Most Useful Campaign to Study?

But really now, armchair generals all have reasons that may not be explicitly spelled out, even in a chess game. Remember General Grant wanted to maintain the momentum of his drive against the rebels in Vicksburg. He was hoping for success and regretted it failed. He gave enough reason for it, but sustaining momentum is a big plus on a wave of former victories. Also at Cold Harbor, the continual advance through the wilderness was flanking maneuvers, and by Cold Harbor, he just may have been hoping to throw Lee off by a direct assault to cover the next movement where he disappeared and crossed the James. It was an unfortunate incident that so many men died for the Union with no real 'attrition' to the confederacy! No wonder he regretted it.
Lubliner.

I can agree about Vicksburg, except that he did not regret that it failed; he regretted making it. Apparently it was against his tactical judgement, but he thought it was worth the risk in order to keep up momentum and avoid a siege under the hot summer Southern sun.
But he still regretted it, even with his valid reasons.

As to Cold Harbor, Grant offered no military reason for making the assault in his memoirs, even though he spent a paragraph justifying Vicksburg to some extent. If he had a military reason for attacking Cold Harbor, he probably would have included it as well; instead, he just said he regretted it.
 
I'm not sure why you seem unable to separate (1) motive from (2) regret that a military decision failed. Plenty of decisions made for valid military reasons have turned out wrong. Only a narcissistic idiot would fail to regret that in hindsight. It is very far from an infallible profession. Eisenhower ordered the D-Day landings to go forward. He prepared a statement expressing his regret and taking the blame in the event that it failed. It didn't but it could have.

The difference between Grant and Eisenhower, based on what you wrote, is that Eisenhower prepared his "regret" before the assault took place, whereas Grant wrote that he regretted his assaults after years of enough time to meditate on his decisions.

Grant offered no motive for Cold Harbor; he simply regretted it. As to Vicksburg he had some valid reasons, but he still wrote that he regretted it, so obviously he felt bad about ordering it despite his sound reasons for it. He probably felt it was a risky maneuver, bet on the risk, and when it failed, wished he had just listened to his better judgment and began the siege from day 1.
 
The difference between Grant and Eisenhower, based on what you wrote, is that Eisenhower prepared his "regret" before the assault took place, whereas Grant wrote that he regretted his assaults after years of enough time to meditate on his decisions.

Grant offered no motive for Cold Harbor; he simply regretted it. As to Vicksburg he had some valid reasons, but he still wrote that he regretted it, so obviously he felt bad about ordering it despite his sound reasons for it. He probably felt it was a risky maneuver, bet on the risk, and when it failed, wished he had just listened to his better judgment and began the siege from day 1.
His "motive" was obvious - to break Lee's line. Lee had kept responding to Grant's turning movements and now they were in the vicinity of Richmond. Do you have information - not made-up speculation - about another motive? And how do you know he didn't regret it on the afternoon of June 3? He immediately commenced planning a completely different maneuver. In his memoirs, I seem to recall the word "always" in connection with his regret. What are you really trying to establish here?
 
As to Cold Harbor, Grant offered no military reason for making the assault in his memoirs, even though he spent a paragraph justifying Vicksburg to some extent. If he had a military reason for attacking Cold Harbor, he probably would have included it as well; instead, he just said he regretted it.
He talked about Cold Harbor for several pages in his memoirs before the "regret" part. All the maneuvers that went on during the campaign were to get into a better tactical position and then attack. And that's what he was planning at Cold Harbor. To again take the offensive. This is the order he sent Meade at 7:00 am on the morning of June 3rd:

"The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed , suspend the offensive ; but when one does succeed , push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken . I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour."​

The regret that he felt was for the loss of life for no measurable gain. But he certainly did talk about the military movements and reasoning leading up to it.
 
His "motive" was obvious - to break Lee's line. Lee had kept responding to Grant's turning movements and now they were in the vicinity of Richmond. Do you have information - not made-up speculation - about another motive? And how do you know he didn't regret it on the afternoon of June 3? He immediately commenced planning a completely different maneuver. In his memoirs, I seem to recall the word "always" in connection with his regret. What are you really trying to establish here?

You seem to be projecting. You are the one with no information, other than made-up speculation, about Grant's motive. Even breaking his line is not that obvious, as Grant offered zero reason for attacking at Cold Harbor in his memoirs.

It's pretty obvious, but we have to keep going over the same old ground, because people keep responding to me, offering excuses for Grant, where Grant himself felt the need to make none. He simply regretted Cold Harbor, and made no explanation of his reason for it, although he offered a paragraph for his explanation of the assault at Vicksburg.

It was pure regret of a presumably rash mistake.
 
He talked about Cold Harbor for several pages in his memoirs before the "regret" part. All the maneuvers that went on during the campaign were to get into a better tactical position and then attack. And that's what he was planning at Cold Harbor. To again take the offensive. This is the order he sent Meade at 7:00 am on the morning of June 3rd:

"The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed , suspend the offensive ; but when one does succeed , push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken . I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour."​

The regret that he felt was for the loss of life for no measurable gain. But he certainly did talk about the military movements and reasoning leading up to it.

Yes, of course he wanted to attack. But he could have regretted very other attack he made, from Spottsylbania, to Five Forks, but instead he singled out Cold Harbor, which was a bloodbath, and Vicksburg.

He simply had no motive to offer for Cold Harbor, military or otherwise. Whereas with Vicksburg, he spent a paragraph justifying it. Cold Harbor was unjustifiable.
 
Yes, of course he wanted to attack. But he could have regretted very other attack he made, from Spottsylbania, to Five Forks, but instead he singled out Cold Harbor, which was a bloodbath, and Vicksburg.

He simply had no motive to offer for Cold Harbor, military or otherwise. Whereas with Vicksburg, he spent a paragraph justifying it. Cold Harbor was unjustifiable.
It was militarily justifiable to attempt it. And it was no more of a bloodbath then Lee ordering Picketts Charge.
 
It was militarily justifiable to attempt it. And it was no more of a bloodbath then Lee ordering Picketts Charge.

Ah yes, your favorite general, Lee, but we're talking about Grant. And Grant felt, from his memoirs, that there was no justification for Cold Harbor, military or otherwise, or at least none he felt to be excusable if made public.

And keep in Mind that Lee also owned his mistake at Pickett's Charge, "It's all my fault." I have no problem admitting Lee's mistakes, but you will duck and dodge every which way to try and excuse Grant, whose memoirs get in your way.
 
Ah yes, your favorite general, Lee, but we're talking about Grant. And Grant felt, from his memoirs, that there was no justification for Cold Harbor, military or otherwise, or at least none he felt to be excusable if made public.

And keep in Mind that Lee also owned his mistake at Pickett's Charge, "It's all my fault." I have no problem admitting Lee's mistakes, but you will duck and dodge every which way to try and excuse Grant, whose memoirs get in your way.
"Justification?" Read his memoirs concerning the lead-up to Cold Harbor rather than just pulling stuff out of your imagination.
 
"Justification?" Read his memoirs concerning the lead-up to Cold Harbor rather than just pulling stuff out of your imagination.

Grant was clear enough. He wrote that he regretted the assault at Cold Harbor, and offered no excuse for it, even though he gave a paragraph in explanation of the assault at Vicksburg.

We don't need to know that he was fighting a campaign against Lee to dig any deeper. He could have not made the assault, and still have crossed the James, or presumably make some other move, perhaps. Instead, he made the assault, which is infamous for its casualties, and he wrote that he regretted it, offering to justification, military or otherwise, while he did so with the assault at Vicksburg. We've been over this ad nauseam.
 
Grant was clear enough. He wrote that he regretted the assault at Cold Harbor, and offered no excuse for it, even though he gave a paragraph in explanation of the assault at Vicksburg.

We don't need to know that he was fighting a campaign against Lee to dig any deeper. He could have not made the assault, and still have crossed the James, or presumably make some other move, perhaps. Instead, he made the assault, which is infamous for its casualties, and he wrote that he regretted it, offering to justification, military or otherwise, while he did so with the assault at Vicksburg. We've been over this ad nauseam.
In other words, you won't be bothered to actually read what Grant wrote about it.
 
Let us put it bluntly. Cold Harbor was a blunder. Grant was the one that made the blunder. What all the fuss is about is calling the shots being 'perfect', and nobody disagrees that all people make mistakes. Grant made a mistake, just as Lee did. And it was not the only one made in the course of either of their lives. So what else is there to admit; a philosophy?
Lubliner.
 
Nobody mentioned the Indian campaigns, nor the Pacific Coast. Just the California volunteers that crossed through Arizona and on into El Paso was an undertaking of worthwhile study.
Lubliner.
 
Grant offered zero reason for attacking at Cold Harbor in his memoirs.
Have you, by any chance, looked into the Official records to see what Meade and Grant wrote in their after action reports? Have you looked at the messages between Meade and Grant before the attack was initiated?? Or, are you only reading his memoirs??
Have you read "Not War but Murder-Cold Harbor 1864" by Ernest B. Furgurson to try and see Grants intent???
 

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