Most Useful Campaign to Study?

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, the assault failed. Grant regretted it. His later siege worked. But he made grave tactical errors in two of his assaults, and he lived to write that he regretted them.

Yes, he said that he had regrets due to the loss of life for no gain. So obviously he cared about his army suffering casualties for no reason.

 

[American87]

Yes, he said that he had regrets due to the loss of life for no gain. So obviously he cared about his army suffering casualties for no reason.

Exactly. He made a poor decision based on gratifying his men's egos, and on the desire to avoid a siege in the hot summer Southern sun. When it failed, he regretted making it.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Grant himself regretted it and said as much, I don't know why there is such a campaign to justify him or brush it under the rug. It was a bad call and he realized it. Grant was not the all-power, omniscient General some would have him out to be.

If you don't regret decisions that lead to failures, especially bloody failures, with 20 years of hindsight that would be pretty stubborn and egotistical.

The debate here is your...unusual, perhaps unique, evaluation of Grant's motivation and reasoning, including your interpretation of Grant's own words.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Has anyone here read Timothy Smith's recent book about the Vicksburg assaults? What does he have to say about Grant's motivation for the assaults?

 

[American87]

If you don't regret decisions that lead to failures, especially bloody failures, with 20 years of hindsight that would be pretty stubborn and egotistical.

The debate here is your...unusual, perhaps unique, evaluation of Grant's motivation and reasoning, including your interpretation of Grant's own words.

My words are Grant's. He offered no military reason for attacking at Cold Harbor, though he did so at Vicksburg. And his reason for attacking at Vicksburg was 1.) He did not want to fight a siege in the hot summer Southern sun, and 2.) Because his troops believed they could beat the Confederates anywhere, and he did not want them wondering why they were ordered to lay siege to Vicksburg without attempting to assault it.

He regretted both.

It's pretty simple really, but some people want to cover for him, even though he was man enough to admit his regrets.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It's pretty simple really, but some people want to cover for him, even though he was man enough to admit his regrets.

I posted the excerpt from his memoirs and let him speak for himself.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

He did not want to fight a siege in the hot summer Southern sun

That is gross understatement about the reality of conducting a protracted siege in the lower Mississippi River Valley in 1863. I don't just mean gross as in large, but gross as in disgustingly dismissive of the very real issues with the climate.

Because his troops believed they could beat the Confederates anywhere, and he did not want them wondering why they were ordered to lay siege to Vicksburg without attempting to assault it.

Your army's morale is very high, the enemy's seems very low, and the enemy has been soundly defeated in multiple engagements.

Besides morale and the benefits of avoiding the costs in time, men, and material in a siege the assaults were an attempt to retain the much vaunted initiative.

 

[American87]

That is gross understatement about the reality of conducting a protracted siege in the lower Mississippi River Valley in 1863. I don't just mean gross as in large, but gross as in disgustingly dismissive of the very real issues with the climate.



Your army's morale is very high, the enemy's seems very low, and the enemy has been soundly defeated in multiple engagements.

Besides morale and the benefits of avoiding the costs in time, men, and material in a siege the assaults were an attempt to retain the much vaunted initiative.

I was using Grant's words, which you said was an unfair interpretation. You are not disagreeing with me, per se, but with Grant's own motives for conducting the assault, as he described them in his memoirs. You can chide over Grant's "gross understatement" all you want for what I care.

As to the last part, that is not what Grant wrote as a motive for making the assault. His reasons were as I stated above.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I was using Grant's words, which you said was an unfair interpretation. You are not disagreeing with me, per se, but with Grant's own motives for conducting the assault, as he described them in his memoirs. You can chide over Grant's "gross understatement" all you want for what I care.

As to the last part, that is not what Grant wrote as a motive for making the assault. His reasons were as I stated above.

Grant didn't understate it. He described problems far beyond just "it was hot." Read it again.

 

[American87]

Grant didn't understate it. He described problems far beyond just "it was hot." Read it again.

I never said Grant said "It was hot," although that is essentially what he said. You're making up arguments again and just trying to disagree with everything I say. Have a good night, I'm done with you for today.

 

[Lubliner]

My words are Grant's. He offered no military reason for attacking at Cold Harbor, though he did so at Vicksburg. And his reason for attacking at Vicksburg was 1.) He did not want to fight a siege in the hot summer Southern sun, and 2.) Because his troops believed they could beat the Confederates anywhere, and he did not want them wondering why they were ordered to lay siege to Vicksburg without attempting to assault it.

He regretted both.

It's pretty simple really, but some people want to cover for him, even though he was man enough to admit his regrets.

But really now, armchair generals all have reasons that may not be explicitly spelled out, even in a chess game. Remember General Grant wanted to maintain the momentum of his drive against the rebels in Vicksburg. He was hoping for success and regretted it failed. He gave enough reason for it, but sustaining momentum is a big plus on a wave of former victories. Also at Cold Harbor, the continual advance through the wilderness was flanking maneuvers, and by Cold Harbor, he just may have been hoping to throw Lee off by a direct assault to cover the next movement where he disappeared and crossed the James. It was an unfortunate incident that so many men died for the Union with no real 'attrition' to the confederacy! No wonder he regretted it.
Lubliner.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

When Grant wrote "We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season" I think readers in the 1880s understood what he meant. Southerners had used it as an argument in favor of slavery - that only Africans could work in the Southern lowlands without frequently being sickened. This was a time before yellow fever or malaria were known as mosquito-borne diseases.

A quarter of the AOTP was on the sick list at Harrison's Landing in mid-1862, which was one of the reasons for its withdrawal from the Peninsula.

In 1847, Winfield Scott's entire Veracruz operation hinged on capturing the port before summer.

It shouldn't be interpreted as Grant saying his men would be unhappy because they would get sweaty.

 

[Pete Longstreet]

Of the 3 choices mentioned, I would pick Vicksburg. In terms of maneuver, logistics, army/naval operations, and goals achieved, it must be considered one of the most important campaigns of the war.

Vicksburg. My reasons emulate the above stated post.

 

[Belfoured]

My words are Grant's. He offered no military reason for attacking at Cold Harbor, though he did so at Vicksburg. And his reason for attacking at Vicksburg was 1.) He did not want to fight a siege in the hot summer Southern sun, and 2.) Because his troops believed they could beat the Confederates anywhere, and he did not want them wondering why they were ordered to lay siege to Vicksburg without attempting to assault it.

He regretted both.

It's pretty simple really, but some people want to cover for him, even though he was man enough to admit his regrets.

I'm not sure why you seem unable to separate (1) motive from (2) regret that a military decision failed. Plenty of decisions made for valid military reasons have turned out wrong. Only a narcissistic idiot would fail to regret that in hindsight. It is very far from an infallible profession. Eisenhower ordered the D-Day landings to go forward. He prepared a statement expressing his regret and taking the blame in the event that it failed. It didn't but it could have.

 

[OpnCoronet]

What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?

Of the choices presented, Grant's Vicksburg Campaign was the most brilliant in planning and execution.



P.S are you referring to Jackson's Valley campaign, or Sheridan's ? Both were spectacular.

 

[29thWisCoG]

I think Vicksburg is amazing, but IMO it started with Grant's arrival at Cairo, IL.

Grant's persistence, improvisation, coordination, and risk taking are a great study in this campaign.

 

[James N.]

What is the most useful campaign to study, if you had to choose just one?

Is it Vicksburg, Chancellorsville, or the Valley Campaign?

Which battle, that is, do you think is the most military brilliant and deserving of close attention?

Depends on your definition of useful, I suppose. I remember reading somewhere many years ago that the author - who may have been an English military analyst - thought that only Grant's Vicksburg Campaign and Jackson's Valley Campaign were the true classics that would remain worth studying from a strictly military viewpoint.

 

[Belfoured]

Depends on your definition of useful, I suppose. I remember reading somewhere many years ago that the author - who may have been an English military analyst - thought that only Grant's Vicksburg Campaign and Jackson's Valley Campaign were the true classics that would remain worth studying from a strictly military viewpoint.

Fair point, but staff rides have long been done at several battlefields for teaching purposes. William Glenn Robertson "invented" the modern staff ride to some extent at Chickamauga, for example, and a great many "teaching points" can be effectively illustrated. It's harder to do that at the true operational/"campaign" level in several instances because of the distances.

 

[American87]

Of the choices presented, Grant's Vicksburg Campaign was the most brilliant in planning and execution.



P.S are you referring to Jackson's Valley campaign, or Sheridan's ? Both were spectacular.

I would prefer Chancellorsville, but Vicksburg is a good choice. It kind of supports my favorite notion of "fortune favors the bold," which Grant was when he detached from his communications and ran the batteries with his transports.

I was referring to Jackson's Valley Campaign, but it's open-ended. Both were spectacular, but I think Sheridan's was more sheer weight of force mixed with excellent, very excellent, use of cavalry against enemy infantry. Whereas Jackson's was more maneuvering and swift tactical decisions that won the campaign.

 

[American87]

Depends on your definition of useful, I suppose. I remember reading somewhere many years ago that the author - who may have been an English military analyst - thought that only Grant's Vicksburg Campaign and Jackson's Valley Campaign were the true classics that would remain worth studying from a strictly military viewpoint.

Interesting, thank you for your input. I presumed Chancellorsville would be in there as well, given that Lee divided his smaller force, already half his enemy's strength, and still won a decisive victory, even though he did not destroy the enemy.

Vicksburg is a classic, and so is Jackson's Valley Campaign. I may have to read from a military analyst's book as well, because I would love to see them compare the campaigns with other military history, and explain just why Vicksburg and the Valley stand up so well in comparison.