McClellan McClellan's War by Rafuse

JerryD

Captain
Joined
Aug 23, 2021
Just wondering if anyone has read this book, and what their thoughts are. I have just started it and the author is spending a surprising amount of time discussing the formation of political parties and economic theory in the first 30 years of the 19th century. I suppose he will eventually get around to explaining why I am reading about the "market revolution" of the 1820's, but it does have me wondering.

I picked it because I understand that Rafuse has a moderately pro-McClellan view, but not overly so.

Interesting tidbit, though. McClellan's great grandfather fought for the Scottish rebels at Culloden!

 
Stick with it, it's a very good book. Rafuse's thesis revolves around McClellan's philosophy of war being shaped by his entire life, upbringing and all. A lot of his early life McClellan associated with the Whig Party, and his family were very good friends with Nicholas Biddle, president of the National Bank. That's why Rafuse spends time on it.
 
Stick with it, it's a very good book. Rafuse's thesis revolves around McClellan's philosophy of war being shaped by his entire life, upbringing and all. A lot of his early life McClellan associated with the Whig Party, and his family were very good friends with Nicholas Biddle, president of the National Bank. That's why Rafuse spends time on it.
I agree.
 
Just wondering if anyone has read this book, and what their thoughts are. I have just started it and the author is spending a surprising amount of time discussing the formation of political parties and economic theory in the first 30 years of the 19th century. I suppose he will eventually get around to explaining why I am reading about the "market revolution" of the 1820's, but it does have me wondering.

I picked it because I understand that Rafuse has a moderately pro-McClellan view, but not overly so.

Interesting tidbit, though. McClellan's great grandfather fought for the Scottish rebels at Culloden!

If memory serves, it's just the first two chapters that deal with the political background of the time. I would agree with the others to stick with it.
 
Just wondering if anyone has read this book, and what their thoughts are. I have just started it and the author is spending a surprising amount of time discussing the formation of political parties and economic theory in the first 30 years of the 19th century. I suppose he will eventually get around to explaining why I am reading about the "market revolution" of the 1820's, but it does have me wondering.

I picked it because I understand that Rafuse has a moderately pro-McClellan view, but not overly so.

Interesting tidbit, though. McClellan's great grandfather fought for the Scottish rebels at Culloden!

I have read it from McClellan's becoming General-in-Chief through his being relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac. The Maryland section really stands out, although I think that he gets the Antietam attack plan slightly wrong. The book is really valuable at Antietam.
 
Glad to read all this. I've been thinking for a while now that little Mac deserves another look, at least by me. And a great Grandfather at Culloden! That's a pretty cool recommendation, (even though I'm not Scotch).

John
Scott, you're not a Scott. ( a pity lol). Scotch is whiskey. 🥃 Sorry if I sound like an old school marm. lol 😂 I hope you will remember the graphics.
 
I read it not long ago and found it a great read, I enjoy the time spent digging into the political dimension of American society and the grounding for McClellan and the prominent early-war Whig conservatives and think it's especially good where it draws on Harsh (Rafuse worked with him when he was alive, I believe) in the Antietam Campaign. It has fair criticism of McClellan not making a try at the Warwick Line on political more than military bases, criticizes him being off the field at Glendale despite suitably recommending the shift to the James, and is a good demonstration of the modern view that his conduct of the Maryland Campaign was pretty good and that his brief Loudoun Valley Campaign was an interesting episode and missed opportunity.

The final conclusion is fairly agreeable - that McClellan failed because in Clausewitzian terms, his genius did not match the friction he encountered, but that his failure and the demise of a war of moderation was ultimately for the betterment of the country.

There are also interesting notes on his contributions to the Tennessee campaign while he was still GiC, the internal absurdity of the early-war Union political leadership that justified what is often called paranoia or arrogance on his part when it was reasonably justified by past experience of press leaks, and so on.
 
@Kay Cee Funny you should bring this up now, I was just corrected about that over this weekend by a friend of mine while on a tour of the Brandywine battlefield. It seems there was an American general, (maybe he was a Colonel?), at that battle whose nickname was "Scotch Willie", not because of his ancestry as I assumed, but because of his favorite beverage.

It seems I owe Bonnie Charlie an apology because I have been referring to him as Scotch for quite a while.

John
 
Re: Scotch vs Scots

Language changes.

In the 1860's, the correct adjective for something or someone from Scotland was Scotch. It is literally just a contraction of Scottish. If you read the "Scotch Bard" Robert Burns etc., you'll find them using Scotch as the adjective for something or someone from Scotland. The word Scots was the English dialect spoken on the border that Burns etc. spoke.

In the 19th century, some of the Scots speaking Lowlanders started using Scots instead of Scotch as the adjective, largely as a form of cultural imperialism over the Highlanders. The same people created the romanticised fairytale Scotland with clan tartans etc.

Throughout the 20th Century, the Scottish education system started teaching that Scotch was incorrect and even offensive, and they effectively stamped out the usage in Scotland. Since then, others have followed mostly to avoid conflict. However, in the 1860's, had you used Scots as an adjective for the Scotch people or Scottish things, people would think you were strange.
Interesting tidbit, though. McClellan's great grandfather fought for the Scottish rebels at Culloden!

Jacobites, not Scottish. The dispute was whether a Catholic or a Protestant should be King, and there were a number of Catholic English troops in the Jacobite army, along with two Irish battalions from the French Army. Meanwhile, there were more Scottish troops in the government army than the whole of the Jacobite army.
 
criticizes him being off the field at Glendale despite suitably recommending the shift to the James,

The issue is mainly that Rafuse accepted Sears' version of events, and then couldn't square it with other things. He just threw in the towel. It was a wasted opportunity, as Sears' version was a very biased, complete with a mistranslation of Paris' journal.

Rafuse's PhD had a lot of effort lavished on it, but in expanding to a book, he relied heavily on secondary sources, which were sometimes biased or incorrect.
 
The issue is mainly that Rafuse accepted Sears' version of events, and then couldn't square it with other things. He just threw in the towel. It was a wasted opportunity, as Sears' version was a very biased, complete with a mistranslation of Paris' journal.

Rafuse's PhD had a lot of effort lavished on it, but in expanding to a book, he relied heavily on secondary sources, which were sometimes biased or incorrect.
I'm open to the possibility that there's brushing up to do on the Peninsula Campaign and that Sears got more wrong out of either malice or error - there's a fair amount he wrote that was poor analysis just because of his post-WWII generation romanticism, even - but I haven't dug into that enough to have a hill to die on.

But even if the information is faulty and it reflects poorly on Rafuse's ability to write his work as comprehensively as he'd have liked to, his willingness to criticize McClellan at least demonstrates even-handedness in a work that's otherwise (correctly) extremely positive compared to the older, sloppier sources of the Lost Cause and postwar eras.
 
I'm open to the possibility that there's brushing up to do on the Peninsula Campaign and that Sears got more wrong out of either malice or error - there's a fair amount he wrote that was poor analysis just because of his post-WWII generation romanticism, even - but I haven't dug into that enough to have a hill to die on.

But even if the information is faulty and it reflects poorly on Rafuse's ability to write his work as comprehensively as he'd have liked to, his willingness to criticize McClellan at least demonstrates even-handedness in a work that's otherwise (correctly) extremely positive compared to the older, sloppier sources of the Lost Cause and postwar eras.
Beware "reviews" of a book by internet posters who have shown over and over in these forums that they are unqualified to objectively assess any publications that are remotely critical of McClellan in any way. That includes a justifiably well-regarded historian like Rafuse, whose book - as you suggest - is strikingly balanced in its assessment. By the way, not everything Sears wrote about McClellan is wrong. Not hardly ....

The glass half-full is that we haven't been given - at least so far - a false disparagement of Rafuse as merely a "social historian". Other capable historians haven't been so fortunate:

 
The glass half-full is that we haven't been given - at least so far - a false disparagement of Rafuse as merely a "social historian". Other capable historians haven't been so fortunate:


You're a very confused here. Rafuse is absolutely a military historian, and he certainly isn't Woodworth, who is a social historian that struggles with basic military concepts.

Rafuse's newer books have deeper research, and are worth the read, despite the price.
 
You're a very confused here. Rafuse is absolutely a military historian, and he certainly isn't Woodworth, who is a social historian that struggles with basic military concepts.

Rafuse's newer books have deeper research, and are worth the read, despite the price.
You're the one who's hopelessly "confused". You were embarrassingly wrong about Woodworth and now you're doing what you do best - doubling down on your fundamental error.
 
Beware "reviews" of a book by internet posters who have shown over and over in these forums that they are unqualified to objectively assess any publications that are remotely critical of McClellan in any way. That includes a justifiably well-regarded historian like Rafuse, whose book - as you suggest - is strikingly balanced in its assessment. By the way, not everything Sears wrote about McClellan is wrong. Not hardly ....

The glass half-full is that we haven't been given - at least so far - a false disparagement of Rafuse as merely a "social historian". Other capable historians haven't been so fortunate:

From what I currently know I think the current consensus is at least fair enough.

I'm somewhat inclined toward the substance of what the members in question have to say about the Peninsula Campaign.

That is to say, I suspect there was probably not any truly great missed opportunity at the Warwick Line (though an assault in the first days would probably have had reasonable benefit), that the 'slowness' in getting to the Chickahominy and onto Richmond was generally a product of real logistical and weather problems, and that a siege was probably the only profitable way to attack Richmond with the 70k~ to 105~ balance that initially existed, let alone the 92-112,000 to 105,000 balance that emerged later. The two biggest possible black marks in military terms would be the direction of forces onward at Oak Grove when the right was vulnerable and the reliance on semaphore and whatnot at Glendale. There was a time I would lurk on this forum and the general level of knowledge seemed less advanced than it is now, and it was refreshing to see posters aware of terms like 'regular approaches' even if they may seem odd or excessive at times.

I'd consider that Halleck and McClellan have to share some of the blame for Second Bull Run, though Pope had no excuse to lose so badly and the unforced removal of the AotP from the James must be seen as a blunder - which increases Halleck's share of blame for 2BR. As does Halleck's timid insistence on 'suggesting' McClellan forward more troops instead of issuing an order, leaving McClellan with the discretion that he most likely misused, with his contempt for Pope and sense he would lose no matter what was sent being excessive if sincere and very feasibly insincere, to put it charitably - with all the condemnation implied by withholding troops on excessive or insincere bases.

But on the other hand, I do think that most of these problems would never had emerged had the Army of the Potomac been kept at its agreed-upon plan strength, and that there is something to be said for a contrast between McClellan's reputation for inflexibility and the fact he did conduct both of his major campaigns with uniquely disruptive circumstances (last-minute withholding of troops and amphibious resources/the aftermath of 2BR and the Peninsula withdrawal).

I suspect I would quit any job that involved working for a boss as frustrating as Lincoln or Halleck or a subordinate as difficult as McClellan, the country be damned. I can at least respect McClellan giving the best showing the Union would put up until Grant came along in the circumstances, and Lincoln recognizing him as the best option available to deal with the 2BR aftermath despite justified personal antipathy and the opposition of his political allies to the decision. But when the best to be said of the relationship between the nation's most important political and military figure is that they were able to tolerate each other during perhaps the greatest military crisis in its history, then however you slice it, the junior has to go regardless of how right within his realm of responsibility he was or wasn't.

Grant's willingness to fight in a way the administration wanted and understood in the spring and summer of 1864, despite it being perhaps less than militarily optimal and not at all resembling his inclinations as demonstrated by his New Bern proposal, is a real plaudit and what was ultimately necessary in the context of a democratic society unfamiliar with mass warfare.

But to circle back to my original point, I am rather mystified by the battles over minutia and precise timings, translations, interpretations, etc. over aspects of the Peninsula Campaign that oftentimes don't even seem to matter all that much.

The current consensus on McClellan as it stands is something I regard as basically sound for positive and negative, and the best way to put it is that I don't believe the further revisions, at least not until a serious work is done on them that stands up to peer review or I dig into the materials myself, but the popular narrative toward McClellan had so many absurd, willful distortions stand for so long that I'm inclined to humor them. The pendulum has probably swung far enough, but maybe there is another inch here or there.
 
From what I currently know I think the current consensus is at least fair enough.

I'm somewhat inclined toward the substance of what the members in question have to say about the Peninsula Campaign.

That is to say, I suspect there was probably not any truly great missed opportunity at the Warwick Line (though an assault in the first days would probably have had reasonable benefit), that the 'slowness' in getting to the Chickahominy and onto Richmond was generally a product of real logistical and weather problems, and that a siege was probably the only profitable way to attack Richmond with the 70k~ to 105~ balance that initially existed, let alone the 92-112,000 to 105,000 balance that emerged later. The two biggest possible black marks in military terms would be the direction of forces onward at Oak Grove when the right was vulnerable and the reliance on semaphore and whatnot at Glendale. There was a time I would lurk on this forum and the general level of knowledge seemed less advanced than it is now, and it was refreshing to see posters aware of terms like 'regular approaches' even if they may seem odd or excessive at times.

I'd consider that Halleck and McClellan have to share some of the blame for Second Bull Run, though Pope had no excuse to lose so badly and the unforced removal of the AotP from the James must be seen as a blunder - which increases Halleck's share of blame for 2BR. As does Halleck's timid insistence on 'suggesting' McClellan forward more troops instead of issuing an order, leaving McClellan with the discretion that he most likely misused, with his contempt for Pope and sense he would lose no matter what was sent being excessive if sincere and very feasibly insincere, to put it charitably - with all the condemnation implied by withholding troops on excessive or insincere bases.

But on the other hand, I do think that most of these problems would never had emerged had the Army of the Potomac been kept at its agreed-upon plan strength, and that there is something to be said for a contrast between McClellan's reputation for inflexibility and the fact he did conduct both of his major campaigns with uniquely disruptive circumstances (last-minute withholding of troops and amphibious resources/the aftermath of 2BR and the Peninsula withdrawal).

I suspect I would quit any job that involved working for a boss as frustrating as Lincoln or Halleck or a subordinate as difficult as McClellan, the country be damned. I can at least respect McClellan giving the best showing the Union would put up until Grant came along in the circumstances, and Lincoln recognizing him as the best option available to deal with the 2BR aftermath despite justified personal antipathy and the opposition of his political allies to the decision. But when the best to be said of the relationship between the nation's most important political and military figure is that they were able to tolerate each other during perhaps the greatest military crisis in its history, then however you slice it, the junior has to go regardless of how right within his realm of responsibility he was or wasn't.

Grant's willingness to fight in a way the administration wanted and understood in the spring and summer of 1864, despite it being perhaps less than militarily optimal and not at all resembling his inclinations as demonstrated by his New Bern proposal, is a real plaudit and what was ultimately necessary in the context of a democratic society unfamiliar with mass warfare.

But to circle back to my original point, I am rather mystified by the battles over minutia and precise timings, translations, interpretations, etc. over aspects of the Peninsula Campaign that oftentimes don't even seem to matter all that much.

The current consensus on McClellan as it stands is something I regard as basically sound for positive and negative, and the best way to put it is that I don't believe the further revisions, at least not until a serious work is done on them that stands up to peer review or I dig into the materials myself, but the popular narrative toward McClellan had so many absurd, willful distortions stand for so long that I'm inclined to humor them. The pendulum has probably swung far enough, but maybe there is another inch here or there.
Going into most of this would obviously derail the thread. As you know, there are voluminous threads on McClellan. I'll leave those aside here. My only point is that I think you may be doing Meade a slight disservice by leaving him out. His "solo" tenure was relatively brief but what he accomplished while he had a full Army of the Potomac was astonishing, being placed in command in the circumstances he was in and winning a major "meeting engagement" that began only three days later, making significant adaptations 'on the fly".
 

Learn About Us
►About CivilWarTalk
►Contact the Webmaster
►Meet the Staff
►Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
►Register
►Browse Forums
►View Today's Discussions
►Search the Forum
Get Help
►FAQ
►Student Guide
►Forum Rules & Etiquette
►Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top