Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
I've been reading on Wellington recently, and it may be of interest with regard to transportation that Wellington's force on campaign (in difficult areas but mostly relying on supply convoys and without plundering, thus feasible in less populated terrain such as the US) operated with a roughly 1:1 ratio of soldiers to transportation personnel, the latter being in the main civilians.
Wellington's men were as a result very mobile and could operate indefinitely in places like central Spain, but the cost was considerable in gold to pay so many civilian contractors promptly. Hood's effectives versus AP suggests that he may have been having to do something similar to gain mobility (in that his November 6 state has 30,000 effectives and 15,000 non effectives) but if he'd gone the "full Wellington" he would have been extremely mobile but with a force of only about 23,000 effectives at the start of the campaign.
This might have been enough, if they'd all been of the same quality as Cleburne's division (i.e. fully rifle trained) but it's probably a bit much to ask for any one commander to make the breakthrough that eluded the rest of the army commanders.
Wellington's men were as a result very mobile and could operate indefinitely in places like central Spain, but the cost was considerable in gold to pay so many civilian contractors promptly. Hood's effectives versus AP suggests that he may have been having to do something similar to gain mobility (in that his November 6 state has 30,000 effectives and 15,000 non effectives) but if he'd gone the "full Wellington" he would have been extremely mobile but with a force of only about 23,000 effectives at the start of the campaign.
This might have been enough, if they'd all been of the same quality as Cleburne's division (i.e. fully rifle trained) but it's probably a bit much to ask for any one commander to make the breakthrough that eluded the rest of the army commanders.