Hood

[David Ireland]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

 

[leftyhunter]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

We have some prior threads on Hood that you might want to look up. We have had at least one that debated if Hood was under the influence of opioids; I can try to bump that thread if you like.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

After Atlanta fell Hood had two basic options;
Option #1
Try to block Sherman's 60k men from marching East to Savannah with Hood having approximately 30k men ( the round number estimate that Hood had at the battle of Nashville) and try to defeat Sherman on open ground.
Option#2 which is what Hood did is attack the AoC in Tennessee. Some posters have argued that Hood came close to capturing General Schofield's yroops before the united with General Thomas's troops. Unfortunately close only counts in horse shoes and hand gernades.
We will never know if Option #1 would of worked. We do know that the general text book recommendation is an offensive army should have a manpower superiority ratio of three to one. Hood would only of been outnumbered two to one on the offense vs being out numbered 55k vs 30k at the battle of Nashville almost a two to one disadvantage.
Leftyhunter

 

[Drew]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

Promoted to his level of incompetence.

OTOH, Union officers acknowledged he was very danged close to achieving his objective at the debacle that was the Battle of Franklin, Tennessee. So there's that.

 

[Tin cup]

After Atlanta fell Hood had two basic options;
Option #1
Try to block Sherman's 60k men from marching East to Savannah with Hood having approximately 30k men ( the round number estimate that Hood had at the battle of Nashville) and try to defeat Sherman on open ground.
Option#2 which is what Hood did is attack the AoC in Tennessee. Some posters have argued that Hood came close to capturing General Schofield's yroops before the united with General Thomas's troops. Unfortunately close only counts in horse shoes and hand gernades.
We will never know if Option #1 would of worked. We do know that the general text book recommendation is an offensive army should have a manpower superiority ratio of three to one. Hood would only of been outnumbered two to one on the offense vs being out numbered 55k vs 30k at the battle of Nashville almost a two to one disadvantage.
Leftyhunter

And, in doing so, the Rebs would have ate all the food the civilians had, instead of Sherman's men!

Kevin Dally

 

[leftyhunter]

And, in doing so, the Rebs would have ate all the food the civilians had, instead of Sherman's men!

Kevin Dally

There's that. One could argue that trying to trap Schofield at Franklin was the least bad option. Putting ourselves in Hood's shoes what better realistic option did Hood have?
Hood has approximately 30k troops vs approximately 55k combined troops for Schofield and Thomas vs 60k for Sherman.
Obviously the AnV can't lian anymore troops. General Price can only muster up 12k troops to invade Missouri and that didn't work out.
What with perfect unfair hindsight could Hood do with limited manpower? Not real sure on Hoods logistics but Hood is far from any seaport and would it not be true that with all the Union troops in Georgia and Tennessee food resources for Hood's 30k men is questionable at best?
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Promoted to his level of incompetence.

OTOH, Union officers acknowledged he was very danged close to achieving his objective at the debacle that was the Battle of Franklin, Tennessee. So there's that.

We have had a lot of debate in various Hood threads over the years that Hood by the Fall of 1864 was the least bad option Davis had for a commander un chief of the AoT.
Leftyhunter

 

[Coonewah Creek]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

Wiley Sword explains Hood's actions...but remember that Sword was certainly no fan of John Bell Hood:

Hood's decision to attack at Franklin was essentially an emotional reflex, rooted in his obsession to "prevent the enemy from escaping."

…Hood on November 30th was angry, overeager, frustrated, and not reasoning well. His resort to tactics of not firing a gun, but to use the bayonet, was a throwback to Gaines' Mill. In Hood's mind failings were often explained in simplistic terms – the want of physical and moral courage. Yet his own failings, and also a vindictive disposition, were masked by his penchant for blaming others.

…Hood harbored visions of past glory. Disciplined valor had won the day then [as at Gaines' Mill]; a similar attack would ever provide the same result. It was the only way he knew or understood. John Bell Hood was a sad anachronism, a disabled personality prone to miscalculation and misperception. Unfortunately, he was also a fool with a license to kill his own men.https://civilwartalk.com/file:///C:...to_keep/army_of_tenn_essay_cwi_2004.doc#_edn1


https://civilwartalk.com/file:///C:...keep/army_of_tenn_essay_cwi_2004.doc#_ednref1 Wiley Sword, Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 263.

 

[AUG]

This was a good thread on Hood at Franklin:
https://civilwartalk.com/threads/hood’s-behavior-at-franklin.140635/

Hood's reasoning there was that, after the debacle at Spring Hill, his only chance at any success was to attack and destroy Schofield's army while at Franklin with its back against the Harpeth River. If he failed Schofield would escape to Nashville and join forces with Thomas.

 

[Coonewah Creek]

Hood's reasoning there was that, after the debacle at Spring Hill, his only chance at any success was to attack and destroy Schofield's army while at Franklin with its back against the Harpeth River. If he failed Schofield would escape to Nashville and join forces with Thomas.

I understand the supposed reasoning of Hood. Forrest practically begged him to give him a division of infantry so he could flank Schofield out of his works. Hood was intent on teaching the Army of Tennessee a lesson. I'm sorry, but I tend to agree with Sword. Cleburne's words,"Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men" tells the story. Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest all advised against the frontal assault. They knew. The men knew. They charged anyway...

 

[Drew]

…Hood harbored visions of past glory. Disciplined valor had won the day then [as at Gaines' Mill]; a similar attack would ever provide the same result. It was the only way he knew or understood. John Bell Hood was a sad anachronism, a disabled personality prone to miscalculation and misperception. Unfortunately, he was also a fool with a license to kill his own men.


Wiley Sword, Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 263.

I understand where Wiley Sword was coming from and don't necessarily disagree with him. The problem is with Union accounts of what happened. They were basically wetting themselves at Franklin.

Eugen Schmiel's biography of Union General Jason Dolson Cox shows this, quoting Cox's private correspondence to his wife from that time and place. They won, sure, but it was anything but a foregone conclusion.

 

[Tin cup]

There's that. One could argue that trying to trap Schofield at Franklin was the least bad option. Putting ourselves in Hood's shoes what better realistic option did Hood have?
Hood has approximately 30k troops vs approximately 55k combined troops for Schofield and Thomas vs 60k for Sherman.
Obviously the AnV can't lian anymore troops. General Price can only muster up 12k troops to invade Missouri and that didn't work out.
What with perfect unfair hindsight could Hood do with limited manpower? Not real sure on Hoods logistics but Hood is far from any seaport and would it not be true that with all the Union troops in Georgia and Tennessee food resources for Hood's 30k men is questionable at best?
Leftyhunter

Hood could have remained close to Sherman, he could move faster than Sherman, block/slow down any one of Sherman's efforts in most any direction taken. Hood left the door open for Sherman, and beat his own head against the wall at Franklin/Nashville!

Kevin Dally

 

[leftyhunter]

I would like my more knowledgeable friends @novushomus , @Saphroneth @67th Tigers @johan_steele @cash
and get their opinions on what Hood should of done based on his limited manpower and logistical resources vs the more numerous and better equipped Union forces.
Leftyhunter

 

[Coonewah Creek]

They won, sure, but it was anything but a foregone conclusion.

It was a close call, but it really shouldn't have been. It should have been a reverse Fredericksburg for the Federals. The flawed deployment of those two Federal brigades out in front of the Union works and forgetting to recall them in time was almost a fatal mistake on their part. As Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions rolled over them, they provided the charging Confederates cover in racing back towards their works in a footrace. The men inside the works couldn't fire for fear of hitting their friends. It shouldn't even have been close...

 

[bdtex]

I would like my more knowledgeable friends @novushomus , @Saphroneth @67th Tigers @johan_steele @cash
and get their opinions on what Hood should of done based on his limited manpower and logistical resources vs the more numerous and better equipped Union forces.
Leftyhunter

@gunny and @EricAJacobson too.

 

[Jamieva]

I understand the supposed reasoning of Hood. Forrest practically begged him to give him a division of infantry so he could flank Schofield out of his works. Hood was intent on teaching the Army of Tennessee a lesson. I'm sorry, but I tend to agree with Sword. Cleburne's words,"Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men" tells the story. Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest all advised against the frontal assault. They knew. The men knew. They charged anyway...

He did not order it to "teach his army a lesson". That is Sword's conclusion with zero evidence to back it up and that narrative drives me nuts

From previous discussions I believe those with more knowledge of the area have pointed out that Forrest's flanking idea would never have worked

 

[Tin cup]

He did not order it to "teach his army a lesson". That is Sword's conclusion with zero evidence to back it up and that narrative drives me nuts

One that Shelby Foote expounded on in that Ken Burns thingy!

Kevin Dally

 

[Coonewah Creek]

He did not order it to "teach his army a lesson". That is Sword's conclusion with zero evidence to back it up and that narrative drives me nuts

Maybe, but I like Sword's decisiveness in drawing a conclusion and not "beating about the bush." Hood was a brave commander, but he should have been given oversight and limited to divison or maybe corps command. Warfare had changed a lot by mid-1864. Hood should never have been put in command of the Army of Tennessee.

 

[johan_steele]

I believe Hood was out of his depth the moment he took command of the AoT. He was a superb Regimental and Brigade Commander and a competent division commander. He was aggressive and a firm believer in aggressive offensive action because it had worked in his own experience.

He was no Lee and after going west he never again faced the AoP instead he was facing the AoC & the AoT (US) who were a different breed. The AoC was under the very able command of Thomas after Missionary Ridge and those men were still operating as though they had something to prove. The AoT (US) were an army that had never really faced a defeat. They were tough, resilient and used to rougher living with less support than the AoP.

From the moment Hood took command he started pushing. The problem was that the AoC didn't budge at Peachtree Creek and the AoT made the battle of Atlanta a fight like few others in the war. IMO it sits as one of the most brutal large scale battles of the war and is one of the most under appreciated. The subsequent seige and fighting around Atlanta did a number on Hoods army and I think on his self confidence.

Hoods actions after the fall of Atlanta are also hugely under studied and under appreciated. I think it was brilliant and his maneuvers did much to rebuild the confidence of his army. He really had it his own way using his smaller forces to stay mobile and keep away from Sherman while being a royal thorn in the side. It wasn't until the blunder of Allatoona Pass with goofy orders and blundered maneuvering that Hood really was checked.

I suspect his success after Atlanta gave thought to the Nashville campaign. Which while audacious was suicidal from the start. He was hoping to retake Nashville and maybe even Chatanooga. He didn't have enough men or material to do it and he was going up against Thomas with a mix of green units and some of the toughest in the western theatre. Add in an ugly winter... He was doomed from the start.

Franklin was an unnecessary bloodbath that bled his army far more than it could afford. And while it was no sure thing for Schofield that he would hold he had strong works and good troops. Good troops behind strong works gave Hood his Fredricksburg.

I've run hot and cold on Hood over the years. I find something to really like about him then find another reason to not like him.

The man had immense personal courage and literally gave an arm and a leg for his cause. After my car accident I gained a different level of understanding of Hood. The man would have been in an immense amount of pain both physically and mentally. He was at his finest up to Chickamauga and began a decline after. But all the way to the end of his life he was no quitter. I think he would have been happier had he died fighting at Nashville.

A lot of the most recent scholarship on the man has made me rethink things. It's always enlightening to be able to read a man's own words. I applaud the work his descendants have done to try and set the record straight. That said I'm still not quite ready to discount Swords view of the man.

 

[AUG]

I understand the supposed reasoning of Hood. Forrest practically begged hiim to give him a division of infantry so he could flank Scholfield out of his works. Hood was intent on teaching the Army of Tennessee a lesson. I'm sorry, but I tend to agree with Sword. Cleburne's words,"Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men" tells the story. Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest all advised against the frontal assault. They knew. The men knew. They charged anyway...

All of that is discussed in the thread I linked. See the fourth post there by @novushomus on the flanking maneuver proposed by Forrest.

Much of the drama concerning Hood's enragement, drug use, etc., was brought up by Sword, most of which has since been debunked and has been discussed here quite a few times. Sword isn't really considered the most reliable source on the battle and campaign. I don't want to appear as a defender or fan of Hood because I'm not (his brigade, yes, but not really him), but I do believe he made most of his decisions there based on rational thinking rather than the quick temper and rashness that he is often characterized for.