Hood

As to your point #2. I'm sure Schofield had wagon trains as well. That would be added to Sherman's total, and he could have waited a bit for more as well. With a serious confederate presence in front of him i don't think he would have tried it without adequate supplies.
Unless Schofield had 30,000 Effectives and 30,000 other troops just driving wagon trains he'd change the ratio for the worse. It's a men-to-wagons ratio issue - historically he had about 800 wagons per corps, so Schofield would need another 1,500 wagons and 10,000 horse.
Sherman also couldn't wait too long, or the amount of forage he'd get would drop unacceptably. There's simply no feasible way to take enough fodder for over 20,000 pack animals - it'd be 125 tons a day per 10,000 animals, for 5,000 tons for the existing animals for a 20-day journey (thus about one and a half tons of fodder per wagon).

Yes, much of the food was collected already. I would expect much of it shipped off to CSA quartermasters. Let's not be naive, cavalry was shadowing Sherman and knew of the pillaging and foraging, they were doing some of that themselves. I would expect much of it as possible was kept out of Federal hands.
My understanding is that at that time the longest single process in the farm calendar was threshing the grain, before mechanical means of threshing came in.


As to point #3. Nah, Sherman would just have done a series of flanking movements. Than again, Hood probably would have rashly attacked him on several occasions. Regardless, it could have been interesting.

Just the need to be closed up enough to manoeuvre (Hood's force being about the size of two of Sherman's columns) would slow Sherman down and reduce the area he could sweep. The goal here would be slowing Sherman down, not stopping him - it's Fabian tactics, and if the commander conducting it is skilled enough it almost doesn't matter who the victim is. Fabian himself was able to use this tactic on no less a commander than Hannibal.
Whether Hood was temperamentally suited to the Fabian role is another matter, it's a hard thing to do.
 
This is a great post ya'll. I believe Hood was a fighter. "There in no reason to have an army in the field but for victory."
Johnston has been assailed by historians for always retreating. Tsun Tsu said "If you cannot defeat your opponent, it is next best to remain undefeated." Hood's "Victory or Death" or Johnston's "Remain Undefeated...RUN!" What a contrast! I don't know enough to make a judgment. I just like posting every once and a while to feel like I'm part of the group. :smile:





What you need to know is that Johnston lost his command, precisely because he followed Sun Tsu's strategy of Run don't fight and, Hood received the command, because he advocated the precise opposite.

I believe, that if, Davis believed that the war was lost(or, in the West, at least) and the best strategy was to conserve the lives of southern men, to help rebuild a defeated South, then he should have left Johnston in command.
 
Johnston was planning to take the offensive at Peachtree Creek, the first real chance he had to do so. He certainly couldn't have done much attacking in the woods and mountains; the terrain would be just as bad for his troops as Sherman's - although he did look for opportunities as at Cassville. He got as much as he could out of the defensive strategy, inflicted attrition on Sherman, and made the odds more favorable for when he did turn to the offensive.
 
I'm not familiar with this, could you elaborate a bit? Thanks.
Essentially Cleburne was the only commander in the US or CS armies who trained line troops in modern rifle combat - that meaning the Hythe method of training troops in range estimation, setting sights, and the like. (Basically the same training the US Sharpshooters went through, but applied to line regiments.)
The result of this was that Cleburne's men were much more effective in ranged combat than average because they could use their rifles as rifles (making full use of the greater accuracy at range - a rifle used at 100 yards is no better than a smoothbore, because the smoothbore would have hit at that range anyway).

This wasn't because he was an ex-British Army man who'd been through the training, as his time in the British Army predated the Hythe method. He did get hold of their musketry manual, though, and applied it effectively.

Here for Liberty Gap; here for something more general on Cleburne and musketry. There's also the summary provided by this dissertation: (ED: the link is old, mea culpa.)

As a testament to the fighting ability of Liddell's Brigade, one of the Union generals fighting for Liberty Gap thought they were fighting "the whole of Cleburne's Division," and a Union colonel thought that the Federals were "stubbornly opposed by a much larger force than ours." Another Union colonel said, "When we were within one-half or three-fourths of a mile of the enemy, the effect of their sharpshooters was terrible." The commander of the Union division, Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson, reported, "The affair at Liberty Gap will always be considered a skirmish, but few skirmishes ever equalled it in severity." The Federal casualties at the gap were 267.

That's a Union division being badly punished by a single Confederate brigade with accurate long-ranged fire, and the Confederate brigade providing such effective fire that the Union troops thought they were actually outnumbered. Some of this was Whitworths, but most of it was just the common Enfield rifle being used properly.
 
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Hood[s only real mistake(and that only after the fact), IMO, was he over tried his army in trying to do the impossible, much as Lee did at at Antietam and Gettysburg. The only difference being that Hood faced Thomas and Lee only faced McClellan and Meade.
 
The only difference being that Hood faced Thomas and Lee only faced McClellan and Meade.
Well, more like Hood campaigned at about a 2:1 disadvantage but went on the offensive, including a major offensive battle at Franklin. Lee campaigned in Pennsylvania at about a 4:3 disadvantage (depending on how you calculate effectives) and in Maryland at an 8:7 disadvantage, and in the latter he spent almost all of the actual fighting on the defensive.

When Lee attacked at Gettysburg he also launched a series of coordinated moves like an attack en echelon and a manoeuvre sur les derrieres; Hood's offensive tactic at Franklin was more like "chaaaarge".
 
Yes, they were actually quite close. But I have written two books on the subject. What do I know?

Well, I'm sure you know that having written about something doesn't mean one has come to the right conclusions.

I have one of your books. Make your argument; I've been wrong before and been set straight.
 
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Well, more like Hood campaigned at about a 2:1 disadvantage but went on the offensive, including a major offensive battle at Franklin. Lee campaigned in Pennsylvania at about a 4:3 disadvantage (depending on how you calculate effectives) and in Maryland at an 8:7 disadvantage, and in the latter he spent almost all of the actual fighting on the defensive.
When Lee attacked at Gettysburg he also launched a series of coordinated moves like an attack en echelon and a manoeuvre sur les derrieres; Hood's offensive tactic at Franklin was more like "chaaaarge".



You are correct, if you are saying the Army of Tennessee did not need a new commander as much as a major upgrading of all aspects of the Army itself, without which, even Lee would have been unable to change the course of events in the West.

Hood assumed the offensive because that was what Davis wanted. Johnston lost his command for not being willing to assure Davis that he would ever be able to assume the offensive.

Without Polk, Thomas would have lost the trained, veteran core of the army was still assembling at Nashville. and, most importantly, there would have been no battle of Franklin.

From the evidence of Gettysburg, I see no reasonable evidence that Lee would have been able to command Polk or the other independent minded corps commanders, any better than Hood(or Johnston).
 
You are correct, if you are saying the Army of Tennessee did not need a new commander as much as a major upgrading of all aspects of the Army itself, without which, even Lee would have been unable to change the course of events in the West.
What I mean is that Hood's offensive action was launched at worse odds than Lee did, and with less finesse. It's not necessary to look to the different Union commanders to explain why Lee's move was more justifiable than Hood - you can look at the force ratios alone.
 
What I mean is that Hood's offensive action was launched at worse odds than Lee did, and with less finesse. It's not necessary to look to the different Union commanders to explain why Lee's move was more justifiable than Hood - you can look at the force ratios alone.




.... And I am saying, given the requirements for(and expectations in Richmond) for an immediate offensive(Thomas buildup at Nashville, would not wait, for the needs of hood and his Army) where were then any viable strategic targets to reinvigorate the War in the West?



P.S. when I said hood over tried his Army as did Lee, I was referring, not to his breaking his Army, as much as putting his Army in a position, from which the enemy could break it. McClellan and Meade, failed to do so, Thomas did not.
 
Yes, much of the food was collected already. I would expect much of it shipped off to CSA quartermasters. Let's not be naive, cavalry was shadowing Sherman and knew of the pillaging and foraging, they were doing some of that themselves. I would expect much of it as possible was kept out of Federal hands.

As to your point #2. I'm sure Schofield had wagon trains as well. That would be added to Sherman's total, and he could have waited a bit for more as well. With a serious confederate presence in front of him i don't think he would have tried it without adequate supplies.

As to point #3. Nah, Sherman would just have done a series of flanking movements. Than again, Hood probably would have rashly attacked him on several occasions. Regardless, it could have been interesting.

I may be one of the few but i think his march was a highly overrated show. My Grandmother probably could have led a huge army, facing virtually no opposition across Ga. Now, if he had whooped Hood all the way to Savannah, i would concur it was great. Exactly how hard is to march across a state facing little opposition, pillaging, stealing, and taking food from civilians. Sounds like a cake walk to me, not the lore it has been made out to be.


Go put on a wool uniform and re-create that march based on what they had available, and report back to us. That's easy to say sitting on your couch.
 
Go put on a wool uniform and re-create that march based on what they had available, and report back to us. That's easy to say sitting on your couch.
A wool uniform would likely have been quite comfortable in December. To compare, i'm sure Lee could have marched all over Pennsylvania if he had nothing to worry about other than a few thousand cavalry and some militia.
 
Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?
Hood was a great leader, but he reminds me of me in a weird way. He was great at small commands. In my case it would be a squad or maybe a platoon - in his case a brigade or division, but he failed more-so as he rose in rank and commanded units that required real supervision. My point being - that - he was a do-er. He made things happen by participating in them. As he rose in command, he was not able to be at the front (due to wounds) - and lead the men the way he was able to as a brigade or division commander. He had to supervise - something that he apparently was never able to truly grasp - and is also the most important leadership trait! He was not much good at logistics - most army commanders probably would not have even attempted the Tennessee Campaign under the logistical restrictions that were at hand. He made a desperate movement that eventually failed due to three things. Lack of supervision at Spring Hill - purely bad luck at Franklin - and pipe dreams at Nashville. I respect the man - but see major flaws in him as well. He never truly accepted responsibility for his failures - at least not as far as I have been able to dig. He saw the campaign as unfortunate - and many obstacles prevented success - but failed to note that his decisions were paramount in the campaign's outcome.
 
I believe, that if, Davis believed that the war was lost(or, in the West, at least) and the best strategy was to conserve the lives of southern men, to help rebuild a defeated South, then he should have left Johnston in command.

The Japanese Navy in WWII removed their cadets from war ships for that very reason. They knew that they would need able bodied men to rebuild Japan. All the cadets were removed from the Yamato and her escorts. Sorry this is kind of off topic.
 
Your question will be debated from kingdom come.
 
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The Japanese Navy in WWII removed their cadets from war ships for that very reason. They knew that they would need able bodied men to rebuild Japan. All the cadets were removed from the Yamato and her escorts. Sorry this is kind of off topic.



Very true. in a way, like the Yamato, Hood in the West, was kept too long from the center of the war and their potential not really tried until too late. There was a glimmer of hope at Spring Hill, was quickly extinguished and after that the darkness fell.

The only difference being, the leaders of Japan, knew it was a useless sacrifice, Davis did not.
 

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