The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

McClellan was at 1st Bull Run now?

Thanks, 67th. No idea why I typed FIRST. Have just edited it to show SECOND.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

McClellan was at 1st Bull Run now?

Thanks, 67th. No idea why I typed FIRST. Have just edited/corrected it to SECOND.

 

[Nathan Towne]

and from a conversion via Livermore's formulae when they only had "effectives" to go on. Newton did the same.



Sherman defined his logistics etc. as being "effective" and thus he used a different meaning to the rebels.



In the ANV, it was. Johnston had redefined PFD to be only effectives. If you look at ANV returns, as explained by Taylor, they only were the "fighting strength" of the army. If you find an ANV return, it will have an entry for "effectives" or sometimes two. Usually it is only the enlisted "fighting strength" of the army, but "total effectives" is sometimes found adding officers. The logistics trains etc. were not listed under this category.

When Johnston took over in the west, he again separated out the fighting troops and the logistics troops, and the latter was around 1/6th of the total. He wanted to have slaves replace them but, unlike the east, the slaves were unreliable.

Hooker also did the same in the Federal army. Hence about 20,000 "for duty" in the logistics train weren't carried under PFD on the 30th April 1864 return, but only appeared under aggregate present. In McClellan's time, returns were made out as per the regulation, including the logistics troops under PFD, and McClellan himself comments about needing to make the adjustment to effectives.

Since this is a Pinkerton thread, Pinkerton reported aggregate present estimates, and attempted to correct to effectives by removing 1/6th, but his calculator instead removed 6% or so.




Yes. We are missing the 26th VA, 32nd VA and several other units on this memo.

If you meant that such was the way in which things were done in the Army of Northern Virginia after Lee took command of the Army, well, that is unfortunately not accurate either. I could point you to any number of returns, but these will suffice. Here are the March of 1863 returns for the Army of Northern Virginia. They are exclusive, of course, of the Divisions which had been detached from the Army. They can be found at 25 OR 2:696:

As you can see, they are Present for Duty strengths of officers and men. This was true right through the war. You can see the same in regimental rolls.

Right below them, on the same page, you can see the returns for the Department of Western Virginia, under the command of Samuel Jones, for the same month (March of '63). As can be seen, they are calculated in Present for Duty, officers and men.

You can find this right through the war in Armies across the Confederacy.

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks, 67th. No idea why I typed FIRST. Have just edited/corrected it to SECOND.

McClellan was at 2nd Bull Run now?

 

[67th Tigers]

If you meant that such was the way in which things were done in the Army of Northern Virginia after Lee took command of the Army, well, that is unfortunately not accurate either. I could point you to any number of returns, but these will suffice. Here are the March of 1863 returns for the Army of Northern Virginia. They are exclusive, of course, of the Divisions which had been detached from the Army. They can be found at 25 OR 2:696:

As you can see, they are Present for Duty strengths of officers and men. This was true right through the war. You can see the same in regimental rolls.

View attachment 517851

Right below them, on the same page, you can see the returns for the Department of Western Virginia, under the command of Samuel Jones, for the same month (March of '63). As can be seen, they are calculated in Present for Duty, officers and men.

You can find this right through the war in Armies across the Confederacy.

View attachment 517852

Yep, as you can see, the situation was as Taylor described it. The number of "effectives" is the number of enlisted fighting men, exclusive of the logistics. Troops with the logistics were carried under aggregate present, but not under "for duty."

Now, with Johnston he appears to have included officers with effectives in his returns, but it is uncertain what is going on with the memos of 30th April and 20th May. Since most of the numbers are the same, which is unlikely, it's very unclear, but the best we have...

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

McClellan was at 2nd Bull Run now?

I was quoting from History.com, and it was NOT 2nd Bull Run. I had to look it up, as memory did not serve me on this occasion. You are correct that McClellan was not present at 1st Bull Run, but according to History.com had estimated the Confederate troop strength that McDowell's forces had to face, so it was First Manassas that they addressed. These are not my words:
Per History.com Editors: "Though much loved by his men, McClellan was deliberate and cautious in the extreme, and from early in the conflict he consistently overestimated the strength of Confederate troops facing him."

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to just after (FIRST) Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I was quoting from History.com, and it was NOT 2nd Bull Run. I had to look it up, as memory did not serve me on this occasion. You are correct that McClellan was not present at 1st Bull Run, but according to History.com had estimated the Confederate troop strength that McDowell's forces had to face, so it was First Manassas that they addressed. These are not my words:
Per History.com Editors: "Though much loved by his men, McClellan was deliberate and cautious in the extreme, and from early in the conflict he consistently overestimated the strength of Confederate troops facing him."

McClellan's inability to properly estimate enemy troop strengths goes all the way back to just after (FIRST) Manassas: " Johnston withdrew his army from Manassas to a more easily defensible position at Culpeper, some 40 miles south and on the other side of the Rappahannock. The Union Army's inspection of the abandoned Confederate works revealed that the enemy's defenses had been far weaker than McClellan had claimed. In particular, a number of the Confederate cannons were found to be only logs painted black, known as "Quaker guns." – History.com Editors, Nov. 9, 2009

By the way, McClellan was in my opinion an above average general overall. He was intelligent (graduated 2nd in his class at West Point). He was just slow and overcautious, and consistently overestimated the strength of his enemy. In May 1861 he was appointed Major General and worked closely with Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott to develop the Anaconda Plan, and he advised Scott prior to the Battle of Phillipi on June 3, 1861 and the Battle of 1st Manassas on July 21, 1861.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Only Carnac the Magnificent can evaluate a book without reading it. Even though you've never actually accessed it, you conclude "n all probability it's a double count".

At the outset, by the way, and as I indicated, Tenney's conclusion (and he makes clear that it's'an estimate) is that the uncounted Union MIA is approximately 4,000, not "5,000".

Let's start with the fact that Tenney's work regarding the respective strengths of the two armies in his 1992 master's thesis earned him a degree and subsequent citation by the likes of Joseph Harsh. Yet you assume that the same guy who turned out that level of scholarship became too dumb to consider whether he is "double counting". In fact, and not surprisingly, he expressly refers to "double counting" issues in this chapter of his book.



In this chapter of his book, however, his primary focus is on Union records, including the morning reports for units that are in the NARA. What he found directly challenges the accuracy of the "6,041 MIA/Captured" in the OR that you're relying on. His conclusion is that most Union army units were using the numbers for "missing" in their morning reports to mean those missing in battle and not necessarily including stragglers during the continuous retreating who also went missing. He located the morning reports of certain units for June 30 and July 10 that recorded "missing" and made a comparison with what is shown in the official "6,041" total. Those units – four brigades and a few individual regiments – show 484 more men "missing" than what shows in their official "MIA" counts. This is because the official count appears to be based on those missing in battle and not those men who went missing as stragglers during the incessant retreating and were captured. A good example is Barlow's 61st NY. The official count shows 20 MIA rank and file. According to Tenney Barlow's morning reports in the NARA show an additional 55 in his "missing" count beyond the 20. In fact, although Tenney relies on the material in the NARA, Barlow's report in the OR specifically states that there were "20 missing on the battlefield" but that "[o]thers fell out on the various marches to and from action, and many of them are doubtless prisoners". OR Vol XI, Part 2 at 69. Tenney points out that 7 men who were missing in the 61st's June 30 report had returned in the July 10 report, reducing the additional "missing" from 62 to 55.

In addition, Tenney looked at several specific units that show "no loss reported" in the official numbers but found primary sources, including reports and other accounts, showing that these units did in fact have losses during the June 25-July 2 time frame, including "missing".

There are plenty of accounts in the OR that show significant straggling by the Union army during these retreats and the capture of significant numbers of stragglers by Confederate units. We know that in war stragglers from a retreating army frequently end up in the wrong hands, while those from an advancing army frequently end up back with their own side. Tenney cites sources from both sides regarding Union stragglers.

In short, we know that the official "MIA" count is wrong.

Regarding those troops captured at the Savage's Station hospital


First, the reports of two hospital captures by Jackson – Savage's Station and then another, much smaller hospital at White Oak - show that both captures included "sick and wounded". That makes sense because Savage's Station was where those initially in the various field hospitals were sent as the Seven Days began. No doubt a large number captured were wounded and it's reasonable to assume that many of those may have been recorded as WIA but there were likely a substantial number who were "sick". One can find references in reports and accounts that during the Seven Days there were "sick"/"unwell" troops who were in/directed to hospital. Swinburne (who you reference), in the pamphlet containing his report expressly stated that at the Savage's hospital on June 26 – before it began receiving wounded – the number of sick was "increasing rapidly". Whether the "sick" were included in the official MIA is far from clear. They would not have been accounted for by the other two categories. Jackson's report adds that beyond the 2,500 "sick and wounded" there were also "500 persons [at Savage's] having charge of the patients" and – by the way – that as of that day D.H. Hill had collected "probably 1,000 stragglers". OR Vol. XI, Part 2 at 556. The correspondence to and from Lee starting July 3 repeatedly refers to "sick and wounded" in the OR, Series II Vol. IV.



We have no idea when Winder's calculation was performed or how it was determined/collected. The date of the document in the OR, Series II, Vol. IV at 821, is July 16 but that doesn't mean that the number was ascertained that morning or even the day before. On July 16 the Richmond Dispatch reported that a large number were brought to Richmond literally the day before, July 15. Moreover, as the Richmond Enquirer reported on July 14, "[c]asual prisoners are brought in every day".



According to the Richmond Enquirer on May 12, the total number of Union POWs in Richmond on May 11 was 918 and of that number 860 "privates" were paroled and sent off for exchange. (This number closely corresponds to the "886" referred to in the OR, Series II, Vol. III at 553). The Richmond Dispatch further reported on May 15 that "all of the Yankee officers" in Richmond were to be transferred south to Salisbury NC. Regarding Seven Pines, the Richmond Dispatch reported on June 2 that 500 Union troops captured in that battle had arrived as of 5 PM the previous evening. On June 4 the Dispatch reported that "the Yankee prisoners in confinement here were sent South yesterday. About 560 went off." (Once the Union army figured out its casualties the total MIA for Seven Pines was only 647. OR Vol. XI Part 1 at 762). In other words, the evidence is that Richmond was emptied of virtually all of those captured before May 11 and those captured at Seven Pines, either by exchange or by transfer farther south, so those men cannot have been part of Winder's number.

Finally, there is the report by the Richmond Dispatch on July 19 that the total captured in the Seven Days and brought to Richmond by that date was "at least" 8,000, confirmed by the Richmond Enquirer on July 19, which added "[w]hen the returns shall have been complete, it will be found that our estimate some time ago was very nearly the figure, or upwards of nine thousand." We also have Lee's statement in his January 1863 official report of the campaign that "[m]ore than 10,000 prisoners, …, were captured". OR Vol. XI Part 2 at 497-98.

Tenney looked at other sources/methods, as well, but he has clearly undermined the accuracy of the official "MIA/Captured" number for the Federals. He also makes it clear that his "about 4,000" number is an estimate. It is almost certainly impossible to ever come up with a precise figure. Following the Seven Days prisoners were coming in daily from a variety of locations and the authorities in Richmond were scrambling to house all of them, finding and using a variety of locations, moving groups around, etc. Even if the actual increased number turns out to be 2,000 or 3,000, that significantly closes the gap between the accepted Confederate losses and the "official" losses for the Army of the Potomac.

After adding the captured left behind in the hospitals onto MIA figures, we are getting up in the realm of some of the reports from Richmond which you are talking about though in terms of the number of prisoners taken.

Did Tenney specifically cut out the double counts?

 

[Little Boots]

For those who have studied McClellan in detail, do you think Mac really believed the Pinkerton reports? Or was he just using the inflated estimates as excuse/cover to justify his actions?

If he was a true believer, then his cries for reinforcement and warnings how if the army is destroyed he will die with it but it won't be his fault are a little more sympathetic.

Conversely, love him or hate him, he was an intelligent man. And he clearly understood logistics. How did it not dawn on him that the estimates just didn't make sense?

After studying the matter, I would argue that McClellan may not have believed the exact numbers he received. However, it was likely that he ran with the higher estimates as a calculated move to get Washington to furnish more troops to the Army of the Potomac.

By June, 1862, McClellan had an effective force of ~95,000 men at his disposal; accounting for losses due to battle and disease, which has run rampant due to their proximity to the mosquito-ridden swamps and marshes of the Chickahominy River. Lee had ~80,000 men at his disposal, placing the two armies at rough parody. For the siege operations McClellan wished to conduct, he understood he would need a larger force than what he had at his disposal.

This is where the "180,000" figure comes into play; this number was likely pushed by McClellan as a means of pressuring Washington to relinquish the corps that was supposed to link up with the army in April and May of 1862, but was being withheld by Lincoln out of the fear that Jackson would descend from the valley and capture Washington. McClellan - who had been an observer during the Crimean War - knew the importance of having reserves for breakthrough attempts; this being a point that was mentioned in the reports sent to Jefferson Davis after the return of the observers from the aforementioned conflict.

Simply put: McClellan likely did not believe in the higher estimate reports, but did understand that a considerable force was standing between him and Richmond; one that was going to be difficult to dislodge with his current force. He needed more men if he wished to guarantee victory. The exaggerated figures was a means to that end, if a bit absurd in hindsight.

 

[Bryce]

For those who have studied McClellan in detail, do you think Mac really believed the Pinkerton reports? Or was he just using the inflated estimates as excuse/cover to justify his actions?

If he was a true believer, then his cries for reinforcement and warnings how if the army is destroyed he will die with it but it won't be his fault are a little more sympathetic.

Conversely, love him or hate him, he was an intelligent man. And he clearly understood logistics. How did it not dawn on him that the estimates just didn't make sense?

When I talk to Gordon Rhea a couple of years ago, he was going to do research on the friendship and relationship between Pinkerton and McClellan. I don't know if he ever produced anything on it.