Most Useful Campaign to Study?

[Belfoured]

I agree with what you would focus on. I'd actually argue that McClellan's massing of artillery at Yorktown, and his naval flank movements up the York, had quite a bit to do with Johnston retreating.

Johnston was a rather conservative general, who saw his opponent making all these moves, and he fell back "accordingly." Whereas Lee defied the tactics manual and divided his force in the Seven days, in the face of a numerically superior army, and drove him back to Harrison's Landing. Lee, being a military genius, in that he devised new tactics or broke the rules and still won, was an exceptional general, though.

I'd also argue that McClellan would have done more to Johnston, had his estimates of enemy troop numbers been somewhere near their actual number. Another lesson of the campaign could be something on how to trust your sources for estimating enemy strength.

I think that lower on the Peninsula there were some advantages for a defender - such as narrower width of the terrain to be defended, but that same feature made offensive operations more difficult. In closer to Richmond that definitely changed - enhanced by McClellan straddling the Chickahominy and keeping his supply base at White House.

 

[American87]

I think that lower on the Peninsula there were some advantages for a defender - such as narrower width of the terrain to be defended, but that same feature made offensive operations more difficult. In closer to Richmond that definitely changed - enhanced by McClellan straddling the Chickahominy and keeping his supply base at White House.

Yes but Johnston felt that McClellan's massing of artillery at Yorktown was ominous, and he fall back "accordingly," insecure in his ability to hold the line against enemy siege guns.

He also had to deal with Union forces landing in his rear at Eltham Landing, which he opposed, but the threat of future landings still lingered.

While a narrow neck of land is often powerful to defend, as in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, when Butler was "bottled up," nonetheless the York River above the Peninsula gave McClellan the ability to outflank Johnston's position.

Of Course, Lee, or some other bold general, may have taken your view of things and resisted to the last on the Peninsula, but Johnston fell right into McClellan's way of seeing things, and retreated "accordingly."

 

[Belfoured]

Yes but Johnston felt that McClellan's massing of artillery at Yorktown was ominous, and he fall back "accordingly," insecure in his ability to hold the line against enemy siege guns.

He also had to deal with Union forces landing in his rear at Eltham Landing, which he opposed, but the threat of future landings still lingered.

While a narrow neck of land is often powerful to defend, as in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, when Butler was "bottled up," nonetheless the York River above the Peninsula gave McClellan the ability to outflank Johnston's position.

Of Course, Lee, or some other bold general, may have taken your view of things and resisted to the last on the Peninsula, but Johnston fell right into McClellan's way of seeing things, and retreated "accordingly."

I think I'd disagree to some extent about the offensive options at the Warwick Line - a combination of confined territory and the actual terrain. I agree about the "combined ops"/Eltham's Landing concerns, but it actually wasn't carried off with much impact (unsurprising, given that Franklin was in command). I'm hardly a devotee of either McClellan or Johnston, but as it turned out I think Johnston got McClellan into a vulnerable position - and then screwed it up with a set of vague verbal orders to converging forces, complicated by a torrential storm the night before.

 

[American87]

I think I'd disagree to some extent about the offensive options at the Warwick Line - a combination of confined territory and the actual terrain. I agree about the "combined ops"/Eltham's Landing concerns, but it actually wasn't carried off with much impact (unsurprising, given that Franklin was in command). I'm hardly a devotee of either McClellan or Johnston, but as it turned out I think Johnston got McClellan into a vulnerable position - and then screwed it up with a set of vague verbal orders to converging forces, complicated by a torrential storm the night before.

Fair enough. Perhaps a more aggressive commander like Lee could have and would have taken advantage of the strengths you see in the Confederate position.

It should be noted that after being licked in the Seven Days, McClellan, as far as I recall, had no more bold maneuvers for taking on the entire Confederate army in his front, from Harrison's Landing, another narrow neck of land.

I, however, believe there was much to the naval operations while McClellan was moving up the Peninsula, and I wonder how a Lee, for example, would have countered that, if at all.

 

[Belfoured]

Fair enough. Perhaps a more aggressive commander like Lee could have and would have taken advantage of the strengths you see in the Confederate position.

It should be noted that after being licked in the Seven Days, McClellan, as far as I recall, had no more bold maneuvers for taking on the entire Confederate army in his front, from Harrison's Landing, another narrow neck of land.

I, however, believe there was much to the naval operations while McClellan was moving up the Peninsula, and I wonder how a Lee, for example, would have countered that, if at all.

Actually, McClellan claimed in mid-late July to Halleck that he had plans for undertaking offensive operations from HL, but that got bogged down in a lot of back and forth arguing between Halleck and himself regarding how many reinforcements he would allegedly need. Ultimately it went nowhere because he was ordered in August to leave HL and reinforce Pope in northern Virginia. I don't think it's ever been completely clear what the specifics of his plan were.

My own take on the USN operations is that after Eltham's it really wasn't much of a factor.

One book that caused me to reassess Johnston on the Peninsula is Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (1999). It's very well-done and -analyzed, even if you don't agree with all his conclusions.

 

[American87]

Actually, McClellan claimed in mid-late July to Halleck that he had plans for undertaking offensive operations from HL, but that got bogged down in a lot of back and forth arguing between Halleck and himself regarding how many reinforcements he would allegedly need. Ultimately it went nowhere because he was ordered in August to leave HL and reinforce Pope in northern Virginia. I don't think it's ever been completely clear what the specifics of his plan were.

My own take on the USN operations is that after Eltham's it really wasn't much of a factor.

One book that caused me to reassess Johnston on the Peninsula is Steven Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (1999). It's very well-done and -analyzed, even if you don't agree with all his conclusions.

Good stuff. I'm not much for studying Johnston in detail, but I like your assessment.