Beware "reviews" of a book by internet posters who have shown over and over in these forums that they are unqualified to objectively assess any publications that are remotely critical of McClellan in any way. That includes a justifiably well-regarded historian like Rafuse, whose book - as you suggest - is strikingly balanced in its assessment. By the way, not everything Sears wrote about McClellan is wrong. Not hardly ....
The glass half-full is that we haven't been given - at least so far - a false disparagement of Rafuse as merely a "social historian". Other capable historians haven't been so fortunate:
To be fair though, he's a social historian rather than a military one. It's not surprising he lacks any grasp on theory of operations etc.
From what I currently know I think the current consensus is at least fair enough.
I'm somewhat inclined toward the
substance of what the members in question have to say about the Peninsula Campaign.
That is to say, I suspect there was probably not any truly great missed opportunity at the Warwick Line (though an assault in the first days would probably have had reasonable benefit), that the 'slowness' in getting to the Chickahominy and onto Richmond was generally a product of real logistical and weather problems, and that a siege was probably the only profitable way to attack Richmond with the 70k~ to 105~ balance that initially existed, let alone the 92-112,000 to 105,000 balance that emerged later. The two biggest possible black marks in military terms would be the direction of forces onward at Oak Grove when the right was vulnerable and the reliance on semaphore and whatnot at Glendale. There was a time I would lurk on this forum and the general level of knowledge seemed less advanced than it is now, and it was refreshing to see posters aware of terms like 'regular approaches' even if they may seem odd or excessive at times.
I'd consider that Halleck and McClellan have to share some of the blame for Second Bull Run, though Pope had no excuse to lose so badly and the unforced removal of the AotP from the James must be seen as a blunder - which increases Halleck's share of blame for 2BR. As does Halleck's timid insistence on 'suggesting' McClellan forward more troops instead of issuing an order, leaving McClellan with the discretion that he most likely misused, with his contempt for Pope and sense he would lose no matter what was sent being excessive if sincere and very feasibly insincere, to put it charitably - with all the condemnation implied by withholding troops on excessive or insincere bases.
But on the other hand, I do think that most of these problems would never had emerged had the Army of the Potomac been kept at its agreed-upon plan strength, and that there is something to be said for a contrast between McClellan's reputation for inflexibility and the fact he did conduct both of his major campaigns with uniquely disruptive circumstances (last-minute withholding of troops and amphibious resources/the aftermath of 2BR and the Peninsula withdrawal).
I suspect I would quit any job that involved working for a boss as frustrating as Lincoln or Halleck or a subordinate as difficult as McClellan, the country be damned. I can at least respect McClellan giving the best showing the Union would put up until Grant came along in the circumstances, and Lincoln recognizing him as the best option available to deal with the 2BR aftermath despite justified personal antipathy and the opposition of his political allies to the decision. But when the best to be said of the relationship between the nation's most important political and military figure is that they were able to tolerate each other during perhaps the greatest military crisis in its history, then however you slice it, the junior has to go regardless of how right within his realm of responsibility he was or wasn't.
Grant's willingness to fight in a way the administration wanted and understood in the spring and summer of 1864, despite it being perhaps less than militarily optimal and not at all resembling his inclinations as demonstrated by his New Bern proposal, is a real plaudit and what was ultimately necessary in the context of a democratic society unfamiliar with mass warfare.
But to circle back to my original point, I am rather mystified by the battles over minutia and precise timings, translations, interpretations, etc. over aspects of the Peninsula Campaign that oftentimes don't even seem to matter all that much.
The current consensus on McClellan as it stands is something I regard as basically sound for positive and negative, and the best way to put it is that I don't
believe the further revisions, at least not until a serious work is done on them that stands up to peer review or I dig into the materials myself, but the popular narrative toward McClellan had so many absurd, willful distortions stand for so long that I'm inclined to
humor them. The pendulum has probably swung far enough, but maybe there is another inch here or there.