Hood

I've been reading on Wellington recently, and it may be of interest with regard to transportation that Wellington's force on campaign (in difficult areas but mostly relying on supply convoys and without plundering, thus feasible in less populated terrain such as the US) operated with a roughly 1:1 ratio of soldiers to transportation personnel, the latter being in the main civilians.

Wellington's men were as a result very mobile and could operate indefinitely in places like central Spain, but the cost was considerable in gold to pay so many civilian contractors promptly. Hood's effectives versus AP suggests that he may have been having to do something similar to gain mobility (in that his November 6 state has 30,000 effectives and 15,000 non effectives) but if he'd gone the "full Wellington" he would have been extremely mobile but with a force of only about 23,000 effectives at the start of the campaign.

This might have been enough, if they'd all been of the same quality as Cleburne's division (i.e. fully rifle trained) but it's probably a bit much to ask for any one commander to make the breakthrough that eluded the rest of the army commanders.
 
We have some prior threads on Hood that you might want to look up. We have had at least one that debated if Hood was under the influence of opioids; I can try to bump that thread if you like.
Leftyhunter
That malicious claim was based on the opinions of a number of writers without a shred of evidence.
 
Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?
From your question, you seem to have already concluded that the failures of his army were solely due to Hood's mistakes.
Hood was a very courageous, dedicated soldier, an exceptional combat leader. He was probably less suited for the role he was given as commander of the Army of Tennessee. Still, he came within an eyelash of capturing most of the Army of the Ohio at Spring Hill.
It is often overlooked that by the waning months of the war attrition, difficulty getting supplies, and other factors had made the rebel forces a shadow of their earlier selves. At the same time, the U. S. forces were becoming stronger and better supplied.
One fights with the army one has, not the one that one wishes to have.
Given that, actions in every theater, regardless of commander, were far less successful than they had been earlier.
 
Fundamentally the size of the Union force which opposed Hood was big enough that he was always going to have real trouble fighting it - it outnumbered him more than 2:1 at Nashville. Going on the offensive was bold but probably too reckless, especially when the enemy is the one dug in!
Keeping in mind hindsight is 20/20 and has former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's classic chestnut " you go to war with the army you have" ; should Hood of tried to block Sherman's March through Georgia ( not a slam dunk fo sucess) or try for the Hail Mary Pass in Tennessee?
Leftyhunter
 
Keeping in mind hindsight is 20/20 and has former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's classic chestnut " you go to war with the army you have" ; should Hood of tried to block Sherman's March through Georgia ( not a slam dunk fo sucess) or try for the Hail Mary Pass in Tennessee?

Given hindsight, blocking Sherman would be the better choice because Sherman's logistical situation depended on reaching the sea. He was essentially making a movement in the same way a Napoleonic army (as in, a French one) did in Europe, moving by foraging, but that involved foraging a wide swath of harvest-time Georgia and it's not something he could repeat - or something he could keep up for much longer, he was emptying his wagons as well as foraging everything in the area he moved through.

Sherman's army is listed as 60,000 (Sherman's strength is given in effectives according to his report; his actual strength in Present would be about twice this as he was taking a very large wagon train). Hood by himself had 30,000; local Confederate militia was about 12,000 to 13,000, and all they really need to do to destroy Sherman's army is prevent it from reaching the sea or just delay it by a week or two. (Sherman's four corps, each about 15,000 Effectives, are in some cases moving too far apart for mutual support; if Hood is good at threatening them then Sherman would have to concentrate, and that would reduce his speed of movement and increase the rate at which he had to consume the supplies from his wagons. If Sherman takes four weeks to get to the coast instead of three and then finds his route to link up with Union supply ships blocked, he's basically finished.)

Of course, not every commander is suited to be a Fabian. Hood may be very ill suited for it temperamentally; JE Johnston may have been the better choice!
 
Given hindsight, blocking Sherman would be the better choice because Sherman's logistical situation depended on reaching the sea. He was essentially making a movement in the same way a Napoleonic army (as in, a French one) did in Europe, moving by foraging, but that involved foraging a wide swath of harvest-time Georgia and it's not something he could repeat - or something he could keep up for much longer, he was emptying his wagons as well as foraging everything in the area he moved through.

Sherman's army is listed as 60,000 (Sherman's strength is given in effectives according to his report; his actual strength in Present would be about twice this as he was taking a very large wagon train). Hood by himself had 30,000; local Confederate militia was about 12,000 to 13,000, and all they really need to do to destroy Sherman's army is prevent it from reaching the sea or just delay it by a week or two. (Sherman's four corps, each about 15,000 Effectives, are in some cases moving too far apart for mutual support; if Hood is good at threatening them then Sherman would have to concentrate, and that would reduce his speed of movement and increase the rate at which he had to consume the supplies from his wagons. If Sherman takes four weeks to get to the coast instead of three and then finds his route to link up with Union supply ships blocked, he's basically finished.)

Of course, not every commander is suited to be a Fabian. Hood may be very ill suited for it temperamentally; JE Johnston may have been the better choice!
Some points i'll make:
If Hood decided to attempt to stay in front on Sherman, Sherman certainly would have taken more than 20 days rations and wouldn't have had to forage nearly as much.

Late Nov. into Mid December is not prime harvest time in Georgia, most of that had already occurred.

If Sherman continued with his march to the sea with Hood in front of him, he most certainly would have recalled Schofield. Hood would have been facing nearly 90K federal troops in Georgia.

Confederate Militia, Sr. reserves, and Garrison troops likely would not stand up well to heavy marching, maneuvering, and the battle tested mid-western troops of Sherman's army. Maybe they could get some regular regiments to join the AOT, I do know there were some in NC, Ga., and SC. The majority would have been garrison troops however, such as Charleston and Savannah. Potentially 20k or so could have been gathered up but not many front line, high quality troops.

I still feel this would have been Hood's best chance however.
 
If Hood decided to attempt to stay in front on Sherman, Sherman certainly would have taken more than 20 days rations and wouldn't have had to forage nearly as much.
He filled all the wagons he had on hand, though - anything less would have been irresponsible. The amount of supplies is pretty much a hard limit - call it 2.4 million person-days of supplies, Present, carried by 60,000 Present but not Effective troops.

Late Nov. into Mid December is not prime harvest time in Georgia, most of that had already occurred.
And what that means is that the food has been collected. It's easily taken up by foraging parties, who don't have to cut entire fields of wheat themselves.

If Sherman continued with his march to the sea with Hood in front of him, he most certainly would have recalled Schofield. Hood would have been facing nearly 90K federal troops in Georgia.
If he did, he'd have 150,000 Present (90,000 Effectives and 60,000 non-Effective Present in the wagon train) with 2.4 million person-days of supplies. That would give him only sixteen days of supplies for his whole force, not twenty, and he'd also go through the newly gathered supplies more quickly unless he gathered more supplies (and to gather more supplies would mean Schofield's men would have to take two more parallel routes as spread out as the four existing ones).

Sherman's movement was logistically limited.

Confederate Militia, Sr. reserves, and Garrison troops likely would not stand up well to heavy marching, maneuvering, and the battle tested mid-western troops of Sherman's army. Maybe they could get some regular regiments to join the AOT, I do know there were some in NC, Ga., and SC. The majority would have been garrison troops however, such as Charleston and Savannah. Potentially 20k or so could have been gathered up but not many front line, high quality troops.
Well, if we assume that Hood could gather up that many, they don't need to manoeuvre and march. Hood can be the force moving near Sherman's moving columns (with the aid of Forrest's cavalry for scouting) to keep them concentrated and slow, and the additional force that's not able to march effectively can dig in along Sherman's route to link up with Union supply vessels - where Hood can back towards them and eventually enter the fortifications, giving Sherman the difficult problem of breaking through a defensive line of works on short notice with tired troops.

Sherman's march was well-executed, but it was also daring and risky.
 
After Atlanta Hood didn't have a good move, he was screwed no matter what. So I reckon one move was as good as another.

As for the fight at Franklin, I don't think Hood was ever close to victory. He broke through the Federal center and reserves counter attacked and held the line. Seems pretty cut and dried. On either side of the breakthrough he achieved nothing.
 
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After Atlanta Hood didn't have a good move, he was screwed no matter what. So I reckon one move was as good as another.

As for the fight at Franklin, I don't think Hood was ever close to victory. He broke through the Federal center and reserves counter attacked and held the line. Seems pretty cut and dried. On either side of the breakthrough he achieved nothing.
I think further study on Franklin may change your mind...it did mine!

Kevin Dally
 
Yeah, probably Lane's and Conrad's guys.
I agree. Had Conrad's and Lane's advanced positions not allowed Cleburne's and Cheatham's (Brown's) divisions to practically overun them and screeened them from being shot at effectively from the Federal works, personally I don't beleive it would have even been close. It would have been a Union reverse Fredericksburg. They would have never broken the Federal center, although no doubt they would have still tried.
 
I agree. Had Conrad's and Lane's advanced positions not allowed Cleburne's and Cheatham's (Brown's) divisions to practically overun them and screeened them from being shot at effectively from the Federal works, personally I don't beleive it would have even been close. It would have been a Union reverse Fredericksburg. They would have never broken the Federal center, although no doubt they would have still tried.

Except one problem - they were there. So to postulate otherwise is just speculation.
 
He filled all the wagons he had on hand, though - anything less would have been irresponsible. The amount of supplies is pretty much a hard limit - call it 2.4 million person-days of supplies, Present, carried by 60,000 Present but not Effective troops.


And what that means is that the food has been collected. It's easily taken up by foraging parties, who don't have to cut entire fields of wheat themselves.


If he did, he'd have 150,000 Present (90,000 Effectives and 60,000 non-Effective Present in the wagon train) with 2.4 million person-days of supplies. That would give him only sixteen days of supplies for his whole force, not twenty, and he'd also go through the newly gathered supplies more quickly unless he gathered more supplies (and to gather more supplies would mean Schofield's men would have to take two more parallel routes as spread out as the four existing ones).

Sherman's movement was logistically limited.


Well, if we assume that Hood could gather up that many, they don't need to manoeuvre and march. Hood can be the force moving near Sherman's moving columns (with the aid of Forrest's cavalry for scouting) to keep them concentrated and slow, and the additional force that's not able to march effectively can dig in along Sherman's route to link up with Union supply vessels - where Hood can back towards them and eventually enter the fortifications, giving Sherman the difficult problem of breaking through a defensive line of works on short notice with tired troops.

Sherman's march was well-executed, but it was also daring and risky.
Yes, much of the food was collected already. I would expect much of it shipped off to CSA quartermasters. Let's not be naive, cavalry was shadowing Sherman and knew of the pillaging and foraging, they were doing some of that themselves. I would expect much of it as possible was kept out of Federal hands.

As to your point #2. I'm sure Schofield had wagon trains as well. That would be added to Sherman's total, and he could have waited a bit for more as well. With a serious confederate presence in front of him i don't think he would have tried it without adequate supplies.

As to point #3. Nah, Sherman would just have done a series of flanking movements. Than again, Hood probably would have rashly attacked him on several occasions. Regardless, it could have been interesting.

I may be one of the few but i think his march was a highly overrated show. My Grandmother probably could have led a huge army, facing virtually no opposition across Ga. Now, if he had whooped Hood all the way to Savannah, i would concur it was great. Exactly how hard is to march across a state facing little opposition, pillaging, stealing, and taking food from civilians. Sounds like a cake walk to me, not the lore it has been made out to be.
 
Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?
Please to define colossal mistakes which he made! Considering the forces that were arranged against him and what he had to engaged with he did what he or any other commander could.He was told to engage Sherman with what forces he had and he did what Richmond ordered him to do.He did the same thing that the commander of Vicksburg defending the city against what he knew to be superior forces.,he followed Davis's orders. The result was destruction of the city,civilian losses and the loss of an army and military goods.Think what he and Johnston could have done with a join force of two armies.Grant had Cold Harbor,Lee had Pickett's Charge.
 

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