The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[Belfoured]

The OR contains two sets of casualty figures, both being 15,xxx.

McClellan's report of August '63 gives 15,249 (1,582 KIA, 7,709 WIA and 5,928 MIA/Captured) suffered 26th June - 1st July (i.e. excluding casualties on the 25th June and 2nd July)

The compiled returns give 15,849 (1,734 KIA, 8,062 WIA and 6,041 WIA/Captured) suffered 25th June - 2nd July.

If memory serves, Tenney took these figures, and added those captured when Sumner abandoned the hospital. However, those men were already counted. On 3rd July, the rebel medical director estimated they had 4,900 captured Federal wounded, including 3,000 taken at Savage's. They were being shipped to Richmond so fast that the next day, half of those estimated to be at Gaine's and Savage's had gone to Richmond.

Those captured at Savage etc. were overwhelmingly injured by gunshot, and are certainly already counted.

On 16th July, Winder reported 7,847 prisoners in Richmond and environs. These include the Seven Days captures, but also some of the captures from Williamsburg, Seven Pines, Jackson's early valley operations etc. who had not yet been exchanged. This doesn't jibe with the idea of 5,000 unreported extra PW's. I generally find the numbers reported by the Federals to be consistent with the number of prisoners the rebels took, and inclusive of the captured hospital etc.

Tenney's research was into the rebel records, and I hope he has some good evidence for his claim of increased Federal casualties, which he has added post-facto, and isn't in his original MA thesis. In all probability, it's a double count.

Only Carnac the Magnificent can evaluate a book without reading it. Even though you've never actually accessed it, you conclude "n all probability it's a double count".

At the outset, by the way, and as I indicated, Tenney's conclusion (and he makes clear that it's'an estimate) is that the uncounted Union MIA is approximately 4,000, not "5,000".

Let's start with the fact that Tenney's work regarding the respective strengths of the two armies in his 1992 master's thesis earned him a degree and subsequent citation by the likes of Joseph Harsh. Yet you assume that the same guy who turned out that level of scholarship became too dumb to consider whether he is "double counting". In fact, and not surprisingly, he expressly refers to "double counting" issues in this chapter of his book.

Tenney's research was into the rebel records

In this chapter of his book, however, his primary focus is on Union records, including the morning reports for units that are in the NARA. What he found directly challenges the accuracy of the "6,041 MIA/Captured" in the OR that you're relying on. His conclusion is that most Union army units were using the numbers for "missing" in their morning reports to mean those missing in battle and not necessarily including stragglers during the continuous retreating who also went missing. He located the morning reports of certain units for June 30 and July 10 that recorded "missing" and made a comparison with what is shown in the official "6,041" total. Those units – four brigades and a few individual regiments – show 484 more men "missing" than what shows in their official "MIA" counts. This is because the official count appears to be based on those missing in battle and not those men who went missing as stragglers during the incessant retreating and were captured. A good example is Barlow's 61st NY. The official count shows 20 MIA rank and file. According to Tenney Barlow's morning reports in the NARA show an additional 55 in his "missing" count beyond the 20. In fact, although Tenney relies on the material in the NARA, Barlow's report in the OR specifically states that there were "20 missing on the battlefield" but that "[o]thers fell out on the various marches to and from action, and many of them are doubtless prisoners". OR Vol XI, Part 2 at 69. Tenney points out that 7 men who were missing in the 61st's June 30 report had returned in the July 10 report, reducing the additional "missing" from 62 to 55.

In addition, Tenney looked at several specific units that show "no loss reported" in the official numbers but found primary sources, including reports and other accounts, showing that these units did in fact have losses during the June 25-July 2 time frame, including "missing".

There are plenty of accounts in the OR that show significant straggling by the Union army during these retreats and the capture of significant numbers of stragglers by Confederate units. We know that in war stragglers from a retreating army frequently end up in the wrong hands, while those from an advancing army frequently end up back with their own side. Tenney cites sources from both sides regarding Union stragglers.

In short, we know that the official "MIA" count is wrong.

Regarding those troops captured at the Savage's Station hospital

Those captured at Savage etc. were overwhelmingly injured by gunshot, and are certainly already counted.

First, the reports of two hospital captures by Jackson – Savage's Station and then another, much smaller hospital at White Oak - show that both captures included "sick and wounded". That makes sense because Savage's Station was where those initially in the various field hospitals were sent as the Seven Days began. No doubt a large number captured were wounded and it's reasonable to assume that many of those may have been recorded as WIA but there were likely a substantial number who were "sick". One can find references in reports and accounts that during the Seven Days there were "sick"/"unwell" troops who were in/directed to hospital. Swinburne (who you reference), in the pamphlet containing his report expressly stated that at the Savage's hospital on June 26 – before it began receiving wounded – the number of sick was "increasing rapidly". Whether the "sick" were included in the official MIA is far from clear. They would not have been accounted for by the other two categories. Jackson's report adds that beyond the 2,500 "sick and wounded" there were also "500 persons [at Savage's] having charge of the patients" and – by the way – that as of that day D.H. Hill had collected "probably 1,000 stragglers". OR Vol. XI, Part 2 at 556. The correspondence to and from Lee starting July 3 repeatedly refers to "sick and wounded" in the OR, Series II Vol. IV.

On 16th July, Winder reported 7,847 prisoners in Richmond and environs

We have no idea when Winder's calculation was performed or how it was determined/collected. The date of the document in the OR, Series II, Vol. IV at 821, is July 16 but that doesn't mean that the number was ascertained that morning or even the day before. On July 16 the Richmond Dispatch reported that a large number were brought to Richmond literally the day before, July 15. Moreover, as the Richmond Enquirer reported on July 14, "[c]asual prisoners are brought in every day".

These include the Seven Days captures, but also some of the captures from Williamsburg, Seven Pines, Jackson's early valley operations etc. who had not yet been exchanged.

According to the Richmond Enquirer on May 12, the total number of Union POWs in Richmond on May 11 was 918 and of that number 860 "privates" were paroled and sent off for exchange. (This number closely corresponds to the "886" referred to in the OR, Series II, Vol. III at 553). The Richmond Dispatch further reported on May 15 that "all of the Yankee officers" in Richmond were to be transferred south to Salisbury NC. Regarding Seven Pines, the Richmond Dispatch reported on June 2 that 500 Union troops captured in that battle had arrived as of 5 PM the previous evening. On June 4 the Dispatch reported that "the Yankee prisoners in confinement here were sent South yesterday. About 560 went off." (Once the Union army figured out its casualties the total MIA for Seven Pines was only 647. OR Vol. XI Part 1 at 762). In other words, the evidence is that Richmond was emptied of virtually all of those captured before May 11 and those captured at Seven Pines, either by exchange or by transfer farther south, so those men cannot have been part of Winder's number.

Finally, there is the report by the Richmond Dispatch on July 19 that the total captured in the Seven Days and brought to Richmond by that date was "at least" 8,000, confirmed by the Richmond Enquirer on July 19, which added "[w]hen the returns shall have been complete, it will be found that our estimate some time ago was very nearly the figure, or upwards of nine thousand." We also have Lee's statement in his January 1863 official report of the campaign that "[m]ore than 10,000 prisoners, …, were captured". OR Vol. XI Part 2 at 497-98.

Tenney looked at other sources/methods, as well, but he has clearly undermined the accuracy of the official "MIA/Captured" number for the Federals. He also makes it clear that his "about 4,000" number is an estimate. It is almost certainly impossible to ever come up with a precise figure. Following the Seven Days prisoners were coming in daily from a variety of locations and the authorities in Richmond were scrambling to house all of them, finding and using a variety of locations, moving groups around, etc. Even if the actual increased number turns out to be 2,000 or 3,000, that significantly closes the gap between the accepted Confederate losses and the "official" losses for the Army of the Potomac.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Only Carnac the Magnificent can evaluate a book without reading it. Even though you've never actually accessed it, you conclude "n all probability it's a double count".

At the outset, by the way, and as I indicated, Tenney's conclusion (and he makes clear that it's'an estimate) is that the uncounted Union MIA is approximately 4,000, not "5,000".

Let's start with the fact that Tenney's work regarding the respective strengths of the two armies in his 1992 master's thesis earned him a degree and subsequent citation by the likes of Joseph Harsh. Yet you assume that the same guy who turned out that level of scholarship became too dumb to consider whether he is "double counting". In fact, and not surprisingly, he expressly refers to "double counting" issues in this chapter of his book.



In this chapter of his book, however, his primary focus is on Union records, including the morning reports for units that are in the NARA. What he found directly challenges the accuracy of the "6,041 MIA/Captured" in the OR that you're relying on. His conclusion is that most Union army units were using the numbers for "missing" in their morning reports to mean those missing in battle and not necessarily including stragglers during the continuous retreating who also went missing. He located the morning reports of certain units for June 30 and July 10 that recorded "missing" and made a comparison with what is shown in the official "6,041" total. Those units – four brigades and a few individual regiments – show 484 more men "missing" than what shows in their official "MIA" counts. This is because the official count appears to be based on those missing in battle and not those men who went missing as stragglers during the incessant retreating and were captured. A good example is Barlow's 61st NY. The official count shows 20 MIA rank and file. According to Tenney Barlow's morning reports in the NARA show an additional 55 in his "missing" count beyond the 20. In fact, although Tenney relies on the material in the NARA, Barlow's report in the OR specifically states that there were "20 missing on the battlefield" but that "[o]thers fell out on the various marches to and from action, and many of them are doubtless prisoners". OR Vol XI, Part 2 at 69. Tenney points out that 7 men who were missing in the 61st's June 30 report had returned in the July 10 report, reducing the additional "missing" from 62 to 55.

In addition, Tenney looked at several specific units that show "no loss reported" in the official numbers but found primary sources, including reports and other accounts, showing that these units did in fact have losses during the June 25-July 2 time frame, including "missing".

There are plenty of accounts in the OR that show significant straggling by the Union army during these retreats and the capture of significant numbers of stragglers by Confederate units. We know that in war stragglers from a retreating army frequently end up in the wrong hands, while those from an advancing army frequently end up back with their own side. Tenney cites sources from both sides regarding Union stragglers.

In short, we know that the official "MIA" count is wrong.

Regarding those troops captured at the Savage's Station hospital


First, the reports of two hospital captures by Jackson – Savage's Station and then another, much smaller hospital at White Oak - show that both captures included "sick and wounded". That makes sense because Savage's Station was where those initially in the various field hospitals were sent as the Seven Days began. No doubt a large number captured were wounded and it's reasonable to assume that many of those may have been recorded as WIA but there were likely a substantial number who were "sick". One can find references in reports and accounts that during the Seven Days there were "sick"/"unwell" troops who were in/directed to hospital. Swinburne (who you reference), in the pamphlet containing his report expressly stated that at the Savage's hospital on June 26 – before it began receiving wounded – the number of sick was "increasing rapidly". Whether the "sick" were included in the official MIA is far from clear. They would not have been accounted for by the other two categories. Jackson's report adds that beyond the 2,500 "sick and wounded" there were also "500 persons [at Savage's] having charge of the patients" and – by the way – that as of that day D.H. Hill had collected "probably 1,000 stragglers". OR Vol. XI, Part 2 at 556. The correspondence to and from Lee starting July 3 repeatedly refers to "sick and wounded" in the OR, Series II Vol. IV.



We have no idea when Winder's calculation was performed or how it was determined/collected. The date of the document in the OR, Series II, Vol. IV at 821, is July 16 but that doesn't mean that the number was ascertained that morning or even the day before. On July 16 the Richmond Dispatch reported that a large number were brought to Richmond literally the day before, July 15. Moreover, as the Richmond Enquirer reported on July 14, "[c]asual prisoners are brought in every day".



According to the Richmond Enquirer on May 12, the total number of Union POWs in Richmond on May 11 was 918 and of that number 860 "privates" were paroled and sent off for exchange. (This number closely corresponds to the "886" referred to in the OR, Series II, Vol. III at 553). The Richmond Dispatch further reported on May 15 that "all of the Yankee officers" in Richmond were to be transferred south to Salisbury NC. Regarding Seven Pines, the Richmond Dispatch reported on June 2 that 500 Union troops captured in that battle had arrived as of 5 PM the previous evening. On June 4 the Dispatch reported that "the Yankee prisoners in confinement here were sent South yesterday. About 560 went off." (Once the Union army figured out its casualties the total MIA for Seven Pines was only 647. OR Vol. XI Part 1 at 762). In other words, the evidence is that Richmond was emptied of virtually all of those captured before May 11 and those captured at Seven Pines, either by exchange or by transfer farther south, so those men cannot have been part of Winder's number.

Finally, there is the report by the Richmond Dispatch on July 19 that the total captured in the Seven Days and brought to Richmond by that date was "at least" 8,000, confirmed by the Richmond Enquirer on July 19, which added "[w]hen the returns shall have been complete, it will be found that our estimate some time ago was very nearly the figure, or upwards of nine thousand." We also have Lee's statement in his January 1863 official report of the campaign that "[m]ore than 10,000 prisoners, …, were captured". OR Vol. XI Part 2 at 497-98.

Tenney looked at other sources/methods, as well, but he has clearly undermined the accuracy of the official "MIA/Captured" number for the Federals. He also makes it clear that his "about 4,000" number is an estimate. It is almost certainly impossible to ever come up with a precise figure. Following the Seven Days prisoners were coming in daily from a variety of locations and the authorities in Richmond were scrambling to house all of them, finding and using a variety of locations, moving groups around, etc. Even if the actual increased number turns out to be 2,000 or 3,000, that significantly closes the gap between the accepted Confederate losses and the "official" losses for the Army of the Potomac.

@Belfoured

I am very interested in taking a look at this book.

Could you provide a link to it?

 

[Belfoured]

@Belfoured

I am very interested in taking a look at this book.

Could you provide a link to it?

@Nathan Towne: I doubt that's available. The book was self-published and I bought my copy directly from the author 10 or 11 years ago. I was put in touch with him by somebody I deal with in the CWRT community who knew him and IIRC I did it by mail (maybe also with a phone call) because he didn't like using email. He did a master's thesis on the respective strengths of the two sides during the Seven Days in 1992 while at GMU under the direction of Joseph Harsh but that did not address this issue. I'm unsure whether that thesis can be accessed on-line. Harsh later cited Tenney's thesis and I believe some others have, as well. His research showed that during the Seven Days the ANV slightly outnumbered the Army of the Potomac.

 

[wausaubob]

@Nathan Towne: I doubt that's available. The book was self-published and I bought my copy directly from the author 10 or 11 years ago. I was put in touch with him by somebody I deal with in the CWRT community who knew him and IIRC I did it by mail (maybe also with a phone call) because he didn't like using email. He did a master's thesis on the respective strengths of the two sides during the Seven Days in 1992 while at GMU under the direction of Joseph Harsh but that did not address this issue. I'm unsure whether that thesis can be accessed on-line. Harsh later cited Tenney's thesis and I believe some others have, as well. His research showed that during the Seven Days the ANV slightly outnumbered the Army of the Potomac.

That kind of estimate makes sense, for a Confederate army formed from the population of eastern states. But the people in Washington who knew the difficulties they were having in sustaining the large US army, had to have doubts. The doubts probably related to questions about whether the Confederacy could out mobilize the US, and doubts about how long Richmond and central Virginia could sustain an army of >100,000 men.
The US system of railroads and canals was set up to support four large east coast cities and Washington, D.C. The Confederate rail and river system was not set up to move food, forage and fuel on the same scale, because that was not necessary in the south during peacetime.

 

[67th Tigers]

Only Carnac the Magnificent can evaluate a book without reading it. Even though you've never actually accessed it, you conclude "n all probability it's a double count".

So, from what you've posted, the double count hypothesis is sound.

At the outset, by the way, and as I indicated, Tenney's conclusion (and he makes clear that it's'an estimate) is that the uncounted Union MIA is approximately 4,000, not "5,000".

Let's start with the fact that Tenney's work regarding the respective strengths of the two armies in his 1992 master's thesis earned him a degree and subsequent citation by the likes of Joseph Harsh. Yet you assume that the same guy who turned out that level of scholarship became too dumb to consider whether he is "double counting". In fact, and not surprisingly, he expressly refers to "double counting" issues in this chapter of his book.

Which doesn't mean he wasn't.

In this chapter of his book, however, his primary focus is on Union records, including the morning reports for units that are in the NARA. What he found directly challenges the accuracy of the "6,041 MIA/Captured" in the OR that you're relying on. His conclusion is that most Union army units were using the numbers for "missing" in their morning reports to mean those missing in battle and not necessarily including stragglers during the continuous retreating who also went missing. He located the morning reports of certain units for June 30 and July 10 that recorded "missing" and made a comparison with what is shown in the official "6,041" total. Those units – four brigades and a few individual regiments – show 484 more men "missing" than what shows in their official "MIA" counts. This is because the official count appears to be based on those missing in battle and not those men who went missing as stragglers during the incessant retreating and were captured. A good example is Barlow's 61st NY. The official count shows 20 MIA rank and file. According to Tenney Barlow's morning reports in the NARA show an additional 55 in his "missing" count beyond the 20. In fact, although Tenney relies on the material in the NARA, Barlow's report in the OR specifically states that there were "20 missing on the battlefield" but that "[o]thers fell out on the various marches to and from action, and many of them are doubtless prisoners". OR Vol XI, Part 2 at 69. Tenney points out that 7 men who were missing in the 61st's June 30 report had returned in the July 10 report, reducing the additional "missing" from 62 to 55.

So, he shows in one case (61st NY) that the actual number of MIA is overestimated, because it included a number of stragglers who returned to their unit. Not a good basis for trying to add 4,000 extra, uncounted MIA.

In addition, Tenney looked at several specific units that show "no loss reported" in the official numbers but found primary sources, including reports and other accounts, showing that these units did in fact have losses during the June 25-July 2 time frame, including "missing".

There are plenty of accounts in the OR that show significant straggling by the Union army during these retreats and the capture of significant numbers of stragglers by Confederate units. We know that in war stragglers from a retreating army frequently end up in the wrong hands, while those from an advancing army frequently end up back with their own side. Tenney cites sources from both sides regarding Union stragglers.

In short, we know that the official "MIA" count is wrong.

Yes, it is an overestimate by the presented evidence.

Regarding those troops captured at the Savage's Station hospital


First, the reports of two hospital captures by Jackson – Savage's Station and then another, much smaller hospital at White Oak - show that both captures included "sick and wounded". That makes sense because Savage's Station was where those initially in the various field hospitals were sent as the Seven Days began. No doubt a large number captured were wounded and it's reasonable to assume that many of those may have been recorded as WIA but there were likely a substantial number who were "sick". One can find references in reports and accounts that during the Seven Days there were "sick"/"unwell" troops who were in/directed to hospital. Swinburne (who you reference), in the pamphlet containing his report expressly stated that at the Savage's hospital on June 26 – before it began receiving wounded – the number of sick was "increasing rapidly". Whether the "sick" were included in the official MIA is far from clear. They would not have been accounted for by the other two categories. Jackson's report adds that beyond the 2,500 "sick and wounded" there were also "500 persons [at Savage's] having charge of the patients" and – by the way – that as of that day D.H. Hill had collected "probably 1,000 stragglers". OR Vol. XI, Part 2 at 556. The correspondence to and from Lee starting July 3 repeatedly refers to "sick and wounded" in the OR, Series II Vol. IV.

Indeed, it did include sick. As the Pittsburgh Gazette reported, almost 11% of the Pennsylvania troops captured at Savage's were ill rather than injured. None of those captured at the Gaines hospital were sick; all were wounded. Overall, probably 5-8% of the captured were sick, rather than wounded in action.

We have no idea when Winder's calculation was performed or how it was determined/collected. The date of the document in the OR, Series II, Vol. IV at 821, is July 16 but that doesn't mean that the number was ascertained that morning or even the day before. On July 16 the Richmond Dispatch reported that a large number were brought to Richmond literally the day before, July 15. Moreover, as the Richmond Enquirer reported on July 14, "[c]asual prisoners are brought in every day".



According to the Richmond Enquirer on May 12, the total number of Union POWs in Richmond on May 11 was 918 and of that number 860 "privates" were paroled and sent off for exchange. (This number closely corresponds to the "886" referred to in the OR, Series II, Vol. III at 553). The Richmond Dispatch further reported on May 15 that "all of the Yankee officers" in Richmond were to be transferred south to Salisbury NC. Regarding Seven Pines, the Richmond Dispatch reported on June 2 that 500 Union troops captured in that battle had arrived as of 5 PM the previous evening. On June 4 the Dispatch reported that "the Yankee prisoners in confinement here were sent South yesterday. About 560 went off." (Once the Union army figured out its casualties the total MIA for Seven Pines was only 647. OR Vol. XI Part 1 at 762). In other words, the evidence is that Richmond was emptied of virtually all of those captured before May 11 and those captured at Seven Pines, either by exchange or by transfer farther south, so those men cannot have been part of Winder's number.

Finally, there is the report by the Richmond Dispatch on July 19 that the total captured in the Seven Days and brought to Richmond by that date was "at least" 8,000, confirmed by the Richmond Enquirer on July 19, which added "[w]hen the returns shall have been complete, it will be found that our estimate some time ago was very nearly the figure, or upwards of nine thousand." We also have Lee's statement in his January 1863 official report of the campaign that "[m]ore than 10,000 prisoners, …, were captured". OR Vol. XI Part 2 at 497-98.

The Richmond Dispatch on 8th July complained that Richmond had 5,000 prisoners, and the cost of feeding them was 2,500 dollars per day. The Richmond Enquirer on 11th July gave the number of prisoners at 5,300, with some started to be forwarded to Belle Isle.

The Richmond Dispatch on the 19th reported that a little less than 5,000 prisoners had been sent to Belle Isle, and there were maybe still 3,000 wounded left in Richmond (i.e. at Libby).

The Richmond Examiner on the 22nd says 4,700 were at Belle Isle, with 500 more en route and ca. 1,000 wounded left at Libby (6,200 total). The Charleston Mercury gives 4,600 at Belle Isle on 2nd August.

The Richmond Dispatch on the 4th August reported the first prisoner exchanges (from the Dix-Hill cartel) - 600 from Belle Isle, leaving 4,100 at Belle Isle, and 400 at Libby (5,100 total). Two days latter it reports another 3,000 exchanged, leaving 1,700 total remaining.

After this, large numbers of prisoners from other locations are added, as all prisoners are centralised, and tracking becomes difficult.

It is interesting that the reports that are high are the ones being quoted, and the lower numbers, the ones consistent with the number listed as captured, are ignored.

Tenney looked at other sources/methods, as well, but he has clearly undermined the accuracy of the official "MIA/Captured" number for the Federals. He also makes it clear that his "about 4,000" number is an estimate. It is almost certainly impossible to ever come up with a precise figure. Following the Seven Days prisoners were coming in daily from a variety of locations and the authorities in Richmond were scrambling to house all of them, finding and using a variety of locations, moving groups around, etc. Even if the actual increased number turns out to be 2,000 or 3,000, that significantly closes the gap between the accepted Confederate losses and the "official" losses for the Army of the Potomac.

Since the official numbers were made from returns, it's difficult to see where an extras would come from.

The real problem is that numbers were registered for the prisoner exchange cartel. The rebels got about 6,000 and the Federals 1,000 during the Seven Days. If the rebels had captured more, they would have claimed more, since they could have exchanged them for their own men.

 

[Saphroneth]

That kind of estimate makes sense, for a Confederate army formed from the population of eastern states. But the people in Washington who knew the difficulties they were having in sustaining the large US army, had to have doubts. The doubts probably related to questions about whether the Confederacy could out mobilize the US, and doubts about how long Richmond and central Virginia could sustain an army of >100,000 men.
The US system of railroads and canals was set up to support four large east coast cities and Washington, D.C. The Confederate rail and river system was not set up to move food, forage and fuel on the same scale, because that was not necessary in the south during peacetime.

But the Confederate system was meant to move cotton to the coasts and transport Northern grain inland, and of course Richmond was at this time being fed by multiple rail lines - plus of course the James River and Kanawha canal, which was incomplete but still stretched nearly 200 miles.

Richmond can draw on the agriculture of southern Virginia (via lines to Danville, Lynchburg and towards the North Carolina border), anything connected to the Roanoke river system, plus it's linked to the rail systems of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. The Richmond and Danville supplied Richmond by itself during the later part of the 1864-5 siege, and in 1862 the Richmond and Petersburg is in operation as well (which links to Lynchburg and to North Carolina).

 

[Belfoured]

So, from what you've posted, the double count hypothesis is sound.



Which doesn't mean he wasn't.



So, he shows in one case (61st NY) that the actual number of MIA is overestimated, because it included a number of stragglers who returned to their unit. Not a good basis for trying to add 4,000 extra, uncounted MIA.



Yes, it is an overestimate by the presented evidence.



Indeed, it did include sick. As the Pittsburgh Gazette reported, almost 11% of the Pennsylvania troops captured at Savage's were ill rather than injured. None of those captured at the Gaines hospital were sick; all were wounded. Overall, probably 5-8% of the captured were sick, rather than wounded in action.



The Richmond Dispatch on 8th July complained that Richmond had 5,000 prisoners, and the cost of feeding them was 2,500 dollars per day. The Richmond Enquirer on 11th July gave the number of prisoners at 5,300, with some started to be forwarded to Belle Isle.

The Richmond Dispatch on the 19th reported that a little less than 5,000 prisoners had been sent to Belle Isle, and there were maybe still 3,000 wounded left in Richmond (i.e. at Libby).

The Richmond Examiner on the 22nd says 4,700 were at Belle Isle, with 500 more en route and ca. 1,000 wounded left at Libby (6,200 total). The Charleston Mercury gives 4,600 at Belle Isle on 2nd August.

The Richmond Dispatch on the 4th August reported the first prisoner exchanges (from the Dix-Hill cartel) - 600 from Belle Isle, leaving 4,100 at Belle Isle, and 400 at Libby (5,100 total). Two days latter it reports another 3,000 exchanged, leaving 1,700 total remaining.

After this, large numbers of prisoners from other locations are added, as all prisoners are centralised, and tracking becomes difficult.

It is interesting that the reports that are high are the ones being quoted, and the lower numbers, the ones consistent with the number listed as captured, are ignored.






Since the official numbers were made from returns, it's difficult to see where an extras would come from.

The real problem is that numbers were registered for the prisoner exchange cartel. The rebels got about 6,000 and the Federals 1,000 during the Seven Days. If the rebels had captured more, they would have claimed more, since they could have exchanged them for their own men.

Here we go:

So, he shows in one case (61st NY) that the actual number of MIA is overestimated, because it included a number of stragglers who returned to their unit. Not a good basis for trying to add 4,000 extra, uncounted MIA

Are you serious? And I thought we were dealing with simple math here.

Let's try stick figures. "Official count" shows "20". June 30 report shows 82 - that's 62 MORE than "official count". July 10 report shows 75. That's 55 MORE than "official count". End result - "official count" is too low by 55. I guess that's "less wrong" than being too low by 62.

I also said he came up with 484 more MIA for four brigades and a few additional regiments than the "official count" MIA for those same units. I cited the specifics regarding one unit - the 61st NY - and added a corroborating report by Barlow. As I'm sure you can deduce, "484" is more than "55". Against all odds, it appears that somehow created confusion on your part.

I also said that - contrary to the "official" count showing several units with "no reported loss" - he investigated those specific units by looking at primary sources and found that they had actual losses during that period, including "MIA". As I'm sure you can figure out, this also affects the accuracy of the K and WIA "official count" you're relying on, but that's just more evidence that the "official count" you're using is unreliable. That's because "actual losses" are by definition higher than the zero/goose egg/dotted line shown in the "official count" for those same units.

The "official" MIA count you've relied on is demonstrably wrong. Fact.

And so much for the composition of Winder's number.

 

[wausaubob]

Its not possible that the transportation system of Virginia was comparable to the transportation system of New York or Pennsylvania.
I think @DaveBrt once estimated that there were about 1200 locomotives in the entire Confederacy at the start of the war. But by the end of the war Pennsylvania had 1200 engines in its railroads alone.
Its not impossible for the Confederacy to mobilize a large army. But they were not capable of matching what New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore could equip and mobilize. And its important to note that at no other time, in any theater, did the Confederates assemble forces in the range of 100,000.
There were only about 5M white people in the entire Confederacy. 1:50 could be a soldier in the Johnston/Lee army, but only very briefly.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Well, as compared to what? The Army of the Potomac, if operating in force, couldn't operate down the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at the time, as the O&A didn't have the capacity to handle the requisite loads. The Army of Virginia, in the Summer of '62, was, of course, far smaller than the Army of the Potomac which was deployed to the Peninsula.

This was still the situation as the Army moved south at the end of October and in November from Antietam Creek. This was well-known in the High Command, hence McClellan, had had to formulate the move to the RF&P prior to being relieved of command. That move would then be orchestrated under Burnside's command.

You only need to read Herman Haupt's Reports on this. The Army, in November, along the O&A was bringing in approximately 700 to 900 tonnes of supplies per day. The Army required 1500 tonnes of supplies to be brought in per day, meaning that the Army was rapidly draining its stores. Just so that you know, Herman Haupt knew more about supplying an Army via rail than anyone else alive.

See also, Herman Haupt in his Reminiscences. For instance, see pages 153-159.

According to John Tucker, the U.S. Army had "delivered" to Fortress Monroe by March 31st of 1862, approximately 121,500 men (presumably PFD), 14,592 animals, 1,224 wagons and ambulances and 44 batteries of artillery. (11 OR 3:53). How do you intend to supply that Army down the O&A?

In addition, you have strategic drain as you move, especially at this time, due to the insufficiencies in the cavalry arm, which requires more units to be siphoned off to cover your rail lines.

What you want to try to avoid is the situation which the U.S. Army faced at the end of '62 and into '63, in which they are stuck operating off of the RF&P line. This is why improvement of the O&A was such an important military priority in late '62 and in '63.

So, McClellan formulated the overall strategic conception which first settled on the Urbanna Plan, which was later modified/replaced with the Peninsula Plan after the Urbanna Plan was deemed to be unworkable (for wholly different reasons, of course).

Comparison of McClellan's estimates of the confederate forces his army faced, with historical reality.

If the AoP actually faced anything near 100,000 confederates, much less 200,000 then McClellan had rashly placed the main army of the Union in an exposed position, deep in enemy territory, with only a parity in numbers at best or overwhelming forces at the worst. No wonder McClellan panicked. It was after all the plan he insisted on, no matter what.

Seven Pines casualties, Confederate


Longstreet's command, S1 V11 pt1 p942: 816 killed, 3739 wounded, 296 missing, 4851 total
Anderson's brigade, same book, p953: 149 killed, 680 wounded, 37 missing, 866 total
Whiting's division, S1 V11 pt2 p506: 164 killed, 1010 wounded, 109 missing, 1283 total (Whiting gives 1273 total but there is an addition error in the row for Law, Law should be 28 + 286 + 42 = 356, not 346)

Full total: 1129 killed, 5429 wounded, 442 missing, exactly 7000 total.

having the main army of the Union deep in confederate territory would have been dangerous , if Little Mac actually believed it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Comparison of McClellan's estimates of the confederate forces his army faced, with historical reality.

That is not the comparison in question. The comparison is, what else could the Army of the Potomac have done?

But do you deny that Lee had 215 or more regiments of all arms?

If the AoP actually faced anything near 100,000 confederates, much less 200,000 then McClellan had rashly placed the main army of the Union in an exposed position, deep in enemy territory, with only a parity in numbers at best or overwhelming forces at the worst. No wonder McClellan panicked. It was after all the plan he insisted on, no matter what.

It was not "the plan he insisted on, no matter what". It was the plan that was enforced by a council of corps commanders called by Lincoln, overriding McClellan's recommendation (for an Urbana plan).

It should also be pointed out that the reason why the enemy army was so strong as of late June (215 regiments of all arms) relative to McClellan's army at the same time (170 regiments of all arms) is a combination of:

1) The initial removal of several divisions of troops from McClellan's army. The adoption of the plan had been based on the not unreasonable idea that McClellan's army would not be stripped of tens of thousands of troops.
2) The repeated denial of troops from McClellan's army, which had been expecting McDowell's corps to arrive since Lincoln's cabinet ministers recommended it in the middle of May. There were ample troops available to reinforce McClellan with between 20,000 and 40,000 extra men PFD without unduly uncovering Washington or harming any other offensive operations.
3) The delays which permitted the Confederates to pull in reinforcements from all over the Confederacy. They considered the fighting around Richmond the main effort and concentrated more troops there than the Union had (in regimental terms) despite being outnumbered across the continent (in regimental terms) by several hundred.


Despite those problems, McClellan nearly pulled it off, and had those promised reinforcements arrived within a calendar month of the time that the fact-finding expedition said they should be sent as soon as possible it would not have been possible for Lee to force him away from Richmond.

 

[Saphroneth]

For what it's worth, I do agree that McClellan probably would have been a lot more successful if someone else had come along first and inflicted over 40,000 casualties on the main Confederate army. Though, speaking of which, the Confederate army at Fredericksburg is almost 80,000 strong by their reckoning, and that's after Antietam (17,000 casualties or so), Second Bull Run (7,000) and the Peninsula (~30,000, of which 20,000 in the Seven Days) and while the Confederates still have ~15,000 troops in Richmond itself.

It's hard to see how McClellan can have been facing less than 100,000, by any metric, simply given those figures. Otherwise you potentially end up with the ridiculous situation in the Great Campaigns of the American Civil War board games, where the Battle of Antietam apparently inflicts -20,000 casualties on the Confederates. (And yes, that's a minus.)

 

[Nathan Towne]

Do you guys know how to sort using this version of the OR? It is easier to use for purposes of showing tables than the format I use.

For instance, if I wanted to go to 5 OR 732.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/mb?a=listsrch;q1=Volume%205;c=106642625;pn=3;sort=date_d

 

[Saphroneth]

Do you guys know how to sort using this version of the OR? It is easier to use for purposes of showing tables than the format I use.

I have this link bookmarked:


Browse | Cornell University Library Making of America Collection

 

[Nathan Towne]

Comparison of McClellan's estimates of the confederate forces his army faced, with historical reality.

If the AoP actually faced anything near 100,000 confederates, much less 200,000 then McClellan had rashly placed the main army of the Union in an exposed position, deep in enemy territory, with only a parity in numbers at best or overwhelming forces at the worst. No wonder McClellan panicked. It was after all the plan he insisted on, no matter what.


having the main army of the Union deep in confederate territory would have been dangerous , if Little Mac actually believed it.

For the March 1, 1862 returns, I have the Army of the Potomac at 185,420 officers and men PFD. (7,864 officers and 177,556 file). That can be found at 5 OR 732. That is exclusive of Federal forces in West Virginia.

Johnston's Army, with this being prior to the detachment of Holmes' command, in their Narch 1st returns, showed 47,306 officers and men PFD (2,963 officers and 44,343 file). That can be found at 5 OR 1086. Including Heth's command, I would guess that the entire Confederate Army in Virginia at the time was around 80,000 men.

Federal intelligence estimates at the time actually usually had the number at about 90,000. Sumner believed that this was probably a little bit high. See: 11 OR 3:21.

This would change quite dramatically, though, in the weeks and months which followed, as the Confederate Army in Virginia would be significantly reinforced.

 

[Saphroneth]

Johnston's Army, with this being prior to the detachment of Holmes' command, in their Narch 1st returns, showed 47,306 officers and men PFD (2,963 officers and 44,343 file). That can be found at 5 OR 1086. Including Heth's command, I would guess that the entire Confederate Army in Virginia at the time was around 80,000 men.

Note that to my understanding this was during a period of significant furlough. A force that would mostly become DH Hill's division was left in the north, plus Jackson's forces, and the garrison of the Yorktown line at the end of April/early May was around 59,000 effectives (early May strength report). This force represents about 100 regiments of all arms.

"The reduction of our force by the operation of the furlough system makes it impracticable to re-enforce the Valley District from that of the Potomac.", JE Johnston to Sec Benjamin, February 14, 1862
(Furloughs were 30 to 60 days long depending on distance to travel.)
On 26th March Johnston writes to Lee mentioning that furloughed men were still returning, so it is still an issue at that time.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Note that to my understanding this was during a period of significant furlough. A force that would mostly become DH Hill's division was left in the north, plus Jackson's forces, and the garrison of the Yorktown line at the end of April/early May was around 59,000 effectives (early May strength report). This force represents about 100 regiments of all arms.

"The reduction of our force by the operation of the furlough system makes it impracticable to re-enforce the Valley District from that of the Potomac.", JE Johnston to Sec Benjamin, February 14, 1862
(Furloughs were 30 to 60 days long depending on distance to travel.)
On 26th March Johnston writes to Lee mentioning that furloughed men were still returning, so it is still an issue at that time.

Do you have the April 30th return for the Confederate Army on the Peninsula? I want take another look at it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Do you have the April 30th return for the Confederate Army on the Peninsula? I want take another look at it.

It's not a "proper" return, and the reason I call it the "early May return" is that it's not got a precise date on it - though it's from the end of the siege, which means sickness in the trenches has to be factored in (Newton's estimate was 10%-20% sickness). It also to my understanding and recollection doesn't include the reserve artillery (56 pieces is the only number given) or some of the cavalry (it gives Stuart's cavalry, though not Magruder's cavalry and not Wise or Hampton's Legions cavalry component), though cavalry strengths for those units are given elsewhere in the OR and Livermore I believe.


The main return starts here:

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.11:pt.3:Correspondence.

 

[Belfoured]

Do you have the April 30th return for the Confederate Army on the Peninsula? I want take another look at it.

You're probably aware of it but Steve Newton's 1989 dissertation at William and Mary, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (subsequently published in book form) is a good study of the period from February/March up through Seven Pines and is useful on this topic.

 

[Nathan Towne]

You're probably aware of it but Steve Newton's 1989 dissertation at William and Mary, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (subsequently published in book form) is a good study of the period from February/March up through Seven Pines and is useful on this topic.

Yeah, it was later developed into a book, which I have.

 

[Nathan Towne]

It's not a "proper" return, and the reason I call it the "early May return" is that it's not got a precise date on it - though it's from the end of the siege, which means sickness in the trenches has to be factored in (Newton's estimate was 10%-20% sickness). It also to my understanding and recollection doesn't include the reserve artillery (56 pieces is the only number given) or some of the cavalry (it gives Stuart's cavalry, though not Magruder's cavalry and not Wise or Hampton's Legions cavalry component), though cavalry strengths for those units are given elsewhere in the OR and Livermore I believe.


The main return starts here:

The War of the Rebellion : a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. / Pub. under the direction of the ... Secretary of War ... ser.1:v.11:pt.3:Correspondence.

We don't have it tabulated as the March 1st returns are?

Steven Newton's basic hypothesis on it is that there would have been a discrepancy between the effective figure and a PFD figure, due to non-representation of officers and other detailed men, but as can be seen, on the March 1st return, the effectives total was actually slightly higher than the PFD figure. I have seen the relationship between the two fluctuate quite a bit over the course of the war, from one return to another, so I tend to try to just find apples-apples comparisons.