The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[Saphroneth]

We don't have it tabulated as the March 1st returns are?

No, that's why I say it's not a proper return. It's not tabulated, it doesn't list categories and the original wasn't dated; nonetheless by tracking units it can give a sense of what the strength was in the Yorktown line on various dates, at least in whatever category this is.

Which is, interestingly, how we can tell Pinkerton's numbers (or the estimates McClellan used based off them) are about right for the Yorktown early siege.

 

[Belfoured]

Yeah, it was later developed into a book, which I have.

I have the book as well - IIRC when I've looked at the dissertation they're pretty much identical.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, that's why I say it's not a proper return. It's not tabulated, it doesn't list categories and the original wasn't dated; nonetheless by tracking units it can give a sense of what the strength was in the Yorktown line on various dates, at least in whatever category this is.

Which is, interestingly, how we can tell Pinkerton's numbers (or the estimates McClellan used based off them) are about right for the Yorktown early siege.

Yeah, it appears to be effectives, but it is unfortunate that it wasn't tabulated so that we have PFD figures, as well.

It is also missing the Third Virginia Cavalry and the Reserve Artillery. Magruder listed the strength of the Third Virginia Cavalry, along with two independent companies of cavalry, at 923 men in his April 23, 1862 return. Based on the average strength of the other field batteries, there were probably around 1,050 men in the reserve artillery.

Then, of course, illness depleted the ranks of the units which had arrived on the Peninsula quite heavily through the end of April.

For me, I find the argument that we can deduce what the PFD strength was from the effective strength via the Livermore method to be quite unconvincing in light of the March 1st returns.

 

[Saphroneth]

It is also missing the Third Virginia Cavalry and the Reserve Artillery. Magruder listed the strength of the Third Virginia Cavalry at 923 men in his April 23, 1862 return. Based on the average strength of the other field batteries, there were probably around 1,050 men in the reserve artillery.

3rd VA is most of what I mentioned as Magruder's cavalry. It's my understanding that the Wise Legion and Hampton Legion cavalry are also not on the report and would be about 700 strong.

 

[Nathan Towne]

3rd VA is most of what I mentioned as Magruder's cavalry. It's my understanding that the Wise Legion and Hampton Legion cavalry are also not on the report and would be about 700 strong.

My understanding was that Wise's Legion reinforced the Army in late May. That would be the Wise Legion of cavalry and a total of seventeen infantry companies of the Henry Wise legion of infantry.

I don't recall regarding Hampton's Legion.

 

[Saphroneth]

My understanding was that Wise's Legion reinforced the Army in late May.

That would be the infantry - the cavalry arrived 29th March I think, after this order:

 

[Nathan Towne]

That would be the infantry - the cavalry arrived 29th March I think, after this order:

View attachment 467561

Great. I had forgotten that.

So, that is about 2,700 additional men, give or take, for the April 30th return, which brings the April 30th number up to about 58,300, or so.

 

[Nathan Towne]

And then do you have a rundown of everything which reinforced the Army up through the onset of the Seven Days?

 

[Saphroneth]

So, that is about 2,700 additional men, give or take, which brings the April 30th number up to about 58,300, or so.

About that. In Regiments of All Arms that's just about 100. (Slightly over 1000 companies.)


Another ~350 companies join in May (and are either at Seven Pines or arriving around the time of Seven Pines) and then about another 660 added and 20 dissolved in June (the 660 number counts Jackson and Ewell), giving slightly over 2000 companies before adding the Richmond defenders (about another 100-150).

 

[Saphroneth]

And then do you have a rundown of everything which reinforced the Army up through the onset of the Seven Days?

Not in terms of strength, but see above for a rough appreciation; more precise numbers in the Regiment Counting section below.


I know Harsh breaks down his 112,000 number into various categories, but looking at them it seems a little like one of them is an underestimate. Here's the four ways I've approached the topic in the past, with the Harsh method being the second one:



Strengths at the Seven Days

For the Seven Days, Jackson came down from the Valley, and in addition a significant number of new regiments joined what was now Lee's army. There are four ways to approach the strength at the Seven Days.


Regiment counting

Going by pure regiment counting, there were 204.7 regiments of all arms forming the field army at the Seven Days, plus the Richmond garrison forces (which helped shape the battlespace June 25-7 and numbered 8.6 regiments of all arms, plus 2.5 militia regiments of all arms, but minus 0.5 because the 12th Bn Louisiana Heavy Artillery was at Yorktown). This totals 215.3 regiments of all arms.
McClellan had 175 regiments of all arms at Richmond and 105,825 men PFD, meaning a strength on that date of 604 men PFD per regiment. The same average strength per regiment for Lee would put him at 130,200 men PFD.


Harsh

Harsh in Confederate Tide Rising gives a list of the strengths of various components of the Seven Days force (and gives 215 regiments of all arms at Richmond). He gives:

Total 112,200 men
Johnston's old army (129 ROAA and 69,000 men) (this appears to be the Seven Pines force minus perhaps Whiting)
Jackson (35 ROAA and 15,904 men)
Dept. of NC (33 ROAA and 22,048 men) of which he says half had arrived (17 regiments and therefore 11,358 men)
Dept. of Henrico (19 ROAA and 11,288 men)
And in addition there are 15 ROAA not counted, which by subtraction must be 4,650 men.

This however appears to be adding formations with different strength definitions:
The Johnston one is 535 men per ROAA, which seems low to be PFD given that McClellan on the same date had 604 men PFD per regiment (and the Confederates were in a better garrison position). This may be Effectives.
The Jackson one is 454 men per ROAA, which also seems low to be PFD.
The Dept. of NC numbers give 668 men per ROAA, which seems reasonable to be PFD.
The Dept. of Henrico gives 594 men per ROAA, which also seems reasonable to be PFD.
And the 15 other ROAA by subtraction are 310 men per ROAA, which is far too low.

Changing these estimates so that:
Johnston's old army is increased to 600 men PFD per regiment (a 12% increase)
Jackson's force is multiplied by 6/5 to convert to PFD (making them 19084 men at 545 men per regiment)
And the 15 other ROAA are treated at 594 men PFD per ROAA (like the Dept. of Henrico)
results in a total of 128,024 men PFD at 595 men per regiment.


Second Bull Run campaign

In an order of battle constructed by Schulte for the Northern Virginia campaign, the strengths of all units in theatre are given. This strength, based on comparisons with four separate AotP divisions, is 0.8 x PFD, which means that taking the strength of each unit when first given by Schulte (before battle casualties) and dividing by 0.8 (multiplying by 1.25) will give an estimated PFD for after the Seven Days.
This method will (erroneously) include the regiments which joined Lee's army after the Seven Days (26.1 regiments of all arms) and any forces Jackson left in the Valley (mostly cavalry) and will also not include the formations left behind by Lee to defend Richmond. Ignoring those factors however we have:

27988 (Jackson's army of the Valley, Aug 1) - includes the Laurel Cavalry and Ashby Horse Art
23608 (Longstreet's command Aug 18) - JR Jones, Hood, Evans, Kemper, Wilcox
6150 (Anderson's division, not reported under Longstreet)- Anderson
2223 (Stuart's command not counting the Laurel cavalry) - F. Lee, Stuart Horse Art, Pelham Horse Art
1509 (Hamton's cav Sept 2) - Hampton, Washington Horse Art
24071 (DH Hill's reinforcing column Sept 2) - DH Hill, McLaws, Walker

Total 85,549 effectives (107,000 PFD)
With Seven Days casualties: 127,000 PFD



Officers

This might sound weird, but it's based off some interesting information noticed in a book from the turn of the 20th century.
Essentially, this author noticed that Lee was complaining that he didn't have enough officers for his regiments after the Seven Days, at a time when he had already sent Jackson (but not AP Hill) off back to the north.
On July 20, Lee had 4,333 officers in his army (not counting Jackson) which was up 12 regiments on the Seven Days.


As it happens, McClellan's report for the 10th of July (which includes Fort Monroe and is up nine regiments on Seven Days strength) has a headline number of 4,327 officers PFD. Looking at all McClellan's infantry units gives a range of 19-25.3 enlisted men per officer, with the average being 23 (so officer number * 24 is a rough estimate of PFD strength for an infantry formation).

The same figure for the whole of McClellan's force, sans Fort Monroe, is about 22.3 (so officer number * 23.3 for whole-force PFD) and including Fort Monroe makes it 22 men per officer (so officer number * 23).

Based on this estimate our first-order calculation for Lee's strength on July 20 would be on the order of 99,700-104,000 PFD.



Doing the same calculation with Lee's infantry units using the July 20 strengths means he comes out as about 13.5 to 18.5 officers per man (averaging 15.2), which is far lower (and definitely supports the idea he's not using the same measure of PFD). Since the AotP corps in March pre-Peninsular campaign were in the range 20.5-23 officers per man (average 22.3) it looks like the reason for the discrepancy is not that McClellan had ended up with a disproportionate number of non-PFD officers; it must be the case that Lee's officer count is proportionate (or low), rather than high.


This means we can estimate Seven Days strength as:


Same number of men per officer as McClellan, for Lee's July 20 strength
+ Jackson and Ewell from Schulte
+ 7 days casualties
- reinforcement regiments (which had arrived by July 20 but which were not at the Seven Days)
- recovered Confederate casualties


4333 officers at Richmond July 20, x 23 by comparison with McClellan = 99,700 PFD
Jackson and Ewell August 1 (7500 + 5700) / 0.8= 16,500 PFD (this is from the Schulte ORBAT and assumes no cavalry went north with Jackson)
Seven Days casualties 20,000 (assume PFD)
12 reinforcement regiments (9152 * 12/13.4) = 8,200 PFD <- this is the reinforcements Lee got post-Seven-Days and by July 20, calculated by comparison with the 13.4-regiment Pennsylvania Reserve division on June 20


Estimate of recovered casualties based on Union...
5th Corps on June 20 exc/ of attached cavalry is (3+493+10940+268+5477+85+2023) (PFD main 5th Corps) + 382+9132 (McCall) for 28803 total
Suffers 56+939 killed and 101 + 2700 captured (3796 unrecoverable casualties) n.b. cav casualties ca. 40 overall, do not affect conclusion
Suffers 194+3611 wounded (3805 recoverable casualties)
Strength July 10 is 20203 + 817 for 21020 total
If no wounded recovered, would be 21202
So recovered casualties 10 days after end of fighting are negligible and/or compensated for by sickness

Will assume 2,000 Confederate casualties recovered by July 20, to argue a fortiori

Thus:

99700 + 16500 + 20000 - 8200 - 2000 =
126,000 PFD

 

[Nathan Towne]

About that. In Regiments of All Arms that's just about 100. (Slightly over 1000 companies.)


Another ~350 companies join in May (and are either at Seven Pines or arriving around the time of Seven Pines) and then about another 660 added and 20 dissolved in June (the 660 number counts Jackson and Ewell), giving slightly over 2000 companies before adding the Richmond defenders (about another 100-150).

Just looking at it up through Seven Pines, you have:

Nine artillery batteries reinforced the Army in May, I believe, just from Richmond (perhaps 560 men). Then the Fourth Virginia Heavy artillery and four more companies of artillery were sent into the Army as infantry (perhaps another 660). Then we have the seventeen companies of the Wise Legion (perhaps another 950 men). Add to that several miscellaneous companies of cavalry (maybe 240 men) and then Huger's division. Then you have the Sixth, Sixteenth, Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Virginia regiments left at Drewry's and Chaffin's bluffs. Then there is the Richmond defense force (between 2,600 and 4,800 men, per Newton).

We would need good returns from Huger's and A.P. Hill's division?

 

[Saphroneth]

Add to that several miscellaneous companies of cavalry (maybe 240 men) and then Huger's division. Then you have the Sixth, Sixteenth, Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Virginia regiments left at Drewry's and Chaffin's bluffs. Then there is the Richmond defense force (between 2,600 and 4,800 men, per Newton).

We would need good returns from Huger's division?

Well, Mahone, Wright and Armistead were in Anderson's division in the Second Bull Run campaign, and Ransom and Walker's bdes were in Walker's division. I can do you their first appearances in the Schulte Second Bull Run ORBAT (which based on his Union ORBAT should be effectives):


Walker's division arrived September 2 with the reinforcing column under DH Hill

Walker's Division / BG John G. Walker 5159 92

Ransom's Brigade / BG Robert Ransom, Jr. 2018 40
Brigade Staff 4
24th NC 552 10
25th NC 507 10
35th NC 487 10
49th NC 468 10

Walker's Brigade / Col. Van Manning 2959 50
Brigade Staff 4
3rd AR 503 10
27th NC 563 10
46th NC 584 10
48th NC 700 10
30th VA 605 10

Walker's Division Artillery 182 2
Stafford (French's) VA Lt. Arty. 93 1
Petersburg (Branch's) VA Arty. 89 1


Anderson's division arrived in the theatre of operations mid-August:



Anderson's Division / MG R.H. Anderson 6150
Division Staff 4

Armistead's Brigade / BG Lewis Armistead 2166
Brigade Staff 3
9th VA 395
14th VA 416
38th VA 352
53rd VA 342
57th VA 451
5th VA Bn. 207

Mahone's Brigade / BG William Mahone 1729
Brigade Staff 4
6th VA 501
12th VA 480
16th VA 373
41st VA 371

Wright's Brigade / BG A.R. Wright 1650
Brigade Staff 3
44th AL 462
3rd GA 393
22nd GA 329
48th GA 463

Anderson's Division Artillery 601

Lee's Battalion / Col. Stephen D. Lee 445
Bath (Taylor's) VA Arty. 82
Portsmouth (Grimes') VA Arty. 68
Bedford (Jordan's) VA Arty. 72
Richmond (Parker's ) VA Arty. 100
Rhett's SC Btty. 60
Ashland (Woolfolk's) VA Arty. 63

Other Artillery 156
Norfolk (Huger's) VA Arty. 79
Lynchburg Beauregard (Moorman's) VA Arty. 77



This is obviously post-Seven-Days, but might be useful. It suggests 11300 effectives after the Seven Days, but Seven Days casualties for those units are:

Mahone​	437​
Wright​	666​
Armistead​	301​
Artillery​	27​
Ransom​	624​
Walker​	12​
Artillery​	17​

Total 2084.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Well, Mahone, Wright and Armistead were in Anderson's division in the Second Bull Run campaign, and Ransom and Walker's bdes were in Walker's division. I can do you their first appearances in the Schulte Second Bull Run ORBAT (which based on his Union ORBAT should be effectives):


Walker's division arrived September 2 with the reinforcing column under DH Hill

Walker's Division / BG John G. Walker 5159 92

Ransom's Brigade / BG Robert Ransom, Jr. 2018 40
Brigade Staff 4
24th NC 552 10
25th NC 507 10
35th NC 487 10
49th NC 468 10

Walker's Brigade / Col. Van Manning 2959 50
Brigade Staff 4
3rd AR 503 10
27th NC 563 10
46th NC 584 10
48th NC 700 10
30th VA 605 10

Walker's Division Artillery 182 2
Stafford (French's) VA Lt. Arty. 93 1
Petersburg (Branch's) VA Arty. 89 1


Anderson's division arrived in the theatre of operations mid-August:



Anderson's Division / MG R.H. Anderson 6150
Division Staff 4

Armistead's Brigade / BG Lewis Armistead 2166
Brigade Staff 3
9th VA 395
14th VA 416
38th VA 352
53rd VA 342
57th VA 451
5th VA Bn. 207

Mahone's Brigade / BG William Mahone 1729
Brigade Staff 4
6th VA 501
12th VA 480
16th VA 373
41st VA 371

Wright's Brigade / BG A.R. Wright 1650
Brigade Staff 3
44th AL 462
3rd GA 393
22nd GA 329
48th GA 463

Anderson's Division Artillery 601

Lee's Battalion / Col. Stephen D. Lee 445
Bath (Taylor's) VA Arty. 82
Portsmouth (Grimes') VA Arty. 68
Bedford (Jordan's) VA Arty. 72
Richmond (Parker's ) VA Arty. 100
Rhett's SC Btty. 60
Ashland (Woolfolk's) VA Arty. 63

Other Artillery 156
Norfolk (Huger's) VA Arty. 79
Lynchburg Beauregard (Moorman's) VA Arty. 77



This is obviously post-Seven-Days, but might be useful. It suggests 11300 effectives after the Seven Days, but Seven Days casualties for those units are:

Mahone​	437​
Wright​	666​
Armistead​	301​
Artillery​	27​
Ransom​	624​
Walker​	12​
Artillery​	17​

Total 2084.

Yeah, so, obviously Mahone's, Armistead's and Blanchard's (later Wright's) brigades were involved at Seven Pines. Ransom's and Walker's brigades were approaching Richmond at the time.

I would have to find some returns from elsewhere in order to get a better image. Johnston estimated that Huger's division numbered about 7,000 men. G.W. Smith had said approximately 5,000. Livermore put them at 6,237.

Then, of course, we have A.P. Hill's division, which composed several additional brigades to the Army.

What do you think the entire Army numbered by the time of Seven Pines?

 

[Saphroneth]

What do you think the entire Army numbered by the time of Seven Pines?

Seven Pines I would say was close to an even battle. From a past post of mine:


During May, Johnston was urging that the Confederates pull all their available troops together at Richmond. This process only really began in May (though it continued in June to a much greater extent) but in addition to the ~103 regiments of all arms with which he marched away from Yorktown the Confederates gained another 35-36 regiments of all arms.

These consisted of:
12 ROAA from Norfolk (Huger's force)
19.6 ROAA in what became AP Hill's division (a brigade left at Fredericksburg, Field's, plus Gregg and JR Anderson which went to Fredericksburg and Branch which went to Gordonsville. All four of these brigades came down to Richmond over the course of late May.
And about four and a half ROAA in miscellaneous units and batteries.

On top of that there's about 7-9 ROAA of garrison forces in Richmond itself, but we won't count those as no direct attack on Richmond was considered in the period.

This means that Johnston's force has increased by roughly a third by the end of May, though he also suffered casualties at Williamsburg.


The first-order estimate of what we should expect to see is a 33% increase in total PFD+, minus the amount of casualties suffered at Williamsburg and the minor battles (for a total of 1,682 at Williamsburg and 48 at Eltham's Landing) resulting in an estimated 91,800 PFD facing McClellan around Richmond for the period of Hanover Court House and Seven Pines. This force is quite close in strength to McClellan's own total around this period, and it should be because the regimental counts are quite similar and that's what this is fundamentally based on (~151 ROAA for McClellan with 103,000 PFD* and 682 men per regiment, ~138 ROAA for Johnston with 91,800 PFD and 655 men per regiment.)

* May 31 morning report, almost identical total strength to May 20 normal report, so pre Seven Pines and thus comparable


+ context from another post - I took the 58,443 effectives I had from the Yorktown siege and multiplied it by 1.20 (6/5) to get PFD


Thus:

McClellan has the advantage if both commanders can get their whole force into the battle (he has about one more division), but of course Johnston didn't (Longstreet's division and a few other brigades bore basically the entire CS casualties, leaving other units untouched) and McClellan couldn't (6th Corps was stuck north of the river by collapsed bridges, as was 5th, and moving 5th south of the river on anything more than a temporary basis risks the supply line being cut).

 

[Saphroneth]

A point that's worth bringing up is the age-old comparison issue where the Confederates have black people to do some camp and logistics duties, so the same number of enlisted-in-regiments men can generate more fighting men for the Confederates; similar ration strengths should produce similar fighting strengths, though*, unless the CS units simply don't need men detached to do some soldier duties at all.


*As 120,000 Union troops with 30,000 men detached on noncombat duties is 120,000 rations eaten for 90,000 combat troops; 100,000 Confederate troops with 20,000 slaves/freedmen and 10,000 men detached on noncombat duties is 120,000 rations eaten for 90,000 combat troops.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Seven Pines I would say was close to an even battle. From a past post of mine:


During May, Johnston was urging that the Confederates pull all their available troops together at Richmond. This process only really began in May (though it continued in June to a much greater extent) but in addition to the ~103 regiments of all arms with which he marched away from Yorktown the Confederates gained another 35-36 regiments of all arms.

These consisted of:
12 ROAA from Norfolk (Huger's force)
19.6 ROAA in what became AP Hill's division (a brigade left at Fredericksburg, Field's, plus Gregg and JR Anderson which went to Fredericksburg and Branch which went to Gordonsville. All four of these brigades came down to Richmond over the course of late May.
And about four and a half ROAA in miscellaneous units and batteries.

On top of that there's about 7-9 ROAA of garrison forces in Richmond itself, but we won't count those as no direct attack on Richmond was considered in the period.

This means that Johnston's force has increased by roughly a third by the end of May, though he also suffered casualties at Williamsburg.


The first-order estimate of what we should expect to see is a 33% increase in total PFD+, minus the amount of casualties suffered at Williamsburg and the minor battles (for a total of 1,682 at Williamsburg and 48 at Eltham's Landing) resulting in an estimated 91,800 PFD facing McClellan around Richmond for the period of Hanover Court House and Seven Pines. This force is quite close in strength to McClellan's own total around this period, and it should be because the regimental counts are quite similar and that's what this is fundamentally based on (~151 ROAA for McClellan with 103,000 PFD* and 682 men per regiment, ~138 ROAA for Johnston with 91,800 PFD and 655 men per regiment.)

* May 31 morning report, almost identical total strength to May 20 normal report, so pre Seven Pines and thus comparable


+ context from another post - I took the 58,443 effectives I had from the Yorktown siege and multiplied it by 1.20 (6/5) to get PFD


Thus:

McClellan has the advantage if both commanders can get their whole force into the battle (he has about one more division), but of course Johnston didn't (Longstreet's division and a few other brigades bore basically the entire CS casualties, leaving other units untouched) and McClellan couldn't (6th Corps was stuck north of the river by collapsed bridges, as was 5th, and moving 5th south of the river on anything more than a temporary basis risks the supply line being cut).

Yeah, so for the reasons which I have stated above, I am not sure whether we can be using that type of metric for conversion here. We need actual numbers to reflect what the approximate relationship should be at any given time.

How large do you take A.P. Hill's division to have been by the time of Seven Pines?

 

[Saphroneth]

Yeah, so for the reasons which I have stated above, I am not sure whether we can be using that type of metric for conversion here. We need actual numbers to reflect what the approximate relationship should be at any given time.

The reason why I've been using regiments of all arms in forming my assessment is that those at least are easy to track - and while we can't form a precise estimate, it's good enough for a rough one.

How large do you take A.P. Hill's division to have been by the time of Seven Pines?

That depends what you mean by "A.P. Hill's division", because it shifted around and much of the formation was marching south a few days earlier as "the Army of the North" - part of it collided with Porter near Hanover Junction.

Discounting the 4th and 9th VA and the 12th NC Cavalry (all of which were part of the Army of the North), I make it:

Field's bde 42 coys inf, 1 bty art
JR Anderson 48 coys inf, 2 bty art
Gregg 50 coys inf, 1 bty art
Branch 50 coys inf, 2 btys art



There were also two brigades which GW Smith took to Yorktown back in April (now under Archer and Pender) which were added to AP Hill's division at some point, but I don't have precise values noted for those as the composition had shifted around a lot. So the answer I have is 190 NEW coys of inf and 6 NEW artillery batteries, plus units that had already been part of Johnston's army.


If they were of similar size to typical Union ones that should be about 13,400 PFD in the four new brigades, exclusive of cavalry. (i.e. almost 50% stronger than a typical Union division, because it has "19 regiments" instead of 12-14.)

 

[Nathan Towne]

The reason why I've been using regiments of all arms in forming my assessment is that those at least are easy to track - and while we can't form a precise estimate, it's good enough for a rough one.


That depends what you mean by "A.P. Hill's division", because it shifted around and much of the formation was marching south a few days earlier as "the Army of the North" - part of it collided with Porter near Hanover Junction.

Discounting the 4th and 9th VA and the 12th NC Cavalry (all of which were part of the Army of the North), I make it:

Field's bde 42 coys inf, 1 bty art
JR Anderson 48 coys inf, 2 bty art
Gregg 50 coys inf, 1 bty art
Branch 50 coys inf, 2 btys art



There were also two brigades which GW Smith took to Yorktown back in April (now under Archer and Pender) which were added to AP Hill's division at some point, but I don't have precise values noted for those as the composition had shifted around a lot. So the answer I have is 190 NEW coys of inf and 6 NEW artillery batteries, plus units that had already been part of Johnston's army.


If they were of similar size to typical Union ones that should be about 13,400 PFD in the four new brigades, exclusive of cavalry. (i.e. almost 50% stronger than a typical Union division, because it has "19 regiments" instead of 12-14.)

It is just too unclear for me to be trying to look at it that way.

As far as the numbers regarding the Northern Virginia Campaign, just in terms of what the Confederate Army actually brought to bear in the campaign, it was nowhere near 100,000 men. Not even close.

However, just to move off for a second back onto the topic which was being discussed here the other day, obviously, McClellan, along with others had been urging reinforcement on the Peninsula and consolidation in northern Virginia and that consolidation finally occurred in June, after the back and forth with McDowell's Corps, with the forces which would comprise the Army of Virginia. What became Sigel's (formerly Fremont's), Banks' and McDowell's Corps. First, Second and Third Corps of the Army of Virginia, later to become First, Eleventh and Twelfth U.S. Army Corps. Maybe, 51,000 men of all arms.

Pope essentially received orders to operate towards Gordonsville and Charlottesville, simultaneously operating against the Virginia Central Railroad. To this, the Confederates would either have to draw down force from around Richmond, or if they didn't then Pope could begin to move against Richmond himself.

Obviously, it had taken WAY too long for the government to finally do this. Much of Jackson's command had moved to Richmond, along with forces from across much of the rest of Virginia, McClellan had made his determination to shift his supply base and the Seven Days was opening. By July 2nd, the Army of the Potomac had largely fallen back to Harrison's Landing and so within basically a week, Pope was really not particularly optimistic about this formulation, any longer.

So, on July 4th, with Lee's entire Army, largely consolidated and completely between them, therefore harming the prospect for coordinated action, Pope was writing to McClellan saying "Were I to move with my command direct on Richmond, I must fight the whole force of the enemy before I could join you, and at so great a distance from you as to be beyond any assistance from your army." However, Pope was also under orders that he was the primary force which had to operate between Confederate forces and Washington.

So, Pope told McClellan that day that he would essentially concentrate his Army east of the Blue Ridge, on a line from Fredericksburg to Culpepper and Sperryville. From there, he could counter any Confederate thrust until, as he put it, "some well-defined plan of operations and cooperation can be determined on."

By July 8th, Pope was in front of the JCCW putting forward his conception for a new strategic plan and Chase was writing in his diary within days that Pope was consequently advocating the abandonment of the Peninsula in order to operate from the RF&P along the Rappahannock (Pope had been made abundantly aware of the limitations of the O&A and that it couldn't support a combined force, nor the Army of the Potomac).

Virtually everything that the Confederates could muster had been sent to confront the Army of the Potomac over the course of May and June and it wasn't until the second half of June that the process of consolidation was put in motion in any substantial way and not until June 26th that Pope received orders to take command of the Army.

If I was McClellan, I would have been very upset at the way in which things played out, to be entirely honest.

 

[Saphroneth]

As far as the numbers regarding the Northern Virginia Campaign, just in terms of what the Confederate Army actually brought to bear in the campaign, it was nowhere near 100,000 men. Not even close.

Well, yes, they only brought two "corps" to bear, and DH Hill's "corps" didn't arrive until after the main fighting. 60,000 effectives actually involved counting max strengths of each individual unit, maybe ~75,000 PFD; after 9,000 casualties at 2BR and at least 17,000 in Maryland, but the addition of DH Hill's "corps" and recovery of wounded/casualty replenishment, the Confederate Army was around 64,000 PFD by their own count on October 10 and 78,000 PFD by their own count at Fredericksburg.

However, Pope was also under orders that he was the primary force which had to operate between Confederate forces and Washington.

This is, I think, the primary bugbear of all Union operations in the East - the consistent belief that there had to be a large force between Confederate forces and Washington (and that a purely defensive ~40,000 wouldn't cut it). The only time that this injunction was broken was Grant's Overland, and only because the force had to hook around south of Richmond to attack it.


The attempt to use the same force defensively and offensively hampered the offensive operations; the unwillingness to recruit enough troops to do both jobs hampered the offensive operations; the unwillingness to wait a couple of months in July and August until reinforcements were available hampered the offensive operations.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Well, yes, they only brought two "corps" to bear, and DH Hill's "corps" didn't arrive until after the main fighting. 60,000 effectives actually involved counting max strengths of each individual unit, maybe ~75,000 PFD; after 9,000 casualties at 2BR and at least 17,000 in Maryland, but the addition of DH Hill's "corps" and recovery of wounded/casualty replenishment, the Confederate Army was around 64,000 PFD by their own count on October 10 and 78,000 PFD by their own count at Fredericksburg.



This is, I think, the primary bugbear of all Union operations in the East - the consistent belief that there had to be a large force between Confederate forces and Washington (and that a purely defensive ~40,000 wouldn't cut it). The only time that this injunction was broken was Grant's Overland, and only because the force had to hook around south of Richmond to attack it.


The attempt to use the same force defensively and offensively hampered the offensive operations; the unwillingness to recruit enough troops to do both jobs hampered the offensive operations; the unwillingness to wait a couple of months in July and August until reinforcements were available hampered the offensive operations.

Yeah, I think that it was a seriously limiting issue, for sure.