Most Useful Campaign to Study?

You seem to be projecting. You are the one with no information, other than made-up speculation, about Grant's motive. Even breaking his line is not that obvious, as Grant offered zero reason for attacking at Cold Harbor in his memoirs.

It's pretty obvious, but we have to keep going over the same old ground, because people keep responding to me, offering excuses for Grant, where Grant himself felt the need to make none. He simply regretted Cold Harbor, and made no explanation of his reason for it, although he offered a paragraph for his explanation of the assault at Vicksburg.

It was pure regret of a presumably rash mistake.
I'll gladly trust others in this thread to determine who is "projecting" and using "made-up speculation".
 
Let us put it bluntly. Cold Harbor was a blunder. Grant was the one that made the blunder. What all the fuss is about is calling the shots being 'perfect', and nobody disagrees that all people make mistakes. Grant made a mistake, just as Lee did. And it was not the only one made in the course of either of their lives. So what else is there to admit; a philosophy?
Lubliner.
Agree. It appears that the poster wants everybody to buy a theory that Grant simply lost his marbles/gave in to mindless rage or something, and did this with no notion of a military purpose. This kind of spin has been used against Hood for decades regarding Franklin, based on him simply being "p o'd" about Spring Hill (with the added bogus claim that he was addled by an alleged addiction to laudanum). Hood obviously thought he could take Schofield, whose back was to the Harpeth, by a broad assault against his line. He was wrong - very much so. But there is nothing showing that he did it because he was p o'd, etc.

For the x-teenth time, a decision that turned out to be a mistake/blunder/wrong does NOT mean that the decision was not based on a military purpose. If somebody has evidence, provide it. But relying on the absence of a detailed explanation afterwards to assert there was no purpose is far from proof of anything. Grant said it was a mistake and he regretted it. He didn't have to generate a 10-paragraph elaboration of "here's why I did it". What was Lee's detailed explanation of why he ordered Pickett's Charge? I've seen analysis by experienced military analysts who admit that they have to speculate on what Lee was thinking and have come up with options - all of which have to do with a military purpose.
 
Yes, as I previously noted, many commanders used direct assaults as part of their repertoire; Grant's decision to assault at Cold Harbor was based on his understanding of the tactical situation and the fact that he was running out of space and time to deliver a blow to the ANV. The fact that it did not succeed, and that he regretted the attack, etc., etc., is immaterial to an explanation for the reasons for the assault.
 
Fair point, but staff rides have long been done at several battlefields for teaching purposes. William Glenn Robertson "invented" the modern staff ride to some extent at Chickamauga, for example, and a great many "teaching points" can be effectively illustrated. It's harder to do that at the true operational/"campaign" level in several instances because of the distances.
I believe the point was more from a psychological than operational point of view, insofar as both Jackson and Grant managed to - in the words of Jackson's famous maxim - mystify, mislead, and surprise the combined enemy forces massing against them and completely dominate their opponents mentally.
 
Interesting, thank you for your input. I presumed Chancellorsville would be in there as well, given that Lee divided his smaller force, already half his enemy's strength, and still won a decisive victory, even though he did not destroy the enemy.

Vicksburg is a classic, and so is Jackson's Valley Campaign. I may have to read from a military analyst's book as well, because I would love to see them compare the campaigns with other military history, and explain just why Vicksburg and the Valley stand up so well in comparison.
I think the difference between Chancellorsville and the other two was that they were longer in both time and distances covered, involving aggressive (as opposed to defensive) initiative, whereby a commander plans an operation and then carries out his plan successfully. Lee at Chancellorsville certainly achieved wonders in wresting the initiative from Hooker, but there was no real plan involved, only reaction to Hooker's move after Hooker voluntarily surrendered the initiative.
 
I think the difference between Chancellorsville and the other two was that they were longer in both time and distances covered, involving aggressive (as opposed to defensive) initiative, whereby a commander plans an operation and then carries out his plan successfully. Lee at Chancellorsville certainly achieved wonders in wresting the initiative from Hooker, but there was no real plan involved, only reaction to Hooker's move after Hooker voluntarily surrendered the initiative.

Good point, thank you.
 
I believe the point was more from a psychological than operational point of view, insofar as both Jackson and Grant managed to - in the words of Jackson's famous maxim - mystify, mislead, and surprise the combined enemy forces massing against them and completely dominate their opponents mentally.
To that point, among other elements of the Vicksburg Campaign there was the Grierson Raid and its purpose. Bearss and Tim Smith, at least, think it worked.
 
I think the difference between Chancellorsville and the other two was that they were longer in both time and distances covered, involving aggressive (as opposed to defensive) initiative, whereby a commander plans an operation and then carries out his plan successfully. Lee at Chancellorsville certainly achieved wonders in wresting the initiative from Hooker, but there was no real plan involved, only reaction to Hooker's move after Hooker voluntarily surrendered the initiative.
Another unique difference between Chancellorsville and the other 2 campaigns is that the primary instigator of Chancellorsville (Hooker) was defeated, unlike Vicksburg/Valley in which the commanders who conceived and executed the campaigns were victorious (Grant and Jackson). All 3 campaigns were brilliantly conceived, but at Chancellorsville, Hooker gave up the initiative to Lee who was able to make the most of the situation. Additionally, while the broad aims and movements in Vicksburg/Valley were planned, the actual trajectory of those campaigns were not decided beforehand but developed in response to actual events on the ground. Grant and Jackson were able to move and shift forces to accomplish their objectives in response to changing developments and movements by the enemy.
 
I think Grant's leadership during Vicksburg was the most brilliant campaign of the entire war, here are a few reasons why:

-Grant engineered a new 60 mile path through the swamps to move 40,000 troops and supplies
-executed the largest ever amphibious assault at the time, without knowledge of what would greet them on the Eastern banks of the MS
-had the assault force move forward for two weeks foraging supplies until a supply line was established on the Yazoo at Walnut Hills
-coordinated naval, infantry, marine, cavalry, and artillery forces in significant numbers
-conducted a well planned feint for the Bruinsburg crossing with Grierson's raid, Porter's mortar shelling, and Sherman's demonstration

I'm a fan of what Lee/Jackson did at Chancellorsville, but imo it can no way compare to the scope, magnitude, and sequence of what Grant pulled off at Vicksburg. You can say that Grant got lucky in a few instances (Pemberton's cavalry was chasing Grierson and couldn't blunt the Bruinsburg landing, Porter's running of the guns at Vicksburg (twice), 'foraging' supplies holding up until a new supply line could be established, JE Johnston diddling around with his corps and not in the immediate vicinity to squash the invasion, etc.)... however, I have always felt that the definition of luck is when preparation meets opportunity, and Grant was well prepared for the Vicksburg campaign.
 
What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?
I have always admired Rosecran's Tullahoma Campaign in June/July of 1863. He took Chattanooga with a minimum of bloodshed.
 
What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?
Been heavily studying the Franklin/Nashville Campaing lately. But the Atlanta Campaing is the one to study for skillful maneuvering by both sides.
 
What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?
Useful from which perspective? Supply and logistics? Maneuver? Defense? etc.
 
For me it was the Peninsular campaign.

Like every campaign there were opportunities lost by both sides.

But for McClellan to get the bulk of his army that close to Richmond with as little loss of life as he had incurred up to that point makes for a campaign worth studying.
 
For me it was the Peninsular campaign.

Like every campaign there were opportunities lost by both sides.

But for McClellan to get the bulk of his army that close to Richmond with as little loss of life as he had incurred up to that point makes for a campaign worth studying.
It took a good six weeks and it helps when the opponent does little more than back pedal. Things changed significantly in the body count category once Johnston, and then Lee, decided to actually put up a fight. The Campaign does offer some learning opportunities but I'd focus on aspects such as - just for example - effective combined operations, staging of supplies, the impacts of weather, and the difficulties in coordinating units for an attack (Seven Pines/Fair Oaks)
 
It took a good six weeks and it helps when the opponent does little more than back pedal. Things changed significantly in the body count category once Johnston, and then Lee, decided to actually put up a fight. The Campaign does offer some learning opportunities but I'd focus on aspects such as - just for example - effective combined operations, staging of supplies, the impacts of weather, and the difficulties in coordinating units for an attack (Seven Pines/Fair Oaks)

I agree with what you would focus on. I'd actually argue that McClellan's massing of artillery at Yorktown, and his naval flank movements up the York, had quite a bit to do with Johnston retreating.

Johnston was a rather conservative general, who saw his opponent making all these moves, and he fell back "accordingly." Whereas Lee defied the tactics manual and divided his force in the Seven days, in the face of a numerically superior army, and drove him back to Harrison's Landing. Lee, being a military genius, in that he devised new tactics or broke the rules and still won, was an exceptional general, though.

I'd also argue that McClellan would have done more to Johnston, had his estimates of enemy troop numbers been somewhere near their actual number. Another lesson of the campaign could be something on how to trust your sources for estimating enemy strength.
 
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