McClellan McClellan on the offensive

[Saphroneth]

Wouldn't that mean if we take your number of 75,000 that their would have been around a 45% straggling rate , would this not mean that Confederate losses would have been much higher than stated.

75,000 campaign strength PFD, then casualties after South Mountain, and multiply by about 2/3, and you get about 47,000 effectives (which is the number I was using by adding up individual brigades.).

The more normal conversion from PFD to Effectives is 80% of PFD becomes effectives, but at Antietam the straggling for both sides is particularly bad.

Most historians agree that Lee started the 17th with around 30,000 effectives as units arrived on the battlefield his overhaul strength for the day not counting losses was around 42,000 effectives.

AP Hill is the only formation that really arrives on the battlefield "late", and his division was about 1/8 of Lee's total strength (so on the order of 5,000-6,000 counting all five brigades - Carman only counts the three engaged ones for example).

55,000 effectives is the common figure given that crossed into Maryland , Given the losses a BoSM and a straggling number much more reasonable of around 5,000 - 8,000 this would mean Lee had on hand around 43,000 to 45,000 overall which is interesting because McClellan claimed to have inflicted over double the enemy dead from 1500 to nearly 4000 and I have seen sources that indicate he was right and that Lee covered up his own losses could their be some truth in this?.

I think Lee's reported casualties are low, certainly - the army was badly disrupted. The number I tend towards is about 17,000 casualties in the whole campaign.

The 55,000 number is a little lower than my own personal estimate, and I'd say about 60,000 (using the normal conversion - 75,000 PFD becomes 60,000 effectives). By the same calculation though McClellan's force marching out of Washington is a bit more than 65,000 effectives at that point, and both forces then shrink as the forced marching of the Maryland Campaign reduces the fraction of their PFD they can convert into effectives.

 

[datterbury]

Here's something that some may want to ponder. On September 10, 1862, McClellan wrote Halleck, "All the evidence . . . goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire Rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick . . . the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful."

Would anyone like to take a shot at explaining why McClellan, outnumbered as he supposedly believed he was, would have taken the offensive at Antietam?

Here's something that some may want to ponder. On September 10, 1862, McClellan wrote Halleck, "All the evidence . . . goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire Rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick . . . the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful."

Would anyone like to take a shot at explaining why McClellan, outnumbered as he supposedly believed he was, would have taken the offensive at Antietam?

Here's something that some may want to ponder. On September 10, 1862, McClellan wrote Halleck, "All the evidence . . . goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire Rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick . . . the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful."

Would anyone like to take a shot at explaining why McClellan, outnumbered as he supposedly believed he was, would have taken the offensive at Antietam?

First let me say something that I believe, but haven't read to much about from all the so called experts. McClellen knew Robert Lee from the Mexican conflict. He had a lot of respect for him and understood he was a better General then himself. Therefore he wasn't about to go head to head with him, under even odds. He could see himself going down in history as the man that got out Generald and easily beaten by Lee. McClellen had a huge ego and would never allow that to happen to him. So obviously he needed to exaggerate the amount of men Lee had, so he could also exaggerate the amount of men he wanted. So if he had double the men Lee had during the battle, he thought he might have a chance. Of course if he had won the battle out right, he would tell anyone that would listen, that both armies had the same amount of men. That's just the kind of guy he was. So after discovering Lees battle plans, he realized that he might have those 2/1 odds in his favor now. But being McClellen, he still tip toed his way into battle. Letting not only Lee know how green of a General he was, but pretty much everyone in Washington also. McClellen was a Democrat, had a lot of respect for Lee and in his own heart never wanted to go to battle against him. Unfortunately for the north. Lincoln liked to give his Generals lots of rope. In McClellens case, 2 years to much!

 

[67th Tigers]

"I prefer Lee to Johnston – the former is too cautious & weak under grave responsibility – personally brave & energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid and irresolute in action".

McClellan didn't consider Lee to be a particularly great general, and he was probably aware of Lee poor record in West Virginia. McClellan knew Lee in Mexico. Both were engineers attached to headquarters, but whilst McClellan was skulking around with a bowie knife doing sneaky stuff behind the Mexican lines, Lee was a HQ wallah. Lee's reputation was as a fortification builder before the war and "Granny Lee" continued to have this reputation until late '62.

 

[Saphroneth]

First let me say something that I believe, but haven't read to much about from all the so called experts. McClellen knew Robert Lee from the Mexican conflict. He had a lot of respect for him and understood he was a better General then himself. Therefore he wasn't about to go head to head with him, under even odds. He could see himself going down in history as the man that got out Generald and easily beaten by Lee. McClellen had a huge ego and would never allow that to happen to him. So obviously he needed to exaggerate the amount of men Lee had, so he could also exaggerate the amount of men he wanted. So if he had double the men Lee had during the battle, he thought he might have a chance. Of course if he had won the battle out right, he would tell anyone that would listen, that both armies had the same amount of men. That's just the kind of guy he was. So after discovering Lees battle plans, he realized that he might have those 2/1 odds in his favor now. But being McClellen, he still tip toed his way into battle. Letting not only Lee know how green of a General he was, but pretty much everyone in Washington also. McClellen was a Democrat, had a lot of respect for Lee and in his own heart never wanted to go to battle against him. Unfortunately for the north. Lincoln liked to give his Generals lots of rope. In McClellens case, 2 years to much!

On the subject of knowing Lee was a better general than McClellan from the Mexican conflict -
That would be quite surprising, given that at the time both were junior officers.


The idea that McClellan made Lee's numbers much larger relies upon the thesis that McClellan must have exaggerated the number of men Lee had over what the data actually told him. But we don't need to guess about that, because we have his internal calculations.
If as of September 10 McClellan really thought Lee had about half as many men as McClellan did, for example, then that would mean (because of how the estimates were produced) that McClellan would have to think Lee had about half as many regiments as McClellan did.

In fact the two had almost the same number of regiments.



The battle plans (SO 191) said absolutely nothing about how many men Lee had, except that he had at least six divisions and probably more (Jackson's Command, Longstreet's Command, and divisions of McLaws, Anderson, Walker, DH Hill). Based on how Jackson and Longstreet had "commands" then McClellan would be able to assume both were commanding more than one division, for at least eight. (This ignores Stuart's cavalry.)

That's all the information about strength that SO 191 gives.


As for the claim about tiptoeing...

It's a funny definition of "tip toe[d] his way into battle" to be the attacker on the bloodiest single day of combat in American history. By the end of the day all but one of the brigades in 1st (with 10), 2nd (with 9) and 12th Corps (with 5) have made attacks (23/24), plus all the brigades in 9th Corps (8/8), one brigade of 5th Corps (1/5.5) and one brigade of 6th Corps (Irwin's, 1/6), totalling 33. Remaining unengaged are 1 brigade of 1st Corps, 4.5 of 5th Corps and 5 of Franklin (so 10.5).

Essentially this is three quarters of his army all on the same day. Given that when he was making his attack plans for the battle (late on the 16th) Morell and Franklin hadn't yet arrived he was making his plans when he had about 34.5 brigades - and all but 2.5 of them go in.


Finally, I'd love to see where you start counting for two years to end at (presumably) November 1862, as the amount of time Lincoln gave McClellan. Are you counting from Lincoln's election?

 

[Saphroneth]

I thought I'd explore a little better the idea that Lincoln was patient with McClellan and let him have his head until November 1862, because I don't think it holds up. This is because of the various times that Lincoln interferes with McClellan's command or otherwise does not simply give McClellan the chance of doing whatever he wants.

For the purposes of this analysis I will take it as read that the Union army could not simply advance against the enemy to victory for most of 1861. This is because of the simple fact that in the middle of July Union troops who had been enrolled for about three months advanced against the Confederate enemy, and the army proved to have serious deficiencies in training and steadiness.

Most of the troops who enlisted early enough that they fought at First Bull Run as three-month regiments were mustered out of service not long afterwards, and so it's not until October that there is any significant part of the new Union army (call-up starting in July) that has been in service longer than the troops who fought at First Bull Run (from a call-up starting in April).

So, once the campaign season of 1862 opens...

- McClellan has a plan for operating on the littoral and sidestepping the Confederate defensive line on and north of the Rappahanock, the Urbanna Plan, which also has options for other landing sites.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to confirm the plan
Instead: Lincoln asks for a vote of the division commanders, then asks for another vote of the newly created corps commanders after the division commanders approve Urbanna. This second vote overrides months of planning and imposes on McClellan a route he thought was inferior due to the potential delays.

- McClellan is about to advance against the enemy and has 15 divisions in his army, plus defences in Washington. He is planning to take up to twelve of them and leave three to defend Washington, plus the Washington defences and some other troops, and to also take control of Fort Monroe when he moves there.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to not reduce the strength of McClellan's army
Instead: McClellan has four divisions removed from his command (Blenker's division plus the whole of 1st Corps) despite Lincoln's promises, and he also loses control of Fort Monroe.

- In May, Lincoln sends a fact finding expedition to find out if McClellan needs reinforcement. They report that he does and that McDowell's corps should be sent to join McClellan immediately.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to do this
Instead: Lincoln keeps delaying sending McDowell's corps, and most of them never arrive at all.

- In June and July, the massive Seven Days attacks by Lee force McClellan away from Richmond. Lincoln promises McClellan upwards of 40,000 reinforcements.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to send all those reinforcements, or as many as he can spare.
Instead: Lincoln sends almost nobody. Two brigades total arrive.

This list is non-exhaustive, but it should suffice to demonstrate that Lincoln did not simply send McClellan on his way and only finally change that policy after it wasn't working out. From the start of the 1862 campaign season Lincoln is interfering and changing things around.

Whether or not Lincoln's interferences are justified, what cannot be denied is that they did happen. To argue they were justified is a separate issue.

 

[wausaubob]

McClellan's problems were political. When Stephen A. Douglas died, McClellan's problems would begin. He commanded for about 1 year. But he was wealthy, handsome, well educated and had traveled in Europe. He was natural Presidential material. McPherson, in the west, would be comparable.
Lincoln was obsessed with the idea of a military takeover. With substantial reason.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

I thought I'd explore a little better the idea that Lincoln was patient with McClellan and let him have his head until November 1862, because I don't think it holds up. This is because of the various times that Lincoln interferes with McClellan's command or otherwise does not simply give McClellan the chance of doing whatever he wants.

To be blunt, this is very deceptive reasoning. This is all arguing from a negative stand point of "interference" as though McClellan's operations are the most important thing, and no other theater of the war is to be considered.

To start with:

- McClellan has a plan for operating on the littoral and sidestepping the Confederate defensive line on and north of the Rappahanock, the Urbanna Plan, which also has options for other landing sites.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to confirm the plan
Instead: Lincoln asks for a vote of the division commanders, then asks for another vote of the newly created corps commanders after the division commanders approve Urbanna. This second vote overrides months of planning and imposes on McClellan a route he thought was inferior due to the potential delays.

Why should Lincoln just accept the Urbanna Plan at face value? Why should he not take the measure of the plan from other officers in the military? You don't present any reason for Lincoln to just accept the plan, why is that the expectation?

- McClellan is about to advance against the enemy and has 15 divisions in his army, plus defences in Washington. He is planning to take up to twelve of them and leave three to defend Washington, plus the Washington defences and some other troops, and to also take control of Fort Monroe when he moves there.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to not reduce the strength of McClellan's army
Instead: McClellan has four divisions removed from his command (Blenker's division plus the whole of 1st Corps) despite Lincoln's promises, and he also loses control of Fort Monroe.

Again, this is ignoring anything else that isn't McClellan's plans, showing a blind spot in your thinking. We could argue ad nauseum over whether McClellan reported deceptive or incorrect numbers to Lincoln about the troops available, but the more important fact is that the men held back either ended up supplementing troops who had already left or were sent to the Valley to fight the very real problem Jackson was creating. McClellan was not operating in a vacuum.

You give no reason for your expectation other than the presumption McClellan's operation is more important.

- In June and July, the massive Seven Days attacks by Lee force McClellan away from Richmond. Lincoln promises McClellan upwards of 40,000 reinforcements.
You'd Expect: Lincoln to send all those reinforcements, or as many as he can spare.
Instead: Lincoln sends almost nobody. Two brigades total arrive.

And once again you're ignoring other factors, namely still, Jackson in the Valley and the threat this then potentially posed to Washington thus necessitating the creation of the Army of Virginia under Pope. You don't give us any reason to expect Lincoln to drop everything and send men who weren't available to help McClellan.

These aren't good responses unless we accept the implicit assumption you're making that McClellan's plans were the only ones that mattered and Lincoln had no other concerns or information which might be more pressing in Washington or the war itself. That very notion should be rejected out of hand and you ought to go back to square one.

 

[Saphroneth]

To be blunt, this is very deceptive reasoning. This is all arguing from a negative stand point of "interference" as though McClellan's operations are the most important thing, and no other theater of the war is to be considered.

Not really. The point I'm making is that the proposition "Lincoln let McClellan run without interference until November 1862" is fundamentally flawed; we can debate whether the interferences are positive or not, but that's separate to the truth of the proposition.


For example, with the Urbanna plan, the process that takes place is:

McClellan presents the plan (and outlines the benefits of it, along with other alternatives and why e.g. the Peninsular plan would be a poor landing place because of the potential for a month's delay in reducing Yorktown).

Lincoln asks for a vote of the division commanders.

The division commanders approve Urbanna.

Lincoln then asks for a vote of the (newly promoted) corps commanders.

The corps commanders reject Urbanna (and substitute the Peninsula).


This is not Lincoln letting McClellan run without interference; in fact, it's the opposite. Lincoln asks for three separate opinions (one from McClellan, one from the division commanders, and then one from the corps commanders) and rejects the concurrence of the first two opinions to accept the third; notably the newly promoted corps commanders were the ones who had rejected Urbanna.

This is consistent with Lincoln seeking cover to overrule McClellan and creating an artificially selected electorate that would reject Urbanna*. That does not mean that it was what was happening, but the possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand.

I certainly agree that Lincoln has the right to question McClellan's plans, and indeed override them if he wants; it means he bears some of the responsibility for the negatives of the substituted plan, though (which turns out to include a month's delay in getting past Yorktown, albeit in a different form to the one McClellan had originally outlined).



By contrast, we can look at the situation after McClellan's replacement by Burnside. The "Lincoln-Stanton" plan (to move straight south towards Culpeper and Orange) was a viable alternative to the plan Burnside had outlined in the conditions that then obtained, but Lincoln approves Burnside's plan without modification; I'm not aware of Lincoln asking for a vote of the corps commanders, though such may have happened without my becoming aware of it.



* the motivation for this would be a desire to avoid directly imposing a plan on the grounds that the plan's failure would result in one bearing the responsibility. Conversely if Lincoln honestly wanted the opinion of other generals then in principle the first vote provided it and the second vote is harder to explain.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Not really. The point I'm making is that the proposition "Lincoln let McClellan run without interference until November 1862" is fundamentally flawed; we can debate whether the interferences are positive or not, but that's separate to the truth of the proposition.

It isn't though, and you can't make the assertion in any way shape or form which doesn't begin with an underlying assumption McClellan's actions are the correct ones, which is what you are stating, or at the very least attempting to frame the narrative in such a way that this is the conclusion you wish us to draw.

 

[67th Tigers]

To be blunt, this is very deceptive reasoning. This is all arguing from a negative stand point of "interference" as though McClellan's operations are the most important thing, and no other theater of the war is to be considered.

The modern notion of war powers being solely wielded by POTUS only came into being in 1862. Since the role was created, the General-in-Chief really did command the army, and POTUS simply gave him general directions. This frustrated the administration in 1861, and they initially created a parallel command structure and undermine the GinC, then replaced him with a general more in tune with the administration's policies (McClellan), and then set out to undermine McClellan with a parallel command structure (which McClellan effectively beat, unlike Scott). With McClellan's victory over the "jacobins" their strategy changed, and they got their own man (Stanton) appointed as SECWAR. Soon it was seen fit to suspend the role of the GinC entirely, and it never really reconstituted. Halleck was a mere functionary in the role, and Grant was sent off to keep him out of the way.

The Urbanna Plan was the reason for the suspension of the role of GinC. The administration hated it, but neither Lincoln nor Stanton would simply give the order "no". They put conditions on it (which McClellan promptly met), then asked for a vote of the generals (who promptly approved the movement) and finally gerrymandered the electorate and had them vote again. To Stanton's chagrin, his gerrymandered electorate replaced Urbanna with Fort Monroe and then approved that. This was an even worse outcome from the administrations point-of-view but they were stuck with it.

The administration were compelled to follow the committees Peninsula plan, but they didn't do it cheerfully. They removed five divisions of infantry, 10 regiments of cavalry (i.e. more than half the cavalry!) and the engineers from the operation once it was underway. Four of those five divisions and most of that cavalry were now in the north Virginia theatre doing nothing. Jackson had proven to be impotent against McClellan's defensive arrangements in late March 1862, and there was no threat to Washington.

However, with seven divisions of infantry (after sending Franklin to McClellan) sitting around in NW Virginia and Fredericksburg, there was the question of what to do with them. It was the judgement of most that four of these divisions should be sent to McClellan, since there was no real threat. Accordingly, Lincoln consented to these four divisions marching south from Fredericksburg, including Shields' Division (which McClellan had ordered left). When Shields marched out of the Shenandoah Valley, Banks didn't adjust his defensive scheme, leaving a hole. Jackson and Ewell exploited the hole and gained Winchester, but failed to gain Harper's Ferry. Hence Jackson gained little of operational value.

However, Lincoln and Stanton became obsessed with catching Jackson, and mismanaged the situation badly. They diverted four divisions to the Shenandoah in a fruitless attempt to catch Jackson, who after giving two of these divisions drubbings was off to Richmond.

The point is, under McClellan's scheme there was no real threat from Jackson. You can see that until late May Jackson is contained (without 1st Corps being involved at all). The administration mismanaged the defense of the Valley giving Jackson an opportunity. They then overreacted to Jackson's failed offensive. For much of this time a whole Corps (1st) was sitting idle at Fredericksburg doing nothing.