Hood

The returns that report 30,600 does not include the recently arrived cavalry of Forrest's corps, which by Forrest's own report was around 3,000 effectives.
That's fair, thank you for pointing it out - though the great majority of Forrest was not, in fact, at Nashville. It doesn't also make up for the Franklin casualties (and thus doesn't explain where the 30,000 number comes from).

I stand by my statement that at Nashville Hood was outnumbered a little more than 2:1.
 
The returns that report 30,600 does not include the recently arrived cavalry of Forrest's corps, which by Forrest's own report was around 3,000 effectives.
Speaking of Forrest, it reminds me that one of Hood's weaknesses was his apparent understanding of logistics at the army level. As an example, IIRC (I don't have the references in front of me at this moment), Hood had directed that the animals (mules and horses) assigned to each of the wagons in the army's trains be reduced from six to four (ostensibly to free up more animals so more wagons could be added to the army train). Forrest (for one) disregarded this order for his cavalry corps train.
 
There was an opening in S.D. Lee's corps in Thomas Hindman's old division. Hindman had been disabled after being blinded by a tree limb at Kennesaw. Hood felt that none of the brigadiers in the division were capable of leading it and brought in Brigadier General John Calvin Brown from Stevenson's division. Then, at Bragg's suggestion, Patton Anderson was brought in to permanently lead it. However, Anderson was wounded severely at Jonesborough. With Brown taking over Cheatham's old division, Hood needed another division commander.

At the same time, Johnson's old division did not exist anymore, the remnants having been consolidated into Gordon's division.

As to Loring, he was apparently upset losing Polk's old corps to Stewart (a junior officer) and he or his supporters attempted to petition about this but it did not go anywhere.
Good info Thanks; Loring was old army and a capable general, but just about disagreeable with all his commander's it seems.
 
Speaking of Forrest, it reminds me that one of Hood's weaknesses was his apparent understanding of logistics at the army level. As an example, IIRC (I don't have the references in front of me at this moment), Hood had directed that the animals (mules and horses) assigned to each of the wagons in the army's trains be reduced from six to four (ostensibly to free up more animals so more wagons could be added to the army train). Forrest (for one) disregarded this order for his cavalry corps train.
I am not an expert on pack animal's. My understanding is that a horse or mule will require at least 5 lps of grain and 5 lps of hay a day. If one reduces a pack train from six to four won't that increase the stain on the animal and increase the animal's chance of death or injury?
Not claiming to be an expert but it appears that logistics involving pack animals is difficult at best.
Leftyhunter
 
I am not an expert on pack animal's. My understanding is that a horse or mule will require at least 5 lps of grain and 5 lps of hay a day. If one reduces a pack train from six to four won't that increase the stain on the animal and increase the animal's chance of death or injury?
Not claiming to be an expert but it appears that logistics involving pack animals is difficult at best.
Leftyhunter
I'm no expert either, but that, I believe, is the gist of the argument against Hood's order.
 
I am not an expert on pack animal's. My understanding is that a horse or mule will require at least 5 lps of grain and 5 lps of hay a day. If one reduces a pack train from six to four won't that increase the stain on the animal and increase the animal's chance of death or injury?
Yes, at least if you don't reduce the size of the wagons (which in turn reduces the amount you can carry) or reduce your movement speed (which reduces your manoeuvre capability).

What Wellington did to increase his mobility was to switch entirely to pack animals, say, but I'm not sure that would work well in America - I suspect six horses pulling a wagon move more supplies than six pack horses. If it had increased his mobility enough to allow better manoeuvre, however, it might have been worth it, at least for a division.

With some hindsight, I'd have done this to Cleburne's division - being the only rifle-trained unit in the army it was much more capable than average of fighting independent actions, which would allow it to act as a more mobile and independent manoeuvre force.
 
Presumably the practice of using six animals per wagon was based on experience, so we do have to wonder how Hood thought he could arbitrarily change it. It's like putting smaller engines in trucks and expecting them to work just as well.

Hypothetically, if one were operating entirely in a region with a comprehensive network of good roads, the smaller teams might work, but that was hardly the case, probably never in the Civil War.
 
Presumably the practice of using six animals per wagon was based on experience, so we do have to wonder how Hood thought he could arbitrarily change it. It's like putting smaller engines in trucks and expecting them to work just as well.

Hypothetically, if one were operating entirely in a region with a comprehensive network of good roads, the smaller teams might work, but that was hardly the case, probably never in the Civil War.
In my younger days, I worked as a laborer for two summers putting a 36" dia. natural gas pipeline from below Spring Hill to well north of Columbia. That entire area has substantial hills. You wouldn't be doing those animals any favors by trying to keep the wagon load constant and reducing the "horsepower" to try to pull them in that territory.
 
My personal belief is he should have attempted to stay in front on Sherman. But if he had, who knows what Sherman may have done. He may not have attempted the March to the Sea at that time. Regardless, if he had, Hood could have lived off the land, been supplied from SC and NC, and picked up additional troops along the way from various garrisons, regiments that were in Ga., NC, and SC. Certainly would have been interesting to see what would have happened if Sherman was facing a strong force deep within enemy territory. It certainly would have been tougher for him than facing virtually no opposition in his vaunted march. Of course with Hood in front of him Sherman likely would have taken his entire force on the march in which Hood would have been greatly outnumbered, even with possibly picking up another 10-15k troops.
 
That's fair, thank you for pointing it out - though the great majority of Forrest was not, in fact, at Nashville. It doesn't also make up for the Franklin casualties (and thus doesn't explain where the 30,000 number comes from).

I stand by my statement that at Nashville Hood was outnumbered a little more than 2:1.

It was not my intention to challenge that assertion about Hood being outnumbered at Nashville, merely to point out that Hood's returns from before Franklin (the 30,600 effectives comes from November 6) do not include Forrest's corps.

For that matter, in addition to the detachment of most of Forrest to Murfreesboro, Palmer's and if I am recalling correctly, Mercer's brigades were detached to support Forrest after the collapse of Bate's division at 3rd Murfreesboro. Bate's division was recalled to the main army after that fiasco.
 
It was not my intention to challenge that assertion about Hood being outnumbered at Nashville, merely to point out that Hood's returns from before Franklin (the 30,600 effectives comes from November 6) do not include Forrest's corps.
That's fair, though in that case I have no idea where the "30,000 at Nashville" number comes from! It's not even "Hood's army on November 6 in Effectives".
 
We know Sherman preferred facing Johnston to facing Hood, but only because Hood was unpredictable. Sherman disliked pitched battles where it was a "roll of the dice" on the outcome. It should be noted that Grant's instructions were for Sherman to "knock Joe Johnston..." Sherman didn't really follow those instructions. Instead, he went after Atlanta. He thought he was performing his job as long as he could prevent the Army of Tennessee from providing any material support to Lee in Virginia. His role was secondary. Grant had the primary job of defeating the ANV.

"About 10 A.M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies were all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers brought me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta, and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the Confederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming the command. I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was his classmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character, etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant "fight." Notice of this important change was at once sent to all parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape. This was just what we wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlanta behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points. Therefore, we had to be constantly ready for sallies.


We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston.
Gen. Sherman

Kevin Dally
 
On the subject of the strength of the Army of Tennessee after Hood assumes command:

On August 31, 1864, Hood reported a strength of 43,467 effectives (fit and armed enlisted men on the firing line) out of 51,141 officers and men present for duty with an aggregate present (everyone on the rolls who wasn't permanently detached or deserted, even if sick or not fit for duty) strength of 65,804. On that day and the next, Hardee's and Lee's corps fought at the Battle of Jonesborough and lost around 2,000 effectives (though the casualties sustained were probably higher). After Atlanta was evacuated, Hood reorganized his army and with Davis's visit a number of changes and transfers were instituted.

The first of these was the transfer of Wheeler's cavalry corps, which had on August 31 reported an effective strength of 6,283 effective troopers and 350 effective artillerymen. Since they were not significantly engaged from that date, it is reasonable to assume that around this many effective cavalrymen went with Wheeler. So Hood loses 6,633 effectives in the transfer of Wheeler alone.

There are three other transfers of note. Alpheus Baker's brigade of Clayton's division was transferred to Mobile to bolster the garrison and to recruit following its losses at Atlanta. Though official numbers are not made available in the O.R., Clayton's division drops from 2,722 effectives to 2,179 effectives following the transfer, suggesting a probable loss of 543 effectives, of which probably 500 who went with Baker. In Walthall's division, Gholson's brigade under Col. John McGuirk, was also transferred out of the army, but the "brigade" of dismounted Mississippi Cavalry was so small that during the Battle of Ezra Church, Walthall had combined it with Youngblood's Battalion of Mechanics and even then the two did not number more than 500 effectives. As Gholson's brigade had originally been transferred from Mississippi to bolster the sagging numbers in Walthall's division, its presence and loss were negligible but still probably took some 250 effectives when they left Hood. The last transfer of note is the reserve artillery battalions of Martin's, Palmer's, Williams's, and Waddell's. Since the latter two did not file returns, getting an effective strength is very hard, since the effective strength of each artillery battalion in the Army of Tennessee varied, but it is probable no more than 800 effectives went to Georgia with the reserve artillery.

The rest are combat losses and desertions. The only significant battle for Hood's army between Atlanta and Spring Hill was Allatoona Pass, where French's division was repulsed with significant losses. Though Hood nor French specified casualties for this action, French's division dropped from 2,897 effectives to 1,999 effectives by the November 6 returns, which indicates that French lost in the neighborhood of 600 effectives or above in the attack.

Effective Strength: 43,467 – 2,000 (Jonesboro): 41,467 – 6,633 (Wheeler): 34,834 – 543 (Baker): 34,291 – 250 (McGuirk): 34,041 – 800 (Reserve Artillery): 33,241 – 800 (Allatoona Pass): 32,441 effectives.

So from battle casualties and transfers, Hood goes from an effective strength of 43,467 to 32,400. From there, is not hard to see where desertions, sickness, and detachment would further bring that number down to the 30,599 muskets he counted on November 6, (though he would be bolstered some-what by the arrival of Forrest's 3,000 effective sized cavalry corps).

Effective Strength lost through transfers: approximately 8,226 effectives.

Johnston's last report, a week before his relief, placed his effective strength at 50,932 on July 10. By the time Hood first reported, he had already fought at Peach Tree Creek, Bald Hill and Ezra Church. On July 31 he reported 44,495 effectives, or a loss of 6,437 effectives from July 10. However, his next report was a slight rise (the result of wounded men returning to the front, replacements, a strenuous effort to comb out not combat staff and detailed men for line duty, and conscripts being assigned) with 44,596 effectives. But by August 10 this number had slightly dropped again to 43,414 effectives, with that trend continuing through August.

The men present for duty tell a similar story:

Johnston left a week after reporting 59,196 men present for duty. After Hood's first three sorties, 51,793 men were present for duty, and 51,956 during the period where Hood briefly gained strength and declined to 51,157 by mid-August. When Atlanta fell Hood had approximately 51,141. When you subtract the numbers of present for duty in the transfers, they correlate with the strength lost according to effective strength (especially when considering Wheeler's corps, which numbered 8,283 present for duty alone) to account for the 35,662 officers and men present and fit for duty when Hood invaded Tennessee.

On November 6, Hood's army reported 30,599 effectives (35,662 present for duty. ) The only cavalry reported on this return is Jackson's division, which was seperate from Forrest's corps.


Forrest reported that he joined the Army of Tennessee at Florence on November 16 and 17. He notes Jackson's division at "about 2,000 men" and that his command made the total "5,000 cavalry." If we compare Forrest's statement to the returns it apparent that Forrest is referring to effective strength for Jackson's division and is not counting artillery.


So on or about November 17 the Army has about 33,000 or more effectives. If we convert this to present for duty using McMurray's method, it would give us about 39,000 present for duty in the weeks before Franklin.

Before going on to discuss Nashville, I would like to state the caveat that while I measure losses in effectives in this post, effectives do not represent the totality of losses in a battle. On the contrary, drummer boys, officers, staff, and even skirmishers were frequently not included in effective counts, yet were just as likely to become casualties in battle. This is why I generally prefer Present-for-Duty as a measure of army strength when possible, but given that several Confederate reports from this period do not use present-for-duty, this complicates matters.
 
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In my younger days, I worked as a laborer for two summers putting a 36" dia. natural gas pipeline from below Spring Hill to well north of Columbia. That entire area has substantial hills. You wouldn't be doing those animals any favors by trying to keep the wagon load constant and reducing the "horsepower" to try to pull them in that territory.

I've not seen the terrain (on my bucket list), but I'm aware of its hilly nature. Would there have been sufficient fodder in the countryside to make this work for animals in the fall of 1864? It's pretty rich farmland, no?
 
I've not seen the terrain (on my bucket list), but I'm aware of its hilly nature. Would there have been sufficient fodder in the countryside to make this work for animals in the fall of 1864? It's pretty rich farmland, no?
Well, Tennessee isn't the deep South, so while there would be pasture land along the way, I don't think you'd find much else to eat in late November. You'd have to employ some of your wagons to carry grain or else I don't think the animals would make out very well.
 
The confederacy was militarily and strategically bankrupt, after the loss of Atlanta ad the movement of the center of the war shifted to the East coast, with Sherman.

Without a significant increase in the sinews of the confederate war effort; men, equipment, supplies, transport, etc., even Lee, IMO,
would not have been to do better than Hood.

As noted by Sherman himself, he would take 60,000 men with him to the Sea and join Grant, while leaving more than enough men to handle the Army of the Tennessee ... and that was perfectly true and it would have been just as true, if Lee had been in command .

To paraphrase Lincoln, Who would have better than Hood? Most especially,, under the burden of the expectations of Davis, to turn the war around in the West, with the forces already available.

Othere might opt for anybody against Hood, but a responsible leader, I think, would want somebody, and the pinckin;s were very slim after the name of Hood.
 
This is a great post ya'll. I believe Hood was a fighter. "There in no reason to have an army in the field but for victory."
Johnston has been assailed by historians for always retreating. Tsun Tsu said "If you cannot defeat your opponent, it is next best to remain undefeated." Hood's "Victory or Death" or Johnston's "Remain Undefeated...RUN!" What a contrast! I don't know enough to make a judgment. I just like posting every once and a while to feel like I'm part of the group. :smile:
 

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