The Peninsula Pinkerton and Mac

[Saphroneth]

I am out working at the moment and don't have access to my books (and the early Peninsula campaign is not an area I have studied quite as extensively as some areas of the war), so I don't recall at the moment, do you recall exactly when Hooker's and Richardson's divisions disembarked?

From memory they disembarked finishing on the 11th* (at Ship Point; IIRC Richardson's disembarkation was spread over the whole storm making little progress and Hooker's began on the 10th after it was over) and were held at Ship Point for a few days, then came up to the main line on the 16th (along with Casey). That movement up to the main line is associated with McClellan planning an assault at Dam Number One.

* could be 12th, in which case shift all times below forwards one day
Most likely they could have been used on the Warwick line on the 12th in full, or brigade elements on the 11th, but the engineering analysis that identified a weak point took up several days during and after the storm and until that was done McClellan didn't really know where he was going to want them (or if it would be better to use them by sea?) and it's easier to go to either end of the line or the middle if you're coming up one of the roads from Ship Point than if you're going laterally along the line of the encamped army.

I believe it's only once those two divisions have disembarked that transports can go back and pick up Franklin.

 

[67th Tigers]

The Irish Brigade of Richardson's division traveled on the Ocean Queen and Columbia, and disembarked at Ship Point on the 12th, having rode out the storm with the entire brigade on ship.

Howard's brigade (minus the 64th NY, left at Washington awaiting a ship) traveled on the S.R. Spaulding (61st NY and 81st Pa), Donaldson and Croton (5th NH and the brigade baggage and arty). The Spaulding managed to offload 2 regts by the morning of the 6th, and Donaldson landed 6 coys of the 5th NH on the 6th. The Croton was delayed until after the storm, with the brigades baggage, arty and the rest of the 5th NH.

Roughly 3 regts of French's bde disembarked on the 6th.

Roughly half of Richardson's infantry disembarked by the 6th, without their artillery, transportation or baggage. They were then pinned down by the storm, 10 miles from McClellan's lines. The remainder offloaded the 10th-12th.

Hooker's division were embarking around the 6th, and Heintzelman's journal records that Naglee's brigade arrived on the 11th, another on the 17th and the last on the 21st.

What I know of Franklin's movements is here.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hooker's division were embarking around the 6th, and Heintzelman's journal records that Naglee's brigade arrived on the 11th, another on the 17th and the last on the 21st.

Cripes, much later than my understanding had it! So really the planned attack on the 16th/17th would have had only one bde of Hooker available.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The Irish Brigade of Richardson's division traveled on the Ocean Queen and Columbia, and disembarked at Ship Point on the 12th, having rode out the storm with the entire brigade on ship.

Howard's brigade (minus the 64th NY, left at Washington awaiting a ship) traveled on the S.R. Spaulding (61st NY and 81st Pa), Donaldson and Croton (5th NH and the brigade baggage and arty). The Spaulding managed to offload 2 regts by the morning of the 6th, and Donaldson landed 6 coys of the 5th NH on the 6th. The Croton was delayed until after the storm, with the brigades baggage, arty and the rest of the 5th NH.

Roughly 3 regts of French's bde disembarked on the 6th.

Roughly half of Richardson's infantry disembarked by the 6th, without their artillery, transportation or baggage. They were then pinned down by the storm, 10 miles from McClellan's lines. The remainder offloaded the 10th-12th.

Hooker's division were embarking around the 6th, and Heintzelman's journal records that Naglee's brigade arrived on the 11th, another on the 17th and the last on the 21st.

What I know of Franklin's movements is here.

Hey @67th Tigers,

What do you have for citations as to the movements which you detailed in Franklin's division?

 

[Nathan Towne]

What McClellan could have done was to March his 80,000 men already available to him and march to Yorktown, overwhelm Magruder's force and march on Richmond, or, at least, Try.

@OpnCoronet

When? If you are looking at a Confederate defense of around 58,400 men, which is what I think is the best figure to use relative to U.S. PFD, until definite evidence is brought forward to demonstrate otherwise, the numerical discrepancy in play here was not that enormous. I mean, remember how long it took to reduce the siege at Petersburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

When? If you are looking at a Confederate defense of around 58,400 men, which is what I think is the best figure to use relative to U.S. PFD, until definite evidence is brought forward to demonstrate otherwise, the numerical discrepancy in play here was not that enormous. I mean, remember how long it took to reduce the siege at Petersburg.

That force had not all arrived by April 5. There's actually a fairly reasonable comparison with Vicksburg, though - strongly fortified position, about the same number of men in the attacking force and defending force, though Vicksburg has no river and a longer frontage.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That force had not all arrived by April 5. There's actually a fairly reasonable comparison with Vicksburg, though - strongly fortified position, about the same number of men in the attacking force and defending force, though Vicksburg has no river and a longer frontage.

Yeah, I hadn't finished.

I was going to go on to use the analogy of the 1864 Georgia campaign. For much of the campaign, whilst Johnston commanded the Army of Tennessee, aside from a stretch following the arrival of the Army of Mississippi (Polk's Corps and the cavalry which was sent to the Army), Sherman's Army Group had a rough numerical superiority of slightly less than two to one (again, as a very rough figure that way). @67th Tigers, by the way, this is an issue which I have spent a lot of time on and I can assure that that is correct. 60%, or so, of Federal strength was a common discrepancy based on PFD figures. Now, how many of the positions which were taken were actually broken?

Here, the position essentially has to be broken, unless turned via water. Granted, U.S. naval presence and heavy siege guns could be and were brought to bear, but the basic point is the basic point.

 

[Saphroneth]

Here, the position essentially has to be broken, unless turned via water. Granted, U.S. naval presence and heavy siege guns could be and were brought to bear, but the basic point is the basic point.

That much is certainly true. There would be a valid argument that the position could have been weak enough on the first day or two to be stormed, if it actually was - if Magruder only had 5,000 in the whole line on April 5 then that's potentially weak enough to just roll over, for example, regardless of how many troops were slated to arrive over the following days - but that really needs to be argued positively in the sense of "a strong attack here could have worked, because..." and ideally reference made to other places where a similar position was taken elsewhere in the war, under circumstances as similar as possible. To argue a fortiori then we might want the taken positions in the example to be stronger.

Instead, what we see is that it's actually quite rare to overcome a defensive line frontally, and time-consuming turning operations or siege work are often preferred instead. There's a few cases where they're overcome, at very low density of troops, and other cases where it can be argued that the defensive line could have been overcome frontally (the very early cases at Petersburg for example where the defenders were at some ridiculously tiny density like 1 man per 10 feet of front) but they're rare compared to cases of attacks against comparatively weaker positions slaughtering the attackers.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That much is certainly true. There would be a valid argument that the position could have been weak enough on the first day or two to be stormed, if it actually was - if Magruder only had 5,000 in the whole line on April 5 then that's potentially weak enough to just roll over, for example, regardless of how many troops were slated to arrive over the following days - but that really needs to be argued positively in the sense of "a strong attack here could have worked, because..." and ideally reference made to other places where a similar position was taken elsewhere in the war, under circumstances as similar as possible. To argue a fortiori then we might want the taken positions in the example to be stronger.

Instead, what we see is that it's actually quite rare to overcome a defensive line frontally, and time-consuming turning operations or siege work are often preferred instead. There's a few cases where they're overcome, at very low density of troops, and other cases where it can be argued that the defensive line could have been overcome frontally (the very early cases at Petersburg for example where the defenders were at some ridiculously tiny density like 1 man per 10 feet of front) but they're rare compared to cases of attacks against comparatively weaker positions slaughtering the attackers.

Well, yes, certainly, the position was weakest as Johnston's forces were coming up. However, Federal force was also weaker at the time.

You can actually track these things on essentially a daily basis.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well, yes, certainly, the position was weakest as Johnston's forces were coming up. However, Federal force was also weaker at the time.

You can actually track these things on essentially a daily basis.

Yes, that's what I'm arguing in favour of - I just think collapsing it down to end-siege strength (for either side) isn't really a true picture of the situation at the time, because there's the possibility that the position was weak to be stormed into earlier (and that needs to be evaluated on the situation at the time). It certainly wasn't later in the siege when Johnston has more men than he needs to fill the entrencments.

 

[Saphroneth]

According to John Tucker, the U.S. Army had "delivered" to Fortress Monroe by March 31st of 1862, approximately 121,500 men (presumably PFD), 14,592 animals, 1,224 wagons and ambulances and 44 batteries of artillery. (11 OR 3:53). How do you intend to supply that Army down the O&A?

So I tracked down where Tucker says this, and he says it was done within 37 days from the order in Washington. I suspect that this means from the vicinity of 13-17 March to the vicinity of 19-23 April.

 

[67th Tigers]

Just from an examination of the returns, the 121,500 must have been the aggregate present of the whole force, with Franklin.

 

[67th Tigers]

@Nathan Towne

I looked at every regimental history I could find, Snell Franklin thesis and a few others.

Most significantly, the timings of the Kearny Brigade convoy came from the History of the First Brigade, New Jersey Volunteers (link).

Slocum's Brigade was largely from this recent history of the 96th Pa (link)

All I could find in Newton's brigade was a history of the 18th NY, giving one ship (link).

 

[67th Tigers]

Regarding Magruder on the 5th; he probably had about 20,000 effectives of all arms (including cavalry) on the Yorktown line on the 5th. Claims of 10,500 or 11,000 refer to ca. 27th March - the beginning of the campaign. His available force had approximately doubled by reinforcement upto the 5th.

By regiments the dispositions were:

• Out on Mulberry Island: 5th La and Noland's Bn
• At Lee's Mill: 5 regiments and a Bn, (2nd La, 10th La, 15th La, 10th Ga, 24th Ga and 1st La Bn)
• At Dam No. 1 and environs: 3 Regts (14th Al, 13th NC and 14th NC) - note, with Colston's brigade you have to go into diaries, histories to find out when they retook position. It was the night of the 4th-5th.
• Reserve at the Lebanon Church: 4 Regts (Wilcox's Bde, 9th, 10th and 11th Al and 19th Miss) - the 9th and 11th Alabama were redeployed to Wynn's Mill and then one regiment was recalled, which is where most of the "marching in circles" myth comes from.
• At Wynn's Mill: 3 regts and a Bn (8th Al, 14th La, 3rd Va and 1st La Zouaves)
• At the Redoubts: 3 Regts and 3 Bns/ partial regts (1st Fl, 13th Al, 23rd Ga, 2nd Ms Bn, 26th Va (partial) and 46th Va (partial))
• In Yorktown proper: 2 Regts and 23-ish coys of heavy arty (6th Ga and 26th Al, etc.)

Most of these are mentioned in Magruder report of operations of the 5th, but the Colston's brigade etc. you have to go to diaries and regimental histories, which I have done.

I examine the (lack of) evidence for McClellan be deceived here.

 

[67th Tigers]

Delete, double post.

 

[OpnCoronet]

@OpnCoronet

When? If you are looking at a Confederate defense of around 58,400 men, which is what I think is the best figure to use relative to U.S. PFD, until definite evidence is brought forward to demonstrate otherwise, the numerical discrepancy in play here was not that enormous. I mean, remember how long it took to reduce the siege at Petersburg.

Was the numerical discrepancy any more than during Chancellorsville or Gettysburg? My point is, deep in enemy territory, the initiative must be maintained.

Whatever the 'discrepancy' it was in favor of McClellan, and he did not even try the defenses Yorktown.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Just from an examination of the returns, the 121,500 must have been the aggregate present of the whole force, with Franklin.

The Tucker figure is at:

-5 OR 46.

It is probably an aggregate present figure, yes.

However, as I was noting separately, 121,000 men, or so, PFD, is in the realm of reason for total Peninsula shipments.

Just going back to the 1864 Georgia Campaign, for one second, as I noticed that you had posted on force strengths in another thread. I will post the total PFD figures, for all branches, below. Just providing that as a basic framework that way.

-On the April 30th Returns, the Army of Tennessee reported 54,500 PFD (4,589 officers and 49,911 file).

-On the June 10th Returns, the Army of Tennessee reported 69,946 PFD (6,538 officers and 63,408 file).

-On the June 30th Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 62,747 PFD (6,066 officers and 56,681 file).

-On the July 10th Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 59,196 PFD (5,931 officers and 53,265 file).

-On the July 31st Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 51,793 PFD (4,976 officers and 46,817 file).

-On the August 10th Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 51,946 PFD (5,017 officers and 46,929 file).

-On the August 20th Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 51,157 PFD (4,992 officers and 46,165 file).

-On the August 31st Returns, the Army of Tennessee Reported 51,141 PFD (4,955 officers and 46,186 file).

-38 OR 3:676-684

 

[OpnCoronet]

He undoubtedly prioritized the Peninsula over going overland, but the Urbana plan was not "defunct" until the March 12/13 meeting nixed the Urbana and substituted in the Peninsula (which was a choice by the corps commanders, not him). At no point did McClellan actually choose the Peninsula plan - the decision was made by others.


Would you be so kind as to explain how said "overwhelming" should have been done? I'll note that McClellan advanced April 3rd (his plans for a quiet buildup followed by a surprise strike with 1st Corps having been working until Heintzelman, Porter and Smith gave the game away in late March, and McClellan moved to the Peninsula personally around the end of March)

For example, should McClellan have ordered both his advancing columns to attack the moment they arrived? Would that have sufficed to be "attempting"?

Are you trying to say The Peninsula Campaign was Not initiated and planned by McClellan, without actually saying it?

I repeat, the only Corps Commanders Council I am aware of was the one called by Lincoln to settle on the exact number of troops left behind to defend Washington City, before McClellan would be allowed to initiate his Peninsula operation.

The fact is, McClellan began active field operations by moving on Yorktown and there he surveyed Magruder's lines and ordered his engineers to find a suitable assault point which they did and little mac chose instead to open a formal siege operation, without even testing Magruder's defenses. We do not know how strong the confederate defenses actually were, because little mac did not try them.




P.S. Gen Johnston inspected Magruder's defenses and disapproved making a stand there, because the lines were vulnerable and the vulnerable part was exactly the part of the confederate line McClellan's engineers chose as the weak point of the confederate defensive line.

 

[Saphroneth]

Are you trying to say The Peninsula Campaign was Not initiated and planned by McClellan, without actually saying it?

I repeat, the only Corps Commanders Council I am aware of was the one called by Lincoln to settle on the exact number of troops left behind to defend Washington City, before McClellan would be allowed to initiate his Peninsula operation.

The fact is, McClellan began active field operations by moving on Yorktown and there he surveyed Magruder's lines and ordered his engineers to find a suitable assault point which they did and little mac chose instead to open a formal siege operation, without even testing Magruder's defenses. We do not know how strong the confederate defenses actually were, because little mac did not try them.

The first March meeting (March 7 IIRC) had a vote, and had as a conclusion that Urbana should be enacted. One week later (March 12-13) Lincoln asked for a second vote by a different subset of people, and that second vote instituted the Peninsular campaign.

I do not know how I can state this any clearer. The Peninsular plan was not McClellan's first choice (that was Urbana) but he deferred to Lincoln's wishes, which was the result of the March 12-13 corps commander vote; that result was to launch the Peninsula, provided that naval support was available (which Keyes said he had confirmed that day) and that 40,000 men were left to defend Washington.


As for how McClellan began active field operations, McClellan ordered both his columns (the right flank led by Porter and the left flank under Keyes) to attack as soon as they reached the line. Both commanders declined to attack because of the strength of the line, which was obvious to them without having to get a thousand men killed.

We actually do know many of the details of the defences - such as that Lee's Mill (where McClellan ordered a bayonet assault and Keyes declined to launch such an attack) is a bridge with a large brigade covering it and 11 guns in nearby defensive works, and with Magruder's main reserve only a mile or so behind it. This is not a position that can be taken at a rush, it is a bridge defended by about as many troops as you can defend a bridge with - at least at the point of attack.

P.S. Gen Johnston inspected Magruder's defenses and disapproved making a stand there, because the lines were vulnerable and the vulnerable part was exactly the part of the confederate line McClellan's engineers chose as the weak point of the confederate defensive line.

Would you be so kind as to post that part of Johnston's inspection report, including which position was identified by Johnston as the weak point of the line? So far as I'm aware Johnston disapproved most of the Red and White Redoubts (as they were built on the forward crest, making them vulnerable to long range rifled artillery fire) while the point of attack that McClellan's engineers selected was Garrow Ridge - a position which neither one of McClellan's columns was aimed at, meaning that it wasn't even found until the scout work was done.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The first March meeting (March 7 IIRC) had a vote, and had as a conclusion that Urbana should be enacted. One week later (March 12-13) Lincoln asked for a second vote by a different subset of people, and that second vote instituted the Peninsular campaign.

I do not know how I can state this any clearer. The Peninsular plan was not McClellan's first choice (that was Urbana) but he deferred to Lincoln's wishes, which was the result of the March 12-13 corps commander vote; that result was to launch the Peninsula, provided that naval support was available (which Keyes said he had confirmed that day) and that 40,000 men were left to defend Washington.


As for how McClellan began active field operations, McClellan ordered both his columns (the right flank led by Porter and the left flank under Keyes) to attack as soon as they reached the line. Both commanders declined to attack because of the strength of the line, which was obvious to them without having to get a thousand men killed.

We actually do know many of the details of the defences - such as that Lee's Mill (where McClellan ordered a bayonet assault and Keyes declined to launch such an attack) is a bridge with a large brigade covering it and 11 guns in nearby defensive works, and with Magruder's main reserve only a mile or so behind it. This is not a position that can be taken at a rush, it is a bridge defended by about as many troops as you can defend a bridge with - at least at the point of attack.



Would you be so kind as to post that part of Johnston's inspection report, including which position was identified by Johnston as the weak point of the line? So far as I'm aware Johnston disapproved most of the Red and White Redoubts (as they were built on the forward crest, making them vulnerable to long range rifled artillery fire) while the point of attack that McClellan's engineers selected was Garrow Ridge - a position which neither one of McClellan's columns was aimed at, meaning that it wasn't even found until the scout work was done.

So, in fact, the planning of the Urbana and Peninsula Operations were Both initiated by McClellan?

McClellan was going to initiate his Urbana Plan, even in the face of Johnston's recent movements, if he had not been prevented by his Corps Commanders?

Do you know the weak spots chosen by McClellan's Engineers?