The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[67th Tigers]

A note on prisoner exchanges.

In some of the above, it has been assumed that prisoners were rapidly paroled prior to the Dix-Hill Cartel. This is not true.

At the beginning of 1862, none of the Federal prisoners from Manassas or Ball's Bluff (ca. 1,600) had been exchanged. The Federals proffered an exchange of the Hatteras prisoners (ca. 400) and in three batches a bit over 750 Federal prisoners were exchanged, leaving a balance of ca. 850 from Manassas and Ball's Bluff still in rebel prisons at Richmond, and outstations. The rebels offered further exchanges, and Stanton ordered Wool on 11th February to negotiate a system, but the Donelson capture caused a change in Stanton's policy, and prisoner swaps were halted.

The bulk of the balance of the Manassas and Ball's Bluff prisoners were the 860-ish swapped in mid-May, leaving some officers and odds and sods yet to be swapped (Cols Willcox and Corcorran for example). By this time ca. 600 prisoners from Williamsburg were coming in, creating the pressure on the prisons. Then Front Royal and Seven Pines added 1,800 prisoners to Richmond. Given overcrowding, Jackson was ordered to hold all further prisoners at Lynchburg (ca. 2,300 after 1st Winchester etc.) and 560 were shipped to Salisbury, NC.

It is important to remember that there were maybe 300 disloyal citizens in prison, and about 100 rebel soldiers under sentence. In addition to the major actions, and handful of foragers etc. were captured daily, Stuart sent in ca. 160 from his raid, there were ca. 70 captured at Hanover Ct Hse etc. - say 400 for minor operations (adding at least a hundred extra sent down by Jackson).

By mid-July there are the following prisoners in the East:

Richmond: 7,847 (Seven Days, Seven Pines etc.)
Salisbury: 780 (Williamsburg, about 100 residual from Manassas etc. the Vermonters from Dam No. 1 and even some from Shiloh etc.)

The 7,847 at Richmond are approximately:
400 "disloyal citizens" and rebel soldiers under sentence
maybe 300 residual prisoners from old operations not moved to Salisbury
650 from Seven Pines
400 from minor operations
leaving a little over 6,000 from the Seven Days, including 40 medical staff.

This doesn't leave much room for large numbers of additional prisoners.

The Richmond Dispatch recorded the exchanges of late July-early August. If you add the numbers up, they give around 7,000 to 7,200 prisoners in Richmond (assuredly excluding civil prisoners and rebel soldiers under sentence). Thus, it would appear there were no significant additional prisoners not counted in mid-July. So, by mid-August these supposed extra prisoners still have not appeared at Richmond.

A note of the numbers of missing

Often the number of missing were overcounted, and come down over time. Often the number of killed and wounded come up, as the fates of lost soldiers were clarified over time. Often there was a larger number of missing than prisoners, and over many weeks the rolls were clarified. If some early rolls state larger numbers of missing, they probably state lower numbers of killed and wounded, because this hasn't been resolved yet.

Caution must be taken with rolls taken recently after action, and any additional missing must be tracked over longer terms, and the killed and wounded also taken notice of. Typically, over several weeks, the fates of many of the missing will be found out, and many missing will be moved to the killed and wounded categories, and stragglers will return. A longitudinal study must be made.

The extra missing from before the rolls resolve into their final state are not necessarily evidence of extra prisoners, but are more generally just a statement of what is not yet known.

The compiled reports in the OR are finalised. The number of men lost will be a constant. Additional "missing" from earlier timepoints will typically come off the killed and wounded.

 

[Belfoured]

A note on prisoner exchanges.

In some of the above, it has been assumed that prisoners were rapidly paroled prior to the Dix-Hill Cartel. This is not true.

At the beginning of 1862, none of the Federal prisoners from Manassas or Ball's Bluff (ca. 1,600) had been exchanged. The Federals proffered an exchange of the Hatteras prisoners (ca. 400) and in three batches a bit over 750 Federal prisoners were exchanged, leaving a balance of ca. 850 from Manassas and Ball's Bluff still in rebel prisons at Richmond, and outstations. The rebels offered further exchanges, and Stanton ordered Wool on 11th February to negotiate a system, but the Donelson capture caused a change in Stanton's policy, and prisoner swaps were halted.

The bulk of the balance of the Manassas and Ball's Bluff prisoners were the 860-ish swapped in mid-May, leaving some officers and odds and sods yet to be swapped (Cols Willcox and Corcorran for example). By this time ca. 600 prisoners from Williamsburg were coming in, creating the pressure on the prisons. Then Front Royal and Seven Pines added 1,800 prisoners to Richmond. Given overcrowding, Jackson was ordered to hold all further prisoners at Lynchburg (ca. 2,300 after 1st Winchester etc.) and 560 were shipped to Salisbury, NC.

It is important to remember that there were maybe 300 disloyal citizens in prison, and about 100 rebel soldiers under sentence. In addition to the major actions, and handful of foragers etc. were captured daily, Stuart sent in ca. 160 from his raid, there were ca. 70 captured at Hanover Ct Hse etc. - say 400 for minor operations (adding at least a hundred extra sent down by Jackson).

By mid-July there are the following prisoners in the East:

Richmond: 7,847 (Seven Days, Seven Pines etc.)
Salisbury: 780 (Williamsburg, about 100 residual from Manassas etc. the Vermonters from Dam No. 1 and even some from Shiloh etc.)

The 7,847 at Richmond are approximately:
400 "disloyal citizens" and rebel soldiers under sentence
maybe 300 residual prisoners from old operations not moved to Salisbury
650 from Seven Pines
400 from minor operations
leaving a little over 6,000 from the Seven Days, including 40 medical staff.

This doesn't leave much room for large numbers of additional prisoners.

The Richmond Dispatch recorded the exchanges of late July-early August. If you add the numbers up, they give around 7,000 to 7,200 prisoners in Richmond (assuredly excluding civil prisoners and rebel soldiers under sentence). Thus, it would appear there were no significant additional prisoners not counted in mid-July. So, by mid-August these supposed extra prisoners still have not appeared at Richmond.

A note of the numbers of missing

Often the number of missing were overcounted, and come down over time. Often the number of killed and wounded come up, as the fates of lost soldiers were clarified over time. Often there was a larger number of missing than prisoners, and over many weeks the rolls were clarified. If some early rolls state larger numbers of missing, they probably state lower numbers of killed and wounded, because this hasn't been resolved yet.

Caution must be taken with rolls taken recently after action, and any additional missing must be tracked over longer terms, and the killed and wounded also taken notice of. Typically, over several weeks, the fates of many of the missing will be found out, and many missing will be moved to the killed and wounded categories, and stragglers will return. A longitudinal study must be made.

The extra missing from before the rolls resolve into their final state are not necessarily evidence of extra prisoners, but are more generally just a statement of what is not yet known.

The compiled reports in the OR are finalised. The number of men lost will be a constant. Additional "missing" from earlier timepoints will typically come off the killed and wounded.

Too many targets, too little time.

650 from Seven Pines

False. It's already been pointed out that in early June c. 560 prisoners captured at Seven Pines had been sent south to Salisbury. The entire federal MIA at Seven Pines (once they figured it out) was 647. And that would assume that literally every MIA was captured and sent to Richmond.

The good news is that we've apparently abandoned the claim that the mid-July population at Richmond included a significant number of Jackson's captures in the Valley. That's tough to square with the fact that until mid-August 2,500 were held at Lynchburg before being ultimately transferred to Richmond.

Extra credit - what are the stats on the deaths of Federal prisoners while they were held in Richmond? There's a source indicating a high death rate among the captured wounded. Dead men don't get exchanged and they don't get counted in those being held.

 

[OpnCoronet]

That is not the comparison in question. The comparison is, what else could the Army of the Potomac have done?

But do you deny that Lee had 215 or more regiments of all arms?






It was not "the plan he insisted on, no matter what". It was the plan that was enforced by a council of corps commanders called by Lincoln, overriding McClellan's recommendation (for an Urbana plan).

It should also be pointed out that the reason why the enemy army was so strong as of late June (215 regiments of all arms) relative to McClellan's army at the same time (170 regiments of all arms) is a combination of:

1) The initial removal of several divisions of troops from McClellan's army. The adoption of the plan had been based on the not unreasonable idea that McClellan's army would not be stripped of tens of thousands of troops.
2) The repeated denial of troops from McClellan's army, which had been expecting McDowell's corps to arrive since Lincoln's cabinet ministers recommended it in the middle of May. There were ample troops available to reinforce McClellan with between 20,000 and 40,000 extra men PFD without unduly uncovering Washington or harming any other offensive operations.
3) The delays which permitted the Confederates to pull in reinforcements from all over the Confederacy. They considered the fighting around Richmond the main effort and concentrated more troops there than the Union had (in regimental terms) despite being outnumbered across the continent (in regimental terms) by several hundred.


Despite those problems, McClellan nearly pulled it off, and had those promised reinforcements arrived within a calendar month of the time that the fact-finding expedition said they should be sent as soon as possible it would not have been possible for Lee to force him away from Richmond.

Please be serious. The council of Corps Commanders was Lincoln's compromise for letting McClellan implement his Peninsula Campaign, i.e., Lincoln would allow McClellan to take the AoP to the Peninsula as insisted on by McClellan, if he left sufficient forces behind, as decided by the Council, to safely cover Washington D. C. The Council of Corps Commanders was called in order to allow McClellan to continue his Peninsula Campaign, not stop it, after all little mac agreed to follow the recommendation of the Council.


Wherever those confederate reg'ts were, they apparently were not with Johnston or Jackson, at the beginning of McClellan's campaign

 

[Saphroneth]

Please be serious. The council of Corps Commanders was Lincoln's compromise for letting McClellan implement his Peninsula Campaign, i.e., Lincoln would allow McClellan to take the AoP to the Peninsula as insisted on by McClellan, if he left sufficient forces behind, as decided by the Council, to safely cover Washington D. C. The Council of Corps Commanders was called in order to allow McClellan to continue his Peninsula Campaign, not stop it, after all little mac agreed to follow the recommendation of the Council.

I am being serious. McClellan wanted to implement the Urbana plan which he'd been evolving for months (having rejected the plan of landing at Fort Monroe after a study done by James Shields concluded that it would involve a long delay reducing Yorktown), and there was a meeting of divisional commanders over that topic on the 7th of March which accepted the Urbana plan 8 to 4. The Urbana plan involved the movement of two corps (more or less) to Urbana, not four, with the rest of the Army of the Potomac intended to follow Johnston closely on his retreat from Manassas - that is, to substantially stay between Washington and Johnston for the first phase of the campaign.


The 12th-13th March meeting of the freshly promoted corps commanders was the one which substituted in the Peninsular plan.

In both cases, McClellan accepted the result of a voting council of generals which was convened at Lincoln's request and which did not include him as a voting member.

 

[OpnCoronet]

What McClellan could have done was to March his 80,000 men already available to him and march to Yorktown, overwhelm Magruder's force and march on Richmond, or, at least, Try.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I am being serious. McClellan wanted to implement the Urbana plan which he'd been evolving for months (having rejected the plan of landing at Fort Monroe after a study done by James Shields concluded that it would involve a long delay reducing Yorktown), and there was a meeting of divisional commanders over that topic on the 7th of March which accepted the Urbana plan 8 to 4. The Urbana plan involved the movement of two corps (more or less) to Urbana, not four, with the rest of the Army of the Potomac intended to follow Johnston closely on his retreat from Manassas - that is, to substantially stay between Washington and Johnston for the first phase of the campaign.


The 12th-13th March meeting of the freshly promoted corps commanders was the one which substituted in the Peninsular plan.

In both cases, McClellan accepted the result of a voting council of generals which was convened at Lincoln's request and which did not include him as a voting member.

That was one of the iterations of the Urbana Plan, yes. It wasn't really one plan. It was a conception, which was then modified numerous times.

What McClellan could have done was to March his 80,000 men already available to him and march to Yorktown, overwhelm Magruder's force and march on Richmond, or, at least, Try.

Why 80,000 men? As mentioned earlier, from the March 31st Report, the Army of the Potomac landed over 121,500 men on the Peninsula, just from those figures and units.

 

[Saphroneth]

What McClellan could have done was to March his 80,000 men already available to him and march to Yorktown, overwhelm Magruder's force and march on Richmond, or, at least, Try.

When? 80,000 men means we're talking about... definitely the point when the last two divisions except for Franklin have landed, in PFD terms. So we're looking at 11th April at the earliest as that's when Richardson and Hooker managed to disembark after the storm of the 6th-10th.

At that point the effective force in the Yorktown line was about 34,000, and that's at a point when Richardson and Hooker are still at Ship Point after disembarking (and still have some way to go to get to the front line), as does Casey's division which was at Hampton Roads. Given it's in effectives, then we're looking at roughly a 2:1 Union advantage, and the Confederates have a belt of fortifications mostly fronted by a river too deep to wade.

Do you think that it's more likely than not that McClellan could "overwhelm" the forces in the Warwick line at that point? Or do you think it's more likely than not that attacking straight into the defences would result in very high casualties?

A prepared attack on a weak point is something else, but you're not advocating for that.

 

[Saphroneth]

Why 80,000 men? As mentioned earlier, by March 31st, the Army of the Potomac had landed over 121,500 men on the Peninsula.

I don't think that can possibly be the case, since the totality of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Corps (before Blenker is detached), plus the cavalry, artillery and Sykes' regulars, HQ troops etc, as of the March return (including some cavalry that McClellan did not get to take) is 102,964 PFD. Of that many divisions hadn't even disembarked from Alexandria by March 31.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sedgwick departed Alexandria 29th March (so could have disembarked by the 31st) and Casey departed Alexandria 31st March (so would not have disembarked). The foregoing units were Hamilton, Porter, Smith, Couch and Sykes, representing:

2/3 of 3rd Corps
2/3 of 4th Corps
Much (but not all) of the HQ troops
And Sedgwick makes about 40% of the 2nd Corps.

We're looking at about 56,000 having disembarked by March 31.

I don't actually know if McClellan ever got 121,500 men in the Peninsular Campaign, at least PFD. It would depend on the size of the reinforcement echelon he got from Fort Monroe etc., they'd have to equal about 7,000 men.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I am being serious. McClellan wanted to implement the Urbana plan which he'd been evolving for months (having rejected the plan of landing at Fort Monroe after a study done by James Shields concluded that it would involve a long delay reducing Yorktown), and there was a meeting of divisional commanders over that topic on the 7th of March which accepted the Urbana plan 8 to 4. The Urbana plan involved the movement of two corps (more or less) to Urbana, not four, with the rest of the Army of the Potomac intended to follow Johnston closely on his retreat from Manassas - that is, to substantially stay between Washington and Johnston for the first phase of the campaign.


The 12th-13th March meeting of the freshly promoted corps commanders was the one which substituted in the Peninsular plan.

In both cases, McClellan accepted the result of a voting council of generals which was convened at Lincoln's request and which did not include him as a voting member.

You are not being serious, if you are trying to say The Peninsula Campaign was not McClellan's substitute for his defunct Urbana Plan.

That was one of the iterations of the Urbana Plan, yes. It wasn't really one plan. It was a conception, which was then modified numerous times.



Why 80,000 men? As mentioned earlier, by March 31st, the Army of the Potomac had landed over 121,500 men on the Peninsula.

I agree completely, it is that I am using the historical context of when McClellan finally, actually began his movement on Yorktown, his strike force was something like 80,000 men, which many, including me, believe was sufficient to overwhelm Magruder at Yorktown, or at least have been attempted. When your are deep in enemy territory, you cannot afford to wait around.

 

[Saphroneth]

You are not being serious, if you are trying to say The Peninsula Campaign was not McClellan's substitute for his defunct Urbana Plan.

He undoubtedly prioritized the Peninsula over going overland, but the Urbana plan was not "defunct" until the March 12/13 meeting nixed the Urbana and substituted in the Peninsula (which was a choice by the corps commanders, not him). At no point did McClellan actually choose the Peninsula plan - the decision was made by others.

I agree completely, it is that I am using the historical context of when McClellan finally, actually began his movement on Yorktown, his strike force was something like 80,000 men, which many, including me, believe was sufficient to overwhelm Magruder at Yorktown, or at least have been attempted. When your are deep in enemy territory, you cannot afford to wait around.

Would you be so kind as to explain how said "overwhelming" should have been done? I'll note that McClellan advanced April 3rd (his plans for a quiet buildup followed by a surprise strike with 1st Corps having been working until Heintzelman, Porter and Smith gave the game away in late March, and McClellan moved to the Peninsula personally around the end of March)

For example, should McClellan have ordered both his advancing columns to attack the moment they arrived? Would that have sufficed to be "attempting"?

 

[67th Tigers]

You are not being serious, if you are trying to say The Peninsula Campaign was not McClellan's substitute for his defunct Urbana Plan.

I agree completely, it is that I am using the historical context of when McClellan finally, actually began his movement on Yorktown, his strike force was something like 80,000 men, which many, including me, believe was sufficient to overwhelm Magruder at Yorktown, or at least have been attempted. When your are deep in enemy territory, you cannot afford to wait around.

You might believe it, but since you think 5 divisions, a spare brigade and 3 cavalry regiments = 80,000, one must wonder.

All up, McClellan's available force ca. 5th April, including non-combatants, was ca. 58,000. It consisted of 5 divisions of infantry, thus:

3rd Corps
3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry
F.J. Porter's Division
Hamilton's Division

4th Corps
5th US Cavalry
Smith's Division
Couch's Division

Reserve (one day behind the advance columns)
6th US Cavalry
Sedgwick's Division
Regular brigade
ca. 5 reserve arty btys

In terms of effectives it was maybe 46,000, rather than 80,000.

Magruder's ca. 16,000 bayonets were indeed outnumbered by McClellan, but he had the advantage of a river line covered with plenty of artillery, and permanent fortifications. Recent military events should tell us how much of a force multiplier that is.

When you are deep in enemy territory, you can't afford to squander resources on low probability of success operations.

 

[Saphroneth]

The operative issue is really that - and people often forget this - the Warwick line is not really a line of defensive fortifications, at least from the point of view of an attacker or a defender. It's a set of discontinuous possible points of attack, and then there's a (short) linear section, and finally a bastion fort from before the War of Independence - the latter of which is of course vulnerable if you have modern heavy artillery, but not without that.

The width of the position really means that you can't shift attacking forces from one point of attack to another (specifically you can't shift attacking forces from one column to another).

 

[Nathan Towne]

Sedgwick departed Alexandria 29th March (so could have disembarked by the 31st) and Casey departed Alexandria 31st March (so would not have disembarked). The foregoing units were Hamilton, Porter, Smith, Couch and Sykes, representing:

2/3 of 3rd Corps
2/3 of 4th Corps
Much (but not all) of the HQ troops
And Sedgwick makes about 40% of the 2nd Corps.

We're looking at about 56,000 having disembarked by March 31.

I don't actually know if McClellan ever got 121,500 men in the Peninsular Campaign, at least PFD. It would depend on the size of the reinforcement echelon he got from Fort Monroe etc., they'd have to equal about 7,000 men.

@Saphroneth

I apologize. That was very poorly phrased on my part. I am often not as careful as I should be with blog posts. What I meant was, using the March 31st Report as a basis (meaning assuming the March 31st numbers), approximately 121,000 men from units contained within the Report, landed on the Peninsula. Tucker tracked them as they came in.

So, again, using the March 31st Report figures, of those units, I am thinking that somewhere in excess of 121,000 were landed on the Peninsula.

 

[Saphroneth]

I apologize. That was very poorly phrased on my part. I am often not as careful as I should be with blog posts. What I meant was, using the March 31st Report as a basis (meaning assuming the March 31st numbers), approximately 121,500 men from units contained within the Report, landed on the Peninsula. Tucker tracked them as they came in.

So, again, using the March 31st Report figures, of those units, I am thinking that somewhere around 121,500 men were landed on the Peninsula.

Alas, the only way I can get that strength is by taking the units which McClellan was permitted to take (as of 6th April, i.e. after he'd had everything deducted that was going to be deducted) and adding back in three divisions (any three of Franklin, McCall, Blenker, King) and/or some of the cavalry that got lost.

It may be a rough statement of the troops that actually went before the Seven Days (which is the 6th April strength plus Franklin and McCall) and the reinforcements stripped from the Dept. of Virginia and sent from Baltimore/DC, which would hold if the non-AoP reinforcements totalled to about 6,500 by my count. Maybe less if I've lost track of a cav regiment or two.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Alas, the only way I can get that strength is by taking the units which McClellan was permitted to take (as of 6th April, i.e. after he'd had everything deducted that was going to be deducted) and adding back in three divisions (any three of Franklin, McCall, Blenker, King) and/or some of the cavalry that got lost.

Yeah, I was referring to total shipments.

On the May 20th return, the Army reported 102,670 men PFD.

-11 OR 3:184

Before the April 6th storm swept through, how many men do you have as having landed?

 

[Saphroneth]

Before the April 6th storm swept through, how many men do you have as having landed? 55-60,000 PFD?

The April 6th storm prevented Richardson and Hooker landing, and Casey was still at Hampton Roads. So:



Infantry (removing cav regiments at 500 PFD per and assigning remaining corps manpower pro-rata on a company basis)
Sedgwick 8783, Porter 12240, Hamilton 9124, Couch 10721, Smith 9977, Sykes 3905:
54750 PFD
+ (Casey 10721 PFD in the rear at Hampton Roads, having landed without much of their equipment, including tents AIUI, but freed up another division for the advance)

Reserve artillery: ~12 batteries or so had landed out of the reserve artillery, and the siege artillerymen may have landed but without their pieces. 1500-2000.

Cavalry: 3 PA, 5 US, 6 US, 1 US and a few sundries had landed. About 2000-2500.

Plus HQ troops.


So somewhere around 70,000 PFD in combat units, plus or minus a few thousand, of which about 10,000 was Casey in the rear and unable to advance. So 60,000 PFD able to attack the Warwick line at some point before the storm, though the rear of the right column (Sedgwick and Sykes) can only really be brought into the fight on the 6th.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The April 6th storm prevented Richardson and Hooker landing, and Casey was still at Hampton Roads. So:



Infantry (removing cav regiments at 500 PFD per and assigning remaining corps manpower pro-rata on a company basis)
Sedgwick 8783, Porter 12240, Hamilton 9124, Couch 10721, Smith 9977, Sykes 3905:
54750 PFD
+ (Casey 10721 PFD in the rear at Hampton Roads, having landed without much of their equipment, including tents AIUI, but freed up another division for the advance)

Reserve artillery: ~12 batteries or so had landed out of the reserve artillery, and the siege artillerymen may have landed but without their pieces. 1500-2000.

Cavalry: 3 PA, 5 US, 6 US, 1 US and a few sundries had landed. About 2000-2500.

Plus HQ troops.


So somewhere around 70,000 PFD in combat units, plus or minus a few thousand, of which about 10,000 was Casey in the rear and unable to advance. So 60,000 PFD able to attack the Warwick line at some point before the storm, though the rear of the right column (Sedgwick and Sykes) can only really be brought into the fight on the 6th.

I was just estimating in my head. I hadn't done the math on it.

 

[Saphroneth]

On the May 10th return, the Army reported 102,670 men PFD.

The May 10th return is of course after McClellan got Franklin back, and that lines up about right (the March 31 strength of the units which had gone by then was 103,069 PFD exclusive of the cavalry outside the Regular Cavalry formation, so probably around 104,000-105,000 PFD depending on whether e.g. the 1st NY is carried on the returns, and then minus Williamsburg casualties.)

 

[Nathan Towne]

The May 10th return is of course after McClellan got Franklin back, and that lines up about right (the March 31 strength of the units which had gone by then was 103,069 PFD exclusive of the cavalry outside the Regular Cavalry formation, so probably around 104,000-105,000 PFD depending on whether e.g. the 1st NY is carried on the returns, and then minus Williamsburg casualties.)

I am out working at the moment and don't have access to my books (and the early Peninsula campaign is not an area I have studied quite as extensively as some areas of the war), so I don't recall at the moment, do you recall exactly when Hooker's and Richardson's divisions disembarked?