C3 Command, Control, Communications: Communications During Major Battles, How did that work?

[dfostermem]

I have read much on battles which almost always have narrative at a relatively high level. The narration states General ordered some movement, requested support, etc. but I have found nothing that details how those communications were actually made. Does anyone have knowledge of how communications were executed during a major battle or any good references?

As an example: At Shiloh Beauregard managed the battle from rear the first day from his headquarters or command post. He would need to stay abreast of the action across front, make decisions, generate orders, etc. How extensive was his headquarters staff and how was it organized? Was there a pool of couriers who were standing by to carry messages and how large would that pool be? Did General have a primary staff who was responsible for writing out message and assigning to a courier? For incoming couriers, was there a staffer who triaged and screened messages?

I guess I'm trying to understand mechanics and the number of personnel required just for the communications. I would assume that had to be similar to modern Incident Command Posts where various functions are divided out and issues addressed at lowest level but elevated as required.

Given the size of Shiloh battlefield, I would think communications were primarily by couriers on horseback. I would think there were quite a few soldiers tied up in courier duties. If the message was significant enough, did they ever send multiple couriers to make sure message was not lost?

Did the commands in the field have their own staff performing command post duties and their own couriers?

Were the messages verbal or written on paper?

Sorry about the multiple questions but I wanted to try to give a feel for the level of detail I looking at. Without an effective communication network there can be no control and everything I have read addresses the command and control but never covers the associated communications that made it happen.

 

[wausaubob]

There were some successes. But I think there colossal failures. Without an expeditious method of communication, there was no way for Wood to tell Rosecrans at Chickamauga, with all due respect general, there is no gap. And the order that was delivered did not make compliance contingent on the gap that was suspected being really there.
Was Gettysburg a communication failure? Could the Confederates have reduced their casualties if there had a means to recall the third day offensive?
I believe at the Battle of the Crater Grant had to go forward to the front to see what was happening and recall the divisions. He couldn't rely on Burnside or the division commanders,

 

[dfostermem]

There were some successes. But I think there colossal failures. Without an expeditious method of communication, there was no way for Wood to tell Rosecrans at Chickamauga, with all due respect general, there is no gap. And the order that was delivered did not make compliance contingent on the gap that was suspected being really there.
Was Gettysburg a communication failure? Could the Confederates have reduced their casualties if there had a means to recall the third day offensive?
I believe at the Battle of the Crater Grant had to go forward to the front to see what was happening and recall the divisions. He couldn't rely on Burnside or the

Trying to quantify effectiveness of communications is probably impossible. Its hard enough to document what they did right and too many potential possibilities of what wasn't done. Even if the message was carried, there is always the potential of it being ignored or misunderstood.

My primary goal is trying to understand the mechanics associated with the process, how it was organized and planned in advance, and getting a feel for the various roles of soldiers. In today's military with radios and electronic comms, its hard to appreciate what it would have been like when communications depended on a man and a horse.

 

[wausaubob]

The army commander could decide whether there was going to be a battle, and where that battle could take place. No one has demonstrated that the commander had much control once the shooting started.

 

[Grim Sentinels Research]

"Field telegraph station"
DigitalCommonwealth.org: https://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth:z029tz90h

"Title (alt.):Wilcox's Landing, Va. (vicinity of Charles City Court House) 1864. Field telegraph station"

"Description: From "War Memories" catalog: It was often necessary to establish a telegraph service between different points in our lines very hurriedly. This view shows one of the characteristic field telegraph stations. An old piece of canvas stretched over some rails forms the telegrapher's office, and a "hard-tack" box is his telegraph table; but from such a rude station messages were often sent which involved the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers."

 

[Rhea Cole]

Signals were a potentially powerful tactical tool. When U.S. signalists or telegraphers knew that the other side was listening in they used old compromised codes to spread 'chicken feed.'

An out of date message it self or appropriately modified would be transmitted in view / hearing of the opposition. Mixed in with current traffic, the bogus messages caused confusion or sewed doubt about the legitimacy of the real messages.

Visual signal teams could be powerful tactically. The Little Round Top signalists that caused Longstreet so much anxiety were spoofing. A station of observation, their flags were visible for miles across the battlefield.

Most of the time, the vigerous waving of the large flag on a 12 foot pole was signaling, "Look at me! I can see you! Peek-a-boo!" or other such nonsense into thin air. Critically, it was that signal team that brought Chamberlin to Little Round Top. They paid a high price for their bravery.

You might think that signal duty would have been pretty cushy. No regular drills; on your own in mounted six man teams; up high above the fighting… as at Gettysburg, signalists suffered ten KIA / wounded in action. There is a certain, "Here I am, please shoot the bullets this way why don't ya!" Thing about waving a flag in plain sight during a battle.

Note: I can attest personally that waving a 6' X 6' flag on a 12' pole as at Alatoona is a very vigorous activity. On a gusty day it is physically impossible. Flagmen developed some impressive arms & shoulders.

Intercepts, ( "contrabands" ) were a direct look at what the opposition was thinking & planning to do. For reasons I cannot explain, during the Atlanta Campaign, Army of Tennessee Signal Service security was extremely lax.

For example, the Kennesaw Mountain Station was visible from anywhere in a vast swath of territory. The lax signal discipline & poor quality cyphers meant that all the messages received & sent from Johnston's HQ were in a neat stack for Sherman to read as he ate supper.

A team consisting of Captain Cole & Lieutenant Floot were gifted code crackers. When the A of TN code was changed, due to their genius, a copy was often distributed overnight.

The contraband announcing General Polk's death, "Send a wagon for General Polk." "Has a wagon come for General Polk?" was how Sherman learned of the bishop general's death.

For a gold standard example of just how effective signal stations of observation were, General Lee was so concerned about the signal teams operating in his rear ordered cavalry to find them. A team that had observed Pickett's charge from above Lee's HQ was captured by J.E.B Stewart himself.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Signals were a potentially powerful tactical tool. When U.S. signalists or telegraphers knew that the other side was listening in they used old compromised codes to spread 'chicken feed.'

An out of date message it self or appropriately modified would be transmitted in view / hearing of the opposition. Mixed in with current traffic, the bogus messages caused confusion or sewed doubt about the legitimacy of the real messages.

Visual signal teams could be powerful tactically. The Little Round Top signalists that caused Longstreet so much anxiety were spoofing. A station of observation, their flags were visible for miles across the battlefield.

Most of the time, the vigerous waving of the large flag on a 12 foot pole was signaling, "Look at me! I can see you! Peek-a-boo!" or other such nonsense into thin air. Critically, it was that signal team that brought Chamberlin to Little Round Top. They paid a high price for their bravery.

You might think that signal duty would have been pretty cushy. No regular drills; on your own in mounted six man teams; up high above the fighting… as at Gettysburg, signalists suffered ten KIA / wounded in action. There is a certain, "Here I am, please shoot the bullets this way why don't ya!" Thing about waving a flag in plain sight during a battle.

View attachment 574906
Note: I can attest personally that waving a 6' X 6' flag on a 12' pole as at Alatoona is a very vigorous activity. On a gusty day it is physically impossible. Flagmen developed some impressive arms & shoulders.

Intercepts, ( "contrabands" ) were a direct look at what the opposition was thinking & planning to do. For reasons I cannot explain, during the Atlanta Campaign, Army of Tennessee Signal Service security was extremely lax.

For example, the Kennesaw Mountain Station was visible from anywhere in a vast swath of territory. The lax signal discipline & poor quality cyphers meant that all the messages received & sent from Johnston's HQ were in a neat stack for Sherman to read as he ate supper.

A team consisting of Captain Cole & Lieutenant Floot were gifted code crackers. When the A of TN code was changed, due to their genius, a copy was often distributed overnight.

The contraband announcing General Polk's death, "Send a wagon for General Polk." "Has a wagon come for General Polk?" was how Sherman learned of the bishop general's death.

For a gold standard example of just how effective signal stations of observation were, General Lee was so concerned about the signal teams operating in his rear ordered cavalry to find them. A team that had observed Pickett's charge from above Lee's HQ was captured by J.E.B Stewart himself.

Really good summary and observations @Rhea Cole.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Really good summary and observations @Rhea Cole.

Thanks. The more I dig into Civil War Signals, the more fascinating it gets.