McClellan McClellan on the offensive

[Moe Daoust]

Here's something that some may want to ponder. On September 10, 1862, McClellan wrote Halleck, "All the evidence . . . goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire Rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick . . . the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful."

Would anyone like to take a shot at explaining why McClellan, outnumbered as he supposedly believed he was, would have taken the offensive at Antietam?

 

[Belfoured]

Here's something that some may want to ponder. On September 10, 1862, McClellan wrote Halleck, "All the evidence . . . goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire Rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick . . . the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful."

Would anyone like to take a shot at explaining why McClellan, outnumbered as he supposedly believed he was, would have taken the offensive at Antietam?

My "unconsidered" reaction is that this piece would probably line up in your column regarding deliberate misstatement of enemy strength. I've clearly slotted the July 15 letter to Ellen in the other column but that was "then" - Peninsula - and this is "now" - Maryland.

 

[Moe Daoust]

My "unconsidered" reaction is that this piece would probably line up in your column regarding deliberate misstatement of enemy strength. I've clearly slotted the July 15 letter to Ellen in the other column but that was "then" - Peninsula - and this is "now" - Maryland.

So are you of the opinion McClellan purposely inflated Lee's numbers on September 10, 1862? If so, what do you think his true estimate of Lee's numbers were?

 

[Scott1967]

So are you of the opinion McClellan purposely inflated Lee's numbers on September 10, 1862? If so, what do you think his true estimate of Lee's numbers were?

Yes he did , McClellan may also have know Lee's exact numbers at Sharpsburg he had plenty of evidence from reports at Harpers ferry and from the Maryland public + his own scouts and spy's to deduce what he was facing , No commander commits to a battle completely blind or ignorant of the enemy's numbers its just common sense.

Their is no way of knowing how many men McClellan thought Lee had privately but his dispatches obviously over exaggerate Lee's force to the extreme I know a few forum member's think McClellan was some sort of genius or underrated when they quote their facts and figures but in truth he failed to achieve any of his objectives while conserving his army.

So yes McClellan did indeed grossly over exaggerate numbers to attempt to get more men the fear of losing and destroying his political career was for more important than actually trying to smash Lee's army.

In my opinion.

 

[Belfoured]

So are you of the opinion McClellan purposely inflated Lee's numbers on September 10, 1862? If so, what do you think his true estimate of Lee's numbers were?

Two qualifications first: (1) The estimate is dated September 10. We would have to move it forward nearly one week to assess why he took the offensive on September 16-17; (2) The estimate pre-dated confirmation as to how split up the ANV actually was - so, again, that would be a factor in McClellan estimating what he faced when he took the offensive. Now, with this out of the way, I've seen a wide range of contemporary sources/reports for ANV strength in the September 10 time frame and you've probably seen even more. Trying to take all of those into account (including reports by observers in Maryland) and given that McClellan (1) knew that Lee had suffered his own losses at 2BR and (2) that by September 10 it appears that stragglers leaked by the ANV were in significant numbers that could be observed, I'd guess somewhere around 65,000 or so. The key word is "guess".

 

[Moe Daoust]

Yes he did , McClellan may also have know Lee's exact numbers at Sharpsburg he had plenty of evidence from reports at Harpers ferry and from the Maryland public + his own scouts and spy's to deduce what he was facing , No commander commits to a battle completely blind or ignorant of the enemy's numbers its just common sense.

Their is no way of knowing how many men McClellan thought Lee had privately but his dispatches obviously over exaggerate Lee's force to the extreme I know a few forum member's think McClellan was some sort of genius or underrated when they quote their facts and figures but in truth he failed to achieve any of his objectives while conserving his army.

So yes McClellan did indeed grossly over exaggerate numbers to attempt to get more men the fear of losing and destroying his political career was for more important than actually trying to smash Lee's army.

In my opinion.

Let me get this right Scott. You are of the opinion McClellan did purposely exaggerate Lee's numbers on September 10th. On this, I agree entirely with you. I don't, however, think that you, I or anyone else can ever be certain what McClellan's true estimates of Lee's numbers were at Antietam. I'm personally inclined to think he may have put Lee's forces on par with his own but again, that is only a guess. Having said that, I very much doubt he knew "exactly" what Lee's numbers were and frankly, no commander can ever know this for certain. It's called the "fog of war."

For the sake of argument, let's assume that McClellan knew "exactly" how many men Lee had (roughly 40,000 according to most accounts.) That would have given him just under a 1.8 to 1 advantage. According to the then widely accepted convention, this was far from a slam dunk advantage, 2 to 1 being the ideal ratio but even then, victory was still not assured (for that a commander would need 3:1 or better.) Next we need to consider that Lee's forces were made up of hardened veterans whereas 20% of McClellan's troops were new and barely trained recruits. Don't kid yourself, McClellan would have been completely aware of this fact and so would Lee have.
So, assuming McClellan figured he had a 1.8 to 1 advantage, all the while being entirely aware that a victory was in no way guaranteed, he, nevertheless, went on the offensive on the morning of September 17th. Keep in mind, this is the man who historians would have you believe was "afraid to use his army" (you even go so far as to suggest he was "afraid of losing.") Considering what was at stake at Antietam (Baltimore and Washington hanging in the balance and the prospect of British recognition of the Confederacy in the event of defeat) I don't blame him if he was afraid of losing. Who wouldn't be?

Of course, all of the above assumes McClellan knew Lee's "exact" numbers and that would have been highly unlikely if not impossible. Even still, he took the offensive and in doing so, effectively threw the dice of war. That doesn't make McClellan a genius by any means but it certainly says something about the man.

This post has to do with McClellan taking the offensive on the morning of the 17th, so please let's not get into the battle itself. That is a subject for an entirely separate post. If you want to delve into the battle, please refer to my article, The Battle of Antietam: A Perspective.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Two qualifications first: (1) The estimate is dated September 10. We would have to move it forward nearly one week to assess why he took the offensive on September 16-17; (2) The estimate pre-dated confirmation as to how split up the ANV actually was - so, again, that would be a factor in McClellan estimating what he faced when he took the offensive. Now, with this out of the way, I've seen a wide range of contemporary sources/reports for ANV strength in the September 10 time frame and you've probably seen even more. Trying to take all of those into account (including reports by observers in Maryland) and given that McClellan (1) knew that Lee had suffered his own losses at 2BR and (2) that by September 10 it appears that stragglers leaked by the ANV were in significant numbers that could be observed, I'd guess somewhere around 65,000 or so. The key word is "guess".

(1) McClellan repeats that "120,000 men or more" figure in another message to Halleck on the 14th. (2) By the time the Lost Order was in McClellan's hands, Lee's dispositions were quite different from what was stated in the communication and that would have obvious to McClellan when his troops bumped into Longstreet's troops who, according the the Lost Order, were supposed to have been marching toward Hagerstown. I'll add a (3) here. The bottom line is that according to those two messages to Halleck, 120,000 Rebels were running around out there somewhere.

Are you suggesting McClellan may have put Lee's numbers at 65,000? If that's the case, to his way of thinking, this would have only given him a 1.1 to 1 advantage over Lee. See my comments to Scott in this regard.

 

[Scott1967]

Let me get this right Scott. You are of the opinion McClellan did purposely exaggerate Lee's numbers on September 10th. On this, I agree entirely with you. I don't, however, think that you, I or anyone else can ever be certain what McClellan's true estimates of Lee's numbers were at Antietam. I'm personally inclined to think he may have put Lee's forces on par with his own but again, that is only a guess. Having said that, I very much doubt he knew "exactly" what Lee's numbers were and frankly, no commander can ever know this for certain. It's called the "fog of war."

I agree McClellan would not have know the exact number but armies were counted by divisions and he would have known what divisions would have been with Lee of this I have no doubt.

As they passed townships of hamlets people would note flags , leaders and even chat to the troops who came through.

A confederate division consisted roughly of around 7-9k if you can account for 8-9 divisions noting both leaders and division flags you have a pretty good idea on numbers.

Although uncertain I agree with https://civilwartalk.com/members/belfoured.27755/ it would not be unfeasible to assume McClellan thought he was dealing with maybe 60k Confederate troops half of the number he quoted to Halleck.

What McClellan did not know was that some of Lee's Divisions were under strength and losses had not been replaced.

Next we need to consider that Lee's forces were made up of hardened veterans whereas 20% of McClellan's troops were new and barely trained recruits.

Personally I don't put much stock in the notion that Green troops were significantly inferior to veteran troops their are advantages and disadvantages to having both but that's another thread entirely.

Of course, all of the above assumes McClellan knew Lee's "exact" numbers and that would have been highly unlikely if not impossible. Even still, he took the offensive and in doing so, effectively threw the dice of war. That doesn't make McClellan a genius by any means but it certainly says something about the man.

You could argue McClellan was under pressure not just by Lincoln but by the public to do something , The exact people McClellan would try and win over in 1864 and failed dismally which goes to show how people viewed him in those times.

 

[Belfoured]

(1) McClellan repeats that "120,000 men or more" figure in another message to Halleck on the 14th. (2) By the time the Lost Order was in McClellan's hands, Lee's dispositions were quite different from what was stated in the communication and that would have obvious to McClellan when his troops bumped into Longstreet's troops who, according the the Lost Order, were supposed to have been marching toward Hagerstown. I'll add a (3) here. The bottom line is that according to those two messages to Halleck, 120,000 Rebels were running around out there somewhere.

Are you suggesting McClellan may have put Lee's numbers at 65,000? If that's the case, to his way of thinking, this would have only given him a 1.1 to 1 advantage over Lee. See my comments to Scott in this regard.

Your question as I read it pertained to September 10, so the number I provided is September 10 - not what McClellan believed he confronted on September 17 (and by that date he knew the ANV had been split up). As an aside, what is the source for Lee's knowledge on September 17 that "20%" of McClellan's force were "new and barely trained recruits"? It took Lee several days to even confirm that McClellan was in command (according to Harsh). On the other hand, given the concededly high level of straggling from the ANV noted by numerous participants, it is inconceivable to me that McClellan didn't have some dim awareness of that. You can't conceal large numbers of stragglers wandering the countryside in search of food, etc.

 

[Harms88]

What gets lost I feel is that for all his caution, McClellan was first and foremost a Union man. Perhaps he didn't respect the President as he should have, but his way of conducting war was in hopes that once it was over, there would be the least amount of hard feelings between Northerners and Southerners.

The Maryland Campaign was actually a pretty aggressive McClellan campaign, and Lee nearly abandoned the Campaign upon learning that McClellan was moving much faster than he had anticipated, only halting once he learned that Jackson had secured Harper's Ferry. And another fact we don't think about, is that most of the Army that he campaigned with were elements that were unfamiliar to him. Such as most of the Army of Virginia, which hadn't been under his personal command prior to his integrating them into his Army of the Potomac. Nor was he even aware of how many troops he had. There are reports from Hooker where he is almost daily trying to get an actual count of how many troops he actually had, because he wasn't able to get a full counting of his I Corps.

I highly suggest the below video for anyone who wants to know the issues that McClellan was actually facing with his own army.

Did he guess incorrectly enemy numbers? Sure. But he was getting his intelligence from men like Pinkerton who did a pretty poor job when it came to discerning fact from fiction when it came to numbers. Yet Pinkerton had a pretty good reputation, so there was no reason for him to suspect the numbers given were false.

McClellan did not, however, desire anything less than a Union victory. Even when he was being nominated as the Democratic choice for President, he was not "Peace at all costs" as he would only negotiate with the South after troops in the field won victories. Wither this would have happened or not, or even if his cabinet would have allowed it is beside the point.

Fact was, McClellan was just as aware of what a rebel army operating unopposed in the Border States could do, both local and international politically as was the President and the Cabinet. He could under no circumstances allow it to go unopposed, no matter his misgivings.

Another point I feel may have been why comes from the fact that most of his battles against Lee had been victories for the Union Army. Very few of the Lee-McClellan battles resulted in Lee being victorious. McClellan may have abandoned the spot after the battle, but it wasn't because Lee was able to drive him off. It was because McClellan chose to leave after winning. So he knew his army could hold it's own, even if he felt he was outnumbered.

So, why did McClellan attack when he thought he was outnumbered? Because he knew that it was much more dangerous to allow Lee, a victorious Confederate General to be left unopposed than him attacking, especially when the European powers were so close to official recognition.

 

[67th Tigers]

For a start, an estimate of 110,000 (+/- 10,000) isn't that wrong. Dave Powell recently noted this as well. If I may quote myself:

2. Confederate Campaign Strength

There are four known ways to get Lee's campaign strength. They are:

2a. A Survey of the Confederate Survey Records

In the early 1990's, the late Prof. Joseph Harsh had a PhD student trawl the CSR's to find the strength of Lee's army in early September. The masters dissertation has never been published, but Harsh extensively used it in his Maryland Campaign trilogy. The headline summary (by division) is given in table 24 in Sounding the Shallows and is 75,528 PFD. It appears this may be PFD as the rebels at the time defined it, so excluding extra-duty men etc. Although Allen (the student) could only find actual strength data for 25% of the companies in the army, he was able to estimate the rest from older data, or post-Antietam data combined with casualty counts.

2b. Add forward

Starting from the last available returns for formations, we can deduct casualties at 2nd Bull Run and derive an estimate. Livermore did this and estimated 77,135 before 2nd BR. However, his estimate is flawed in places. Starting with the 20th July return, Livermore included Rhett's artillery, which was the garrison artillery of Richmond, and Wise's Brigade, which was left in the garrison. He failed to give numbers for several units that served in Maryland. These include Lawton's Brigade (2,041 on 13th August), Drayton's Brigade and Evans' Brigade (joined 28th July with, according to Allen, 4,600), the 5th and 8th Florida (1,448 according to a different Allen), and the 2nd Virginia (273).

Harsh found 2,200 North Carolina recruits joined just before they left Richmond (Taken and the Flood, fn 76 to chapter 1). Others joined on the march (although probably only a few hundred).

Taking the forces left at Richmond at 3,300 (1,300 for Wise and 2,000 for Rhett), these total 84,397 before 2nd Bull Run, and deducting casualties gives 76,126 PFD.

2c. Add back

Starting from the returns after Antietam, the casualties can be added back to make an estimate. The first complete return after Antietam is 10th October, and Gene Thorpe has done this calculation, finding 77,769 PFD.

2d. Observations of the forces

Some people counted the forces they say. Gene Thorpe has done a wonderful job collating what he could find. Most observations were around Frederick, which the rebel army marched through. It should be noted that the cavalry, Walker's division and G.B. Anderson's brigade of D.H. Hill's division did march through Frederick.

The most commonly quoted observation is that of Dr. Steiner. In his diary for the 10th September he noted that the column that passed through that day took 16 hours to pass his house, and was about 64,000 men, including several thousand "negros" mixed in with the regiments. These latter would not usually be included on the returns. He noted that some rebel regiments were as weak as 150 men, and that none were more than 500. This latter point is not quite true, but few were over 500, such as the recruit swollen 1,000 man 5th North Carolina, and the average regiment of 10 coys was 411 strong. The next day he watched the 8,000 men of D.H. Hill's division (minus G.B. Anderson) march through (after the wagon train one believes). The 69,000-70,000 men (exc/ the non-whites who would not be counted as troops) is consistent with the calculations above, after estimating the cavalry and 3 infantry brigades that didn't pass through Frederick.

2e. Conclusions

Lee's campaign strength can be estimated to be in the 75-80,000 ball park. It is a similar sized army to that he took to Gettysburg. At Gettysburg there were an addition 12-20,000 slaves/ free men of color in the logistics, both the wagon train and attached to regiments as cooks etc. (See Kent Masterson Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg). It is similar here, although we have no count.

Previous regression across all of Lee's returns has shown that the present was on average 1.1934x the PFD, and did not vary much. Thus the moving force is around 90-95,000 by this measure. Thus the moving columns probably consisted of 87,000-100,000 human souls, and more likely in the 90-95,000 range. The question is how did a moving force of over 90,000 men apparently field so few men for battle a fortnight later?

 

[Moe Daoust]

Your question as I read it pertained to September 10, so the number I provided is September 10 - not what McClellan believed he confronted on September 17 (and by that date he knew the ANV had been split up). As an aside, what is the source for Lee's knowledge on September 17 that "20%" of McClellan's force were "new and barely trained recruits"? It took Lee several days to even confirm that McClellan was in command (according to Harsh). On the other hand, given the concededly high level of straggling from the ANV noted by numerous participants, it is inconceivable to me that McClellan didn't have some dim awareness of that. You can't conceal large numbers of stragglers wandering the countryside in search of food, etc.
[/QUOTE "what is the source for Lee's knowledge on September 17 that "20%" of McClellan's force were "new and barely trained recruits"? ]
On September 3rd he wrote President Jefferson Davis "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable."OR XIX/2 p. 590.
So now I ask you to provide your proof that "McClellan didn't have some dim awareness" of the "high level of straggling in Lee's army. Fair is fair.

 

[Scott1967]

For a start, an estimate of 110,000 (+/- 10,000) isn't that wrong. Dave Powell recently noted this as well. If I may quote myself:

2. Confederate Campaign Strength

There are four known ways to get Lee's campaign strength. They are:

2a. A Survey of the Confederate Survey Records

In the early 1990's, the late Prof. Joseph Harsh had a PhD student trawl the CSR's to find the strength of Lee's army in early September. The masters dissertation has never been published, but Harsh extensively used it in his Maryland Campaign trilogy. The headline summary (by division) is given in table 24 in Sounding the Shallows and is 75,528 PFD. It appears this may be PFD as the rebels at the time defined it, so excluding extra-duty men etc. Although Allen (the student) could only find actual strength data for 25% of the companies in the army, he was able to estimate the rest from older data, or post-Antietam data combined with casualty counts.

2b. Add forward

Starting from the last available returns for formations, we can deduct casualties at 2nd Bull Run and derive an estimate. Livermore did this and estimated 77,135 before 2nd BR. However, his estimate is flawed in places. Starting with the 20th July return, Livermore included Rhett's artillery, which was the garrison artillery of Richmond, and Wise's Brigade, which was left in the garrison. He failed to give numbers for several units that served in Maryland. These include Lawton's Brigade (2,041 on 13th August), Drayton's Brigade and Evans' Brigade (joined 28th July with, according to Allen, 4,600), the 5th and 8th Florida (1,448 according to a different Allen), and the 2nd Virginia (273).

Harsh found 2,200 North Carolina recruits joined just before they left Richmond (Taken and the Flood, fn 76 to chapter 1). Others joined on the march (although probably only a few hundred).

Taking the forces left at Richmond at 3,300 (1,300 for Wise and 2,000 for Rhett), these total 84,397 before 2nd Bull Run, and deducting casualties gives 76,126 PFD.

2c. Add back

Starting from the returns after Antietam, the casualties can be added back to make an estimate. The first complete return after Antietam is 10th October, and Gene Thorpe has done this calculation, finding 77,769 PFD.

2d. Observations of the forces

Some people counted the forces they say. Gene Thorpe has done a wonderful job collating what he could find. Most observations were around Frederick, which the rebel army marched through. It should be noted that the cavalry, Walker's division and G.B. Anderson's brigade of D.H. Hill's division did march through Frederick.

The most commonly quoted observation is that of Dr. Steiner. In his diary for the 10th September he noted that the column that passed through that day took 16 hours to pass his house, and was about 64,000 men, including several thousand "negros" mixed in with the regiments. These latter would not usually be included on the returns. He noted that some rebel regiments were as weak as 150 men, and that none were more than 500. This latter point is not quite true, but few were over 500, such as the recruit swollen 1,000 man 5th North Carolina, and the average regiment of 10 coys was 411 strong. The next day he watched the 8,000 men of D.H. Hill's division (minus G.B. Anderson) march through (after the wagon train one believes). The 69,000-70,000 men (exc/ the non-whites who would not be counted as troops) is consistent with the calculations above, after estimating the cavalry and 3 infantry brigades that didn't pass through Frederick.

2e. Conclusions

Lee's campaign strength can be estimated to be in the 75-80,000 ball park. It is a similar sized army to that he took to Gettysburg. At Gettysburg there were an addition 12-20,000 slaves/ free men of color in the logistics, both the wagon train and attached to regiments as cooks etc. (See Kent Masterson Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg). It is similar here, although we have no count.

Previous regression across all of Lee's returns has shown that the present was on average 1.1934x the PFD, and did not vary much. Thus the moving force is around 90-95,000 by this measure. Thus the moving columns probably consisted of 87,000-100,000 human souls, and more likely in the 90-95,000 range. The question is how did a moving force of over 90,000 men apparently field so few men for battle a fortnight later?

Precise and accurate but completely mythical in proportion no offence.

Most Historians and Generals of the time give Lee's Maryland campaign at the very most 55k that includes the Richmond defence forces and that's the ball park figure were dealing with here not ifs and buts and paper roster's , its about the troops that crossed into Maryland.

McClellan didn't have the hindsight or the internet like we do and I think people make to much out of his poor spy network their are various means and methods to discern troop numbers but eyes on the ground is the best way.

It was all about counting divisions as I explained above it was that simple to say he was ill advised by Pinkerton who would have been one of many sources does not rub with me.

Prisoners , Stragglers , Maryland Public , Scouts , Screening cavalry all would have give clear indications of which divisions were on the march not just that but I suspect the division flags themselves sort of gave it away , The real trick is sorting the chaff from the wheat and getting the proper intelligence.

I know your a McClellan advocate and I respect both your knowledge and historic research but seriously you got take off those rose tinted glasses sometimes his assessment of Lee's numbers in the Maryland campaign is absurd , Granted all general's tend to over cook the goose but McClellan left his in to burn.

In my opinion

 

[Belfoured]

Fair enough. And I'll be honest - I'll have to look for sources. For the moment. given the conceded high level of straggling in the ANV while in hostile territory, I have a very difficult time believing that the straggling wasn't noted by observers. If ANV assessments of the level are correct, where were all of these guys hiding, what were they eating, etc. And there weren't likely all being secreted by the residents - this was the "Union" part of Maryland.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Fair enough. And I'll be honest - I'll have to look for sources. For the moment. given the conceded high level of straggling in the ANV while in hostile territory, I have a very difficult time believing that the straggling wasn't noted by observers. If ANV assessments of the level are correct, where were all of these guys hiding, what were they eating, etc. And there weren't likely all being secreted by the residents - this was the "Union" part of Maryland.

I have no doubt that McClellan was made aware of the straggling situation though I don't know that he would have known to what extent. I think I even remember reading about him getting reports of Rebel stragglers. Having said that, I have my doubts that it was as widespread as some historians would have us believe (I never conceded to "high level of straggling."

 

[67th Tigers]

Most Historians and Generals of the time give Lee's Maryland campaign at the very most 55k that includes the Richmond defence forces and that's the ball park figure were dealing with here not ifs and buts and paper roster's , its about the troops that crossed into Maryland.

Let he just quote Harsh on this, after noting his students research had found over 75,000:

"Walter Herron Taylor, one of the most avid statisticians of the Lost Cause, gave Lee 49,077 men at Second Manassas and 35,255 at Sharpsburg. 33 In neither of his books does Taylor estimate the size of the Confederate army at the time of crossing the Potomac, nor does he assign a figure to the reenforcements from Richmond.

William Allan puts Lee at 50,000 on September 2 by taking Taylor's figure for Second Manassas and then assuming the reinforcements "fully made up for his losses in battle, but it is not so certain that they covered the additional losses from sickness and straggling." 34 A. L. Long wrote the army "did not exceed 45,000 effective men." 35

Bradley Johnson went to the extreme of giving Lee only 35,000 men present for duty on entering Maryland, but he apparently made the error of using Taylor's figures for September 17 without accounting for either battle or straggling losses between the 2d and the 17th. 36

Contemporary historian Stephen Sears concluded, "Reinforcements from Richmond … were at hand or on the way, but they barely made good the 9,000 men lost at Bull Run and Chantilly. On this date [September 3] Lee could count perhaps 50,000 troops with which to undertake his expedition beyond the Confederacy's northern frontier." 37 Sears offers no source for his figures, but the echo is so strong as to suggest he adopted Allan's views.

On the other side, several authors have suggested Lee had a somewhat larger army at the time. Without specifying a number, Longstreet's chief of staff, Moxley Sorrell, noted: "The enemy had suffered a serious defeat and was driven into his capital, his numbers again very great, but of demoralized and raw-recruited men. On the other hand, Lee also had a strong army (for Confederate numbers— we had been accustomed to be outnumbered.)" 38

Historian James Murfin decided: "The most men he counted on taking into Maryland was 70,000, and this number would probably be depleted even more by the time he crossed the Potomac." 39 Murfin cites no source for his conclusion, nor does he explain why serious depletion was expected between Chantilly and the crossing of the Potomac. He perhaps alludes to the drop-outs who objected to leaving the Confederacy."

Essentially, aside from Murfin (and we've no details of his estimate), all the estimates did not count the formations that joined Lee after Bull Run, that is the divisions of DH Hill, McLaws and Walker, the cavalry brigade of Wade Hamption and the Artillery Reserve.

 

[Moe Daoust]

For a start, an estimate of 110,000 (+/- 10,000) isn't that wrong. Dave Powell recently noted this as well. If I may quote myself:

2. Confederate Campaign Strength

There are four known ways to get Lee's campaign strength. They are:

2a. A Survey of the Confederate Survey Records

In the early 1990's, the late Prof. Joseph Harsh had a PhD student trawl the CSR's to find the strength of Lee's army in early September. The masters dissertation has never been published, but Harsh extensively used it in his Maryland Campaign trilogy. The headline summary (by division) is given in table 24 in Sounding the Shallows and is 75,528 PFD. It appears this may be PFD as the rebels at the time defined it, so excluding extra-duty men etc. Although Allen (the student) could only find actual strength data for 25% of the companies in the army, he was able to estimate the rest from older data, or post-Antietam data combined with casualty counts.

2b. Add forward

Starting from the last available returns for formations, we can deduct casualties at 2nd Bull Run and derive an estimate. Livermore did this and estimated 77,135 before 2nd BR. However, his estimate is flawed in places. Starting with the 20th July return, Livermore included Rhett's artillery, which was the garrison artillery of Richmond, and Wise's Brigade, which was left in the garrison. He failed to give numbers for several units that served in Maryland. These include Lawton's Brigade (2,041 on 13th August), Drayton's Brigade and Evans' Brigade (joined 28th July with, according to Allen, 4,600), the 5th and 8th Florida (1,448 according to a different Allen), and the 2nd Virginia (273).

Harsh found 2,200 North Carolina recruits joined just before they left Richmond (Taken and the Flood, fn 76 to chapter 1). Others joined on the march (although probably only a few hundred).

Taking the forces left at Richmond at 3,300 (1,300 for Wise and 2,000 for Rhett), these total 84,397 before 2nd Bull Run, and deducting casualties gives 76,126 PFD.

2c. Add back

Starting from the returns after Antietam, the casualties can be added back to make an estimate. The first complete return after Antietam is 10th October, and Gene Thorpe has done this calculation, finding 77,769 PFD.

2d. Observations of the forces

Some people counted the forces they say. Gene Thorpe has done a wonderful job collating what he could find. Most observations were around Frederick, which the rebel army marched through. It should be noted that the cavalry, Walker's division and G.B. Anderson's brigade of D.H. Hill's division did march through Frederick.

The most commonly quoted observation is that of Dr. Steiner. In his diary for the 10th September he noted that the column that passed through that day took 16 hours to pass his house, and was about 64,000 men, including several thousand "negros" mixed in with the regiments. These latter would not usually be included on the returns. He noted that some rebel regiments were as weak as 150 men, and that none were more than 500. This latter point is not quite true, but few were over 500, such as the recruit swollen 1,000 man 5th North Carolina, and the average regiment of 10 coys was 411 strong. The next day he watched the 8,000 men of D.H. Hill's division (minus G.B. Anderson) march through (after the wagon train one believes). The 69,000-70,000 men (exc/ the non-whites who would not be counted as troops) is consistent with the calculations above, after estimating the cavalry and 3 infantry brigades that didn't pass through Frederick.

2e. Conclusions

Lee's campaign strength can be estimated to be in the 75-80,000 ball park. It is a similar sized army to that he took to Gettysburg. At Gettysburg there were an addition 12-20,000 slaves/ free men of color in the logistics, both the wagon train and attached to regiments as cooks etc. (See Kent Masterson Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg). It is similar here, although we have no count.

Previous regression across all of Lee's returns has shown that the present was on average 1.1934x the PFD, and did not vary much. Thus the moving force is around 90-95,000 by this measure. Thus the moving columns probably consisted of 87,000-100,000 human souls, and more likely in the 90-95,000 range. The question is how did a moving force of over 90,000 men apparently field so few men for battle a fortnight later?

I am in awe of your grasp for details.

 

[67th Tigers]

I have no doubt that McClellan was made aware of the straggling situation though I don't know that he would have known to what extent. I think I even remember reading about him getting reports of Rebel stragglers. Having said that, I have my doubts that it was as widespread as some historians would have us believe.

The returns do show huge straggling (Lee probably only has ca. 42,000 effectives with him on the 22nd September field return), but it mostly seems to have happened west of South Mountain, and even more on the Virginia side of the Potomac.

The scramble to get away after South Mountain, and the brutal forced marches to reassemble at Sharpsburg caused huge straggling. Two of the divisions which paused at Shepherdstown and allowed their men to catch up (Lawton's and Walker's divisions) recovered a lot of their stragglers. The Stonewall division pushed through without stopping and found that about 2/3rds of the division were absent. It seems a lot might of caught up, but our count is from straight off the march.

McLaws' and Anderson's divisions made the longest marches and went straight into the fight with barely a couple of hours rest. Suffice to say that instead of the 18,000 effectives they had a few days earlier they appear to have had around 8,000.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Precise and accurate but completely mythical in proportion no offence.

Most Historians and Generals of the time give Lee's Maryland campaign at the very most 55k that includes the Richmond defence forces and that's the ball park figure were dealing with here not ifs and buts and paper roster's , its about the troops that crossed into Maryland.

McClellan didn't have the hindsight or the internet like we do and I think people make to much out of his poor spy network their are various means and methods to discern troop numbers but eyes on the ground is the best way.

It was all about counting divisions as I explained above it was that simple to say he was ill advised by Pinkerton who would have been one of many sources does not rub with me.

Prisoners , Stragglers , Maryland Public , Scouts , Screening cavalry all would have give clear indications of which divisions were on the march not just that but I suspect the division flags themselves sort of gave it away , The real trick is sorting the chaff from the wheat and getting the proper intelligence.

I know your a McClellan advocate and I respect both your knowledge and historic research but seriously you got take off those rose tinted glasses sometimes his assessment of Lee's numbers in the Maryland campaign is absurd , Granted all general's tend to over cook the goose but McClellan left his in to burn.

In my opinion

You say you respect both his knowledge and historic research and yet you won't give him any credibility. Seriously, you have to take off those blinders of yours Scott. You have been so brainwashed that you can't or won't stop to consider anything other than what you have been spoon fed by the historians. To study the history of the American Civil War and particularly when dealing with controversial figures such as George McClellan, requires a lot of objectivity and the posing of questions and well as looking for the answers. "History is a fable agreed upon, wrote Napoleon. It's up to the serious student to seek out the truth.

 

[Saphroneth]

Fair enough. And I'll be honest - I'll have to look for sources. For the moment. given the conceded high level of straggling in the ANV while in hostile territory, I have a very difficult time believing that the straggling wasn't noted by observers. If ANV assessments of the level are correct, where were all of these guys hiding, what were they eating, etc. And there weren't likely all being secreted by the residents - this was the "Union" part of Maryland.

My understanding is that most of the stragglers can be divided into these categories:

1) Stragglers who fell out in Jackson's "corps" (Jackson Early AP Hill) or in McLaws' "corps" (McLaws Anderson) south of the Potomac.
These men would either have caught up with their unit a day or so later (before Antietam) or a few days later (after Antietam, joining the wagon trains which were moving over Boteler's Ford) and either way would have been out of contact with the supply system for only a couple of days. The area was not under Union observation and they would have had just missed a meal or two (at most; if they'd been issued three days' rations before falling out they might have had enough to eat anyway).

2) Stragglers who fell out in the movement from South Mountain to Antietam.
These men would have either rejoined the Confederate army or been swept up by the pursuing Federal advance guard; there were a lot of prisoners in the Maryland Campaign by some reports (references to several thousand unwounded prisoners being exchanged in the following weeks can be found; it's possible these were battle captures but it's also possible they got swept up.)
These men would have been noticed by Federal observation by being captured, and would have eaten rations in prison.

3) Stragglers who were disassociated with their units behind Confederate lines.
These men would have been part of the moving body of the Confederate armies but just not actually present with the fighting front at Antietam itself. In common with the stragglers who fell out south of the Potomac these men wouldn't have been observed; they'd have missed a day or two's rations if they didn't show up for food.

4) Stragglers who fell out in Maryland before the Confederate army reached South Mountain.
These men would have been amenable to observation, and were largely not seen.

5) Stragglers who refused to cross the Potomac and fell out in Virginia.
These men would also have been amenable to observation. Reports indicating perhaps a couple of thousand exist, but they can't really support ~20,000 or so (as would be needed to be the primary reason reconciling Lee's post-Antietam reports of ~60,000 men with his army hold up with the ~40,000 effectives he claimed at Antietam; if they're the only reason then it implies the staggering total of 37,000 men didn't cross the Potomac, which is utterly untenable as it's almost exactly half of Lee's army).


My estimate of Confederate effective strength at Antietam is about 47,000 (having gone through the regiments/brigades/divisions) and this implies that there were about 28,000 men who did not fight at Antietam for one reason or another; of these many must have been just behind the lines because Lee's post-Antietam reports (September 22, plus the earliest returns for the artillery and cavalry) and adding-back a Maryland Campaign casualty estimate gives about 60,000 men.


Thus:

Approx. 75,500 (entered Maryland)
HF casualties 300
Cramptons Gap casualties 900
South Mountain casualties 2700
Not at Antietam: Thomas' brigade (about 1,600)
At Antietam itself: about 47,000
Implies 23,000 CS stragglers

Union captures unwounded about 3,200

Approx. 75,500 (entered Maryland)
Total Maryland Campaign casualties ~17,000 (so strength should be down to 58,500)
September 22nd state plus cav and artillery 43,000 (while units still disrupted)

Implies 15,500 men had not yet returned to the ranks by the 22nd


Approx. 75,500 (entered Maryland)
Total Maryland Campaign casualties ~17,000
September 30th state 58,500

Implies all stragglers have come back in by the 30th September, or rather that the number of outstanding stragglers is equal to the number of men who have recovered.


Approx. 75,500 (entered Maryland)
Total Maryland Campaign casualties ~17,000
October 10th state 64,000


Implies that large numbers of wounded have been recovering by this point, or possibly that men are being moved from extra duty to PFD categories to replenish the army's fighting strength. If this was already going on by 30 September it influences the numbers there by a couple of thousand (which would imply a couple of thousand stragglers who had not yet come back in).

This is consistent with the idea that most of the stragglers were not stragglers for a long time.



One model is that there were about 13,000 stragglers south of the river on the forced-marches to concentrate at Antietam, most of them from Jackson and McLaws' corps.
Notably my estimate for McLaws and Anderson at Antietam is about 8,000 between them and on 2nd September McLaws alone disposed of 7,340 infantry and 419 gunners; Anderson disposed of about 5,700 men. Anderson's division may have been disrupted when this return was taken, as in the October 10 return Anderson gives 7,800 PFD and McLaws gives 7,100; adding the 3,500 or so casualties they suffered in the campaign means that their campaign-start strength could have been north of 18,000 between them.
Heavy straggling in these two divisions would explain a lot of the estimated stragglers south of the river.

The rest of the stragglers in this model would be men who fell out of line and got captured by the Union (about 3,000) and men who were with the army but not with their units (about 7,000).

An alternative model is that many of those 13,000 stragglers in the first grouping did in fact try and catch up with their units and merely manage to catch up with the army, and were either with the wagon trains south of the river or "behind the lines" north of the river (to go with the ~7,000 the first model categorized that way).




If the idea of 13,000 or 23,000 stragglers sounds preposterous, taking the straggling recorded in 1st Corps of the Union army (about 30% or so of headline PFD strength) and applying it pro-rata to the whole Union force at Antietam on the 17th produces about 25,000 stragglers. Many of these would have fallen out of line on the march; the rest would be with the army but not with their units.