Most Useful Campaign to Study?

[American87]

What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?

 

[American87]

I'm going to go with Chancellorsville, for now, because it teaches that Fortune Favors The Bold, more than any other campaign or battle.

So many times in the Civil War, McClellan, Grant in 1861, proved that generals feared making attacks because of what they expected to find on the opposite side, but those fears turned out to be false, and if they had just gone along as planned, which Grant for his sake did, then they would have won.

 

[Lubliner]

For logistics, Sherman's march. For campaigning, Seven days, Second Bull Run, Antietam. I look at Grant as an overall commander to study from Belmont to Appomattox. Every one of his battles need to be taken as a whole to understand his growth in leadership.
Lubliner.

 

[American87]

For logistics, Sherman's march. For campaigning, Seven days, Second Bull Run, Antietam. I look at Grant as an overall commander to study from Belmont to Appomattox. Every one of his battles need to be taken as a whole to understand his growth in leadership.
Lubliner.

Grant was pretty simple, he did what works, when he got lucky, as at Donelson, and he didn't care about the casualties. He would launch an assault more for show, like at Vicksburg, than for any practical purpose it had or he believed it had.

He matched the politics to the war, and gave the Radicals what they wanted, so he was able to keep his position, and I mean this in keeping up an aggressive appearance, even when he probably knew he would fail, like at Cold Harbor.

For Logistics I 100% agree with Sherman, who was not much of a tactician. For precise maneuvering and battles, I assume you mean Lee in those campaigns, then I guess you are right.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

He would launch an assault more for show, like at Vicksburg, than for any practical purpose it had or he believed it had.

even when he probably knew he would fail, like at Cold Harbor.

I think it does Grant, and other generals, a disservice to conclude that because an assault was a bloody failure it was therefore pointless and somehow knowingly futile.

Grant had steadily driven Pemberton in Vicksburg, and the last battle (Black River Bridge) had been an especially smashing victory. Grant also had no idea how long a siege would last.

Likewise, Grant had reason to think he had Lee on the ropes at Cold Harbor.

I don't mean to suggest the assaults were brilliant decisions. They certainly had serious flaws and were failures. But they weren't launched for the LOLZ.

 

[JeffBrooks]

I would say the Vicksburg Campaign and the Atlanta Campaign.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant was pretty simple, he did what works, when he got lucky, as at Donelson, and he didn't care about the casualties.

Grant was no more simple, lucky, or careless about casualties than other generals. Here's another Gordon Rhea quote:

"Grant was less reckless with his soldiers' lives than his predecessors had been. No single day of Grant's pounding saw the magnitude of Union casualties that McClellan incurred in one day at Antietam, and no three consecutive days of Grant's warring proved as costly to the Union in blood as did Meade's three days at Gettysburg. ... Grant and Lee were about as evenly matched in military talent as any two opposing generals have ever been. Grant's strength was unwavering adherence to his strategic objective. He made mistakes, but the overall pattern of his campaign reveals an innovative general employing thoughtful combinations of maneuver and force to bring a difficult adversary to bay on his home turf. Lee's strength was resilience and the fierce devotion that he inspired in his troops. He, too, made mistakes and often placed his smaller army in peril. But each time—Spotsylvania Court House and the North Anna River come to mind—he improvised solutions that turned bad situations his way."​

Gordon C. Rhea, In the Footsteps of Grant and Lee​

 

[OpnCoronet]

For Campaigns, as opposed to battles, Grant's Vicksburg Campaign and Sherman's Atlanta Campaign are the obvious choices, IMO.

If one considers Gettysburg a Campaign as well as a battle, then I think it the most interesting because of so many What If's.

 

[American87]

I think it does Grant, and other generals, a disservice to conclude that because an assault was a bloody failure it was therefore pointless and somehow knowingly futile.

Grant had steadily driven Pemberton in Vicksburg, and the last battle (Black River Bridge) had been an especially smashing victory. Grant also had no idea how long a siege would last.

Likewise, Grant had reason to think he had Lee on the ropes at Cold Harbor.

I don't mean to suggest the assaults were brilliant decisions. They certainly had serious flaws and were failures. But they weren't launched for the LOLZ.

Grant knew they were risky or doomed to fail. That's why he wrote in his memoirs that he regretted making them, and he explained that he made the Assault on Vicksburg, because he didn't want to be judged for launching a siege, with assaulting the works first.

He kept up appearances to look like "The Fighting General," because he knew how Lincoln and the radicals in the North viewed generals who were less than absolutely aggressive.

 

[American87]

Grant was no more simple, lucky, or careless about casualties than other generals. Here's another Gordon Rhea quote:

"Grant was less reckless with his soldiers' lives than his predecessors had been. No single day of Grant's pounding saw the magnitude of Union casualties that McClellan incurred in one day at Antietam, and no three consecutive days of Grant's warring proved as costly to the Union in blood as did Meade's three days at Gettysburg. ... Grant and Lee were about as evenly matched in military talent as any two opposing generals have ever been. Grant's strength was unwavering adherence to his strategic objective. He made mistakes, but the overall pattern of his campaign reveals an innovative general employing thoughtful combinations of maneuver and force to bring a difficult adversary to bay on his home turf. Lee's strength was resilience and the fierce devotion that he inspired in his troops. He, too, made mistakes and often placed his smaller army in peril. But each time—Spotsylvania Court House and the North Anna River come to mind—he improvised solutions that turned bad situations his way."​

Gordon C. Rhea, In the Footsteps of Grant and Lee​

None of McClellan's or Meade's battles were done with as much vanity as Grant's attacks on Vicksburg or Cold Harbor. In Fact, Meade fought a defensive battle at Gettysburg.

Grant attacked incredibly strong positions, leading to exceptionally high casualties, in Cold Harbor's case, because he needed to keep up appearances that he was fighting. He wrote so himself in his memoirs, when he explained that the assault made at Vicksburg was to anticipate criticisms that he conducted a siege without first attempting to take the town by assault, and that he always regretted making it.

 

[DanSBHawk]

None of McClellan's or Meade's battles were done with as much vanity as Grant's attacks on Vicksburg or Cold Harbor. In Fact, Meade fought a defensive battle at Gettysburg.

Grant attacked incredibly strong positions, leading to exceptionally high casualties, in Cold Harbor's case, because he needed to keep up appearances that he was fighting. He wrote so himself in his memoirs, when he explained that the assault made at Vicksburg was to anticipate criticisms that he conducted a siege without first attempting to take the town by assault, and that he always regretted making it.

The "exceptionally high casualties" that the Grant critics cite, in the morning attack of June 3rd at Cold Harbor, were actually less than what Lee suffered during Picketts charge. So maybe you should apply your "vanity" accusation to Lee.

Your characterizations of Grants motivations are fiction.

 

[jackt62]

Of the 3 choices mentioned, I would pick Vicksburg. In terms of maneuver, logistics, army/naval operations, and goals achieved, it must be considered one of the most important campaigns of the war.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant knew they were risky or doomed to fail. That's why he wrote in his memoirs that he regretted making them, and he explained that he made the Assault on Vicksburg, because he didn't want to be judged for launching a siege, with assaulting the works first.

He kept up appearances to look like "The Fighting General," because he knew how Lincoln and the radicals in the North viewed generals who were less than absolutely aggressive.

Completely wrong. Here is what Grant wrote in his memoirs about the attack at Cold Harbor, and Vicksburg:

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.​

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms : they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking sur- face water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained — and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.​

Nothing about "doomed to fail" or about "being judged" or about "fighting general" or about "radicals in the north."

 

[jackt62]

He kept up appearances to look like "The Fighting General," because he knew how Lincoln and the radicals in the North viewed generals who were less than absolutely aggressive.

Disagree. There is nothing to indicate that by the time of the assault at Cold Harbor (not to mention Vicksburg), Grant had to worry about being labeled as a commander who was "less than absolutely aggressive." In fact, Grant had long established his fighting reputation with Lincoln after the campaign against Fts. Henry and Donelson, and his subsequent forays in the Mississippi Valley. Grant's decision to undertake direct assaults at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor were calculated attempts to deliver a coup de grace to an opponent, not to "keep us appearances." The fact that both assaults failed, and were regretted by Grant in later years is simply an acknowledgment of that failure, not that his initial reasoning was necessarily faulty or that he was goaded into them by the political administration.

 

[major bill]

What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?

This would depend on why you were studying them. If one was studying them to gain insight on modern military tactics one battle might be good. However if you are studying them to better understand the tactics of the Civil War era a different battle might serve you better. For example at a military school we studied Gettysburg to gain insight on how modern meeting engagements should be fought by military leaders. If one wanted to better understand how interior lines impact tactics Gettysburg would be good to study If a modern military school wanted the students to study how to seize and maintain the flow of the battle, then a different Civil War battle might be studied.

 

[American87]

The "exceptionally high casualties" that the Grant critics cite, in the morning attack of June 3rd at Cold Harbor, were actually less than what Lee suffered during Picketts charge. So maybe you should apply your "vanity" accusation to Lee.

Your characterizations of Grants motivations are fiction.

Grant's "Critics" are military critics. Grant launched two charges for vanity purposes, and he wrote as such, and wrote that he regretted making them.

Your obsession with shifting Grant criticisms to criticism's of Lee is outstanding. You could just be an honest person you know.

 

[American87]

Completely wrong. Here is what Grant wrote in his memoirs about the attack at Cold Harbor, and Vicksburg:

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.​

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms : they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking sur- face water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained — and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.​

Nothing about "doomed to fail" or about "being judged" or about "fighting general" or about "radicals in the north."

Ah yes, he was worried about what his soldiers would think, if he laid siege to the city without assaulting first. That is why he made it; his troops were overconfident and he wanted to satisfy their egos, even though he regretted it later.

 

[American87]

Disagree. There is nothing to indicate that by the time of the assault at Cold Harbor (not to mention Vicksburg), Grant had to worry about being labeled as a commander who was "less than absolutely aggressive." In fact, Grant had long established his fighting reputation with Lincoln after the campaign against Fts. Henry and Donelson, and his subsequent forays in the Mississippi Valley. Grant's decision to undertake direct assaults at Vicksburg and Cold Harbor were calculated attempts to deliver a coup de grace to an opponent, not to "keep us appearances." The fact that both assaults failed, and were regretted by Grant in later years is simply an acknowledgment of that failure, not that his initial reasoning was necessarily faulty or that he was goaded into them by the political administration.

He certainly liked to keep up appearances. That is why he issued his "We'll fight it out along this line if it takes all summer" statement.

He knew the assaults at Vickburg and Cold Harbor were suicidal. He offered no vindication for making the one at Cold Harbor, and his statement for Vicksburg was that his troops believed they could do anything, and he didn't want to hold them back.

They were both poor decisions where his concern for other's opinions, or his own bull-headishness got in the way of sound military judgement.

 

[American87]

This would depend on why you were studying them. If one was studying them to gain insight on modern military tactics one battle might be good. However if you are studying them to better understand the tactics of the Civil War era a different battle might serve you better. For example at a military school we studied Gettysburg to gain insight on how modern meeting engagements should be fought by military leaders. If one wanted to better understand how interior lines impact tactics Gettysburg would be good to study If a modern military school wanted the students to study how to seize and maintain the flow of the battle, then a different Civil War battle might be studied.

Good answer, thank you.

I take it you like Gettysburg

 

[major bill]

Good answer, thank you.

I take it you like Gettysburg

I can not say I overly like the Battle of Gettysburg. I am interested in how the meeting engagement was fought on day one. At a military school I studied the tactics of how the Soviet Union and the United States armies planed to fight meeting engagements and found them interesting. I participated in a two day exercise about defending against a Soviet style meeting engagement.