Was Soft War Ever a Winning Strategy?

[JerryD]

In another thread I reviewed Ethan Rafuse's book McClellan's War, in which Mac felt that a soft war approach that respected southern property rights and did not resort to actions such as emancipation would eventually lead the seceding states to recognize that secession was all a huge mistake, that they had nothing to fear from the Lincoln Administration, and they would come back into the Union willingly. I know that this theory also underpinned Scott's thinking on the Anaconda Plan as well.

But my question is, if this was pursued, did it really have any chance of succeeding? I tend to think not. Once the step of secession had occurred I think the leaders of the CSA, and especially Davis, were committed to following through with the war and either win or perish. Does anyone really think that soft war was ever a viable winning strategy? Rafuse concludes after Antietam, and the Emancipation Proclamation, that soft war was no longer possible, but I tend to think it never really was.

 

[steve59p]

In another thread I reviewed Ethan Rafuse's book McClellan's War, in which Mac felt that a soft war approach that respected southern property rights and did not resort to actions such as emancipation would eventually lead the seceding states to recognize that secession was all a huge mistake, that they had nothing to fear from the Lincoln Administration, and they would come back into the Union willingly. I know that this theory also underpinned Scott's thinking on the Anaconda Plan as well.

But my question is, if this was pursued, did it really have any chance of succeeding? I tend to think not. Once the step of secession had occurred I think the leaders of the CSA, and especially Davis, were committed to following through with the war and either win or perish. Does anyone really think that soft war was ever a viable winning strategy? Rafuse concludes after Antietam, and the Emancipation Proclamation, that soft war was no longer possible, but I tend to think it never really was.

Interesting idea and not heard it before. By respecting southern property rights do you mean basically their ownership of slaves and hence things such as no emancipation or more broadly in terms of less looting or devastation, at least if not facing widespread resistance by the locals?

I would say it might avoid alienating some of the southerners as much and also possibly the growing hostility toward the union that seems to have developed in Kentucky during the war. Also possibly less support for northern copperheads who opposed the war. On the other hand your likely to frustrate, if not alienate some of the radical Republicans and emancipators who are bitterly opposed to slavery. Furthermore, if that stance was made clear right from the start while it would probably have no real impact on foreign governments it might reduce the number of volunteers coming in from 3rd countries who saw the world as a 'crusade' against slavery.

The leading figures in the rebel government, along with the main fire-fighters are extremely unlikely to want to re-enter the union but a lot of lesser figures and ordinary population might start to ask why are we fighting if states rights and slavery are to a large degree secured.

I think the union would still win because of its considerably greater resources, unless there was a serious break down of will at the highest level but whether quicker or slower than OTL I wouldn't know.

Anyway a fair amount of waffle possibly but initial thoughts on the idea.

 

[JackADriscoll]

When I think of a softer war I think of maybe Napoleonic wars? Maybe but also not in such a way that it may not happen again? Interesting query

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

In another thread I reviewed Ethan Rafuse's book McClellan's War, in which Mac felt that a soft war approach that respected southern property rights and did not resort to actions such as emancipation would eventually lead the seceding states to recognize that secession was all a huge mistake, that they had nothing to fear from the Lincoln Administration, and they would come back into the Union willingly. I know that this theory also underpinned Scott's thinking on the Anaconda Plan as well.

But my question is, if this was pursued, did it really have any chance of succeeding? I tend to think not. Once the step of secession had occurred I think the leaders of the CSA, and especially Davis, were committed to following through with the war and either win or perish. Does anyone really think that soft war was ever a viable winning strategy? Rafuse concludes after Antietam, and the Emancipation Proclamation, that soft war was no longer possible, but I tend to think it never really was.

You are absolutely correct. A "soft war" would not have worked.

 

[JerryD]

Interesting idea and not heard it before. By respecting southern property rights do you mean basically their ownership of slaves and hence things such as no emancipation or more broadly in terms of less looting or devastation, at least if not facing widespread resistance by the locals?

Yes, that is the idea. Treat all citizens in rebellious states as if they were loyal citizens, including catching and returning runaway slaves.

I would say it might avoid alienating some of the southerners as much and also possibly the growing hostility toward the union that seems to have developed in Kentucky during the war. Also possibly less support for northern copperheads who opposed the war. On the other hand your likely to frustrate, if not alienate some of the radical Republicans and emancipators who are bitterly opposed to slavery. Furthermore, if that stance was made clear right from the start while it would probably have no real impact on foreign governments it might reduce the number of volunteers coming in from 3rd countries who saw the world as a 'crusade' against slavery.

The leading figures in the rebel government, along with the main fire-fighters are extremely unlikely to want to re-enter the union but a lot of lesser figures and ordinary population might start to ask why are we fighting if states rights and slavery are to a large degree secured.

I think the union would still win because of its considerably greater resources, unless there was a serious break down of will at the highest level but whether quicker or slower than OTL I wouldn't know.

Anyway a fair amount of waffle possibly but initial thoughts on the idea.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Interesting question.

Adoption of the Crittenden Compromise in early 1861 might have prevented the secession of some states, and a smaller, weaker Confederacy might have been willing to re-unite with the U.S. after defeat in a soft war.

So, so speculative though. Crittenden Compromise was a non-starter from the get-go.

 

[jackt62]

The "soft war" strategy that the Lincoln administration adhered to in the first year of the war was based on the idea that the seceded states were "erring" sisters who simply needed some cajoling to rejoin the Union. In that regard, instructing the military to embark on a massive campaign of resource destruction, occupation, widespread foraging and devastation was not exactly the best prescription for persuading the south to come home. In contrast, suppressing the rebellion meant keeping the war away from civilian lives and property and upholding the right of states to maintain humans in bondage. But by mid to late 1862, the United States reluctantly abandoned this approach for the simple reason it didn't work. Strongly held beliefs and convictions on both sides doomed the soft war approach. In that regard, I don't see any realistic pathway for its success. But it had to be tried.

 

[Pat Answer]

Interesting question. Leaving aside the political differences for a moment, there was some disagreement even about what "soft war" meant. Scott's Anaconda Plan, at least initially, was about blockade and securing the Mississippi River, and did not envision large-scale invasions of the South. McClellan, on the other hand intended to combine respect for social institutions/property with overwhelming military force aimed at Richmond and any point that could support it (Atlantic coast and east Tennessee, &c). McClellan probably didn't appreciate as well as Scott that once armies are in motion, conflict takes on a life of its own; Scott (and he wasn't alone) underestimated the "strongly held beliefs and convictions on both sides" that "doomed the soft war approach." @jackt62

Sometimes we forget that "civil" "war" is technically an oxymoron.

 

[TallTallMan]

No.

 

[JerryD]

The "soft war" strategy that the Lincoln administration adhered to in the first year of the war was based on the idea that the seceded states were "erring" sisters who simply needed some cajoling to rejoin the Union. In that regard, instructing the military to embark on a massive campaign of resource destruction, occupation, widespread foraging and devastation was not exactly the best prescription for persuading the south to come home. In contrast, suppressing the rebellion meant keeping the war away from civilian lives and property and upholding the right of states to maintain humans in bondage. But by mid to late 1862, the United States reluctantly abandoned this approach for the simple reason it didn't work. Strongly held beliefs and convictions on both sides doomed the soft war approach. In that regard, I don't see any realistic pathway for its success. But it had to be tried.

You know, you raise an interesting point. I had not thought about it that way, but I think you are probably right. It had to be at least tried. Good point.

 

[damYankee]

What would best describe Buchanan's strategy?
Soft like a marshmallow. We know how well that worked, all joking aside no, it would not have worked.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The only way Soft War might have succeeded is if it was combined with Union domination on the battlefield. If the war seems militarily unwinnable in late 1862 then Southerners might be willing to talk with a Soft War.

Hard War was going to become inevitable as the war dragged on for logistical reasons I'd nothing else. Union armies operating deep into the Confederacy had no real choice besides taking large quantities of foodstuffs from Southern civilians.

 

[Zack]

Building on what @jackt62 said -

If two sides go to war over a piece of territory, it can be (relatively) easy to say "my expenditure of resources is no longer equal to the value of this territory. Therefore, I will end this war." This is, of course, a reductive way to view war, but it can be helpful in this discussion. When a war is fought over something concrete and tangible, it is easy for either side to determine that the amount of blood and treasure they have spilled is no longer worth whatever concrete thing they wanted to attain.

But what if your goal is freedom? Unity? Survival? What is the value of these ideas? How much are you willing to sacrifice for these concepts? They're soft and squishy and many would be willing to sacrifice substantially more for these ideas than for a piece of land.

If we view the war as an existential struggle - the South believed that the abolition of slavery represented an existential threat because it would lead to racial conflict and amalgamation; the North believed that if states were allowed to leave the Union at will the integrity of the country would collapse plus those who believed in the moral necessity of freeing slaves - then you can argue that hard war was all but inevitable. Both sides were fighting for ideas they were willing to sacrifice everything for.

As I mentioned before - this is obviously a theoretical and somewhat reductive way to view the conflict that lacks in nuance (Unionists, for example) - but it's perhaps another way to look at the question beyond simply strategy, tactics, economics, and logistics. Nothing is inevitable in war, but it is notable that both sides suffered crippling defeats and yet kept fighting. The Army of the Potomac lost major battle after major battle but kept plugging along because the cause was still worth sacrificing for. The Confederacy suffered defeat after defeat in the west, losing huge swathes of territory, but kept fighting because the cause was still worth sacrificing for.

A fun thought exercise!

 

[Present Arms]

A campaign to win the hearts and minds of a population must overcome difficult obstacles. One of them is the often repeated observation that no one ever went broke by underestimating the intelligence of the general public; so an intellectual approach produces little result. Another is that in most conflicts, about one third of the population is adamant for one side and about one third is equally adamant for the other side. The remaining third merely waits to see who wins.

 

[JerryD]

Building on what @jackt62 said -

If two sides go to war over a piece of territory, it can be (relatively) easy to say "my expenditure of resources is no longer equal to the value of this territory. Therefore, I will end this war." This is, of course, a reductive way to view war, but it can be helpful in this discussion. When a war is fought over something concrete and tangible, it is easy for either side to determine that the amount of blood and treasure they have spilled is no longer worth whatever concrete thing they wanted to attain.

But what if your goal is freedom? Unity? Survival? What is the value of these ideas? How much are you willing to sacrifice for these concepts? They're soft and squishy and many would be willing to sacrifice substantially more for these ideas than for a piece of land.

If we view the war as an existential struggle - the South believed that the abolition of slavery represented an existential threat because it would lead to racial conflict and amalgamation; the North believed that if states were allowed to leave the Union at will the integrity of the country would collapse plus those who believed in the moral necessity of freeing slaves - then you can argue that hard war was all but inevitable. Both sides were fighting for ideas they were willing to sacrifice everything for.

As I mentioned before - this is obviously a theoretical and somewhat reductive way to view the conflict that lacks in nuance (Unionists, for example) - but it's perhaps another way to look at the question beyond simply strategy, tactics, economics, and logistics. Nothing is inevitable in war, but it is notable that both sides suffered crippling defeats and yet kept fighting. The Army of the Potomac lost major battle after major battle but kept plugging along because the cause was still worth sacrificing for. The Confederacy suffered defeat after defeat in the west, losing huge swathes of territory, but kept fighting because the cause was still worth sacrificing for.

A fun thought exercise!

Great post. I think part of the soft war theory was to avoid making the war an existential struggle. But I think that would require allowing cooler heads to prevail, and I just dont think that was possible at that time.

The fact is slavery was not threatened by Lincoln's election, but southern leaders had whipped themselves into a frenzy to convince themselves that it was. Alexander Stephens, a voice of reason at this time, gave a speech to the Georgia secession convention in which he said he would be the first to support secession IF southern rights were violated, but as far as he could see they had not been violated. Essentially he was saying secessionists were pushing secession out of fear of what MIGHT happen, and Stephens was saying, let's wait and see if they actually get violated before we throw away the Union that has been so beneficial for the prosperity of the south. But this was no time for moderation, or even common sense. So long as southern leaders were convinced that Lincoln was coming for their slaves, they viewed the war as an existential struggle for the survival of their lifestyle, and I dont think soft war was going to convince them otherwise.

 

[steve59p]

When I think of a softer war I think of maybe Napoleonic wars? Maybe but also not in such a way that it may not happen again? Interesting query

Not really as they were a radical change from earlier conflicts in the 18thC - although technically this started with the French revolutionary wars. A sizeable part of the reason why French armies were more mobile in both revolutionary and imperial periods was because instead of relying on extensive logistical systems to supply troops in the field the forces were allowed to loot, with some restraint, to get the food, fodder and other resources they needed. In places, most noticeably Iberia and parts of Russia this went pretty much to what we would now call total war with widespread devastation and massacres on both sides. Mostly by the French as they had the sheer numbers for most of the time but it wouldn't be good to be a Frenchman caught by the guerillas during that period.

Also Napoleon especially to maintain his large military forces stationed most of them outside France with their needs being supplied by local population and when an opponent was defeated they often faced a heavy indemnity, in cash and/or kind.

Anyway diverting somewhat but the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars weren't anything like soft.

 

[RedRover]

Yes, that is the idea. Treat all citizens in rebellious states as if they were loyal citizens, including catching and returning runaway slaves.

Whatever any of the US generals thought, that wasn't possible for US commanders after August, 1861 certainly. Under the authority of a July, 1861 act of Congress, President Lincoln declared on August 16, 1861 that all of the inhabitants of the Southern States (except for some stated exceptions) were in insurrection against the laws of the Union. We might call it the "Insurrection Proclamation."

"Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in pursuance of an act of Congress approved July 13, 1861, do hereby declare that the inhabitants of the said States of Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida (except the inhabitants of that part of the State of Virginia lying west of the Alleghany Mountains and of such other parts of that State and the other States hereinbefore named as may maintain a loyal adhesion to the Union and the Constitution or may be from time to time occupied and controlled by forces of the United States engaged in the dispersion of said insurgents) are in a state of insurrection against the United States, and that all commercial intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other States and other parts of the United States is unlawful, and will remain unlawful until such insurrection shall cease or has been suppressed; that all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise, coming from any of said States, with the exceptions aforesaid, into other parts of the United States without the special license and permission of the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, or proceeding to any of said States, with the exceptions aforesaid, by land or water, together with the vessel or vehicle conveying the same or conveying persons to or from said States, with said exceptions, will be forfeited to the United States; and that from and after fifteen days from the issuing of this proclamation all ships and vessels belonging in whole or in part to any citizen or inhabitant of any of said States, with said exceptions, found at sea or in any port of the United States will be forfeited to the United States; and I hereby enjoin upon all district attorneys, marshals, and officers of the revenue and of the military and naval forces of the United States to be vigilant in the execution of said act and in the enforcement of the penalties and forfeitures imposed or declared by it, leaving any party who may think himself aggrieved thereby to his application to the Secretary of the Treasury for the remission of any penalty or forfeiture, which the said Secretary is authorized by law to grant if in his judgment the special circumstances of any case shall require such remission..."
Done at the city of Washington, this 16th day of August, A.D. 1861, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-sixth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Gen. Butler inquired in May, 1861 about slaves running away to the US forces. The Secretary of War subsequently instructed Butler to do nothing contrary to the laws of any State in terms of carrying off or liberating slaves, but where slaves came to the US forces themselves, to not presume to return them to masters in States subject to the Confederate authorities:

More certain authority for the liberation of slaves was established by law on July 17, 1862, which declared that the U.S. Government, through the civil courts, had the power, relative to citizens in insurrection and rebellion to convict and punish with the confiscation of property including slaves...

Also, from the same act, relative to the armies, any slave in the Confederacy who were thereafter either captured by, or ran away to US forces, were free in spite of any State laws to the contrary, and any US military officers who presumed the validity of the claims of slaveowners within the Confederacy would forfeit their commissions...

President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was a public notice relative to the general enforcement of this act, per his war powers.

 

[jackt62]

If we view the war as an existential struggle - the South believed that the abolition of slavery represented an existential threat because it would lead to racial conflict and amalgamation; the North believed that if states were allowed to leave the Union at will the integrity of the country would collapse plus those who believed in the moral necessity of freeing slaves - then you can argue that hard war was all but inevitable. Both sides were fighting for ideas they were willing to sacrifice everything for.

Exactly. Neither side was fighting for territorial gain in which some kind of negotiated settlement might be easier. But if each side believes it is fighting an existential war of survival, then negotiation becomes almost impossible. That's why all attempts at conciliation such as the Crittenden Compromises or offering compensated emancipation where doomed to failure. When those attempts failed and war became inevitable, the administration and military leaders continued their quest for a "soft" landing to the conflict, in the hope that a clear distinction could be drawn between the southern population at large, and the rebellious faction. But that proved to be another misleading understanding of the sharp divide between north and south. By mid to end 1862, it was clear that the north could only vanquish the south by taking off the kid gloves.

 

[121st PA Vols]

In another thread I reviewed Ethan Rafuse's book McClellan's War, in which Mac felt that a soft war approach that respected southern property rights and did not resort to actions such as emancipation would eventually lead the seceding states to recognize that secession was all a huge mistake, that they had nothing to fear from the Lincoln Administration, and they would come back into the Union willingly. I know that this theory also underpinned Scott's thinking on the Anaconda Plan as well.

But my question is, if this was pursued, did it really have any chance of succeeding? I tend to think not. Once the step of secession had occurred I think the leaders of the CSA, and especially Davis, were committed to following through with the war and either win or perish. Does anyone really think that soft war was ever a viable winning strategy? Rafuse concludes after Antietam, and the Emancipation Proclamation, that soft war was no longer possible, but I tend to think it never really was.

JerryD, trying to look at this through the eyes of the participants, we can't forget the mindset in particular that led to the actual firing on Fort Sumter. I think at the very outset, 'soft' went out the window (populace and most politicians), making it impossible for the injured party to not respond in kind. How do you go soft when someone just punched you in the mouth? How could anyone sell that? So I don't feel you can get past Sumter, Bull Run, definitely Shiloh....!....to even consider the premise. Certainly W A Y before Antietam as Refuse maintains. So no, I don't think it ever had (or has) a chance of succeeding.

 

[Pat Answer]

We're all saying pretty much the same thing. War is almost always easier to start than finish, and almost always costs more, lasts longer, and leads to greater consequences than anyone who initially cheered it on ever anticipated. The main takeaway for me about the one that started here in 1861 is how both sides simply and badly underestimated each other. As I've said in this forum on many other occasions, most arguments over which action was most to 'blame' for its outbreak miss the point: secession was legitimate or illegal depending on the viewpoints, and there was never any wiggle room between the two. Only a truly "home by Christmas" victory could have shortened things and that is truly rare when 'peoples-in-arms' take the field.