Rosecrans was a known Salmon P. Chase protégé, Chase was a Lincoln adversary, and Rosecrans was a popular Ohioan war hero in the middle of a combustible political situation with Vallandiham creating troubles. Lincoln tread lightly, fearing the political backlash. Thus, he let Grant make that decision (knowing in all likelihood what it would be). In this way, the decision was left to a general who made it based on military necessity, and the political axe fell on someone else — who didn't care for politics at this point in time.

————

Lincoln could have ordered Grant to Chattanooga to fix the situation with whoever was in command. Grant normally worked with what he had, and rarely asked the President for anything. In those cases he did, it was promotions for officers who had earned them and who he trusted — a reasonable request considering the level of discretion and authority Grant had and the kind of tasks he'd be delegating to these subordinates.

Exhibit 1. I present to you the case of Joe Hooker, who Grant distrusted, calling him a "dangerous man." For his own preference, he would have sent Hooker back. In fact one of Hooker's subordinates refused to serve under him, which created problems Grant had to deal with, without being able to remove any of them. Grant worked with a man he distrusted and used the resources he was given.

Exhibit 2. In the list of commanders appointed by Lincoln who had vendettas against Grant, I present to you: Gen. McClernand. This particular political general was the senior-most subordinate to Grant, which created problems for everyone else, specially Sherman, who Grant considered his right hand. Yet, McClernand proceeded to undermine and slander Grant every chance he got and had the President's ear for his vainglorious accounts of his abilities. It's evident he was seeking Grant's removal for his own appointment early on, but when Grant proved a formidable rival he couldn't dislodge, he switched tactics to ask the President for an independent command.

Grant worked with him even after Lincoln created a problematic situation promising McClernand an independent command in an area that was under Grant's control. Lincoln completely undermined Grant here, yet Grant politely managed the "embarrassment" of the situation as best he could. Conducted an entire campaign this way and only relieved McClernand when the general proceeded to "hang himself" violating regulations concerning the press.

Exhibit 3. In spite of his personal preferences, Grant was a subordinate soldier who worked with Lincoln's choices of commanders. In 1864 Grant was compelled to rely on the questionable abilities of Banks, Siegel and especially Butler for key roles in his campaign against Lee. None of these he was free to remove because the President held that power and he had political reasons. Only after the election did Grant remove Butler for justified military reasons. Siegel was removed after his failure in the Shenandoah, with the President's consent. Even then, Grant wasn't free to appoint who he wanted and Gen. Hunter was approved and decided upon by the President. Only after giving full opportunity to the President's choices, and all of them failing did Grant get his protégé promoted in Sheridan.

Lincoln also afterwards rehabilitated and reinstated McClernand and Rosecrans to commands, even though he knew Grant would prefer not to have either as a subordinate.

Anyways, I had to cite these examples because this theory that Grant only worked with his favorites is overdone and simply incorrect. He would have worked with Rosecrans if that was what he was ordered to do, but if given the choice, why would he choose Rosecrans?

Stanton gave Grant a personal briefing that described in detail the situation at Chattanooga, and the battle of Chickamauga as reported by Dana, together with Lincoln's appraisal of the stunned duck hit on the head. In his memoirs Grant recalled learning that Rosecrans had been run off the field with a large portion of his army, while Thomas put up a strong resistance and retreated in an orderly fashion. This was the reason he cited for the removal. It was a justifiable military reason given to him by Stanton. The fact Rosecrans had plotted against him, and he couldn't trust him was probably the icing in that cake, but as shown by the McClernand situation and other examples I cited, mutual dislike wouldn't have been enough to remove him.
Really excellent analysis.

I completely agree that Grant was given the choice on whether to remove Rosecrans, but was also given the thoughts of the administration. Grant was savy enough to get the message, and the fact that it probably coincided with his preference anyway, it made the decision a no-brainer. Rosy had to go.
 
I'm also not exactly clear on how much Grant was seriously worried, and how much he was responding to Lincoln and Stanton's demands for battle now. He was certainly getting a lot of pressure from them to do something to prod Thomas into action.
Also, all those dispatches from Lincoln worried about Burnside.

We have hindsight in knowing how this gets resolved. In real time, it was a crisis for Washington.

Grant wrote that the best way he had to relieve Burnside was to attack Bragg where he was and hope he recalled Longstreet.
 
Charles Hamilton was politicking against McPherson, whose command he wanted, and refused to serve under McClernand during the Vicksburg campaign. Had he accepted the assignment as a McClernand subordinate, Hamilton could potentially have risen to command a division whenever McClernand "hung" himself, but he decided to resign instead. Grant accepted his resignation when it was offered, Why should he have done otherwise?
Not just McPherson, but McPherson and Hurlbut, both of whom had been appointed corps commander by way of Lincoln's orders.

It's unfortunate, because Grant had promised him that he would eventually call for reinforcements from XVI Corps, to be commanded by himself or Hurlbut as Hurlbut saw fit, and Hurlbut himself knew that he wasn't a battlefield commander.

So if Hamilton had just shut his yap, he would have commanded the southern half of the Vicksburg encirclement.

Grant offered him three options, report for duty under McClernand, swap places with Prentiss in command of southeastern Arkansas, or resign. Hamilton chose to resign, and Grant heartily endorsed the resignation despite having lobbied for Hamilton's promotion earlier.
 
I'm also not exactly clear on how much Grant was seriously worried, and how much he was responding to Lincoln and Stanton's demands for battle now. He was certainly getting a lot of pressure from them to do something to prod Thomas into action.
My memory is that Grant sent John Logan to Nashville. Then perhaps he thought how disrespectful that was towards Thomas, and not the way Grant would want to be relieved under similar circumstances, and resolved to go to Nashville himself. The battle occurred. Thomas was vindicated and Grant reported said: I guess I won't be going to Nashville.
 
Rosecrans had a brilliant mind. But as has been noted elsewhere, his serious injuries probably affected his fitness to be an independent commander. Persistent pain can have that effect. I have empathy for a historical figure with that handicap. Its unfortunate that he could not see his career as succeeding as a competent executive officer.
 

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