The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not sure the source of that one. My own count comes to within about 230 of the Sears figures, for the Confederates, and your own count (if the addition error is removed) comes to exactly 300 short of the Sears figures (with the whole difference being KIA) - though I'm still not sure how you get the exact KIA/WIA breakdown from Pender etc. Unless you're apportioning Pender and Anderson by the average distribution of the others.


In the sense of WIA being recorded and then left behind to be captured?

I am working on tallying them again right now.

Yes, regarding Murfreesboro, the higher figure comes from double counting of wounded who were left behind by the Army and fell into captivity as it fell back from Murfreesboro on the night of January 3rd-4th.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not sure the source of that one. My own count comes to within about 230 of the Sears figures, for the Confederates, and your own count (if the addition error is removed) comes to exactly 300 short of the Sears figures (with the whole difference being KIA) - though I'm still not sure how you get the exact KIA/WIA breakdown from Pender etc. Unless you're apportioning Pender and Anderson by the average distribution of the others.


In the sense of WIA being recorded and then left behind to be captured?

Have you found comprehensive casualty figures, Federal and Confederate for all operations on the Peninsula/via the Peninsula through July 2nd?

 

[wausaubob]

Pinkerton's numbers were logistically impossible. But they did start the transition to accepting reality. 1. The Confederates intended to fight a long and bloody war to establish their regional separation, and 2. fighting near Richmond was a mistake as that put the Confederates in their strongest position. The siege of Richmond was not likely to be shorter or easier than the siege of Sevastpol.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think McClellan always went with the inflated numbers regardless of who was providing them, Pinkerton, his own staff or some other source. McClellan was an excellent General in all aspects except for actual combat, the inflated enemy numbers was his comfort zone for not doing what he knew he should have.

We actually know for sure this isn't true - there were several sets of numbers floating around in the Maryland Campaign and McClellan's were among the smallest.

What is your best example of McClellan "not doing what he knew he should have"?

 

[Saphroneth]

Have you found comprehensive casualty figures, Federal and Confederate for all operations on the Peninsula/via the Peninsula through July 2nd?

I've generally been using the OR figures, which are complete for the Federals as far as I can tell (all units, all dates) but exclude July 2 fighting for the Confederates and have some approximate numbers. These figures give about a 4,000 difference in casualty count, Union to Confederate.

 

[Saphroneth]

Pinkerton's numbers were logistically impossible.

You keep saying that, but it's not as if McClellan's army of broadly similar size (i.e. not qualitatively different) wasn't being supplied by one railroad in the field; Washington DC in late 1861 was similarly being supplied by one railroad in the field, and that had about 180,000 men PFD in the army.

Do you think - and I've asked this before - that Confederate regiments grew over time after June 1862, instead of shrinking from casualties?

 

[Saphroneth]

Pinkerton's numbers were logistically impossible. But they did start the transition to accepting reality. 1. The Confederates intended to fight a long and bloody war to establish their regional separation, and 2. fighting near Richmond was a mistake as that put the Confederates in their strongest position. The siege of Richmond was not likely to be shorter or easier than the siege of Sevastpol.

As it happens, there's plenty of reason to suspect the siege of Richmond to be shorter or easier than the siege of Sevastopol if done correctly - as of June 26 1862 McClellan was moving siege guns onto the heights over Richmond (among them the long-range rifles which, as at Fort Pulaski, proved to render even previous permanent masonry forts inadequate as defensive structures).

There's a reason Lee felt that McClellan could do it. ("McClellan will make this a battle of posts...")

 

[wausaubob]

As it happens, there's plenty of reason to suspect the siege of Richmond to be shorter or easier than the siege of Sevastopol if done correctly - as of June 26 1862 McClellan was moving siege guns onto the heights over Richmond (among them the long-range rifles which, as at Fort Pulaski, proved to render even previous permanent masonry forts inadequate as defensive structures).

There's a reason Lee felt that McClellan could do it. ("McClellan will make this a battle of posts...")

Richmond was the wealthiest, best connected place in the Confederacy, after New Orleans fell. It was the one place that had both irmills and flour mills. As McClellan neared Richmond, everything became easier for the Confederates. Would the US have captured Richmond before the last blockade port at Wilmington had been closed, and the direct road south severed? Perhaps. But it wasn't going to quick and it wasn't going to easy and it obviously wasn't going to a bloodless campaign of posts. What the Confederates lacked in numbers they more than made up in audacity.

 

[Saphroneth]

Richmond was the wealthiest, best connected place in the Confederacy, after New Orleans fell. It was the one place that had both irmills and flour mills. As McClellan neared Richmond, everything became easier for the Confederates. Would the US have captured Richmond before the last blockade port at Wilmington had been closed, and the direct road south severed? Perhaps. But it wasn't going to quick and it wasn't going to easy and it obviously wasn't going to a bloodless campaign of posts. What the Confederates lacked in numbers they more than made up in audacity.

Who said bloodless? It would basically consist of a series of artillery-led assaults, where the rifled siege guns shatter the fortifications and remove the defensive ability of selected parts of the position against direct infantry attack; those attacks, if successful, unhinge the entire defensive line. That's not bloodless, but it's exactly how siege (in the sense of attacks, as opposed to starving a target out) worked in the 18th and 19th centuries, only much faster because you don't need to dig multiple sets of parallels to get the guns closer - the rifled guns can do their work from outside the range of the defending guns.

As far as I can tell McClellan had one main fortified belt to overcome before he was actually inside Richmond itself (Fort Jackson, Fort Johnston etc), plus some lines of rifle pits and entrenchments. And you think that would take over two years?

 

[Nathan Towne]

I've generally been using the OR figures, which are complete for the Federals as far as I can tell (all units, all dates) but exclude July 2 fighting for the Confederates and have some approximate numbers. These figures give about a 4,000 difference in casualty count, Union to Confederate.

Just for the Seven Days?

Regarding the entire campaign though?

 

[Saphroneth]

Regarding the entire campaign though?

I've looked into that in an analytic sense in the past, though not comprehensively. One interesting point I saw was that for Seven Pines Confederate casualties, to quote a previous comment of mine:

Longstreet took 4,850 of them and Anderson's bde of DH Hill took 860, while Whiting took 1,270. This sums to 6,980 which is actually more than the generally accepted 6,100.

(Sears gives 6,134.)

 

[Saphroneth]

Williamsburg Confederate is OR 11 volume 1 568, 569, 587 and is:

568: Longstreet's report, 1,560
569: itemized report, explicitly incomplete, 1,251
gives Early without a 5th NC report, Hill's VA bde, Jenkins, Pickett, Pryor, Wilcox; misses:

Colston (may not be engaged)
Semmes (may not be engaged)
Kershaw (may not be engaged)
Rodes (was definitely engaged, lost the colonel of the 2nd Florida)
Featherston (may not be engaged)
Cav bde (was definitely engaged, saw wounded colonel and major)

587: Pickett's report, 190

Under the circumstances I'd be inclined to take Longstreet's report as a minimum, the p 569 itemized report misses about half the force present.

 

[Saphroneth]

Seven Pines casualties, Confederate


Longstreet's command, S1 V11 pt1 p942: 816 killed, 3739 wounded, 296 missing, 4851 total
Anderson's brigade, same book, p953: 149 killed, 680 wounded, 37 missing, 866 total
Whiting's division, S1 V11 pt2 p506: 164 killed, 1010 wounded, 109 missing, 1283 total (Whiting gives 1273 total but there is an addition error in the row for Law, Law should be 28 + 286 + 42 = 356, not 346)

Full total: 1129 killed, 5429 wounded, 442 missing, exactly 7000 total.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Seven Pines casualties, Confederate


Longstreet's command, S1 V11 pt1 p942: 816 killed, 3739 wounded, 296 missing, 4851 total
Anderson's brigade, same book, p953: 149 killed, 680 wounded, 37 missing, 866 total
Whiting's division, S1 V11 pt2 p506: 164 killed, 1010 wounded, 109 missing, 1283 total (Whiting gives 1273 total but there is an addition error in the row for Law, Law should be 28 + 286 + 42 = 356, not 346)

Full total: 1129 killed, 5429 wounded, 442 missing, exactly 7000 total.

@Saphroneth

This is an issue which often arises from final reports to final tallies. I was just mentioning in another thread that I have used the 3,722 official Federal casualty figure for July 22nd (Atlanta Campaign), but in Logan's Report (commanding the Army) he reported 3,521 total casualties for July 22nd.

Final tallies are more reliable, in my opinion, whenever available.

That is a great find, by the way, because we typically use the 6,134 figure for Confederate casualties (980 Killed, 4,749 Wounded, 405 Captured or Missing)

So, that would be for Confederate casualties at Seven Pines:

-1,129 Men Killed
-5,429 Men Wounded
-442 Men Captured or Missing

7,000 Total Casualties.

The Federal casualty reports at Seven Pines which I am aware of are at 11 OR 1:762.

They came to:

-790 Men Killed
-3,594 Men Wounded
-647 Men Captured or Missing

5,031 Total Casualties.

By the way, could you provide a link to the OR you are using? It is easier to use than the one I use.

This is what I use.

The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Civil War | OSU eHistory

ehistory.osu.edu

 

[Nathan Towne]

If any of the calculations of Mac's apologists on this thread, are anywhere near correct, it indicates to me that McClellan's entire Peninsula Campaign was misbegotten, from the very first.

Well, as compared to what? The Army of the Potomac, if operating in force, couldn't operate down the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at the time, as the O&A didn't have the capacity to handle the requisite loads. The Army of Virginia, in the Summer of '62, was, of course, far smaller than the Army of the Potomac which was deployed to the Peninsula.

This was still the situation as the Army moved south at the end of October and in November from Antietam Creek. This was well-known in the High Command, hence McClellan, had had to formulate the move to the RF&P prior to being relieved of command. That move would then be orchestrated under Burnside's command.

You only need to read Herman Haupt's Reports on this. The Army, in November, along the O&A was bringing in approximately 700 to 900 tonnes of supplies per day. The Army required 1500 tonnes of supplies to be brought in per day, meaning that the Army was rapidly draining its stores. Just so that you know, Herman Haupt knew more about supplying an Army via rail than anyone else alive.

See also, Herman Haupt in his Reminiscences. For instance, see pages 153-159.

According to John Tucker, the U.S. Army had "delivered" to Fortress Monroe by March 31st of 1862, approximately 121,500 men (presumably PFD), 14,592 animals, 1,224 wagons and ambulances and 44 batteries of artillery. (11 OR 3:53). How do you intend to supply that Army down the O&A?

In addition, you have strategic drain as you move, especially at this time, due to the insufficiencies in the cavalry arm, which requires more units to be siphoned off to cover your rail lines.

What you want to try to avoid is the situation which the U.S. Army faced at the end of '62 and into '63, in which they are stuck operating off of the RF&P line. This is why improvement of the O&A was such an important military priority in late '62 and in '63.

So, McClellan formulated the overall strategic conception which first settled on the Urbanna Plan, which was later modified/replaced with the Peninsula Plan after the Urbanna Plan was deemed to be unworkable (for wholly different reasons, of course).

 

[Saphroneth]

Indeed, any attempt at a movement by the flank in the same way as Hooker tried and Grant achieved means you're limited by the amount of food in your wagons. It's workable if the line of the Rapidan cannot be feasibly defended by current Confederate positions, because you can cut straight across to Fredericksburg and Port Royal, but if the Confederates have an army on the Rappahannock and Rapidan in strength then you end up fighting a battle in the Wilderness with your supplies dwindling.

I think Grant had something like 4,300 wagons exclusive of 9th Corps, which is about 1 wagon for every 30 men PFD in the Army of the Potomac. McClellan didn't have remotely enough to pull off the same trick - even in November he had 1,890 wagons, which even with prioritization is simply a much worse ratio.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Indeed, any attempt at a movement by the flank in the same way as Hooker tried and Grant achieved means you're limited by the amount of food in your wagons. It's workable if the line of the Rapidan cannot be feasibly defended by current Confederate positions, because you can cut straight across to Fredericksburg and Port Royal, but if the Confederates have an army on the Rappahannock and Rapidan in strength then you end up fighting a battle in the Wilderness with your supplies dwindling.

I think Grant had something like 4,300 wagons exclusive of 9th Corps, which is about 1 wagon for every 30 men PFD in the Army of the Potomac. McClellan didn't have remotely enough to pull off the same trick - even in November he had 1,890 wagons, which even with prioritization is simply a much worse ratio.

Precisely.

In addition, the O&A had been improved considerably by the Spring of '64, so the Army was able to move into The Wilderness from a completely different angle. Once you are off of the O&A and onto the RF&P, north of the Rappahannock and Rapidan River lines, your angles are much more constricted. I have made this point many times. At Chancellorsville, for instance, the Confederate Army is between The Wilderness and your ability to get back on the RF&P south of the river if need be. The angles are just far more challenging once you are off of the O&A north of the rivers.

Also, again, ordinance expenditure is enormous. At Murfreesboro, for instance, we know that the U.S. spent over two million rounds of small arms ammunition. Take that as an example and extrapolate from there. Ordinance requirements can begin to dangerously impact strategy and tactics. You can't be pulling punches, if you take my meaning.

 

[Saphroneth]

In addition, the O&A had been improved considerably by the Spring of '64, so the Army was able to move into The Wilderness from a completely different angle. Once you are off of the O&A and onto the RF&P, north of the Rappahannock and Rapidan River lines, your angles are much more constricted. I have made this point many times. At Chancellorsville, for instance, the Confederate Army is between The Wilderness and your ability to get back on the RF&P south of the river if need be. The angles are just far more challenging once you are off of the O&A north of the rivers.

There's an intersting point which I think deserves noting, related to that, which is that:


Early 1862 (late March, just before the Peninsula)- there is a Confederate force of about 2 divisions at Fredericksburg, which can block attempts to get through the Wilderness, and then the rest of Johnston's force can steam into you
Late 1862 (McClellan's relief) - there is no Confederate force at Fredericksburg, and half Lee's army is away in the Valley with the other half at Culpeper about to pull back to Gordonsville.
1863 (the Chancellorsville campaign) - the whole Confederate force is at Fredericksburg.
May 1864 (Grant's offensive) - there is no Confederate force at Fredericksburg or east of the Wilderness - the corps are all cantoned west of it.

I think this plus the availability of fully supplied wagons upon crossing the river, in combination, present essentially the major control on whether a Federal attempt to force the Rapidan will actually work. At that, Lee nearly managed to hook around in front of Grant in 1864, but didn't quite manage it.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There's an intersting point which I think deserves noting, related to that, which is that:


Early 1862 (late March, just before the Peninsula)- there is a Confederate force of about 2 divisions at Fredericksburg, which can block attempts to get through the Wilderness, and then the rest of Johnston's force can steam into you
Late 1862 (McClellan's relief) - there is no Confederate force at Fredericksburg, and half Lee's army is away in the Valley with the other half at Culpeper about to pull back to Gordonsville.
1863 (the Chancellorsville campaign) - the whole Confederate force is at Fredericksburg.
May 1864 (Grant's offensive) - there is no Confederate force at Fredericksburg or east of the Wilderness - the corps are all cantoned west of it.

I think this plus the availability of fully supplied wagons upon crossing the river, in combination, present essentially the major control on whether a Federal attempt to force the Rapidan will actually work. At that, Lee nearly managed to hook around in front of Grant in 1864, but didn't quite manage it.

Exactly. With one additional factor. Getting to and securing the key crossroad points, say in The Wilderness.

Nonetheless, while the Army was operating on the Peninsula, it is really a shame that consolidation took as long as it did, like with the forces which became the Army of Virginia. Rosecrans, from his department, didn't make himself especially popular in some circles with how frequently and vociferously he pushed this on the War Department. I really think that more should have and could have been done significantly sooner that way.

In my view, the larger strategic picture was not very well handled in the vacancy period (March 11th-July 23rd) and the consequences were manifesting themselves by June and would carry on for months.

 

[Saphroneth]

Nonetheless, while the Army was operating on the Peninsula, it is really a shame that consolidation took as long as it did, like with the forces which became the Army of Virginia. Rosecrans, from his department, didn't make himself especially popular in some circles with how frequently and vociferously he pushed this on the War Department. I really think that more should have and could have been done significantly sooner that way.

What's really baffling to me is the extent to which Lincoln was either incurious, being fed manifestly false information, or mendacious about it himself. At one point he tells McClellan that there's not 75,000 men outside the Army of the Potomac "east of the mountains", listing five different commands which the previous day had totalled 89,692 PFD - after deducting the brigades which at that time were en route to join McClellan.

I don't know how Lincoln can possibly have ended up with the number he gives.