Hood

[Coonewah Creek]

I think he would have been happier had he died fighting at Nashville.

Sam Watkins in "Co. Aytch" says that when he went to get his furlough after Nashville, he saw Hood crying like a baby. The man was brave, he believed in the cause, he was a great commander at the division level. I agree that he was in over his head in command of the Army of Tennessee however, and I still tilt towards Sword's assessment of him also.

 

[novushomus]

I understand the supposed reasoning of Hood. Forrest practically begged him to give him a division of infantry so he could flank Schofield out of his works. Hood was intent on teaching the Army of Tennessee a lesson. I'm sorry, but I tend to agree with Sword. Cleburne's words,"Well, Govan, if we are to die, let us die like men" tells the story. Cleburne, Cheatham and Forrest all advised against the frontal assault. They knew. The men knew. They charged anyway...

There are quite a few problems with Forrest's proposal, not to say the least -

To sum what I've written before:
1. There was no time. It would have been dark before an action was opened. Schofield could slip away to Nashville and unite with Thomas unscathed.
2. The area around Franklin between Winstead Hill and the Harpeth is flat. Any move, except a wide and circuitous one, would have been seen.
3. Fort Granger and the Fourth Army Corps were across the Harpeth and could easily block any such move.
4. The strongest division in the Army of Tennessee, Brown's division, had only 4,000 effectives. Wood's division of Fourth Army Corps could match this handily (from the top of my head, Wood's division had 6,000 effectives).
5. Every officer present had been at Spring Hill the night before. There a flank march had been made, and everyone from Hood on down had failed.

I also strongly disagree with the notion that he wanted to punish the Army of Tennessee's soldiery with a frontal attack. There were valid military reasons for Hood's assault at Franklin. The assault was a gamble (and a failed and bloody one at that), but one that came closer to succeeding than many people today realize or are willing to admit.

 

[novushomus]

Why did John Bell Hood make such colossal mistakes at the end of the war?

A post of mine from an earlier thread about Hood and Atlanta:
Hood failed in several ways, the first and arguably most important being that he left the details to almost all of his major operations to subordinates. While this is a reasonable thing for a military commander to do, the Army of Tennessee had become, thanks to the machinations of Polk, Hardee, and Hood himself, an army where subordinates could not be trusted to accomplish their commander's objectives. If Hood himself was not present, then it wasn't going to get done the way Hood wanted it. Unfortunately, Hood was only physically present at one of the Atlanta campaign's battles, Bald Hill, and he only issued two direct orders during that battle. (He would ultimately not learn this lesson about the army, see the Affair at Spring Hill).

Hood had several opportunities, but was unable to execute them and he could not trust his subordinates to really execute them, with the possible exception of Stewart. Peachtree Creek was fumbled by a fuming Hardee, and Bald Hill was a combination of Wheeler and Hardee under-performing (though Hood did not manage his part of the field well), and Ezra Church was to S.D. Lee's overconfidence. Late in the siege, Hood sent away most of his cavalry under Wheeler to raid. Wheeler ultimately failed to cut Sherman's railway line and Hood effectively blinded himself when Sherman decisively swung his army group to cut Atlanta's last railroad south. The mismanagement of Jonesboro (a pointless battle as the rail-line would be cut by the Twenty-Third Corps regardless if the Army of the Tennessee was checked) speaks to itself, but Hood on bad intelligence recalled S.D. Lee's corps, an order that almost saw Hardee's isolated corps destroyed. However, the buck ultimately stops with the army commander, and that is Hood's fault.

There were staff issues (Chief of Staff Mackall quit over Bragg's presence and role in the new organization of the army, which meant he had to move his artillery chief Shoup to the chief of staff and move a colonel up to be the artillery chief), which conclude with the fact that Hood did not seem well prepared to evacuate Atlanta, and when he was forced to, the fires he set to his ammunition trains destroyed much of the city. So much equipment was destroyed or captured that Hood lost Shoup to a military inquiry (which would also have an impact at Spring Hill and Nashville).

Now, these are the things that Hood did. A very common claim is that Hood wasted 20,000 of his men in bloody and fruitless assaults around the city. However, this is not bared out by an examination of army returns and the context of campaign battles. Hood endured serious losses, but when Atlanta fell he was stripped of his cavalry corps, two infantry brigades (the Orphan Brigade and Baker's brigade), two cavalry brigades (Ferguson and McGuirk), four reserve artillery battalions (Williams, Martin's, Palmer's, and Waddell's) which explain the Army of Tennessee's reduced state when Hood invaded Tennessee that fall.

One thing that is clear is that Hood seemed incapable of learning from his mistakes, something that doomed him as an army commander and would fatally do him in Tennessee.

 

[Coonewah Creek]

One thing that is clear is that Hood seemed incapable of learning from his mistakes, something that doomed him as an army commander and would fatally do him in Tennessee.

Well, that much we can agree on at least.

Thanks for the post! Wish I'd been around for that earlier discussion.

 

[novushomus]

Well, that much we can agree on at least.

Thanks for the post! Wish I'd been around for that earlier discussion.

Most of Hood's failures can be attributed to one of three things: Overdelegation of command, over-estimating of what his own forces were capable of, and misreading the enemy.

Essentially either Hood was attempting to replicate Lee's command style without having the executive officers Lee had or was unable, due to reasons of mobility, to attempt a more direct command and control method, especially in light of the repeated failures the army had. Most of his plans were too ambitious and were essentially gambling, especially the entire Tennessee Campaign.

But why the hands-off approach? Earl J. Hess has theorized that Hood perhaps feared being captured because of his limited mobility (fates that befell similarly handicapped commanders like Edward Johnson and Richard Ewell) and this is why he stayed away from the action. I've seen similar theories floated that, after Chickamauga, Hood did not want to risk being wounded or killed after suffering such a traumatic injury. But these are theories without primary evidence of Hood's reasoning. We can only make conjecture based on Hood's battlefield behavior.

Before and to Chickamauga, Hood was usually very close to the front, inspiring his troops as they surged forward. From a brigade commander at Gaines Mill to command of Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga, Hood was always near the front. Afterward, he takes a much more hands-off approach, and as a corps commander under Johnston was often downright neglectful, such as in the positioning of the Cherokee Battery at Resaca that led to its loss and the poorly thought-out and scouted attack on Hooker's Twentieth Army Corps at Kolb's Farm.

Or, and I think this is the most convincing, that Hood's judgment was off, especially at the higher command levels. Part of this is overestimation in the capabilities of his men and a misplaced faith in some of his corps commanders, but essentially Hood during the Atlanta and most of the Tennessee Campaigns is away from the central action because of choice. He remains near Stewart's corps at Peach Tree Creek and even when informed of Hardee and Cheatham moving too far to the right or the pressure on Cheatham's front, he does not leave his command post, believing that Stewart's front is the critical front. At Bald Hill, he supervises at a point between Hardee and Cheatham but does little except to commit Cheatham when it becomes apparent Hardee's attack has stalled. He does override Cheatham's decision not to support the breakthrough at the Troup House or otherwise intervene. He considered Hardee's the decisive attack and believed Hardee was experienced enough to fight without his input, as he had believed at Peach Tree Creek.

At Ezra Church, this is even more perplexing. When both of his corps commanders are wounded, and command of the field ends up in the hands of the army's third most-junior division commander, Hood does not leave Atlanta to take hold of the situation. He sends Hardee instead, justifying it by saying that Atlanta could be attacked and therefore he must remain at the most decisive location in the city. At Jonesborough, he is misled again several times as to Sherman's location or intention and not only lost Atlanta but almost got Hardee's corps destroyed by recalling S.D. Lee in the mistaken belief that Sherman would storm the city.

 

[Jamieva]

Maybe, but I like Sword's decisiveness in drawing a conclusion and not "beating about the bush." Hood was a brave commander, but he should have been given oversight and limited to divison or maybe corps command. Warfare had changed a lot by mid-1864. Hood should never have been put in command of the Army of Tennessee.

A decisive conclusion based on what evidence? His personal bias?

Nobody will disagree Hood should never have been promoted, but when Johnston was removed who else would you pick? Hardee had already turned down the offer once, and Davis hated Beauregard with a passion. Lee was not going to part with someone to be sent south.

 

[Jamieva]

Most of Hood's failures can be attributed to one of three things: Overdelegation of command, over-estimating of what his own forces were capable of, and misreading the enemy.

Essentially either Hood was attempting to replicate Lee's command style without having the executive officers Lee had or was unable, due to reasons of mobility, to attempt a more direct command and control method, especially in light of the repeated failures the army had. Most of his plans were too ambitious and were essentially gambling, especially the entire Tennessee Campaign.

But why the hands-off approach? Earl J. Hess has theorized that Hood perhaps feared being captured because of his limited mobility (fates that befell similarly handicapped commanders like Edward Johnson and Richard Ewell) and this is why he stayed away from the action. I've seen similar theories floated that, after Chickamauga, Hood did not want to risk being wounded or killed after suffering such a traumatic injury. But these are theories without primary evidence of Hood's reasoning. We can only make conjecture based on Hood's battlefield behavior.

Before and to Chickamauga, Hood was usually very close to the front, inspiring his troops as they surged forward. From a brigade commander at Gaines Mill to command of Longstreet's corps at Chickamauga, Hood was always near the front. Afterward, he takes a much more hands-off approach, and as a corps commander under Johnston was often downright neglectful, such as in the position of the Cherokee Battery at Resaca that led to its loss and the poorly thought-out or scouted attack on Hooker's Twentieth Army Corps at Kolb's Farm.

Or, and I think this is the most convincing, that Hood's judgment was off, especially at the higher command levels. Part of this is overestimation in the capabilities of his men and a misplaced faith in some of his corps commanders, but essentially Hood during the Atlanta and most of the Tennessee Campaigns is away from the central action because of choice. He remains near Stewart's corps at Peach Tree Creek and even when informed of Hardee and Cheatham moving too far to the right or the pressure on Cheatham's front, he does not leave his command post, believing that Stewart's front is the critical front. At Bald Hill, he supervises at a point between Hardee and Cheatham but does little except to commit Cheatham when it becomes apparent Hardee's attack has stalled. He does override Cheatham's decision not to support the breakthrough at the Troup House or otherwise intervene. He considered Hardee's the decisive attack and believed Hardee was experienced enough to fight without his input, as he had believed at Peach Tree Creek.

At Ezra Church, this is even more perplexing. When both of his corps commanders are wounded, and command of the field ends up in the hands of the army's third most-junior division commander, Hood does not leave Atlanta to take hold of the situation. He sends Hardee instead, justifying it by saying that Atlanta could be attacked and therefore he must remain at the most decisive location in the city. At Jonesborough, he is misled again several times as to Sherman's location or intention and not only lost Atlanta but almost got Hardee's corps destroyed by recalling S.D. Lee in the mistaken belief that Sherman would storm the city.

You could also argue he was insubordinate as a corps commander under Johnston in not carrying out attack orders during the campaign.

 

[mofederal]

Hood was one of those generals who believed in the frontal attack. He was tactical wizard. He used what he thought would work. It worked to a degree at Franklin at the cost of some generals and a lot of his army. He may have not been under the influence of anything, we just really know, but he was not thinking straight or at his best that day. Of course his battles around Atlanta should have been an indicator of his ability and ideas on war. A lot of poor choices were made in his campaigns as the general in command of the Army of Tennessee.

 

[Saphroneth]

Fundamentally the size of the Union force which opposed Hood was big enough that he was always going to have real trouble fighting it - it outnumbered him more than 2:1 at Nashville. Going on the offensive was bold but probably too reckless, especially when the enemy is the one dug in!

 

[Si Klegg]

You could also argue he was insubordinate as a corps commander under Johnston in not carrying out attack orders during the campaign.

You have to wonder whether that was incompetence or direct disobedience in order to undermine Joe Johnston. Hood had been corresponding behind Johnston's back with Bragg, Seddon and Jeff Davis back in Richmond ever since he'd been moved out west. Admittedly, he'd been tasked by Davis to do so, but his letters - and his two-facedness - when consulting with Johnston over plans, supplies and readiness for a campaign once he was out there don't do his character any favours.

Albert Castel in 'Decision in the West' describes his cloying eagerness to curry favour with Davis in an encounter Hood had with Mary Chesnut in Richmond in February 1864 before he moved out west:

'Hood told Mrs Chesnut that "the President was finding fault with some of his officers in command," whereupon Hood had declared: "Mr. President, why don't you come and lead us yourself? I would follow you to the death." Mary Chesnut's response to this revelation was to say to Hood: "Actually - if you stay here in Richmond much longer, you will grow to be a courtier. You came a rough Texian!"

 

[Coonewah Creek]

A decisive conclusion based on what evidence? His personal bias?

I've read the more recent "Hood reconsidered" works. My conclusion isn't just based on Sword. I've changed some of my earlier perceptions of Hood based on these recent works, but not that of his incompetence as an army commander.

 

[Coonewah Creek]

A lot of poor choices were made in his campaigns as the general in command of the Army of Tennessee.

We know Sherman preferred facing Johnston to facing Hood, but only because Hood was unpredictable. Sherman disliked pitched battles where it was a "roll of the dice" on the outcome. It should be noted that Grant's instructions were for Sherman to "knock Joe Johnston..." Sherman didn't really follow those instructions. Instead, he went after Atlanta. He thought he was performing his job as long as he could prevent the Army of Tennessee from providing any material support to Lee in Virginia. His role was secondary. Grant had the primary job of defeating the ANV.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Of Hood's Generals, why was Edward Johnson transferred to AoT after his exchange from being captured at the mule shoe? Was there no place for him in Lee's army as his division had been destroyed? or more needed in the west? Was Lorring still a problem as he had been to R E Lee in western Va or Jackson at Romney?

 

[leftyhunter]

Fundamentally the size of the Union force which opposed Hood was big enough that he was always going to have real trouble fighting it - it outnumbered him more than 2:1 at Nashville. Going on the offensive was bold but probably too reckless, especially when the enemy is the one dug in!

Fundamentally the size of the Union force which opposed Hood was big enough that he was always going to have real trouble fighting it - it outnumbered him more than 2:1 at Nashville. Going on the offensive was bold but probably too reckless, especially when the enemy is the one dug in!

The Wiki numbers are 55k Union vs 30k Confederate. Are these numbers off? If so what is a better estimate?
Leftyhunter

 

[Carronade]

The Nashville campaign overall, and several decisions within it, were essentially a "Hail Mary" attempt to turn the tide of a war which was rapidly moving towards total defeat. Lincoln's reelection demonstrated that the Union was not going to simply tire of fighting. Desperate times may justify desperate measures.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Try to block Sherman's 60k men from marching East to Savannah with Hood having approximately 30k men ( the round number estimate that Hood had at the battle of Nashville) and

Do you mean at Franklin? Because the number of men Hood had at Nashville was much smaller than at the start of the campaign due to Franklin.

 

[Saphroneth]

The Wiki numbers are 55k Union vs 30k Confederate. Are these numbers off? If so what is a better estimate?

Comparing 10 December returns.

Hood gives:
Effectives 23,000
PFD 26,850
AP 36,400
AP&A 87,000

Thomas' report of his December 10 state gives his PFD broken down by units, and if I sum up the total for all the units actually at Nashville during the battle of Nashville (GHQ, 4th AC, 23rd AC, Det. AoT (Smith), District of the Etowah, and all but 2nd division of the cavalry corps) it comes out as 62,500 PFD. To get 55,000 you need to count PFDE only (at which point it matches pretty much exactly, so that's the source number) - but even Hood's PFD is only about 27,000.
Using AP, meanwhile, Hood is 36,400 but Thomas is about 78,000. So Hood is definitely outnumbered more than 2:1 by Nashville no matter which measure you use - except Aggregate Present and Absent, but I don't really think Hood's army should deserve to be considered large because it had a higher proportion of absent sick, deserted, and missing.

Hood's army was 30,600 effectives on November 6, but that's before Columbia let alone Franklin. If you use Hood's November 6 strength you have to look for the matching value for Thomas, which isn't December 10 - and it's not Nashville strength.


Add back the Franklin casualties to rewind to the pre-Franklin state and Hood isn't quite outnumbered by 2:1 (depending what numbers you add to and which of the casualty counts you pick). But by Nashville even the entirety of Hood's force is outnumbered 2:1 by that component of Thomas' force concentrated at Nashville.

 

[novushomus]

Of Hood's Generals, why was Edward Johnson transferred to AoT after his exchange from being captured at the mule shoe? Was there no place for him in Lee's army as his division had been destroyed? or more needed in the west? Was Lorring still a problem as he had been to R E Lee in western Va or Jackson at Romney?

There was an opening in S.D. Lee's corps in Thomas Hindman's old division. Hindman had been disabled after being blinded by a tree limb at Kennesaw. Hood felt that none of the brigadiers in the division were capable of leading it and brought in Brigadier General John Calvin Brown from Stevenson's division. Then, at Bragg's suggestion, Patton Anderson was brought in to permanently lead it. However, Anderson was wounded severely at Jonesborough. With Brown taking over Cheatham's old division, Hood needed another division commander.

At the same time, Johnson's old division did not exist anymore, the remnants having been consolidated into Gordon's division.

As to Loring, he was apparently upset losing Polk's old corps to Stewart (a junior officer) and he or his supporters attempted to petition about this but it did not go anywhere.

 

[Coonewah Creek]

Desperate times may justify desperate measures.

Agreed...but "desperate" should not devolve into the realm of pure "fantasy!"

 

[novushomus]

Comparing 10 December returns.

Hood's army was 30,600 effectives on November 6, but that's before Columbia let alone Franklin. If you use Hood's November 6 strength you have to look for the matching value for Thomas, which isn't December 10 - and it's not Nashville strength.

The returns that report 30,600 does not include the recently arrived cavalry of Forrest's corps, which by Forrest's own report was around 3,000 effectives.