Most Useful Campaign to Study?

[American87]

I can not say I overly like the Battle of Gettysburg. I am interested in how the meeting engagement was fought on day one. At a military school I studied the tactics of how the Soviet Union and the United States armies planed to fight meeting engagements and found them interesting. I participated in a two day exercise about defending against a Soviet style meeting engagement.

Where would the U.S. and Soviets have a meeting engagement?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

None of McClellan's or Meade's battles were done with as much vanity as Grant's attacks on Vicksburg or Cold Harbor. In Fact, Meade fought a defensive battle at Gettysburg.

Grant attacked incredibly strong positions, leading to exceptionally high casualties, in Cold Harbor's case, because he needed to keep up appearances that he was fighting. He wrote so himself in his memoirs, when he explained that the assault made at Vicksburg was to anticipate criticisms that he conducted a siege without first attempting to take the town by assault, and that he always regretted making it.

I don't see that as vanity.

Given the criticism Meade faced for not attacking at Lee at Falling Waters it's rather prescient.

When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

Among the rank-and-file perhaps, but not among key generals like Baldy Smith given his overcaution at Petersburg.

it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking sur- face water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with.

In a war where far more men died of disease than all other causes combined, this a pretty serious concern. A serious yellow fever outbreak in Grant's army could have broken the siege.

 

[jackt62]

He knew the assaults at Vickburg and Cold Harbor were suicidal

I would not categorize the first assault at Vicksburg on May 19th as being knowingly suicidal. Grant had achieved a series of open field victories against Pemberton's Army of Mississippi which led to that force withdrawing into its Vicksburg entrenchments. Grant authorized the first assault in the hope that it would lead to Vicksburg's fall and negate the necessity of a siege. Yes, that limited attempt failed but it prompted Grant to attempt a second assault on May 22nd. That assault was made along a longer front, and the portion of the assault at the Stockade Redan was in fact termed a "forlorn hope." The failure of the second assault ended any chance of quickly capturing Vicksburg, but convinced Grant that further direct attacks were futile. As far as Cold Harbor is concerned, a similar pattern presented itself. Grant had maneuvered Lee and the ANV from the Rappahannock almost to the James River, but was not successful in destroying the ANV. Cold Harbor was Grant's last chance to salvage the Overland Campaign and achieve a damaging blow to the enemy. Once again, that assault failed and Grant was forced to abandon his campaign, and alter his strategy by crossing the James and striking at Petersburg's underbelly. So although in retrospect, Grant regretted these assaults, his motivation for carrying them out at the time was based on calculated military reasoning. Right or wrong, Grant believed that he could achieve his goals by overcoming enemy forces in these cases. Let's remember that Grant was a highly aggressive commander, a trait that ultimately led the way to northern success. His use of direct assaults was still a limited tactic but one that he maintained in his toolbox.

 

[major bill]

Where would the U.S. and Soviets have a meeting engagement?

I am not sure I remember where the simulated engagement took place but probably somewhere in eastern Europe, perhaps eastern Germany. The battle we planned for and studied was between armored or mechanized divisions so was on the small size. One of the goals was to prevent the Soviets from achieving 3 to 1 combat power at any one point. Remember terrain effects the combat power a Soviet tank brigade has as a given place.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Ah yes, he was worried about what his soldiers would think, if he laid siege to the city without assaulting first. That is why he made it; his troops were overconfident and he wanted to satisfy their egos, even though he regretted it later.

So no acknowledgment that your first mischaracterizations were wrong. You simply make new mischaracterizations.

 

[Belfoured]

I'm going to go with Chancellorsville, for now, because it teaches that Fortune Favors The Bold, more than any other campaign or battle.

So many times in the Civil War, McClellan, Grant in 1861, proved that generals feared making attacks because of what they expected to find on the opposite side, but those fears turned out to be false, and if they had just gone along as planned, which Grant for his sake did, then they would have won.

Chancellorsville also teaches some other lessons - (1) a force that achieves surprise and gains the initiative should not voluntarily surrender its advantage (see April 30); (2) a commander should not simply reject repeated intelligence coming from the front about the enemy's movements, especially on his flanks, based on assumptions (see May 2); (3) when a commanding officer is partially incapacitated he should defer to a competent subordinate (see May 4); (4) when a force has significant numerical superiority over an enemy that has divided his already inferior force, the superiority should be exploited (see May 3-4); (5) when a communication ordering a supporting element to fill a vulnerable point is critical, redundancy in the means of communication is advisable (see May 2).

 

[Belfoured]

I am not sure I remember where the simulated engagement took place but probably somewhere in eastern Europe, perhaps eastern Germany. The battle we planned for and studied was between armored or mechanized divisions so was on the small size. One of the goals was to prevent the Soviets from achieving 3 to 1 combat power at any one point. Remember terrain effects the combat power a Soviet tank brigade has as a given place.

I have a friend who when he was in the Army studied an armored meeting engagement that would occur in what was then Czechoslovakia. They did a lot of conventional warfare tactical analysis for eastern Europe.

 

[American87]

I don't see that as vanity.

Given the criticism Meade faced for not attacking at Lee at Falling Waters it's rather prescient.



Among the rank-and-file perhaps, but not among key generals like Baldy Smith given his overcaution at Petersburg.



In a war where far more men died of disease than all other causes combined, this a pretty serious concern. A serious yellow fever outbreak in Grant's army could have broken the siege.

I was wrong in believing that Grant was tying to put on an image for Lincoln and the Radicals back home; he attacked at Vicksburg because his troops thought they were invincible, and he didn't want to disappoint them by initiating a siege without assaulting first. He later wrote he regretted it, despite his reasons for making it in the first place.

 

[American87]

I would not categorize the first assault at Vicksburg on May 19th as being knowingly suicidal. Grant had achieved a series of open field victories against Pemberton's Army of Mississippi which led to that force withdrawing into its Vicksburg entrenchments. Grant authorized the first assault in the hope that it would lead to Vicksburg's fall and negate the necessity of a siege. Yes, that limited attempt failed but it prompted Grant to attempt a second assault on May 22nd. That assault was made along a longer front, and the portion of the assault at the Stockade Redan was in fact termed a "forlorn hope." The failure of the second assault ended any chance of quickly capturing Vicksburg, but convinced Grant that further direct attacks were futile. As far as Cold Harbor is concerned, a similar pattern presented itself. Grant had maneuvered Lee and the ANV from the Rappahannock almost to the James River, but was not successful in destroying the ANV. Cold Harbor was Grant's last chance to salvage the Overland Campaign and achieve a damaging blow to the enemy. Once again, that assault failed and Grant was forced to abandon his campaign, and alter his strategy by crossing the James and striking at Petersburg's underbelly. So although in retrospect, Grant regretted these assaults, his motivation for carrying them out at the time was based on calculated military reasoning. Right or wrong, Grant believed that he could achieve his goals by overcoming enemy forces in these cases. Let's remember that Grant was a highly aggressive commander, a trait that ultimately led the way to northern success. His use of direct assaults was still a limited tactic but one that he maintained in his toolbox.

Grant never admitted any valid reason for attacking at Cold Harbor, though he admitted regretting it. He kept his motives a secret. If he had any valid reason for the charge, he would have said so, like he did for Vicksburg. He was simply frustrated that Lee kept blocking him, and he wanted to make one all-out, against-all-odds assault before crossing the James, because he knew he would look weak in Northern eyes if he passed Lee twice—North Anna and Cold Harbor—without fighting, and his own bull-headishness convinced him to make a suicidal attack out of frustration and determination. Of course, he never admitted these things; he had no valid military reason to offer when writing his memoirs.

His attack at Vicksburg was to satisfy his troops' ego, who thought they were invincible. Other than that, his own military reason was that he did not want to fight siege conditions in the hot summer Southern sun, and he needed to try to town by assault to prevent that. Notice here that he offers some military reason for the charge, but he still regrets it.

 

[American87]

I am not sure I remember where the simulated engagement took place but probably somewhere in eastern Europe, perhaps eastern Germany. The battle we planned for and studied was between armored or mechanized divisions so was on the small size. One of the goals was to prevent the Soviets from achieving 3 to 1 combat power at any one point. Remember terrain effects the combat power a Soviet tank brigade has as a given place.

Interesting. I never knew that about armor, I have almost zero knowledge of armored warfare. But thanks for the interesting insight, much appreciated.

 

[American87]

So no acknowledgment that your first mischaracterizations were wrong. You simply make new mischaracterizations.

I know you want to control my words, But I'm just using what Grant wrote. It's too bad you can't take it up with him why he fought at Vicksburg, the assault that is.

 

[Belfoured]

I would not categorize the first assault at Vicksburg on May 19th as being knowingly suicidal. Grant had achieved a series of open field victories against Pemberton's Army of Mississippi which led to that force withdrawing into its Vicksburg entrenchments. Grant authorized the first assault in the hope that it would lead to Vicksburg's fall and negate the necessity of a siege. Yes, that limited attempt failed but it prompted Grant to attempt a second assault on May 22nd. That assault was made along a longer front, and the portion of the assault at the Stockade Redan was in fact termed a "forlorn hope." The failure of the second assault ended any chance of quickly capturing Vicksburg, but convinced Grant that further direct attacks were futile. As far as Cold Harbor is concerned, a similar pattern presented itself. Grant had maneuvered Lee and the ANV from the Rappahannock almost to the James River, but was not successful in destroying the ANV. Cold Harbor was Grant's last chance to salvage the Overland Campaign and achieve a damaging blow to the enemy. Once again, that assault failed and Grant was forced to abandon his campaign, and alter his strategy by crossing the James and striking at Petersburg's underbelly. So although in retrospect, Grant regretted these assaults, his motivation for carrying them out at the time was based on calculated military reasoning. Right or wrong, Grant believed that he could achieve his goals by overcoming enemy forces in these cases. Let's remember that Grant was a highly aggressive commander, a trait that ultimately led the way to northern success. His use of direct assaults was still a limited tactic but one that he maintained in his toolbox.

I'm skeptical of arguments that these officers - Grant, Lee, or others - ordered assaults for any reason other than their assessment of what was militarily appropriate or necessary. That's completely different from whether the attacks were "good" or "bad" decisions. I've long heard this stuff about Hood at Franklin - that the attack was made because he was p o'd about Spring Hill. I think the attack was a bad idea, and it turned out that way. But I believe that Hood made the assault for his perception of military reasons. The same holds for Lee on July 3 at Gettysburg, Grant's assaults at Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, Lee at Malvern Hill, etc.

 

[jackt62]

The same holds for Lee on July 3 at Gettysburg, Grant's assaults at Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, Lee at Malvern Hill, etc

Many of the major army commanders authorized direct assaults at one time or another during the war; Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain is another example. While we have been conditioned to believe that flanking maneuvers were the only "preferred" method of assault, there were certainly times when frontal assaults were considered as an option by reliable commanders who had specific reasons for doing so. Sometimes these assaults did succeed; the assault up Missionary Ridge is a prime example.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Grant's "Critics" are military critics. Grant launched two charges for vanity purposes, and he wrote as such, and wrote that he regretted making them.

Which critics are you referring to?

His attack at Vicksburg was to satisfy his troops' ego, who thought they were invincible. Other than that, his own military reason was that he did not want to fight siege conditions in the hot summer Southern sun, and he needed to try to town by assault to prevent that.

Morale is a pretty important thing, you know?

 

[American87]

Which critics are you referring to?



Morale is a pretty important thing, you know?

I am referring to myself, which is who the original poster was referring to.

And yes, morale is important, and we see how Well Grant's assault worked out, and how he regretted making it.

 

[Belfoured]

Which critics are you referring to?



Morale is a pretty important thing, you know?

And, as you pointed out earlier, avoiding having your troops stationary for several weeks in a place where disease could run rampant makes "giving it a shot" worthwhile. The Army of the Potomac proved the downside of holing up at Harrison's Landing in July 1862.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I am referring to myself, which is who the original poster was referring to.

And yes, morale is important, and we see how Well Grant's assault worked out, and how he regretted making it.

Yes, we did see how well it worked out. The assault was one part of a campaign and siege which resulted in the surrender of Vicksburg.

 

[American87]

Yes, we did see how well it worked out. The assault was one part of a campaign and siege which resulted in the surrender of Vicksburg.

Yes, and the assault failed and Grant lived to write that he regretted it.

Grant himself regretted it and said as much, I don't know why there is such a campaign to justify him or brush it under the rug. It was a bad call and he realized it. Grant was not the all-power, omniscient General some would have him out to be.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, and the assault failed and Grant lived to write that he regretted it.

Grant himself regretted it and said as much, I don't know why there is such a campaign to justify him or brush it under the rug. It was a bad call and he realized it. Grant was not the all-power, omniscient General some would have him out to be.

No one suggested Grant was perfect. No general was. But Grant is not solely defined by his setbacks.

If Grant had curled up into a fetal position after a setback, he never would been successful. Vicksburg surrendered. So we saw how that worked out.

 

[American87]

No one suggested Grant was perfect. No general was. But Grant is not solely defined by his setbacks.

If Grant had curled up into a fetal position after a setback, he never would been successful. Vicksburg surrendered. So we saw how that worked out.

Yes, the assault failed. Grant regretted it. His later siege worked. But he made grave tactical errors in two of his assaults, and he lived to write that he regretted them.