On the subject of the strength of the Army of Tennessee after Hood assumes command:
On August 31, 1864, Hood reported a strength of 43,467 effectives (fit and armed enlisted men on the firing line) out of 51,141 officers and men present for duty with an aggregate present (everyone on the rolls who wasn't permanently detached or deserted, even if sick or not fit for duty) strength of 65,804. On that day and the next, Hardee's and Lee's corps fought at the Battle of Jonesborough and lost around 2,000 effectives (though the casualties sustained were probably higher). After Atlanta was evacuated, Hood reorganized his army and with Davis's visit a number of changes and transfers were instituted.
The first of these was the transfer of Wheeler's cavalry corps, which had on August 31 reported an effective strength of 6,283 effective troopers and 350 effective artillerymen. Since they were not significantly engaged from that date, it is reasonable to assume that around this many effective cavalrymen went with Wheeler. So Hood loses 6,633 effectives in the transfer of Wheeler alone.
There are three other transfers of note. Alpheus Baker's brigade of Clayton's division was transferred to Mobile to bolster the garrison and to recruit following its losses at Atlanta. Though official numbers are not made available in the O.R., Clayton's division drops from 2,722 effectives to 2,179 effectives following the transfer, suggesting a probable loss of 543 effectives, of which probably 500 who went with Baker. In Walthall's division, Gholson's brigade under Col. John McGuirk, was also transferred out of the army, but the "brigade" of dismounted Mississippi Cavalry was so small that during the Battle of Ezra Church, Walthall had combined it with Youngblood's Battalion of Mechanics and even then the two did not number more than 500 effectives. As Gholson's brigade had originally been transferred from Mississippi to bolster the sagging numbers in Walthall's division, its presence and loss were negligible but still probably took some 250 effectives when they left Hood. The last transfer of note is the reserve artillery battalions of Martin's, Palmer's, Williams's, and Waddell's. Since the latter two did not file returns, getting an effective strength is very hard, since the effective strength of each artillery battalion in the Army of Tennessee varied, but it is probable no more than 800 effectives went to Georgia with the reserve artillery.
The rest are combat losses and desertions. The only significant battle for Hood's army between Atlanta and Spring Hill was Allatoona Pass, where French's division was repulsed with significant losses. Though Hood nor French specified casualties for this action, French's division dropped from 2,897 effectives to 1,999 effectives by the November 6 returns, which indicates that French lost in the neighborhood of 600 effectives or above in the attack.
Effective Strength: 43,467 – 2,000 (Jonesboro): 41,467 – 6,633 (Wheeler): 34,834 – 543 (Baker): 34,291 – 250 (McGuirk): 34,041 – 800 (Reserve Artillery): 33,241 – 800 (Allatoona Pass): 32,441 effectives.
So from battle casualties and transfers, Hood goes from an effective strength of 43,467 to 32,400. From there, is not hard to see where desertions, sickness, and detachment would further bring that number down to the 30,599 muskets he counted on November 6, (though he would be bolstered some-what by the arrival of Forrest's 3,000 effective sized cavalry corps).
Effective Strength lost through transfers: approximately 8,226 effectives.
Johnston's last report, a week before his relief, placed his effective strength at 50,932 on July 10. By the time Hood first reported, he had already fought at Peach Tree Creek, Bald Hill and Ezra Church. On July 31 he reported 44,495 effectives, or a loss of 6,437 effectives from July 10. However, his next report was a slight rise (the result of wounded men returning to the front, replacements, a strenuous effort to comb out not combat staff and detailed men for line duty, and conscripts being assigned) with 44,596 effectives. But by August 10 this number had slightly dropped again to 43,414 effectives, with that trend continuing through August.
The men present for duty tell a similar story:
Johnston left a week after reporting 59,196 men present for duty. After Hood's first three sorties, 51,793 men were present for duty, and 51,956 during the period where Hood briefly gained strength and declined to 51,157 by mid-August. When Atlanta fell Hood had approximately 51,141. When you subtract the numbers of present for duty in the transfers, they correlate with the strength lost according to effective strength (especially when considering Wheeler's corps, which numbered 8,283 present for duty alone) to account for the 35,662 officers and men present and fit for duty when Hood invaded Tennessee.
On November 6, Hood's army reported 30,599 effectives (35,662 present for duty. ) The only cavalry reported on this return is Jackson's division, which was seperate from Forrest's corps.
Forrest reported that he joined the Army of Tennessee at Florence on November 16 and 17. He notes Jackson's division at "about 2,000 men" and that his command made the total "5,000 cavalry." If we compare Forrest's statement to the returns it apparent that Forrest is referring to effective strength for Jackson's division and is not counting artillery.
So on or about November 17 the Army has about 33,000 or more effectives. If we convert this to present for duty using McMurray's method, it would give us about 39,000 present for duty in the weeks before Franklin.
Before going on to discuss Nashville, I would like to state the caveat that while I measure losses in effectives in this post, effectives do not represent the totality of losses in a battle. On the contrary, drummer boys, officers, staff, and even skirmishers were frequently not included in effective counts, yet were just as likely to become casualties in battle. This is why I generally prefer Present-for-Duty as a measure of army strength when possible, but given that several Confederate reports from this period do not use present-for-duty, this complicates matters.