The frustrating part is he totally ignored Gen. Forests suggestion to give him a brigade and move around the federal right. I think Hood in this instance was being petty and refused due to his dislike of Forest.
Forest knew the Franklin area very well as he and his men had spent much of the previous year there.
I don't think Hood was being petty here. There were serious problems with Forrest's proposal. There wasn't enough time before dark, and to be effective it would require more than a brigade. Wood's division (Fourth Army Corps) of more than 6,000 effectives was across the Harpeth and in position to respond to such a move, in addition to the Federal cavalry and Fort Granger. Forrest would need most of an infantry corps to be effective here, as Hood's largest division, Brown's, had only 4,000 effectives. The closest corps, Stewart's, had a little more than 8,000 effectives (one of his divisions, French, had just 1,400!*). In addition, the move would be observable, and the troop of Fourth Corps (which had largely crossed or were crossing the Harpeth) could react. Additionally, a successful flank march had been made the night before but the effort was bungled by a combination of the actions of every ranking officer present in Hood's army.
*French's division was normally consistent of three brigades, Ector's, Sears's Mississippi brigade, and Cockerill's famous Missouri brigade. Ector's brigade was detached with the army's pontoon equipment and trains. Even with Ector's brigade, French's division would have numbered only 1,900 effectives.