Absent Commanders

[Leah's Choice]

In Jeffrey Wert's book, Sword of Lincoln, on pages 106, 112 and 113, Mr. Wert indicates that George McClellan was not near the battlefields on several occasions when his army was engaged in battle.

Some things I've read put the general's practically in the thick of battle, and I'm thinking here specifically of Generals Lee and Grant. Particularly, with Grant, I've read passages about him riding through areas where balls were flying with no evident concern for his own safety.

I was reading this evening about the battle for Atlanta, and I'm not sure where Sherman was, but it seemed like Generals McPherson, Logan, Leggett and a few others were present either on or very near the field (McPherson fell in the part I was reading this evening).

I understand that a general's headquarters were not necessarily right in the thick of things, but I'm wondering, which were the "hands-on" commanding generals, and are there general officers who seemed to avoid the actual battlefields for one reason or another. Wert seemed to be suggesting that McClellan deliberately avoided areas where the shooting was being done.

And, to what extent was their presence needed, or were there certain commanders that the soldiers would have preferred would just go away and let them fight?

Thanks

 

[Elennsar]

Brigade and lower commanders were expected (by the men, not the rules) to lead from the front.

Division commanders sometimes did.

Beyond that, I think most stayed out of the immediate path of bullets, but several did not.

Hancock, for instance, and those you mentioned.

I'm not aware - other than "hoping General soandso isn't killed" - whose troops minded them being nearby.

Wish I could think of more, but that's all that is coming up.

McClellan was not even in the vicinity for several battles, and was out of effective reach to influence Antietam (as was Bragg at Chickamauga, I believe).

But that's a comment on tactics, not on leadership.

 

[Leah's Choice]

I'm not aware - other than "hoping General soandso isn't killed" - whose troops minded them being nearby.

Elennsar:

I recall reading (can't tell you where...and I don't remember which general this was about, but it may have been R.E. Lee), that at or near one battlefield, for some reason or another the general being spoken to didn't want to get on his horse. Seems to me he wasn't feeling well. One of the soldiers, very concerned for the general's safety and perhaps a little exasperated, said, "Will you just get on the g**d*** horse, General darlin'?" I don't recall for sure the darlin' general's reaction, but I think he got on the horse.

 

[ole]

There were different styles with each.

We might agree that some played it too close: witness A.S. Johnston. Some played it so far away from the action that there was a large gap in the communication.

Seems like the biggies were always close enough to direct action, but never so close as present more than a moderate risk to their HQ (hindquarters).

Ole

 

[Elennsar]

In The Killer Angels, Kilrain says that to Chamberlain, other than the fact Chamberlain is only a colonel - same message and all.

But I wouldn't say it couldn't have happened to a general. There were enough of them that I'm sure at least some had someone politely ask them to get on their d--- horse.

 

[Leah's Choice]

I've never read Killer Angels, but Chamberlain would have been my second choice on that remark, and perhaps more likely since he was wounded several times during the war.

 

[Elennsar]

If you've seen the movie Gettysburg (which is based on the book), it may be in there (I've seen it but can't remember).

If not..well, beats me. Its a good line.

 

[Leah's Choice]

There were different styles with each.

We might agree that some played it too close: witness A.S. Johnston. Some played it so far away from the action that there was a large gap in the communication.

Seems like the biggies were always close enough to direct action, but never so close as present more than a moderate risk to their HQ (hindquarters).

Ole

Ole:
I'm too tired (read "lazy") to look it up, but I think one of the battles Wert mentioned regarding McClellan's absence from the field, had to do with him being on a ship while the fighting was going on.

Oh well, I'm not that 'tired.' From page 113, Sword of Lincoln:

"McClellan conferred with Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin and oversaw the deployment of the units, before riding away with his staff. "Why he left was an enigma," stated one of Heintzelman's headquarters clerks. McClellan expected a Confederate assault -- "The roads will be full enough tomorrow," as he predicted the day before -- and still he fled from another battlefield. It was, as historian Hubbell declared, an "inexplicable and inexcusable" decision. McClellan went to Haxall's Landingon on the James, where he boarded the gunboat Galena and had dinner, while at Glendale, his army struggled for its survival."

It was from reading this some months ago that I began to wonder if McClellan's constant excuses for not going into battle, were less that he really thought Lee's army was bigger than his own, than that he was a bit cowardly. It also made me wonder why the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac liked him so much. A couple of years later they "hurrahed" when Grant turned them toward Lee's army after some pretty brutal fighting, instead of heading in the other direction.

 

[ole]

McClellan was one that carried "executive separation" to an extreme. I wouldn't go so far as to say that "he fled the scene," but that might be really close.

There were better commanders that realized that they really ought to be close enough to the battle to read it and to make what changes might be necessary.

It might be that Sid Johnston and Reynolds absolutely had to be where they were killed. I'll give Reynolds more reason than Sid Johnston. (Johnston had no business leading a brigade from the front. Reynolds' action might have been more justified.)

Given that Shiloh was early in the war and I don't know where the Confederate Commanders were, the Union Commanders were up close and personal with the action. Not too close, but close enough to see what was happening.

Ole

 

[cash]

Elennsar:

I recall reading (can't tell you where...and I don't remember which general this was about, but it may have been R.E. Lee), that at or near one battlefield, for some reason or another the general being spoken to didn't want to get on his horse. Seems to me he wasn't feeling well. One of the soldiers, very concerned for the general's safety and perhaps a little exasperated, said, "Will you just get on the g**d*** horse, General darlin'?" I don't recall for sure the darlin' general's reaction, but I think he got on the horse.

Leah, I think you're talking about the movie, "Gettysburg" with Buster Kilraine telling "Colonel Darlin'" Chamberlain to ride his horse.

Regards,
Cash

 

[cash]

There are two famous "Lee to the rear" episodes, the most famous being at Spotsylvania. Lee was so excited he was going to lead a charge personally. The men grabbed Traveler's reins and turned him around, saying, "Lee to the rear!" They told Lee to stay behind and they would make the charge without him.

Regards,
Cash

 

[cash]

McClellan was one that carried "executive separation" to an extreme. I wouldn't go so far as to say that "he fled the scene," but that might be really close.

There were better commanders that realized that they really ought to be close enough to the battle to read it and to make what changes might be necessary.

It might be that Sid Johnston and Reynolds absolutely had to be where they were killed. I'll give Reynolds more reason than Sid Johnston. (Johnston had no business leading a brigade from the front. Reynolds' action might have been more justified.)

Given that Shiloh was early in the war and I don't know where the Confederate Commanders were, the Union Commanders were up close and personal with the action. Not too close, but close enough to see what was happening.

Ole

Well, Sidney Johnston was one of those confederate commanders at Shiloh, and we know where he was, leading a charge from the front.

Regards,
Cash

 

[matthew mckeon]

In John Keegan's "Mask of Command," he lists four military commanders, Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, U.S. Grant and Adolf Hitler. One of the issues he examines for each is how much personal danger were they in, during battle. The question isn't a moral one, its a question of balancing the risk of getting hit and your strategy stalling, keeping all aspects of the battle in mind, including the ones outside your immediate sight, without losing contact with the realities of the fighting.

 

[matthew mckeon]

Culturally, Alexander had to lead from the front, putting himself at the head of his household troops and plunging into the thick of the hand to hand combat. His battleplan had to be made before the armies were joined, because he really exerted no influence after it started.

Wellington had an extremely personal style of command, personally riding to his officers and giving orders, going to where the fighting was heaviest, moving constantly around the field. He called it "taking trouble" with his battles, and Waterloo was the "most trouble I had even taken." He never personally led charges or commanded subunits, but was often present and underfire. After Waterloo, many of the survivors could remember Wellington being present at some point.

U.S. Grant's battlefields were geographically larger than Wellington, and the weapons longer ranged. As army commander, Grant was under fire on a few occasions, but not as a policy. He relied more than Wellington on his staff officers and sub commanders to carry out his will.

Keegan called Alexander's style "heroic" and Wellington and Grant's style "anti heroic."

 

[matthew mckeon]

Hitler, who never approached the battlefield, relied on a barrage of propaganda to convince his soldiers he understood their needs and shared their hardships. Keegan refers to this as "false heroic." Hitler thought he could command from hundreds of miles away because of advances in communications technology.

 

[matthew mckeon]

McClellan strikes me as the antithesis of many CW generals in that he didn't "march to the sound of the guns" Lee, Grant and a host of lesser commanders instinctively moved to the heaviest fighting. At Seven Days, McClellan actually physically moved away from the fighting and left his corps commanders to run the show.

 

[K Hale]

Yeah, I think there's no need to hesitate to use the phrase "fled the scene" when it comes to McClellan at the Seven Days.

I think the AotP loved McClellan because he's the one who first got them organized into an army (as opposed to the mob at 1st Manassas). And he was such a good cheerleader for them. He issued one address where I think his words were, "You know your commanding general loves you as a parent loves his children." And he really looked the part of a commanding general. He just couldn't act it.

Strangely, though, they never seemed to catch on, even after defeat after defeat.

 

[matthew mckeon]

McClellan only commanded at Seven Days and Antietam. The big disasters: 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, were under other leaders. Who Mac's record is one defeat and one draw.

 

[K Hale]

True, I guess it's more of a failure to do anything than a failure at doing something.

 

[Elennsar]

The problem is that he should have won the Seven Days Campaign. His army beat Lee's tactically everywhere except Gaines' Mill.

McClellan had the option of winning that campaign, and he chose to turn tail.

That's a pretty big failure.