I have read much on battles which almost always have narrative at a relatively high level. The narration states General ordered some movement, requested support, etc. but I have found nothing that details how those communications were actually made. Does anyone have knowledge of how communications were executed during a major battle or any good references?
As an example: At Shiloh Beauregard managed the battle from rear the first day from his headquarters or command post. He would need to stay abreast of the action across front, make decisions, generate orders, etc. How extensive was his headquarters staff and how was it organized? Was there a pool of couriers who were standing by to carry messages and how large would that pool be? Did General have a primary staff who was responsible for writing out message and assigning to a courier? For incoming couriers, was there a staffer who triaged and screened messages?
I guess I'm trying to understand mechanics and the number of personnel required just for the communications. I would assume that had to be similar to modern Incident Command Posts where various functions are divided out and issues addressed at lowest level but elevated as required.
Given the size of Shiloh battlefield, I would think communications were primarily by couriers on horseback. I would think there were quite a few soldiers tied up in courier duties. If the message was significant enough, did they ever send multiple couriers to make sure message was not lost?
Did the commands in the field have their own staff performing command post duties and their own couriers?
Were the messages verbal or written on paper?
Sorry about the multiple questions but I wanted to try to give a feel for the level of detail I looking at. Without an effective communication network there can be no control and everything I have read addresses the command and control but never covers the associated communications that made it happen.
You have picked the wrong battle for CSA command & control.
Beauregard's battle deployment made effective command & control impossible.
The tactical objective was to force Grant's left away from the Tennessee River landing. Forrest & other commanders on Beauregard's right did not receive orders to attack. They eventually did so on their own responsibility.
An example of effective communication leading to effective command & control occurred on June 23, 1863, the first day of the Tullahoma Campaign.
A week earlier, a fullly worked up Beardslee Repeating Telegram column arrived at Army of the Cumberland's HQ in Murfreesboro TN.
Unlike the Telegraph, which required 10 volt wet cell batteries, Beardslees utilized a magneto to generate electricity.
The Beardslee was a system. The dedicated wagons held miles of wire on spools. Oak poles with an iron spike on one end & a hook on the other facilitated stringing the single wire.
Rosecran's plan was to sweep around Bragg's right.
As this illustration of Eli Lilly's battery, attached to Wilder's Brigade, indicates, a 500 year rain event (TVA) turned roads into quagmires & every creek into a raging torrent. The struggle up to the Highland Plateau from Bradyville reduced Palmer's advance to a crawl.
In a typical example of the entrepreneurial spirit of the Army of the Cumberland, Col. Wilder had mounted his infantry & equipped his men with seven shot Spencer repeating rifles. Lilly's six 3" rifles & a battery of 12 pound mountain howitzers were attached. Lilly ammunition boxes were repacked, replacing long range rounds with canister.
Where I-24 cuts up to the Highland Plateau today is Hoover's Gap. General Thomas expected forcing the gap would take tow days & cost 2,000 casualties. Wilder blitzed the gap, with each of his 2,000 wielding three times the firepower of Confederate General Bate's men who made repeated attempts to sweep what they thought was dismounted cavalry aside.
Behind that opening in the Rutherford County courthouse clock tower were very large telescopes facing east & west. Signal men stood on the platform to send flag & torches signals along a 45 mile east west along Rosecrans' front facing the Army of Tennessee. The unprecedented rain event shut the visual signal network down.
When Thomas received the report that Wilder had broke through Hoover's Gap & held it open, he contacted Rosecrans. The long, carefully planned sweep around Bragg's right was stalled. A golden opportunity to breakthrough the center demanded a redirection.
The Beardslee operators had established a line made up of five mile nodes. In the dark, in a sterling example of Col. Boyde's OODA Circle of decisive tactical decision making, Rosecrans redirected the entire eastern flank. Orders were written & communicated overnight. Thomas' corps poured through Bragg's center… incredibly, it was 48 hours before Bragg was aware that his entire right flank had been turned.
The Army of Tennessee's forty mile wide front was anchored by the elaborate fortifications at Tullahoma TN. His plan was to force Rosecrans to beat his army bloody attempting breach the miles of elaborate earthworks guarding the Army of Tennessee's reserve supply depot.
In Bragg's rear was the intimidating mass of Monteagel Mountain. Blasted through the mountain in the 1840's by gangs of highly skilled slaves, the Cumberland Mountain Tunnel is still the single track link between Nashville and Chattanooga. The Lightening Brigade burning warehouses at the northern end of the tunnel was the smoke signal that alerted Bragg to the peril of being completely cut off. It was only the knee deep mud that allowed him to win the race for the Tennessee River.
On July 4th the Army of the Cumberland made the laborious climb to the top of Monteagle Mountain & through the 2,000 foot long RR tunnel. The riches of hogs, corn & remounts in Middle Tennessee & connection to Louisville KY were secured with the loss of 550 men. It was the Beardslee Repeating Telegraph units & the realtime communication of intel & orders that made it all possible.
On July 23, 1863 General Stanley, commander of the A of the C's cavalry, ordered a concentration at Rover.
Today, you can enjoy a country ham, red eye gravy & biscuits breakfast at the Fried Tater restaurant in the original Rover post office / country store. You would probably use Google or the nav system in the car to find your way.
This is General Polk's map of the Army of Tennessee front in Middle Tennessee June 1863. Both Polk, who commanded the western area, & army Commander Bragg's HQ's were in Shelbyville. Along the top edge of the map is the A of the C's line spanning 50 miles from east to west. One of the smudges with a flag on the upper left edge marks The Works at Triune.
This formidable three miles of "rifle pits" surmount a ridge that dominates the skyline. The highest point, where the magazine is, marks a stone faced star shaped bastion.
The Triune Ridge looking west from a high point in Murfreesboro.
Pilot Knob, adjacent to Readyville can be seen on the eastern horizon, 8 miles from the Courthouse Signal Station & 25 miles from Triune.
24 / 7 signalists had thousands of square miles under observation. On cold, clear nights torch signals could be sent &…
received across the 41 miles between Fort Transit Station to Fort Negley station in Nashville.
If you look carefully, the improbable tree house signal station can be seen to the left of the Fort Negley Flag.
I have no idea why this posts sideways. Unlike General Polk's map that was had drawn, dark age monk fashion, by an Irish civil engineer. There was only one of them. "Rover" is nowhere on Polk's map… nor is little else.
Contrast that with Map #1 of Shelbyville & Vicinity lithographed in volume for issue to General Stanley / his cavalry commander / General Grainer who commanded the 10,000 Reserve Corps that manned the Works at Triune & subordinate commanders.
In Rosecrans' elaborate plan that involved a front (+/-) 80 road miles wide, the advance on Shelbyville was a feint. It was exactly what Bragg was supposed to anticipate. A tissue of outright lies spread by word of mouth, news papers & empty camps fooled even the mighty Forrest. Orders for Stanley & Grainer to mass their forces in the early morning of July 23 at the crossroads where the Rover store still stands.
There is no way to exaggerate how existential the A of the C's topographical office was to the success of the Tullahoma Campaign & Sherman's army group all the way to Atlanta, Savannah, across the Carolinas & on to the Grand Review in Washington.
Bringing the